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ABSTRACT 
The Quasi-Sovereign People: Public Opinion and the Challenges Facing Deliberative 
Democracy 
by 
William Bryce Bensley 
 
Deliberative democracy has become the dominant framework for theorizing the political 
relationship between citizens and the state. In particular, many have turned to this conception 
of democratic politics in debating the proper role that public opinion should play in the broad 
scope of politics, while also comparing these aspirations to empirical democratic realities. 
This dissertation considers and challenges optimistic accounts of the place for deliberative 
public opinion in contemporary democratic politics. The argument which emerges alleges 
that deliberative theorists have failed in defending the theory from critiques of inconsistency 
and/or incoherence. In preparing the critique, I first locate deliberative democracy within the 
historical outlines of political theory more generally. I then describe generational statements 
of the theory and accompanying critiques, drawing upon empirical literature which provides 
a sobering portrait of the inefficacy of the average (non-deliberative) citizen. The upshot of 
the discussion suggests that the twin goals of obtaining a ‘deliberative’ and ‘democratic’ 
political culture confront dim prospects. I draw upon recent debates revolving around the 
‘Systemic Turn’ to suggest that deliberative democracy risks running its course as a useful 
theory of political life. I conclude by considering whether deliberative democracy can be 
salvaged as a regulatory ideal as it becomes married to political realism, given changing 
political contexts and socio-political malleability.  
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Chapter 1: Public Opinion and Popular 
Sovereignty in Democratic Theory and 
American Politics 
 
The Intrigue of Public Opinion in Theory and Practice 
In both normative theory and applied empirical research, ‘public opinion’ has stubbornly 
eluded conceptualization and precise measurement.  Although there may be a slight minority 
who continue to proclaim that “public opinion does not exist,” most recognize there to be 
some legitimizing role for public opinion within the context of democratic representation.1  
Indeed, to disavow the importance of public opinion appears to undercut many of the central 
presumptions widely shared by students of democratic theory.  Nevertheless, at least since 
the 18th Century, public opinion has been a central topic of political controversy and remains 
an ‘essentially contested’ concept.2  Genealogically tied to the aspirations and tensions of 
Enlightenment thought, it served as a form of political consciousness to challenge the 
uncontested reign of the absolute state.  Jürgen Habermas writes that public opinion 
“articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and ultimately came to 
assert itself as the only legitimate source of law.”3  How public opinion is realized as a source 
of legitimacy for liberal-democracies, however, remains a difficult question to answer. 
At first it might seem obvious that the obscurities of this conceptual black-box have 
to do with its composite parts: “public” and “opinion.”4  The former might be taken to refer 
                                                             
1 Bourdieu 1979. 
2 Gallie 1956. 
3 Habermas 1989, 54. 
4As Robert Binkley (1928, 389) put it, “Here is one entity: an opinion; there is another: a public.”  
 2 
to a social category, or collectivity, which appears as an actor or subject in relation to a type 
of activity or project directed towards important social issues.  In adjectival form, as 
‘publicness,’ it might refer to the nature or character of an activity or social space.  In its role 
as ‘publicity,’ it might be said to refer to a moral principle or civil right, serving as a key 
foundation for public opinion and popular sovereignty.   As a social space, the ‘public 
sphere’ may refer to a specific arena, domain or locus (real or imaginary) of social life and 
occupying a ground between the state and society.  It is often viewed as the literal or 
figurative stage for social contestation and integration vis-à-vis public discourse or a market 
of opinion. 
‘Public opinion’ might then be conceived as a linkage of the preceding four elements 
while adding a fifth, i.e. opinion.  While the question of what constitutes a/the ‘public’ is 
difficult to pin down, to say the least, the role of ‘opinion’ in its operative role is at least 
equally important for many of the age-old questions in political theory.  Following Plato, 
‘opinion’ might be said to regard that which is but could also not be (that which is uncertain, 
contingent and susceptible to change).  ‘Knowledge’ on the other hand regards that which 
certainly and necessarily is (the unchanging, eternal).5  For Kant, opinion represents an 
insufficient form, both objectively and subjectively, of ‘holding for true’ and can therefore be 
contrasted with believing and knowing.6  Ferdinand Tőnnies, one of the first to directly take 
up the question of what it means for the public to have an opinion, follows Kant's lead and 
describes opinion and thinking as existing in a threefold relationship to wishing, wanting and 
feelings in general.7  
                                                             
5 See Republic 477a-478a. 
6 Kant 1996, 686. 
7 Tőnnies 1922, 117. 
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It should come as no surprise that evaluations of public opinion are intimately 
connected to the tensions between popularly-driven and elite-driven systems of political 
representation.8  If the people are said to rule in some sense, there is usually a premium 
placed on their cognitive capacity or a reliable attention span at the very least.  If not to 
decide policy themselves, the citizenry should be able to serve in an evaluative, monitorial, 
and/or potentially retributive role with respect to political representatives.9  At least since 
Philip Converse’s work on the belief systems of mass publics, however, scholarship has 
become attentive to the precariousness of opinion-formation processes.  Research finding that 
the vast majority of Americans is ignorant, indifferent, and characterized by holding 
“nonattitudes” has inspired an enormous body of literature and made clear the importance of 
reexamining the psychological underpinnings of opinion.10  In general, those who study the 
origins and reliability of opinion now have a much greater appreciation for its affective 
characteristics.11  There remains much to be studied, however, with regards to the underlying 
roles of emotion and motivation in the formation of values, preferences, and ideological 
attachments. 
Of course, debates on the nature and current status of public opinion depend on the 
work we expect it do in our contemporary democratic context.  As I will attempt to show, the 
ideal of the opinion of the public as a conveyed declaration of the collective’s ‘will’ 
                                                             
8 As will be shown below, the former does not necessarily refer to ‘direct democracy,’ but may admit of 
mediation and the propriety of unequal roles in the political process. 
9  Schudson (1999, 21) describes expectations of the ‘monitorial citizen’ not to involve knowledge of all the 
issues all of the time, but instead, "that they should be informed enough and alert enough to identify danger to 
their personal good and danger to the public good. When such danger appears on the horizon, they should have 
the resources—in trusted relationships, in political parties and elected officials, in relationships to interest 
groups and other trustees of their concerns, in knowledge of and access to the courts as well as the electoral 
system, and in relevant information sources to jump into the political fray and make a lot of noise.” See too 
Schudson 1998; Pettit 1997; Fiorina 1981.   
10  Converse 1964; 1970. 
11 Marcus and Neuman 2000. 
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continues to implicitly guide much theoretical and empirical research.  The idealization of the 
informed, engaged and sophisticated citizen retains a strong grip on the democratic 
imagination.  Those who decry deficits in the democratic process usually are often guided by 
such expectations, envisioning a functioning political system as a transmission-belt or 
hydraulic model meant to transform the people’s wishes into policy.  Without such 
responsiveness, many conclude that, “democratic theory loses its starting point.”12  Rather 
than bemoaning supposed shortcomings, this dissertation attempts to reassess the 
identification of the public’s opinions as the bedrock of the democratic process.  To this aim, 
I urge a reconsideration of the ambitions of democratic theory in terms of the mediated 
relationship of the citizen to the state. 
My project is centrally interested in the question of whether public opinion depends 
on the formative practices of deliberative discourse.  I critically analyze the starting point of 
deliberative theory and its claim that “the principle of popular sovereignty states that all 
political power derives from the communicative power of citizens.”13  At first glance, the 
desirability of deliberative goals and supposed benefits are difficult to refute: a nearly-
universal inclusion of all interested parties in the process of policy-formation, epistemic 
clarification of contentious political ideas, positions and priorities, a more civil exchange 
between interested citizens, and the legitimation of democratic representation in which 
distortive or corruptive influences are found out and jettisoned.  Especially since the 1990s, 
the allure and feasibility of democratic models centered on deliberation has been the subject 
of intense controversy.  Drawing upon Jürgen Habermas and reflecting on the motivations of 
developments in his thought, I push for a reconceptualization of deliberation in coming to 
                                                             
12 Achen 1975. 
13 Habermas 1996, 170. 
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grips with the practical function and limitations of public opinion today.  A renewed 
appreciation of deliberation cannot be achieved without taking into account the important 
implications of empirical work on public opinion, including topics on social-psychology, 
mass media and polling, opinion and policymaking.   In particular, I urge deliberativists to 
take seriously the insights from realist theory by attending to the disproportionality of elite 
influence (especially in terms of partisan attachment), the inseparability of strategic and 
communicative action, and the contingency of political interest and motivation (both 
requisite for deliberation) upon the socio-political environment.  Some have come close to 
treating deliberation as messianic, a silver bullet, or cure-all for the multiple symptoms of our 
anemic political life.  These optimists seem gripped by the Deweyan dictum, “The cure for 
the ailments of democracy is more democracy.”14  Reviving a communicative conception of 
political legitimation in face of the real terms of politics does not preclude viewing popular 
sovereignty as the wellspring of a legitimate democratic system.  It does require, however, 
that we address the nondeliberative realities that characterize American politics today. 
 In the chapters that follow, I take up Habermas’ call to bring theory and empirical 
research together.  In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I overview the relationship 
of public opinion to popular sovereignty in political theory; most notably in deliberative 
democratic theory.  I then reflect on debates regarding the origins and operations of public 
opinion in American politics.  In chapter two, I discuss the ways in which the polling 
enterprise attempts to bolster popular sovereignty through the democratic measurement of the 
people’s ‘voice.’  Though noble in its broad intentions, I argue that the industry has had 
deleterious effects in terms of narrowing our conceptions of ‘public opinion.’  I draw upon 
sociological critiques to highlight deliberative objections against equating the poll with 
                                                             
14 Dewey 1927, 327. 
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public opinion in order to indicate the practical and theoretical consequences of this 
practice’s ubiquity.  In the third chapter, I overview the progression of deliberative theory 
across three turns or eras.  Starting with Habermas as a founder and catalyst for the 
‘deliberative turn,’ I reflect upon the attempted implementation of deliberative practices and 
controversies over deliberative principles that have ensued over the last couple decades.  I 
posit that the latest ‘systemic turn,’ while sensitive to the empirical difficulties facing 
deliberation, might signal the dissolution of the theory’s critical and transformative potential.   
 Chapters four and five take up deeper issues confronting deliberation as a way of 
conceptualizing politics in a normative key.  In the fourth chapter, I discuss Habermas’ 
notions of ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ and how their decoupling represents a challenge for the 
reconstruction of solidarity in posttraditional society.  I critically analyze the prospects for 
‘constitutional patriotism’ as an attempt to reconceptualize obligations of citizenship in an 
age of disenchantment.  Noting the difficulties of directing allegiance to constitutional 
principles, I consider the value of socialized distrust, vigilance, and extrainstitutional 
allegiances insofar as they make possible public opinion’s operation as a ‘siege’ upon the 
political system.  The fifth chapter reflects upon the consequences of hyper-partisanship, 
polarization, and the rise of populist politics as a result of societal disintegration and 
widespread disillusionment with politics as usual.  I incorporate a discussion of the 
philosophical treatment of rhetoric (both classical and modern) and political symbology to 
make the case that relevant divides in the public are socially-driven rather than strictly 
ideological in nature.  This has led to a politics routinely characterized by spectacle, in which 
Trump as a populist has proven himself an adept performer of crisis.  I make the case that 
underestimating the potency of populist appeals reflects upon the shortcomings of 
 7 
deliberative democratic theory, which continues to struggle in finding a place for public 
reason in the context of post-truth. 
 The final chapter, rather than attempting to summarize or resolve the foregoing 
points, argues that deliberative theory and the realist tradition bear certain affinities and 
would mutually profit from collaboration.  Drawing upon ‘realist’ tendency in Habermas’ 
work, I make the case that deliberation need not be seen as sharing the same pitfalls of ‘ideal 
theory,’ which attempts to moralize politics according to given ideals (e.g. consensus).  Both 
share an interest in the grounds of legitimacy, which is a key focus in my consideration of 
popular sovereignty in mass politics.  Nevertheless, I do not attempt a neat reconciliation of 
deliberative goals and nondeliberative realties.  Deliberative theory can only gain purchase if 
it comes to grips with the entrenched problems of American politics, be they economic, 
social-cultural, political, or ideological in nature.  ‘Getting real’ with regard to the 
structuration and social reification of these trends dictates that we revisit our estimation of 
the radically-democratic potential of political life.  Whilst considering ways in which 
dispositions for and practices of critical citizenship might be encultured, I also point out that 
the dynamic intersectionality of the problems we face entail the public’s status as quasi-
sovereign. 
 
Public Opinion’s Philosophical Significance  
 
I will not attempt here a comprehensive overview of the intellectual history of ‘public 
opinion,’ but it is safe to say that many canonical figures in political theory regard this 
phenomenon with a great deal of wariness if not disdain.  Tocqueville, an ambiguous admirer 
of the American republic, was deeply- concerned with equalizing tendencies that threatened 
to level social conditions.  He posited that public opinion acted as an intrusive weight upon 
 8 
the conscience of the individual, and its gradual suffocation is such that, “the majority do not 
need to force him; they convince him.”15  This sentiment would come to be echoed by J.S. 
Mill, who understood public opinion not as a means to freedom and democracy but rather as 
a tyranny over reason.  Taken as a champion of liberal thought, Mill’s prioritized pursuit of 
truth rarely aligned with the opinion of the distracted and ignorant many (i.e. the masses), for 
they together represented a “collective mediocrity."  Instead, representative government—
formed and operated by the magnanimous few—was to assist in the recognition of “true 
interests.”16  James Bryce at the end of the 19th century would identify the problems 
accompanying passive, ‘silent majorities,’ and how their inactivity contributes to the 
‘fatalism of the multitude.’  Although he also placed importance upon the people being 
informed and interested in national developments, he held that, “the duty of a patriotic 
statesman in a country where public opinion rules, would seem rather to resist and correct 
than to encourage the dominant sentiment.”17  William MacKinnon, the first to systematically 
formulate sociological assumptions for the political functioning of public opinion, observed 
an intimate connection between public opinion and the middle class.  As with the preceding 
authors, MacKinnon was highly critical of the tendencies of the mass, as when he wrote, 
“popular clamour is powerful in proportion as the lower class is ignorant and numerous.”18  
Instead, public opinion proper was to be discovered in the sentiment demonstrated by the 
“best informed, most intelligent and most moral persons in the community.”19   
 Ferdinand Tőnnies, an important but neglected thinker of the early 20th century, 
provided one of the first schematizations that directly addressed the phenomenon of public 
                                                             
15 Tocqueville 2004, sec. 3 chapter 21. 
16 Mill 1991, 295. 
17 Bryce 1995, 921. 
18 MacKinnon 1927, 15. 
19 Ibid. 
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opinion.  He occupied a dramatic moment in intellectual history in which there was a 
decisive shift away from earlier normative-political and philosophical theories toward 
psychological and sociological conceptualizations of public opinion.   Well-known for his 
distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society), Tőnnies is also an 
indispensable contributor to the public opinion literature.20  He wrote, “public opinion lacks a 
specific space and time.  It spreads like a fog,” suggesting that public opinion has been 
improperly reduced to those opinions or preferences uttered in public or those elicited by 
polls.21  Tőnnies instead conceived of public opinion as a form of social will, one completely 
distinct from the machinery of the state.  In his theory, the “opinion of the public” (die 
Őffentliche Meinung) is one of the basic forms of the complex social will (competing with 
convention and legislation) that performs the role religion once did for traditional 
communities.  As a substitute for a widely-shared religion, the opinion of the public is 
essentially collective and is to be taken as an underlying state of spiritual and moral 
agreement.  Though it may be possible to reveal public opinion, it is very difficult if not 
impossible to comprehend the opinion of the public.  The key problem here is that the latter 
requires a unity and agreement of worldviews, convictions and moral principles of many 
people, even if these often remain inchoate.   
 It must be noted that, for Tőnnies, the many are not directly involved in the explicit 
formation of the opinion of the public.  Rather, this activity is properly understood as within 
the domain of a select few—specifically those who are scientifically inclined and devoted to 
rigorous thought.  The opinion of the public is thus something akin to an act of judgment, 
                                                             
20 Tőnnies 1987.  
21 Tőnnies 1922, 136.  This would be echoed by one of the leading thinkers on public opinion in America, V.O. 
Key Jr. (1961, 8) who wrote, “to speak with precision about public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips 
with the Holy Ghost.” 
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similar to a juridical order or the dictates of an elite, decision-making body.  He writes, “It is 
an agreed-upon decision—the expression of a totality which is not gathered as an audience of 
subject of opinion of the public, except in spirit, and which is typically too large to be 
represented as a gathering.”22  A public opinion, properly understood as distinct from The 
public opinion, tends to be rooted in particularity and determined by narrow interests. 
Tőnnies provides a schema for evaluating the states of public opinion: solid, fluid, and 
gaseous.  These “opinion bubbles” are in a descending order of firmness/coherence according 
to their degree of unanimity and concern with general, constitutive ideas.23  Because it is 
difficult to grasp the complexities of the opinion of the public, Tőnnies recognizes that 
defining public opinion is always a struggle, a contest between estates and classes over the 
power to steer and manipulate its form.24 
 Jürgen Habermas, the primary figure in my discussion to follow, was influenced by 
Tőnnies’ work and provides a provocative interpretation of the nature and role of public 
opinion.  As a concept that only became explicitly relevant in Europe in the 17th and 18th 
century, Habermas describes public opinion’s critical function vis-à-vis political authority to 
be revolutionary both in philosophical and historical terms.  He writes, “intrinsic to the idea 
of a public opinion born of the power of the better argument was the claim to that morally 
pretentious rationality that strove to discover what was at once just and right.”25  Despite 
significant changes to Habermas’ iterations of the discursive model over the course of his 
                                                             
22Ibid., p. 131-2. 
23 Tőnnies (ibid., 184-8) has no shortage of criticisms to level against the most ephemeral, gaseous state of 
public opinion: it is easily changed, too hasty (like a child), superficial as a consequence of haste and mobility, 
filled with prejudice, persevering and capricious (simultaneously), tenacious concerning personalities, agitated 
and passionately moved by the impressions of the day, largely unaware of ideas of order, law and morality, 
framed by slogans, addressed to a generalized audience and hangs on words without a sophisticated 
understanding.  
24 Ibid., 120.  Similar to Habermas’ depiction of the public sphere, the press plays a central role in this struggle. 
25 Habermas 1989, p. 54  
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career, he continues to maintain that the persuasiveness of an articulated argument or 
proposed policy, rather than a mere vote count, should guide democratic processes.  
Legitimacy is achieved on the basis of transparent and inclusive democratic procedures of 
opinion and will formation that lead to binding-decisions and reasonable outcomes.  The 
functioning of the deliberative system—including informal discursive practices in civil 
society as well as formal, institutionalized processes in the public sphere—requires the 
mobilization of “relevant lines of enquiry, topics and claims, requisite information,” the 
provision of argumentation for these inputs, and their evaluation in the phase of decision-
making so that affirmative and negative stances are rationally motivated, rather than being 
shaped by deception, manipulation, or violence.26 
Following his initial work on the transformation of the public sphere, Habermas 
would come to emphasize the consequences of an increasing disconnect between what he 
referred to as the system (the formally institutionalized, authorized, decision-making bodies) 
and the lifeworld (the ordinary, day-to-day, organic experience of the public) in modern 
democratic life.27   In full appreciation of the Tőnniesian distinction above, Habermas goes so 
far as to declare the extinction of The public opinion and the domination of nonpublic 
opinions which are not formed along the basis of public, deliberative discourse.  Why then do 
we continue to invoke this mysterious force?  In answer to the question at the heart of this 
dissertation, Habermas argues, “the conception of public opinion is retained because the 
constitutional reality of the social-welfare state must be conceived as a process in which the 
exercise of social power and political domination is effectively subjected to the mandate of 
                                                             
26 Habermas 2008, 147. 
27 This frames the discussion of solidarity in the fourth chapter. 
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democratic publicity.”28  The fact that public opinion—as the subjective capacity to 
legitimize law—continues to hold its grip on the democratic imagination is perhaps one of 
most compelling reasons for extending Habermas’ project today. 
 
Public Opinion in America: Dewey and Lippmann 
The truncated overview above is meant to indicate public opinion’s complicated reputation in 
the history of political thought.  In shifting to public opinion’s legacy in the American 
context, I take my beginnings from the debates between John Dewey and Walter Lippmann 
in the early decades of the 20th century.  This debate is important in its own right, but also in 
light of Habermas’ intellectual debts to Dewey given their similar understanding of the 
communicative core of democratic practice.29  Dewey considered an actively involved public 
to be the essential foundation for democracy.  This was closely linked with his identity as a 
pragmatist and philosopher of education, for he took seriously the idea that American politics 
should resemble an experiment—one with as few dogmatic presuppositions as possible and 
guided by the consequences of trial and error.  He was an unwavering proponent of the view 
that democracy is more than an institutional framework, for him it is imbued with ethical 
                                                             
28 Ibid., p. 244 
29 A connection that is very obvious when Dewey (1939, 227-8) writes, “Democracy as a way of life is 
controlled by personal faith in personal day-by-day working together with others.  Democracy is the belief that 
even when needs and ends or consequences are different for each individual, the habit of amicable 
cooperation—which may include, as in sport, rivalry and competition—is itself a priceless addition to life.  To 
take as far as possible every conflict which arises—and they are bound to arise—out of the atmosphere and 
medium of force, of violence as a means of settlement into that of discussion and of intelligence is to treat those 
who disagree— even profoundly— with us as those from whom we may learn, and in so far, as friends.  A 
genuinely democratic faith in peace is faith in the possibility of conducting disputes, controversies and conflicts 
as cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the other a chance to express itself, instead of 
having one party conquer by forceful suppression of the other— a suppression which is none the less one of 
violence when it takes place by psychological means of ridicule, abuse, intimidation, instead of by overt 
imprisonment or in concentration camps. To cooperate by giving differences a chance to show themselves 
because of the belief that the expression of difference is not only a right of the other persons but is a means of 
enriching one's own life-experience, is inherent in the democratic personal way of life.” 
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meaning as a way of life.30  This suggests the impropriety of understanding the state as a 
distinct entity, conceptually separable from the people who are constitutive as its lifeblood.   
He wrote (pace Habermas), “A public articulated and operating through representative 
officers is the state; there is no state without a government, but also there is none without the 
public.”31  Consequently, he thought that if as many as possible individuals engage 
intersubjectively—in sharing new ideas and discussing them intelligently with an aim at 
scientific rigor—the probability increases that the collective will come to a rational and 
mutually-agreeable decision.  Important for current scholarship, Dewey pushed for 
reconsidering the individual, not as a spatially and intellectually isolated/atomized unit but as 
a communal being entitled to an equitable share in the consequences of associative action.  
Thus, while admitting the modern character of the public as “amorphous and unarticulated,” 
the promises of organization, inculcated democratic habits, and localized communication 
stood out as means by which the Great Society could be transformed into the ‘Great 
Community.’32 
 Walter Lippmann was the most widely read democratic ‘realist’ of the 1920s, and 
provided a haunting critique of public opinion in what Dewey considered “perhaps the most 
effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned.”33  In Public Opinion, 
Lippmann articulates the fundamental problem of relying on “the public” as the basis of 
                                                             
30 Dewey 1937, 217. “Democracy is much broader than a special political form, a method of conducting 
government, of making laws and carrying on governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and 
elected officers.  It is that, of course.   But it is something broader and deeper than that.  The political and 
governmental phase of democracy is a means, the best means so far found, for realizing ends that lie in the wide 
domain of human relationships and the development of human personality. It is, as we often say, though 
perhaps without appreciating all that is involved in the saying, a way of life, social and individual.  The key-
note of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of 
every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together: which is 
necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as 
individuals.” 
31 Dewey 1927, 67. 
32 Ibid., 131. 
33 Dewey, Middle Works 13:337 
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sound governance.  Drawing upon psychological and philosophical premises, he contended 
that, “democracy in its original form never seriously faced the problem which arises because 
the pictures inside people’s heads [their public opinions] do not automatically correspond 
with the world outside.”34  Lippmann is noteworthy for his irreverence with regard to 
traditional democratic orthodoxies.  His position was essentially one sharpened by 
disillusionment with democratic politics, but also represents an extreme positivistic stance 
regarding the role for scientific experts in discerning the character of the objective world and 
the common interest that eludes the public.  For Lippmann, not only opinion but the public 
itself was an artificial product formed through the administration of political insiders.  In the 
absence of capable citizenry sensitive to the facts of the matter, he advocated instead for the 
promotion of a “specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality.”35 
 Lippmann’s most scathing critique of the pretensions of democratic theory and its 
expectations of public opinion would come in his later work, The Phantom Public.  Here, he 
explicitly rejects what he deems an “unattainable ideal,” of the “sovereign and 
omnicompetent citizen.”36  Arguing that the science of politics requires precise solutions that 
are not likely to originate in the general public, Lippmann suggests that the essence of 
popular government should be appropriately understood as the ordinary citizen’s ability and 
willingness to “support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when things 
seem to be going badly.”37  Self-government, contra Dewey, should not be thought of as an 
inherent good in itself but good for its results (e.g. health, housing, education etc.)  To ask the 
                                                             
34 Lippmann 1922, 19. 
35 Lippmann 2009 [1927], 195. 
36 Ibid., 10-11. 
37 Ibid., 116. This sentiment would come to be echoed by Joseph Schumpeter (2008 [1942], 269) several 
decades later, when he defined democracy as, “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” 
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average citizen to partake in governance in a substantive and continuous way—i.e. in the 
detection, consideration, and solution of public problems—is as absurd as expecting a fat 
man to excel at being a ballet dancer.38  Relying upon stereotypes and symbolic thought, 
fragmented ‘publics’ are rightly limited in their relegated role as spectating bystanders; 
distinguished from those capable agents charged with the administration of public affairs.  
Putting society ‘in its place’ entails that “we must abandon the notion that democratic 
government can be the direct expression of the people.  We must abandon the notion that the 
people govern.”39 
 Dewey would spend much of his remaining intellectual life attempting to answer the 
charges leveled by Lippmann.  While taking the latter’s challenges to heart and recognizing 
that “optimism about democracy is today under a cloud,” Dewey refused to take democratic 
challenges to signal the defeat of popular governance as an achievable ideal.40  No doubt, 
complex problems faced the organization of the public into a state capable of determining the 
consequences of policy and protecting the interests of its members.  The reconstructive tasks 
of philosophy, science, and education are also severely complicated by the emergence of new 
social and economic conditions under industrial capitalism.  This necessitates a pragmatic 
assessment of political conditions, given that “we have inherited, in short, local town-
meeting practices and ideas.  But we live and act and have our being in a continental national 
state.”41  The public may be eclipsed, but its status as ‘inchoate’ does not render it 
phantasmal.  Because democracy is not to be confused with democratic ‘machinery,’ Dewey 
argues that task facing the public becomes the clarification and deepening of democracy’s 
                                                             
38 Lippmann 2009 [1927], 29. 
39 Ibid., 51. 
40 Dewey 1927, 110. 
41 Ibid., 113. 
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meaning through widespread praxis, so as to “criticize and re-make its political 
manifestations.”42  This praxis will necessarily be communicative as public opinion is 
essentially the communication of the results of social inquiry through debate, discussion, and 
persuasion.  The task of recreating democracy will thus “have its consummation when free 
social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication.”43  
Although Lippmann was right to point out the ‘new normal’ in which our political culture 
and modes of discourse are marked by confusion, Dewey reads  the uncertainty of changing 
conditions to entail reasons not only for discomfort and anxiety, but democratic hopes and 
aspirations. 
 Despite their wide differences regarding the role and character of public opinion, 
Dewey and Lippmann demonstrated a shared confidence in the progress in science, 
technology, and mass communications.  Both held a strong belief in the power of rigorous 
inquiry and the spirit of reason to allow advances in human understanding.  The time period 
framing their debate was one in which the social sciences made conscious efforts to restrict 
social-problem and reform-oriented theory and research to instead develop disciplinary 
knowledge.  Particularly in the context immediately preceding World War II, research 
became predominantly directed toward empirical and quantitative opinion research, drawing 
heavily upon psychological theory and studies of voting behavior.  Traditionally dominant, 
studies of the triangle of public opinion, representational democracy, and the freedom of the 
press would become secondary to the empirical linkages between public opinion polling, 
analysis of propaganda, and the development of public relations.44  As I elaborate below, it is 
a matter of intense debate whether the shifts away from sociological and historical 
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43 Ibid., 184. 
44 Splichal 1999, 77. 
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understandings of public opinion have resulted in more reliable conceptualizations of the 
object under study.   
 
Contemporary Mass Politics and Public Opinion Research 
The last century might be aptly described as one of mass politics.  In this context, the current 
state of public opinion research can be read as the result of an intellectual development 
evolving across three broad and overlapping stages.  First, the earliest philosophical 
treatments of public opinion treated it as an abstract force in society.  Then, in the mid-19th 
and early 20th centuries, it was conceived as a sociological or discursive phenomenon, 
revealed through active discourse and a competition of groups for social, economic, and/or 
political power.  Finally, shifts in intellectual paradigms from the mid-20th century to the 
present have produced a view of public opinion as a psychological phenomenon to be 
observed in the aggregation of individual preferences within a population or sample.45   
 Scott Althaus notes two important consequences of the most recent paradigm shift.  
First, up until the 1930s, public opinion’s revelation tended to be associated with action or 
barriers to action rather than predispositions or the preparedness to act.  Subsequent 
psychological interpretations intimately bound up with survey research, however, have 
tended to view attitudes rather than action as the primary phenomenological interest.  A 
second trend is observable, as earlier sociological research was concerned with action 
conducted by and/or in service of interested groups rather than the population as a whole.  
With the rise of random sampling methodology, many researchers take public opinion to be a 
                                                             
45 Althaus 2003, 290.  This understanding drove Floyd Allport’s explicit personification of public opinion, as 
when he wrote, “the phenomena to be studied under the term public opinion are essentially instances of 
behavior…of human individuals…The emergent product must be expressed by some individuals or we cannot 
know it at all.”  Allport 1937, 13. 
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psychological construct that predicts the likely behavior of unorganized groups and provides 
information about the political preferences of lumped populations.  While the new 
framework may not quite redeem George Gallup’s confidence in the power of the poll to 
measure the ‘pulse’ of democracy, the shift from a substantive to an adjectival understanding 
of public opinion remains determinative for research today.  Public opinion is often equated 
with the aggregation of individual opinions, authenticated by scientific polls, serving to direct 
governance in some fashion.  A potential problem in conceiving of public opinion in this 
way, however, is to treat it as “virginal, preconstituted, prepolitical, presocial.”46  In the next 
chapter, I describe the ways in which this treatment has driven theoretical and empirical 
studies apart, with unfortunate consequences for both. 
 The ‘mass’ has been and often continues to be understood as the dark side of the 
‘public.’47  According to C.W. Mills’ seminal formulation, a public is characterized by a 
situation in which there is a rough proportionality between the expression and reception of 
the opinions of participants, communication is structured so as to facilitate response, opinion 
formed by discussion has available to it an outlet in effective action (even against prevailing 
authority), and the public remains largely autonomous and insulated against authoritative 
institutions.48   A mass, on the other hand, is marked by disproportionality in 
expressive/receptive functions in which communities of publics become abstract collections 
of individuals receiving impressions from the mass media.  Communication channels 
function unilaterally, inhibiting response, as do the political channels transforming opinion 
                                                             
46 Schudson 1998, 228. 
47 Classic polemical statements of this view include Le Bon, Tarde, and Ortega y Gasset. The first describes the 
reception of masses increasingly as crowds; characterized by mental inferiority and suggestibility.  The second 
provides a more surgical analysis in his psychological distinction between the ‘crowd’ and ‘public.’  In an 
outright polemic, the third wrote, “’Everybody’ was normally the complex unity for the mass and the divergent, 
specialized minorities.  Nowadays, ‘everybody’ is the mass alone.”  See Le Bon 1895; Tarde 1901; and Ortega 
y Gassett 1932. 
48 Mills 1956, 303.   
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into policy.  Finally, the autonomy of the mass is forfeited so that it is constantly penetrated 
by forms of authority.49  A number of factors have transformed the liberal constitutional state 
so as to inaugurate mass politics.  For example, “the shift to a hyper-spending society, the 
breakup of family capitalism and its consequent impact on corporate structure and political 
power, the centralization of decision-making (politically in the state and economically in a 
group of large corporate bodies), and the rise of status and symbol groups in the place of 
specific interest groups—are all indications of the arrival of new social forms and changes in 
life under mass society.”50  Compounded by status anxieties and the ever interconnectedness 
of the world, these evolutions result in what Daniel Bell refers to as, “changed character 
structures and new moral tempers.”51  A central consideration in this dissertation is the ways 
in which the ‘will of the people’ is shaped and (dis)empowered by communicative structures 
in the age of mass politics.   
 Working with typologies always runs the risk of oversimplification, and so it should 
be noted that of course something reminiscent of a ‘public’ can be said to be relevant to the 
American political process.  On the other hand, there is not and has never been an American 
‘Public,’ though there may well exist a plurality of publics that at least nominally share 
collective concerns.  Perhaps more controversially, I argue here that the prevalence of mass-
like tendencies—which have been convincingly demonstrated to characterize the populace 
and its relationship to governance—is neither an accident nor an aberration from a robust 
state of civic autonomy and efficacy.  Asymmetrical political influence and a non-dialogical 
relationship between those wielding political influence and the many in the audience has long 
been a functional reality.  Before making this argument, however, a brief overview of the 
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symptoms of mass society may be in order.  Among these I include the results of empirical 
research on media effects, the social-psychological bases of partisanship and political 
ideology, and the (non)responsiveness of the political system in terms of policymaking. 
Media Effects 
 
Early theorizing about the impact of the mass media on society was distinctly influenced by 
the political context following World War I.  The media were attributed with nearly-
omnipotent power to persuade or even brainwash those tuning in to what few channels were 
available.  Concerns over the widespread use of propaganda in totalitarian and fascist 
regimes, the increasingly sophisticated forms of advertising and public relations, and the 
corrosive effects of mass cultural production on traditional standards framed these studies.  
As described by Katz and Lazarsfeld, “The image of the mass communication process 
entertained by researchers had been, firstly, one of ‘atomistic mass’ of millions of readers, 
listeners and movie-goers, prepared to receive the message; and secondly…every message 
was conceived of as a direct and powerful stimulus to action which would elicit immediate 
response.”52  Drawing upon narratives of modern decline, the ‘powerful media effects’ 
approach pointed to conditions which enabled this unidirectional influence, including: the 
alienation accompanying large scale industrialization, urbanization and the centralization of 
decision-making, and the growth of mass political movements.  Studies such as those 
conducted by Harold Lasswell would attribute a ‘hypodermic needle’ model of influence to 
the media, and spurred forecasts of an Orwellian ‘garrison state’ among other dystopian 
scenarios.53  Public figures and intellectuals such as Walter Lippmann would warn about the 
                                                             
52 Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955, 16. 
53 See Lasswell 1971.  Other studies in this era include Cantril and Allport’s 1935 study of radio listeners, and 
the Payne Fund studies of motion picture influence between 1928 and 1933. 
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dangers of ‘manufactured consent,’ indicative of prevailing concerns in the early 20th 
century. 
As a direct response to the exaggerated omnipotence of the media, the era of minimal 
effects (or limited/indirect effects) characterized media studies between the 1940s and 1960s.  
Minimalists had a different answer to Harold Lasswell’s famous question, i.e. ‘who says 
what to whom in what channel and to what effect?’  This school of thought argued that 
opinion formation takes place via complex social processes in which the media play a 
relatively modest part.54  Proponents, especially Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues from the 
Columbia School, pointed to the difficulty of establishing the effectiveness of elite 
messaging in shaping public opinion.  The critique uniting these thinkers is described by 
Klapper as follows, “Mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and 
sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of 
mediating factors and influences”—including interpersonal communication.55   Katz and 
Lazarsfeld’s Personal Influence was a prototypical example on this front, emphasizing the 
two-step flow of communication and the role of ‘opinion leaders’ in canalizing political 
messages.56  In addition to the sociological studies of media effects, others such as Carl 
Hovland would conduct experiments to demonstrate messaging’s variability and context-
dependence.57 
Following the changing tide in media studies, some hypothesized the obsolescence of 
the field of mass communication effects.  Figures such as Bernard Berelson argued the field 
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55 Perse 2001, 25. 
56 Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955. 
57 Hovland et. al. 1949, 1953. 
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had plateaued and the ‘great ideas’ that had driven early media research had ‘worn out.’58  
Many others, however, detected a dilemma on the horizon.  The general paradox was framed 
thusly: “How could media researchers demonstrate the seemingly obvious power of the mass 
media, in the face of the equally well-demonstrated obstinate audience?”59  Taken 
collectively, Converses’ work on political ideology and belief systems in the 1960s, 
McCombs and Shaw’s research on agenda-setting in the early 1970s, and a wave of studies in 
the 1980s-90s on framing effects signaled a reorientation in political-communications theory.  
The new approach, characterizing what some now call the ‘classical era of effects,’ took 
lessons from the hyperbolism of early mass media research as well as the emphasis on 
conditional influence in the minimal effects era.60  Key to understanding this renewal is the 
sweeping change that occurred in the media environment during the 1960s in which the 
growing ubiquity of televisions revived concerns about pernicious social influences.61   
Though televised signals were not necessarily thought to be endowed with omnipotence (as 
might have been hypothesized earlier), they did allow for wider control over the perceived 
importance of items on a ‘loaded’ issue-agenda.  In addition to influences from one’s family, 
peer-group, neighbors, teachers and other relations, booms in communicative technology 
now allowed for concerted socio-political cultivation via mass-produced images and 
messages.62  An important caveat to these findings, however, is that receivers of messages 
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are not necessarily members of a passive mass but instead have varied motives which are 
relevant to the acceptance or rejection of different kinds of influence.63  
As Katz described it, the history of communications theory can best be understood as 
an oscillation of emphasis between active and passive audiences, and between minimal and 
powerful effects.64  The general consensus today is that communications via the media do 
have consequential effects on the development of political attitudes and preferences.  Issues 
of context and gradations of influence notwithstanding, the overwhelming majority of those 
who study political communication hold the effects of mass communication to be a well-
established fact.  Studies of media effects and audience receptivity in the last couple decades 
have converged in recognition of the great diversity of communicative situations and the 
possibilities of communicating at a distance even given the persistence of intervening social 
and cultural variables.  Early research that decried the malleability of the mass was thus 
bound to fail in terms of predictive value, in part because of changes in technology and social 
circumstance but also because of an errant understanding of influence as mechanistic and 
starting from a strongly-individualistic methodology.65   
It is now clear, therefore, that the media does carry influence, albeit moderated.66  The 
work on framing by James Druckman and Dennis Chong is especially relevant in the new era 
of media studies.  Rather than starting from the assumption that the media influences or 
distorts the thinking of citizens who hold pre-formed preferences and beliefs, they find that 
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frames are integral to opinion formation in the first place.  A frame can come about when, in 
the course of describing a campaign, issue, problem, event etc. a speaker’s emphasis on a 
subset of ‘potentially relevant considerations’ causes individuals to focus on those 
considerations in constructing their opinions.67  This need not, however, result in the 
insidious kind of manipulation or manufacture of mass opinion frequently warned about 
throughout the past century.  As Druckman’s work demonstrates, frames have relative 
degrees of impact—they can lead to an almost automatic attribution effect, or they can be 
mulled over more deliberately.  This depends both on timing and on the competitive nature 
(i.e. openness) of the framing environment, so that frames which are frequently repeated or 
drilled are not necessarily deemed “strong.”68  Instead, strength might be conditioned on the 
value-laden content of the frame itself, both its emotive and rational pull.69  Emphasis on the 
dynamism of a complex media environment therefore has implications for core deliberative 
ideals, such as a maximal diversity of inputs and the potential for broadened perspectives 
through interpersonal communications.   
Innovations made possible by the increasingly sophisticated communicative 
technologies, the near ubiquity of the internet and social media, and political uses of ‘big 
data’ have not nullified the effects of agenda-setting and framing—assuming that this is 
possible even in principle.   Rather, these developments have added a layer of complexity 
that has inaugurated a new era of research on media effects.70  As discussed in the next 
chapter, the expensiveness of survey research in terms of both time and money—not to 
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mention a substantial decline in response rates—has played a part in ushering in what some 
believe to be a new age in political communication studies.  In contrast to ‘made’ or ‘elicited’ 
data, researchers from various fields now have the capacity to mine what is referred to as 
‘found’ data by drawing on content from social media.71  This new way of approaching an 
overwhelmingly complex universe of self-supplied information about citizen-consumers and 
their political inclinations/habits has been used for a variety of purposes of interest to 
political scientists—namely election forecasting, political networking, and longitudinal 
studies of changes in the public’s political moods.  Although the predictive value and 
ethicality of these new modes of measurement remains contested, and the future relationship 
between traditional survey research and the up-and-coming research paradigm is unclear, it 
can be safely said that the media landscape has changed in such a way so as to mandate 
adaptations in public opinion research.72   
In summary, although media studies may have entered into a new research 
‘paradigm,’ there is much that remains unknown about the relative standing of senders and 
recipients of political communications.  As suggested by the broad thrust of empirical 
evidence, what we know of the latter is at odds with the image of the average citizen as a 
passive pawn, unscrutinizing and susceptible to any and all kinds of messaging.73  Neither 
does it suggest, however, that she is autonomous in forming opinions, balanced in her 
selection of information/outlets, or self-conscious in her adoption of given frames and 
(in)attention to events or issues.  Consequently, while many were too hasty in condemning 
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the average news consumer as a passive and impotent member of the mass, a parallel 
criticism might well be leveled against those who took for granted an extant and widespread 
capacity for monitorial vigilance on the part of everyday citizens.  
 
 
Social-Psychological Bases of Ideology and Partisanship 
 
Characterizations of the psychological makeup of masses tend to be unflattering.  In many 
ways, the description offered by James and adapted by Lippmann to describe the infantile 
dispositions of a dispersed public captures this criticism.  As citizens, we often stumble about 
in “one great, blooming, buzzing confusion.”74  This polemic might be dismissed as an 
attempt to justify an elitist-strain of leadership, one unconcerned with the non-problem of a 
demobilized citizenry.  If the caricature were a self-serving product of ideological inclination 
and nothing else, this would be an easy victory for the friend of the common man who seeks 
to restore the demos’ reputation.  Unfortunately, there is a good deal of evidence suggesting 
that the stability provided by ideological and partisan platforms is itself rooted in social-
psychological dynamics that are often unreliable, to say the least, and frequently pose 
dangers to core democratic values.  Here I can only touch on some of the most important 
findings. 
 At least since the 1950s, survey research in the United States has consistently 
indicated a profound and unsettling lack of political sophistication amongst the vast majority 
of the electorate.  Early findings such as that offered by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee in 
1954—corroborated by Campbell in 1960 and Converse in 1964—demonstrated that the 
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typical American voter is largely uninformed about politics, inconsistent in her political 
values, unreflective about politics and only weakly motivated to participate.  Even without 
assuming perfect information or ideological consistency, many perceived something like a 
“continental shelf” separating the elites and masses when it comes to knowledge and 
sophistication.75  Despite a few studies that purported to show improvements in civic 
capacity, the larger body of evidence suggests that pessimistic theses from the 50’s and 60’s 
have withstood the test of time.76  These findings have been absorbed by the academic 
community, not only by those whose political programs benefit from the alleged 
shortcomings of the ordinary citizen, but also by those who seek to bridge the epistemic 
divide by any democratic means possible.77 
Research in the last couple decades has raised awareness of the context-dependence 
of complex processes driving opinion-formation.  In particular, work by Zaller in 1992 and 
backed by more recent studies has shown that the availability of information is decisive for 
developing capacities of judgment we typically ascribe to the politically-adept citizen. 78  
According to Zaller, the politically attentive and well-informed are more likely to express 
opinions in the first place, and these opinions will be more stable and held with conviction.  
They are also more likely to use ideological concepts ‘correctly,’ cite evidence in political 
discussions, and process information sensitively.  They are also better at retaining new 
information, deploying heuristics reliably, and voting more consistently with their political 
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interests.79  An emphasis on contextuality has led many researchers to abandon the traditional 
conception of political attitudes as fixed preferences.  Instead, it is widely recognized that the 
former more often resemble constructions built on the fly for specific, practical purposes.  
The importance of what has come to be known as his “top of the head” model of cognition is 
that it points to the endogeneity of attitudes within the mediated political process.80    
 Research such as Zaller’s presents an opportunity for reexamining many of the 
presuppositions and ideals of democratic theory, particularly in addressing the epistemic 
functioning of the citizen.  These types of findings severely complicate and even jeopardize 
one of Dahl’s key qualifications for democratic functioning: “the continuing responsiveness 
of the government to the preferences of its citizens.”81  They also suggest problems with the 
simple equation of public opinion with the outcomes of aggregated survey results, as the 
latter often do not provide a sufficient background of how attitudes or preferences arise and 
relate to policy decisions.82  While early dismissals of public opinion were the result of an 
investigation into its substantial content (or lack thereof), new studies more attuned to the 
dynamism of public opinion concern themselves with the processes which motivate or inhibit 
its formation.  An important turn in the cognitive-psychological understanding of the basis of 
opinion formation has also forced researchers to revisit their models of political processing.83  
In particular, the common role of heuristics or cognitive shortcuts makes it necessary to 
reconsider the mediated relationship that the citizenry bears to the state.  Since Downs, it has 
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been generally accepted that it is irrational for the average citizen to invest much time and 
effort in becoming informed and making political decisions, given the multiplicity of 
nonpolitical commitments and interests in day-to-day life.84  Nevertheless, voters who are 
unfamiliar with substantive issues can often evaluate candidates or consider policy 
propositions using more easily acquired data, including: recent economic trends, partisanship 
and personal characteristics of candidates, ideologies of actors involved and the identities of 
opinion leaders and interest groups endorsing candidates/issues.85   
The updating of beliefs in practice thus falls short of the bar of rationality often-
supposed in normative theory.86  Instead, as shown in Lord’s seminal study, motivated 
reasoning is properly viewed as a product of biased processing, in which the individual 
utilizes consistency filters in order to reduce cognitive dissonance and reaffirm their 
ideological identity.87  Grouped under motivated reasoning are the tendencies toward 
confirmation bias (seeking information to confirm prior beliefs), prior attitude effects 
(viewing evidence consistent with prior opinions as more relevant/strong), the 
disconfirmation bias (spending more time resisting arguments inconsistent with prior 
opinions regardless of merit), and the availability or accessibility bias (over/underestimating 
phenomena’s commonality based on the accessibility and vividness of the cognitive object in 
question).88  As summarized by Rahn and her colleagues, even in drawing upon what 
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86 For example, findings of the predominance of “on-line processing” over “memory-based processing” show 
that 
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87 Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979, see also Feldman and Conover 1983. 
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ostensibly seem to be ‘reasons’ in the course of making political evaluations, unconscious 
processes and emotional reactions dominate the consideration of candidates and issues such 
that “people rationalize their pre-existing preferences.”89  This may prove expedient or 
minimally-detrimental in the short-term, e.g. for making electoral decisions, but many argue 
that these shortcuts are unreliable in the long-term for facilitating informed or ‘considered’ 
opinion.90 
An emerging research bloc suggests that opinion is bound up with attitudinal 
constraint; itself understood as involving the interplay of affective attachments and 
ideological leanings.91  Recent work has emphasized the importance of mass and 
interpersonal communications in fundamentally altering the nature and strength of 
partisanship.  For example, cues (i.e. information bites) allow individuals to make inferences 
without drawing on more detailed knowledge, often coming from experts, interest groups, 
friends, family, or from one’s party (the last is by far the most studied).  The evidence 
strongly shows that Americans are divided along party lines and that the trend can and has 
been reinforced by the motivated selection of media outlets.92  Partisanship does not always 
spring strictly from a political source, however, as work by Sinclair and other political 
sociologists suggests that “individuals are influenced by their social networks to choose party 
identifications.”93  Findings on the pathways of identification lead to the following 
predicament: the ideological pull of political polarization may lead to constraint (associated 
with high quality opinion) but cause people to ignore arguments perceived to be strong 
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(associated with low quality opinion).94  It may be the case that while partisan loyalty is not a 
sufficient condition for responsible democratic citizenship—at least as traditionally 
understood95—it might be the best citizens can do given the institutions under which we 
currently live.96  What this means for navigating a system of mass politics will be explored 
throughout this dissertation. 
The norms for the deliberative citizen are usually said to include equanimity and 
open-mindedness.  The traits of the “resolute partisan,” on the other hand, often entail the 
passionate pursuit of variably-articulated goals and committed loyalty to a political cause.97  
Attachment to and motivation by partisan and ideological drives undeniably shapes the ways 
that most people approach politics.  A substantial body of research has found that emotions 
manifest ‘situational appraisals’98 and structure the sorts of actions that people undertake.99  
Politically speaking, emotions help to regulate attentiveness and engagement.100  
Distinguishing between anger and anxiety, it is also possible to observe people’s willingness 
to act aggressively or to seek further information101—both of which may influence the 
                                                             
94 Druckman 2014, 20. 
95 An example of Campbell’s legacy here: ”Citizens are at their best not when they are partisan, but when they 
are independent.”  Muirhead 2006, 714.  
96 This is essentially the argument posed by McAvoy 2015.  It is important to note findings showing that 
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(2006, 31) explains, “political knowledge does not correct for partisan bias in perception of ‘objective’ 
conditions, nor does it mitigate the bias.  Instead, and unfortunately, it enhances the bias; party identification 
colors the perceptions of the most politically informed citizens far more than the relatively less informed 
citizens.” 
97 Mackuen et al. 2010, 440. 
98 See Roseman, Wiest and Swartz 1994; Smith et al. 1993. 
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appraisal of candidates and issues.102  It is thus extremely pertinent to investigate how 
“emotion animates the types of citizenship that people practice.”103 
Paying due heed to the normalcy of citizens guided by emotions, habits, and 
heuristics in making political decisions need not be taken as a non-starter for the aspirations 
of deliberation, once adjusted.  For example, it may be possible to accommodate insights 
such as those expressed in the theory of ‘affective intelligence.’104  Marcus and his 
colleagues argue that, “preconscious affective appraisals identify the strategic character of 
environments by swiftly mapping their features and matching them against stored 
memories.”105  This may prove useful on a routine basis, but in novel situations these rote 
processes may prove unreliable.  When confronted with conditions of uncertainty and risk, 
feelings of anxiety may result in halting the use of those heuristics and may initiate a strategy 
of conscious consideration.  Thus, cognitive processes are not constant or uniform but 
situational.  Marcus et al. describe an unexplored emotional strategy which they call 
“aversion.”  They argue that when people feel threatened and find themselves in recurring 
“disagreeable situations,” they typically rely on learned and previously-successful solutions.  
In confronting risk and the unknown, however, they are likely better deliberators, entering 
into thoughtful consideration to address anxiety and uncertainty.  Consequently, the authors 
claim that, “the type of citizenship people practice will depend on the kind of negative 
emotion politics evokes.”106  In aversive situations, strategic processing will entail the 
stubborn defense of convictions, solidarity with allies and opposition to accommodation.  In 
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anxious situations, on the other hand, more open consideration of the opposition and 
willingness to compromise may ensue.   
Lavine’s work on the role of partisan ambivalence and the contingency of political 
judgment is also relevant for deliberation here, as he takes up the question of whether 
motivated reasoning is unbounded.  He argues that while the heavy majority is deeply biased 
and remains staunchly partisan, there is the potential for at least some citizens to experience 
internalized conflict (what he calls ambivalence) towards party labels.  He observes that 
disjunctures can occur between an individual’s long-term identification with her political 
party and her short-term evaluations of the parties’ capacities to govern and deliver benefits 
to the public.107  Important for my purposes here, he also notes that this type of ambivalence 
is a primary determinant of two key dimensions in political reasoning: depth and objectivity.  
Ambivalent partisans are more likely to engage in careful deliberation than their univalent 
(i.e. nonambivalent) counterparts.  They are more responsive to the political environment, 
they rely on richer (though cognitively costly) criteria in forming judgments, and they hold 
more accurate perceptions of the political world (in terms of being less prone to viewing it 
through a partisan lens).  All this leads to the authors’ conclusion that, “contrary to popular 
conceptualizations of mass political judgment…ambivalent partisans do not simply react 
mechanically to the political ideas they encounter; rather, they approximate the type of 
critical, systematic and open-minded thought praised by democratic theorists.”108  In 
combining both affective and evaluative dimensions of social identification, Lavine thus 
attempts to overcome the false dichotomy supposed in the conflict between social identity 
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and rational voter theories.  Such a model, he argues, leaves room for both objective 
assessment and long-term stability, a dynamic called “critical loyalty.”109 
 All of the above is relevant for developing theories of media effects.  For example, it 
is important to qualify the significance of agenda-setting and framing effects.  In order to 
determine their usefulness or potential danger, one must consider broader features of the 
socio-political world (e.g. incentives for engagement, forums for debate and learning).  One 
must also be attuned to a variety of other factors, e.g. the steering influences of political 
rhetoric (wording), the invocation of numerical data, the roles of strong attitudes, cognitive 
abilities, contemplation and the need for/desirability of providing rationales for preferences.  
Taking into consideration the radically-dynamic interplay between patterns of cognition and 
the formative role of social context thus complicates expectations of the rational, monitorial, 
and reason-giving citizen.  As noted by Dennis Chong, a paradox is apparent in studying 
these issues: “the problem of motivated reasoning can be summarized as too little 
responsiveness to information that is relevant to the decision.  Conversely, the problem of 
framing is too much responsiveness to the description of alternatives.”110  It remains unclear 
how we are to balance expectations of strongly held beliefs—which allow for ideological 
orientation—with the deliberative premium placed on open-mindedness and a reflective 
consideration of the ‘facts of the matter.’  In this sense, a better understanding of how we as 
citizens actually think about political questions should be factored in to diagnoses of the 
current state of democracy measured against long-held ideals. 
 
The Socialization of Political Beings 
                                                             
109 Ibid., 11. 
110 Chong 2013, 119. 
 35 
The socialization literature complements the political-psychological discipline in underlining 
the important influences of one’s social-political ecosystem.111  In Lazarsfeld’s famous 
words, “[A] person thinks, politically, as he is, socially.  Social characteristics determine 
political preference.”112  Sinclair’s recent work, mentioned above, is important in that it 
suggests that political life is secondary to one’s social life.  As she notes, “individuals 
primarily form social relationships based on shared nonpolitical characteristics.”113  Taking 
into account the ways in which the political sphere does not envelop other important areas of 
identity-formation114 allows for a more dynamic understanding of the constitution of 
‘interests.’115  If it is true that individuals discuss politics in the context of constructing social 
and political identities, rather than being primarily guided by the transmission of information, 
this has definite implications for the possibility of persuasion and attitude change.  It also 
reflects the reality that political appeals are made not only to reason, but to passions and 
prejudices.116  Mathiowetz is also on point in acknowledging the complexity of human 
motivations, as when he writes, “Misled by natural language into thinking that appeals to 
interest refer to things that are independent of or prior to the activity of grouping and 
constituting [political subjects], students of politics have obscured the activities that appeals 
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to interest entail.”117  If we are to move away from a narrow identification of interests in 
terms of the calculative self-interest of homo economicus, this also suggests the need to 
challenge dubious metrics that purportedly advise how one should hold preferences or ‘vote 
correctly.’118  If social contact has the potential to differentially entrench participants in their 
political viewpoints or lead to a substantial reexamination of their positions, this makes the 
study of networks relevant for examining whether social heterogeneity breeds the type of 
motivated engagement for which deliberativists have long hoped.119   
Changing modes of organization and participatory styles also inform the theoretical 
starting-point of public opinion research.  As noted by Bimber in his influential research, the 
growth of what he calls “postbureaucratic” organizations offer new capacities for “speed, 
opportunism and event-driven political organization.”120  This shift also entails revisiting 
what is meant by ‘membership,’ as its denotation may shift from issue to issue and from 
event to event.121  New developments in technological communication must also be taken 
into account in order to understand how democratic engagement might be facilitated, 
enhanced and widened, on the one hand, or watered-down and narrowly consumed according 
to ideological predispositions on the other.  In order to avoid the type of starry-eyed Internet 
utopianism, itself an iteration of democratic mysticism, it is important to note the tradeoffs of 
living in a hyper-information age and how this bears the double-edged potential to either 
ameliorate or exacerbate democratic deficiencies.122   
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Unfortunately, up until recently much of public opinion research has foundered in 
failing to adequately appreciate the formative influence of the social environment.123  This is 
most regrettable in light of the recent boom of research considering the interplay of genetic 
and environmental factors that determine the political character of citizens; i.e. in terms of 
partisanship, sophistication, participation, system support etc.   For example, one of the key 
figures in the tradition of political socialization, David Sears, notes that: “the study of human 
psychological development views individuals in terms of their life histories, employing the 
tool of time within the human life span.”124  Although including time as an independent 
variable may seem banal, this facilitates consideration of how malleable politically relevant 
attitudes and behaviors may be in adulthood—the typically-demarcated range of subjects 
assumed to be relevant for studies of democracy.  There are four general models which 
hypothesize the role of time in the political life cycle.  The ‘persistence’ model suggests that 
the residues of preadult learning persist throughout life.  The ‘impressionable years’ model, a 
variant of the first, suggests that orientations are particularly susceptible to influence in late 
adolescence and early adulthood, but tend to stabilize thereafter.125  Conversely, the ‘lifelong 
openness’ model suggests that individuals remain open to influence throughout later life (e.g. 
by events and the nature of “the times”).  Finally, the ‘life-cycle’ model suggests that people 
show stage-specific propensities.126   
Paradigmatic studies of the development of political attitudes among preadults have 
drawn considerable attention to the endurance of Americans’ partisanship.  This is in large 
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part because party identification is by far the strongest and most consistent predictor of 
voting preferences—the latter often taken to be the hallmark of democratic participation.  In 
The American Voter, for example, the authors point to the centrality of party identification in 
orienting voters to the political universe.  Although for many the takeaway lesson of this 
study was the polemical suggestion that the average American wanders confused in a 
political morass, it is equally significant that they emphasize the early, formative bases of 
partisanship in the preadult (not pre-political) years.  Later research, such as that by Sears, 
tested the crystallization of preadults’ party identifications and found substantial levels of 
partisan fixity which corresponded to adult levels.127   The hypothesized familial 
transmission model would be tested later by Jennings and Niemi in their renowned 
“Michigan socialization study.”  Through a longitudinal cohort study of high school seniors 
and their parents, they found substantial parental transmission of party identification from 
parents to adolescents, and other political attitudes to a lesser degree (e.g. political trust).128  
Even more important for my research project, they find that families significantly vary in 
their ability to pass on partisanship to their kin.  Parents who are more politicized, greatly 
interested, and possess relatively stable attitudes themselves are able to provide more 
consistent cues that shape the youth’s political character.129  Subsequently and for the most 
part, scholars have reached a consensus that, “predispositions formed early in life may not 
persist unchanged all through adulthood, but they do shape later development.”130  
The consideration of developmental dynamics offers a way to build on the insights of 
political psychology by revisiting the developmental history of the citizen.  Unfortunately, 
                                                             
127 Sears and Valentino 1997;  Sears, Haley and Henry 2008. 
128 Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009.  See also Lewis-Beck et. al. 2008. 
129 Beck and Jennings 1991; Jennings et. al. 2009. 
130 Sears and Funk 1999, 454;  Stokers and Jennings 2008. 
 39 
this type of thick, long-term analysis has often gone unexplored both by those who champion 
the capacity of the masses to serve in an important democratic role, and those who dismiss 
such prospects.  What is important in this connection is the role of timing and political 
environment in the socialization of future citizens.131  Sears proposes that, “persistence may 
stem from a high-volume and/or one-sided flow of communication in the individual’s 
microenvironment.  The opportunity to practice the orientation in conversation and behavior 
may also facilitate it.”132  It seems to be the case that the innocence of youth is almost 
immediately beset by prejudices and dogmatism such that political habits (good or bad) are 
most effectively ingrained early on in the life cycle.  “The times” can work to influence and 
leave an indelible impression upon political actors in the direct or indirect experience of 
significant events, but the evidence generally points to the determinativeness of preadult 
molding.  The comparative importance of the formative years (designated here as roughly 10-
17) and the impressionable years (approximately 17-25) have important pedagogical 
implications for those who seek to instill democratic virtues in up-and-coming citizens.133 
The primacy of the formative years suggests that while it may be possible to 
preemptively discourage traits that are typically taken to lead to democratic shortcomings, 
this potential becomes almost Sisyphean once an adult becomes locked in her ways.  This 
brings us back, ironically to the insights of philosophers both ancient and modern who insist 
on the importance of early education and childrearing in determining the fate of the political 
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community.134  It also invites the troubling possibility that the transformative power of 
diverse social networks and technologically-enhanced informational media, while undeniably 
important, may be secondary to the intimate environment in which a child is raised.  It may 
be too strong to suggest that some individuals are politically ‘botched,’  but it is also 
important to note that the proponents of deliberation have likely erred in assuming a radical 
degree of pliability amongst grown adults engaged in critical dialogue and reflection.  Socio-
psychological backgrounds are constituted by a mélange of affective and unconscious 
influences that are difficult to discern or compute as political variables.  Again, to emphasize 
the point argued above, it may be that the type of cognition exemplified by most political 
agents is ‘hot’ rather than ‘cool,’ and is reflective of formative experiences in one’s early 
enviornment.   
Given the evidence that partisanship inheritance is generally strong, there have been 
recent studies that question whether partisanship consistently operates as a reliable ballast.  
This returns us to the familiar dilemma of what we expect of our citizens: consistency and a 
stable sense of self, or open-mindedness and a constant updating of one’s position/identity.135  
Recent research by Dinas, for example, supports the hypothesis that children are more likely 
to adopt their family’s political views when politics is important to the parents, and that 
politically engaged parents raise children that later become engaged adults.  These two 
dynamics, however, when considered together, suggest that “the children who are most likely 
to initially acquire the political views of their parents are also most likely to later abandon 
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them as a result of their own engagement with the political world.”136  Thus, the 
impressionable years model might be of comparative worth in some cases, and is 
complemented by social learning theories suggesting that early social contexts may provide 
cross-cutting political influences.137  The exposure or vulnerability to political events and 
networks, however, will depend on attentiveness to political cues and messages.  
Furthermore, both exposure and attentiveness are positively associated with higher degrees of 
political awareness and interest.138  They will also depend on one’s ability to form accurate 
beliefs about others’ opinions, and this accuracy will be dependent on the salience of the 
attitudinal domain of the recipient (again, this is bound with interest in politics).  Given that 
politically interested adults are likely to have grown up in politicized families, we appear to 
have completed the circle: those who are socialized early on in such a way that they are 
predisposed towards conversing about politics and maintaining interest and attentiveness will 
be brought closer to external influences which might induce them to revise their political 
views.139 
 Other recent research demonstrates that although many have found political interest 
to be indispensable in connection to other key democratic factors (e.g. knowledge and 
participation) interest itself has received scant attention as a dependent variable. 140  Danielle 
Shani points out that the study of political behavior almost always takes as its starting point 
adult characteristics and activities.  Although interest is invoked on a regular basis, the 
question of its motivation is almost always treated as a subsidiary question, useful only in 
                                                             
136 Dinas 2014, 4. 
137 See Mutz and Mondak 2006; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Nir 2005; Cappella, Price and Nir 2002; Eveland 
2004; Scheufele et. al 2006. 
138 Zaller 1992. 
139 Dinas 2014, 831. 
140 See Luskin 1990; Verba et. al. 1995. 
 42 
connection to citizen participation or political accumen.141  A difficulty involved with 
measuring political interest—which she defines as the “intrinsic motivation to engage in 
politics”— has to do with its relationship with other political attributes such as civic duty, 
strength of partisanship, and perceptions of political competence and efficacy.142  Some 
traditionally held that “political interest seems to be influenced more by political factors than 
by demographic attributes,” but there is a growing sense that the quasi-causal arrows might 
be reversed. 143  With this understanding, interest acts as a key determinant (rather than 
consequence) of other political attributes, so it is entirely appropriate to treat interest 
independently to determine its origins and stability throughout the lifecycle.   
 Given that interest has historically been treated as requisite for key democratic ideals 
(e.g. self-rule, political equality, and quality representation), the fact that it itself has 
remained a ‘black-box’ is surprising and suggests substantial shortcomings on the part of 
political science.  Shani attempts to play her part in the revival of socialization research in 
studying the implications of interest’s stability, as demonstrably backed by recent research 
and consonant with the ‘persistence’ model described above.144  Using British and American 
longitudinal panel data, she considers the role of prime candidates shaping individuals’ 
interest at a young age: the influence of family, the child’s ability and personality, school, 
youth activities, peer groups and salient political events, all in turn.  Her work is also unique 
in that she utilizes diverse disciplinary toolkits—such as social learning theory, cognitive 
development, theories of personality and its development within the family, resource 
availability and a less-familiar model from the sociological literature: cultural capital 
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theory.145  This multidimensional approach allows her to more effectively examine the 
question of whether those who are politically interested or disinterested vary in substantial 
ways, as well as how mutable these differences may be.146 
 After testing the various formative elements and theoretical approaches, Shani 
concludes: “the seeds of citizens’ motivation to engage in politics are planted in 
preadulthood.”147  In line with Jennings’ work, she also finds strong support for the claim 
that the environment fashioned by parents seems to carry the most weight in determining 
adults’ political interest.  Interestingly, she finds that parenting style, rather than the parents’ 
political activity per se, has a distinct role in terms of the future citizen’s comfort with 
politics.  The school also is an important player, however, especially in terms of improving 
cognitive skills early148, offering engaging and impressionable experiences, and in dedicating 
resources to extracurricular activities and other stimulants for political discussion.149  Shani 
thus effectively steers between the Scylla and Charybdis of social determinism (in terms of 
social-cultural location and feedback) and social mobility.  This will serve as a model for my 
own dissertation, as it is important to realize that moving beyond purely psychological 
accounts of public opinion (which I would argue are overly-dominant today) entails focusing 
on structural elements and the persistent fact of socio-economic inequality (in line with a 
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‘capabilities approach’).150  Even though such disparities have been found to be 
determinative for participation, for too long motivation has been considered to be 
independent of the distribution of resources and opportunities.151  As Shani writes, “class 
matters where we do not tend to think it does- in shaping motivation itself.”152  This bears 
important implications for compensatory socialization—although it may be extremely 
difficult to encourage positive parenting techniques from the outside153, engagement in 
school and in extracurricular activities with one’s peers may provide the type of cultural and 
cognitive resources important for bolstering political interest and pursuing greater equality 
across the public sphere.154 
 The socialization literature presents an opportunity to reconsider those factors which 
determine not so much what we think about politics, but how we come to think or care about 
politics.  This is relevant for theoretical work as well, particularly for deliberative theory.  
Critics argue that deliberation is bound to fail given how people are, whereas proponents 
respond that this ignores what people have the potential to become.155  Both seem to have 
forgotten the important insight that citizens do not spring into existence as reasoning adults, 
ready and willing to converse in a civil manner and deliberatively mull over the ‘facts of the 
                                                             
150 As CW Mills (1951, 169) wrote, “The life of an individual cannot be adequately understood without 
reference to the institutions within which his biography is enacted.”  
151 As evidenced in remarks by Prior and Verba (2008. 6), “known explanations for participation are more 
helpful for a theory of political interest to the extent that [they] pertain to motivation, not resources.”  Verba 
(2005, 102) also describes political interest as a “clear measure of motivation not dependent on resources.”  
152 Shani 2009, 446. 
153 As a link between social origin and cognitive ability, Shani discusses the parenting style of “concerted 
cultivation,” borrowed from Lareau, in which parents attempt to foster their child’s talents by routinely 
incorporating organized activities from an early age.  She includes examples such as: parents reading to their 
children, being involved in their education, planning for them to attend college, encouraging the development of 
opinions and exposing them to culture. Shani 2009, 452. 
154 See McDevitt and Chaffee. 2000; Beaumont et. al.  2006. 
155 Although I take issue with the shortcomings of the ‘rosy-eyed’ deliberativists, the dismissals of the former 
are even more important to contest.  As Sartori (1962, 88) writes, “the majority is passive not because they can’t 
read, but because of what they read; not because they cannot learn about politics, but because they are not 
interested in it.  It is nobody’s fault in particular, and it is time we stopped seeking scapegoats.”  
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matter.’  Rather, each of us has a rich biographical background (though some may be richer 
than others), and our preferences, principles and inclination to participate stem from a wide 
variety of influences, only some of which are in our power to control.  Returning to the 
importance of competition and pluralized inputs, it may be that while the lessons of 
childhood learned in the home are usually determinative, they compete with other socializing 
forces such as those found in school, peer networks, the workplace, marriage, social/political 
associations etc.  The focus moving forward should not necessarily be to determine which 
life stage or formative influence is singularly most important in these regards, but how the 
training and habituation of the deliberative citizen can be preempted across a concert of 
socializing spheres.   
 
Political (Non)Responsiveness 
Putting aside the question of how public opinion forms, a practical question is what it does in 
the American democratic context.  Put more simply, does opinion matter?  For better or 
worse, many students of democratic theory have proceeded from the assumption that the 
wishes, preferences, opinions, views, or beliefs of the citizenry somehow guide politics and 
policymaking.  V.O. Key Jr. is a classic example, “Unless mass views have some place in the 
shaping of policy, all the talk about democracy is nonsense.”156  The obvious question, 
however, begs an answer as to how this influence is achieved.  How are government officials, 
especially those elected, supposed to collect, digest, and act upon information regarding the 
demands or needs of various publics?  Assuming that this is even possible, how are they to 
assign weights to these perspectives and act upon them in the messy business of governance?  
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Are they to treat and respond to all input equally, regardless of origin and merit, or should 
they attempt to discern some general or ‘true’ interest as relates to the issue at hand? 
 For the moment, I put aside normative questions regarding ideals of representation or 
the place of judgment and authority, instead considering the empirical work that has 
examined how representation works in practice.  Over the last half-century, many researchers 
have attempted to study responsiveness in a variety of ways and with more-or-less reliable 
methods.  Miller and Stoke’s 1963 study of “Constituency Influence in Congress” initiated 
waves of research on this topic.157  Their dyadic method involved comparing district-level 
public opinion data with corresponding congressmen’s roll votes and responses to a separate 
survey regarding their constituencies.158  They found an overall modest relationship between 
the opinions of constituencies and congressperson’s roll call votes, differing substantially 
across policy areas (according to the ‘visibility’ and salience of given issues, e.g. foreign 
policy vs. civil rights legislation).  The limitations of constituency effects, however, were that 
they did not tell researchers more about the relationship of inputs to the production of 
policies (going beyond roll call votes).  Furthermore, because measures of the opinions of 
publics and policy votes were conducted on different scales and using different survey data, 
this severely undercut the possibility of saying something more definite about the ‘closeness’ 
or ‘proximity’ of opinion and action.159   
 Subsequent analyses were directed not only at the relationship between opinion and 
isolated government policies in dyads at particular points in time, but in aggregate and over 
long periods as well.  Studies such as those by Monroe in 1979 as well as Page and Shapiro 
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in 1983 found substantial evidence of opinion-policy congruence, exceeding fifty percent in 
the periods they studied.  This relationship was even stronger in cases of larger opinion 
majorities, dramatic opinion changes, and on high-salience issues.160  Monroe later extended 
this research and examined processes of party representation, finding that although it dropped 
several points in the 1980-1990s, opinion-policy congruence was roughly similar to the 
robustness of congressional correlations.161  Other studies of presidential responsiveness 
found noticeable congruence between public opinion and presidential position-taking and 
action (while noting the reality that presidents proactively shape the public’s attention to 
given issues and oscillate between focusing on policy and their symbolic role as heads of 
state).162  Perhaps more surprisingly, given its reputation as being politically-insulated (at 
least in theory), other studies found statistically-significant ties between national public 
opinion and rulings by the Supreme Court.163  As trend data became increasingly available, 
evidence accumulated that purportedly showed general governmental responsiveness to 
opinion over time.164 
The above has led many optimistic authors, such as the eminent scholar Robert 
Shapiro, to argue “the overall evidence—qualifications, contingencies, and all—provides a 
sanguine picture of democracy at work.”165  As Shapiro notes himself, however, the debate is 
far from over.  Measurement problems abound, and there are definite limits to what we can 
positively say about responsiveness in causal terms.166  On a more technical level, scholars 
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like Barabas point out a problematic starting point guiding much current research.  He argues 
that many studies suffer from the same liability: “they depend upon survey data to 
characterize public policy preferences…many researchers collect available public opinion 
data and then look to policy outcomes rather than first starting with a comprehensive set of 
national issues.”167  Many have criticized responsiveness studies on grounds of causal 
attributions or bias towards the status quo, but Barbaras argues that the subtler and more 
“insidious problem” is the mismatch between poll questions and the national issue agenda.168  
As Burstein recently pointed out, starting with opinion polls focuses on issues that the public 
considers important, and thus identify “the very issues on which the public is most likely to 
hold elected officials accountable, and on which, therefore, democratic governments are most 
likely to do what the public wants.”169  Even though polls are now ubiquitous (the 
implications of which are discussed in the next chapter), the irony is that relatively few of the 
questions polled pertain to policies on the national agenda.  This signals the problem of 
selecting denominators: if we begin with the national set of issues on the agenda, the findings 
on responsiveness look much worse.  This in fact is what Barabas found, and he concludes 
his article with the following:  “How well does democracy work in the United States? 
Answers vary, but the trends seem to be moving in the wrong direction from the standpoint 
of democratic theory—that is, people [especially the poor] seem less and less likely to get 
what they say they want from government.”170  Despite supposed advances in survey 
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research, the black box between opinion expression and the items taken up in policymaking 
continues to frustrate efforts to supply causal models of representation.171 
Of course, there is also a multitude of confounding variables embedded in the 
political environment complicating the measurement of political responsiveness.  Many 
critics persuasively point out trends working against cheerful variants of the ‘responsiveness 
thesis,’  including: increased partisan polarization in government, individualization in 
congress, incumbency effects, the ability of presidents and other leaders to use polling data to 
steer, persuade and manipulate public opinion (e.g. through ‘crafted talk’) rather than follow 
it, nonresponsiveness even on highly-salient issues (e.g. foreign aid, electoral reform, gun 
control), divisive interbranch relations (especially in the last decade), and the 
disproportionate power of money and organized interest groups in politics, driving 
‘segmented representation.’172  These intervening factors inhibit the construction of a 
parsimonious model of responsiveness, but perhaps an even deeper problem is that 
insufficient attention is paid to the question of which inputs and outputs should be considered 
in evaluating the transmission of opinion to governmental decision-making.  Although the 
answer to the former is usually the results polls or ballots, and policies or laws for the latter, 
we have already seen that one’s choice of numerators and denominators have dramatic 
consequences for assessing responsiveness.173  This selection itself says something important 
about researchers’ values, interests, and assumptions in making such assessments. 
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Regardless of one’s stance on how much responsiveness is ‘good’ for democracy, the 
increasing evidence that responsiveness is substantively determined by economic standing is 
certainly disconcerting.  It may well be argued that in taking responsiveness as their 
dependent variable, classical studies—as well as many of those conducted today—neglect 
important sources of variability in responsiveness.  Rather than question whether the system 
responds to input, it may be more productive to consider to whom it responds, when, and how 
this response is incentivized politically.174  This problem was recognized by Schattschneider 
over a half-century ago, when he noted that the biases of the pressure system correlate 
heavily with affluence.  He wrote, “The flaw in the [organized interest] heaven is that the 
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”175  While it is important not to use 
terms like ‘oligarchy’ lightly, or to prematurely condemn the political system as corrupt or 
nepotistic, there are certainly reasons for revisiting some of the more sanguine pictures of 
American representation and its democratic potentials.176 
 
Quasi-Sovereignty and the Challenges for Deliberative Democracy 
As should be obvious already, the idea that America represents the idea of democracy par 
excellence is problematic in light of findings in media studies, social-psychology, and 
political responsiveness.   This dissertation aims to demonstrate the difficulty of determining 
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the extent to which an ontologically-elusive public—and its needs, wishes, and preferences—
can be properly said to be sovereign in American politics.  Habermas is the central figure 
influencing my answer, as he and his various ‘faces’ provide a balanced analysis of 
deliberative and democratic challenges and potentials.  Nevertheless, there are central aspects 
of his discursive model of legitimacy that are empirically problematic.  For example, in his 
criticism of the “social-psychological liquidation” of the concept of public opinion, 
Habermas poses what I argue is an unhelpful analytic separation of communicative and 
strategic action.177  His counterfactual construction distinguishes between the type of social 
coordination that is achieved non-coercively (with the reason-giving norm oriented towards 
mutual understanding) and that which results from the coercive use of threats, bribes, and 
concealed motivations.   Habermas also equates strategic and instrumental action, in which 
the influence of rhetoric and symbology come at the expense of the motivations of the “ideal 
speech situation” whose outcome is determined by no force except that of “the better 
argument.”  Deliberation is meant to clear away political “muddying elements,” providing a 
legitimizing function.  Even in his later work, Habermas appears to continue to see the public 
as ontologically prior to and distinct from administrative, decision-making bodies.  While he 
may believe it to be dogmatic in a “harmless sense,” Habermas retains an idea of autonomy 
core to his discursive model in which “human beings act as free subjects only insofar as they 
obey just those laws they give themselves in accordance with insights they have acquired 
intersubjectively.”178  
 Habermas is not so starry-eyed so as to believe that these ideals are proximally 
realized in contemporary liberal-democracies.  As he writes, “I have no illusions about the 
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problems that our situation poses and the moods it evokes.”179  The public is increasingly 
peripheral to politics, decisionmaking, and the legislative process.  Opinion is massaged in a 
manipulative manner through the deployment of rhetoric, symbols, and ideological devices, 
so that the dynamics of mass communication “betrays relations of power which make a 
mockery of the presumption of a fair play of arguments.”180  The asymmetrical structure of 
mass communication turns deliberative participants who encounter political questions and 
controversies into “more or less passive spectators and consumers.”181  Polarization among 
the parties is exacerbated by influential elites on the inside, who serve to benefit from 
divisions in the mass public.  This is made explicit with Donald Trump’s election, which 
signals a neo-populist politics antithetical to the deliberative expectations of reason-giving, 
reciprocity, inclusion, and good faith.  An anonymous watching public stands by while actors 
on the stage demonstrate a seemingly ambivalent attitude towards the goal of reaching 
effective, binding decisions.  The rise of a type of politics compatible with ‘post-truth’ leaves 
open Habermas’ central question of whether democracy still has an epistemic dimension, 
given his admission that “once opinions degenerate into mere opinions, there is nothing left 
to deliberate about.”182 
 Nevertheless, the public remains a primordial force insofar as it is required for 
democracy to remain conceptually coherent as a political framework.  Furthermore, current 
understandings of public opinion’s origin, function, and importance require a deliberative 
dimension if the importance of popular sovereignty is to be ‘cashed out’ in contemporary 
politics; i.e. in bestowing legitimacy on the mediated processes through which legally-
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binding decisions are made, affecting subjects of the law.  Deliberation retains a 
transformative potential insofar as it refuses to take the citizen as she is, instead holding out 
for the promise of socio-political processes to shed light on domestic controversies, 
problems, and social ills if not leading to greater consensus on political paths to be 
pursued.  In the end, deliberative-democratic hopes depend on the cultivation of critically-
spirited, open-minded, and pragmatically-oriented civic dispositions, particularly among the 
youth.  This naturally requires greater attention to the enculturation of appropriate traits and 
habits in civil society, whether in educational, vocational and/or associational life.  It also 
mandates a realistic approach to politics, questions of political motivation, and sources of 
legal obligation.  In the end, the argument traced through the chapters is that the American 
people is ‘quasi-sovereign.’  This is to say that coercion on the part of the state is never 
perfectly legitimated.  Deliberation can and does take place, but rarely in authoritative 
institutionalized arenas and always in the context of value conflict, inequality, domination, 
and otherwise non-ideal politics. 
 In the next chapter, I take up issues of political opinion’s measurement, and the 
philosophical impetus behind the rise and hegemony of the opinion poll.  I reflect on how 
polling can and has served democratic purposes, but also how it tends to exacerbate 
confusion in the general public and allow for strategic manipulation on the part of political 
elites.   Consistent with my thesis, I argue that in many instances the practice and reception 
of polls tends to drive the abstraction of popular sovereignty, and obscure the ways in which 
popular opinions do or do not influence governance.  For these reasons, I extend 
deliberativists’ concerns regarding the often-explicit reduction of public opinion to poll 
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results.  This suggests not only the shortcomings of the industry, but its potentially-
deleterious effect upon the public sphere’s deliberative quality. 
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Chapter 2: The Holy Ghost of Public Opinion:  
The Use and Abuse of Polling 
 
 
 
The Meanings of Public Opinion  
 
‘Public Opinion’—a phrase persistently wielded in discussion by political and media elites, 
scholars, and casual political commentators all.  But what is it that we mean by public 
opinion?  What is the operational referent here?  Why does this mysterious force persistently 
crop up in discussions and debates about the current state of politics, society, and culture?  
As signified by the title of this chapter, such questions seem to have advanced very little 
since V.O. Key Jr., a prominent figure in public opinion research, observed “to speak with 
precision about public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.”183  
The most troubling aspect of this confusion is that public opinion is invoked all too often in a 
self-serving fashion, whether to legitimize the election of legislators and executives, the 
(non)pursuit of domestic and foreign policy, coverage of news stories, and in generalizations 
about prevailing trends in the general ‘public.’   
 Despite the elusiveness of public opinion, many continue to hold with conviction that 
it is indispensable as a conceptual bulwark of democratic politics, and that it can and should 
be measured often and rigorously for that reason.184  This is not to say that there is a 
consensus regarding the substantive role that public opinion should play.  For some it serves 
as a rather weak signal or measure of a hazy and imperfectly shared public ‘mood.’  For 
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others it is to be taken seriously as a mandate upon the direction of government.  This usually 
presumes that the people have definite and coherent preferences—more or less structured by 
ideological ordering—that should be respected and followed in the prioritization, design, and 
implementation of public policy.  Where one stands on this issue depends first on addressing 
the empirical question of whether or not public opinion ‘matters’ in today’s political context, 
i.e. in terms of preferences guiding the design and execution of policies.  This question also 
bears on one’s belief in the measurability of public opinion as an operational variable.  
Finally, as reflective of one of the longest-standing debates in democratic theory, is the 
normative question of the public’s proper role in legitimizing politics.   
 My responses to these questions will inevitably be polemical given the deep divisions 
in public opinion research, not to mention that I come at the question from a theoretical bent.  
I argue that, while public opinion might not matter in the ways that the most committed 
democrats may think, it continues to influence politics today in consequential ways.  Public 
opinion may not exist in a substantive form, i.e. as a signal of the vox populi or ‘Will of the 
People’ imagined in strong models of democracy.  Nevertheless, the specter of public 
opinion can lead to significant mobilizations or countermobilizations that effectively (even if 
inadvertently) enhance the political power and life prospects of members of the public.  If it 
is indeed mythical, I argue that public opinion has often proved an influential myth.  Thus, I 
affirm that public opinion does ‘matter,’ but only sometimes in service of democratic ends 
and even then in an oblique fashion. 
 To the second question regarding the measurability of this phenomenon, I embrace 
the critical position that can be traced to gadflies such as Herbert Blumer in the 1940s and 
Pierre Bourdieu in the 1970s.  I refrain from claiming that public opinion is ‘unmeasurable’ 
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(ironically it’s an empirical matter, as they say).  I do go so far, however, as to argue that 
despite purported improvements over the past half-century, survey and polling methods have 
largely missed their mark.  In attempting to hypostatize the white whale of public opinion by 
equating it with the results of aggregated opinion polls or sample surveys, empiricists have 
fallen back on an identification of public opinion which is normatively insufficient as well as 
scientifically-inconclusive.  The prevailing modes of detecting the opinion of the public have 
fallen short of statistical rigor, but more importantly they have failed to connect with more 
elementary and principled questions regarding the object of study.  A full appreciation of the 
legacy of public opinion and its ideational-historical background sheds light on the tendency 
of modern research to empty public opinion of its rich dynamism, effectively treating it as 
“virginal, preconstituted, prepolitical, presocial.”185 
 The answer to the third and most philosophically-difficult question depends on 
addressing the first two questions, but also hooks into debates about the larger aspirations of 
democratic politics.  For good reasons, one could argue that populist-elitist debates have 
unhelpfully characterized discussions of democratic theory for far too long, locking us into 
false alternatives and unrealistic ideal types.  Considering tensions in representative 
governance and its worth continue to drive debates regarding the proper role of the citizenry 
vis-à-vis the state.  If we truly live in an American republic ‘of, for, and by the people,’ a 
minimal degree of input on the part of the populous seems to be a non-negotiable starting 
point; especially if the average citizen to regard the state as legitimate in its inherently-
coercive faculty.  As will be discussed, many have attempted to deflate democratic 
enthusiasms in light of corroborated findings that allege the incapacity of the average 
American intellect to digest—let alone direct— the complex operations of government.  
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Where one stands on the question of popular legitimation thus depends on how persuaded 
one is by the methodological designs and substantive conclusions of these studies.  However, 
it also hinges on larger, perhaps undecidable, questions, e.g. whether the purpose of 
representative governance is to govern responsively or intelligently, and whether these 
functions are inherently at odds. 
 This discussion of the conceptualization of public opinion and its role in democratic 
politics is intended here to prepare the ground for a critique of modern deficiencies in 
thinking about and attempting to measure ‘public opinion.’  My discussion of the normative 
intricacies involved in answering the third question above will therefore spill over into the 
chapters that follow.  As I see it, however, the deflationary polemic logically leads to 
pressing questions regarding the substantial role for members of the mass public.  Once the 
usually implicit pretensions of statistical techniques and models of polling are brought under 
scrutiny and denied their bold claim to secure democratic legitimation, it should become 
clear that much work remains to be done in terms of analyzing the practical role of collective 
preferences in democratic politics.  My hope is that rather than taking my criticisms as a 
rejection or dismissal of empirical social science, they will resonate with sensitive readers 
and encourage a more thorough collaboration between theorists and empiricists in refining 
how we think about and measure public opinion.   
 
 
Dawn of the Poll: Measuring the ‘Pulse of Democracy’ 
 
Political consumers and junkies who tune in to their preferred news network or peruse the 
latest issue of their go-to journalistic source will inevitably note reports of the latest poll or 
survey that purports to describe prevailing political trends in the general public.  Some might 
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cynically scoff at the seeming ludicrousness of what these depictions claim to reveal about 
the American public, but many take these to be reflective of some underlying social-political 
reality.  Most consumers have probably heard of the Gallup poll, quite possibly without an 
idea of who George Gallup was or how enormous his influence has become in the boom of 
what I critically refer to as ‘statistical democracy.’  Here I devote some space to an 
examination of Gallup’s legacy and the booming polling enterprise, which I argue has led to 
some egregious fallacies and unproductive dead-ends in current studies of public opinion. 
 In order to appreciate Gallup’s legacy, it is crucial to first turn to the thought of James 
Bryce who so profoundly influenced the former’s enthusiasm for democratic measurement.  
Not unlike Alexis de Tocqueville a half-century before him, Bryce offers a number of 
observations on the essential aspects of American philosophy and the practice of democracy.  
In his view, “Every man knows that he is himself a part of the government, bound by duty as 
well as self-interest to devote part of his time and thoughts to it.”186  Furthermore, inherent in 
this duty was the categorical imperative that “every citizen has, or ought to have thought out 
for himself certain opinions, i.e., ought to have a definite view, defensible by arguments, of 
what the country needs, of what principles ought to be applied in governing it.”187  These 
dictates were uncomfortably paired with a realization of the tendency of private persons to 
deprioritize public questions.  Thus, in many ways similar to that ambiguous admirer of the 
American republic who preceded him, Bryce like Tocqueville recognized the important but 
tenuous role of the public’s authority in warding off arbitrary and unresponsible rule. 
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 It is no accident that Bryce has frequently been declared the ‘patron saint’ for 
pollsters who keep up the march in the modern era of public opinion research.188  This 
influence is evident in his belief that the democratic ideal would be achieved “if the will of 
the majority of citizens were to become ascertainable at all times, and without the need of its 
passing through a body of representatives.”189  George Gallup, who came along thirty years 
later with his colleagues Archibald Crossley and Elmo Roper, would take up the call of 
applying science to the detection of the democratic will.  Gallup’s background as a researcher 
of consumer preferences served as a natural segue to the political application of consumer 
feedback in the context of the ultimate survey: democratic elections.  He assumed the 
implementation of his commercial technique—once sufficiently specified and adapted—
would of the utmost importance in weeding out the loud voices of political interests and in 
drawing out and amplifying the murmur of ‘silent majorities.’   Until the end, Gallup 
unabashedly expressed his hope that the refinement of statistical methods would bring about 
a “truer democracy.”190 
 The above is not meant to suggest that Gallup was the first to apply technology and 
statistical techniques to the study of public opinion.  Though he would come to establish the 
American Institute of Public Opinion in 1935, what one might deem the official inauguration 
of the opinion poll, polling in the U.S. can be traced back to 1825 when the Harrisburg 
Pennsylvanian conducted a ‘straw vote’ to measure presidential sentiment in Delaware.191  In 
the 1890s, Reverend Walter Laidlaw in New York and W.E.B. Du Bois in Philadelphia 
conducted extensive projects in order to collect and tabulate information on their respective 
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urban neighborhoods.192  It was only in the early twentieth century that research became 
‘serious,’ however, as instantiated in the 1904 poll carried out by the New York Herald 
before the presidential election and repeated in subsequent elections until 1916.  Polls would 
begin to crop up in very diverse publications, e.g. Literary Digest in 1916, Farm Journal in 
1928, Women’s Home Companion in 1935, and Fortune in 1936.193  By this point, there were 
over eighty polling organizations, six operating nation-wide.194   
Gallup would rise to prominence in 1936 when he successfully predicted the Literary 
Digest’s incorrect forecast of Alf Landon’s win over Franklin D. Roosevelt.  The Digest’s 
error stemmed from its biased oversampling, drawn from phone directories, car registrations, 
mail questionnaires, of the views of the upper economic levels of the electorate.  As Gallup 
argued and is familiar to most all adherents of social science, the predictive power of 
polling/survey techniques stems from the greater reliability of representative sampling.  
Gallup wrote, “If a sample is accurately selected, it represents a near replica of the entire 
population.  It is a miniature electorate with the same proportion of farmers, doctors, lawyers, 
Catholics, Protestants, old people, young people, businessmen, laborers and so on, as is to be 
found in the entire population.”195  Though he himself was off by seven percentage points, 
FDR’s election was quickly accepted as a vindication of Gallup’s methods, and in the 
following years his interviewers would sweep across localities in America to survey diverse 
cross-sectional quotas of individuals sorted according to age, sex, SES and political 
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affiliation.196  The significance of his sampling doctrine cannot be overstated, as it has 
transformed the paradigm of social studies.  As Osborne and Rose put it, “the representative 
sample is probably as important to the social sciences in the twentieth century as the 
telescope was in the sixteenth.”197 
From the late 1930s through the 1950s, survey research grew substantially and 
became increasingly institutionalized.  State polls run or supported by newspapers, 
universities, and private polling firms saw exponential growth.  The federal government 
expanded its use of surveys, commercial polling and marketing firms grew in number and 
size, and institutes quickly grew oversees.  By the mid-century, seventeen countries were 
grouped under the International Association of Public Opinion Institutes, later redubbed as 
the Gallup International Association.198  Jean Converse argues that the confluence of booms 
in technological capacity, industrialization, and urbanization provided “fertile ground” for the 
emergence of modern survey research.199   Delli Carpini complements this analysis in her 
description of a “ménage à trois” between government, business, and academia.  These 
institutions were united by shared concerns regarding National Socialism, fascism, and 
communism, the propagandizing effects of mass media, economic conditions after the Great 
Depression, increasing nationalization of the domestic economy, and the need to bolster 
support for US involvement in WWII.200   
In terms of university-based institutions, Lazarsfeld founded the Bureau of Applied 
Social Research (originally the Office of Radio Research) in 1937, Field founded the 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in 1941, and Likert founded the University of 
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Michigan’s Survey Research Center in 1946.  Other important milestones included the first 
publication of Public Opinion Quarterly in 1937, the formation of the Committee on the 
Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and Consumer Wants by the National Research Council 
and the Social Science Research Council in 1945, and the formation of the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research by the NORC in 1947.201  These institutional 
developments had profound effects on subsequent public opinion research, and the new norm 
of using survey research as a key tool produced seminal works whose theoretical models and 
empirical findings continue to shape research agendas today. 
Just as the shift from straw polls to Gallup’s consumer model was necessitated by the 
need to refine and tighten methodologies, the latter’s preferred method of quota sampling 
would come under scrutiny in the 40s and 50s.  Multi-stage area sampling, which was used 
by academics and government researchers, would come to be considered as the sole 
legitimate method following a public debate in POQ in which Gallup was unable to account 
for his surveys’ irregularities.  Other developments included improvements in questionnaire 
design, the use of subjective measures and more detailed questions, broadened subjects 
surveyed, standardized documentation and reporting of data and methods, attempts to 
improve response options to constrain choice and minimize bias, the use of open-ended and 
closed-ended questions, the construction of multiple-item indices and scales, standardized 
interviewer training, and the inclusion of demographic questions which better enabled the 
analysis of the roots and influences of opinions and attitudes.202  Survey designs became 
increasingly hypothesis-driven, and methods to analyze data and reject alternate explanations 
were tightened.  Work by academics such as Lazarsfeld, Fiske, Berelson, and Gaudet also set 
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the trend of using large-scale panel surveys for measuring individual-level change and testing 
measurement reliability.  Researchers have become increasingly sensitive to critiques of 
cruder approaches to survey research, and are now including measures which allow insight 
into emotional response203, interviews of focus groups meant to be non-directional, deeper, 
set in personal contexts, and other implements that allow more specificity about processes of 
opinion formation and change. 204   
Methods and theories of the general purpose of survey research have continued 
develop since the 1960s, but as Delli Carpini argues this is largely an “afterword to the story 
begun in the 1930s.”205  Telephone surveys became a preferred survey mode by the 1980s in 
light of their quality control, speed, and low cost but later would come under fire given 
problems with sampling, interviewer effects, response reliability, and questionnaire design.  
Computers have enabled developments in sampling (especially Computer-assisted 
telephone/personal interviewing), database management, survey design, and data analysis.  
Despite their drawbacks in terms of sampling and survey monitoring, internet surveys have 
also pushed the frontier of public opinion research and continue to be refined.  Perhaps most 
importantly, as noted in the introductory chapter, emergent technologies, widespread and 
increasingly-affordable internet access, and overwhelming participation in social media have 
together allowed researchers streamlined access to study trends in the public.  Automated 
access to ‘big data’ has allowed researchers to gather historically-unparalleled amounts of 
low-cost information about consumers and citizens, the political import of which has shaken 
up traditional studies of public opinion.  Although surveying is still the most popular means 
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of tapping into the political trends characterizing the public, it remains to be seen how it will 
be partnered with cyber research and data mining.206 
Politically speaking, polls are now ubiquitous in the study, practice, and coverage of 
governance.  Polling has become a billion-dollar-a-year industry, and there are currently 
more than 1,200 polling firms in the U.S.  The boom of polls both public (sponsored by news 
organizations, foundations and universities) as well as proprietary (used by candidates, 
officeholders, and policy makers) demonstrates the diverse incentives driving public opinion 
research.  The Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton administrations began a trend that 
continues today in which the White House devotes substantial resources to assembling public 
opinion data and conducting “extensive public relations activities.”207  During the 2012 
presidential election, polling firms conducted more than 37,000 polls and made more than 
three billion phone calls.208  Though initially monopolized by presidents, polling data is now 
widely available to members of Congress and everyday citizens alike. The result has been the 
development of a whole new political ballgame—one in which image management and the 
binds of accountability have necessitated shifts in political strategy and the institutional 
balance of power.  The invention of the “rolling cross-sectional survey” has also been highly 
consequential in that it allows for tracking daily or weekly opinion change, which itself 
allows for detailed analysis of the influence of media, political and worldly events.209  While 
problematic in terms of reliability and influence, media-sponsored ‘exit polls’ have been used 
to capture the fresh opinions of voters and predict winners in state and national elections.210  
In brief, it seems to be the case that American politics is now under the “hegemony of public 
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opinion.”211  What this means exactly and how this political ‘reality’ corresponds with 
democratic norms is the central concern guiding this dissertation. 
 
 
Blumer’s Early Critique 
 
This discussion of Gallup’s legacy, circumscribed though it may be, underlines the 
astounding ascendance of survey research in the social sciences and of the poll as a 
democratic tool.  Taking a step back, however, it is equally important to note the influence of 
highly-critical voices proteesting the claims made by more zealous proponents of surveys and 
polls.  Chief among these antagonists ranked Herbert Blumer and Pierre Bourdieu after 
him.212  Blumer stands out in that he levels his critique at the very basis of the following 
claim from Gallup: “not only have the polls demonstrated by their accuracy that public 
opinion can be measured; there is a growing conviction that public opinion must be 
measured.”213  In their opposition, Blumer and those who continue to answer his call 
represent an important countervailing force lambasting the equation of opinion polls with 
public opinion, a fallacy which appears to maintain its strong grip today. 
In order to understand Blumer’s strong reaction to what he saw as an egregiously 
flawed starting point, it may be helpful to take a step back and discuss the influence of his 
intellectual nemesis in Floyd Henry Allport.  Widely considered a founder of experimental 
social psychology, Allport would build on the pointed criticisms made by Walter Lippmann 
in attempting to move the study of public opinion away from lofty philosophical abstraction.  
For Allport, metaphorical uses of the term serve no purpose except to distract and confuse, 
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and as such it makes no sense to use phrases such as ‘the voice of public opinion' or even to 
speculate about what the public wants.  While these ‘corporate fictions’ might have served 
well for transitioning to the modern era, some like Allport argued that they had outlived their 
scientific and democratic usefulness.  Allport’s influence is important to note here, if for no 
other reason than that his article “Towards a Science of Public Opinion” was the opening 
piece in the first issue of Public Opinion Quarterly in 1937.  Disregarding the postulations of 
political philosophers, Allport regarded public opinion as the arithmetic sum of individual 
expressions in favor of or against certain definite conditions.  He wrote, “opinions are 
reactions of individuals; they cannot be allocated to publics without become ambiguous and 
unintelligible for research.”214  Allport defines ‘public opinion’ in such a way that makes the 
public circular: a public denotes “the number of people holding a certain opinion, and the 
people holding that opinion would be identified as those belonging to that public.”  With this 
bold move, Allport eliminates the public from the definition of public opinion, given his 
dismissive regard for the latter as “superfluous for the purpose of research.”215  In line with 
his perspective, mainstream empiricist approaches adopting methodological individualism 
would come to overshadow holistic psychological approaches interested in the social 
conditions under which public opinion is formed.  Public opinion as an organic, social 
process was thus reconceived as a “measurable quantity that could be tapped by survey 
research.”216 
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Despite what some like Habermas have characterized as the worrisome “social-
psychological liquidation” of the concept of public opinion, many empiricists have followed 
Allport in privileging the attitudes expressed by individuals, aggregated to represent 
something called ‘public opinion.’  His contemporary, Harwood Childs, argued that “Public 
opinion always refers to a collection of individual opinions, not to some mystical entity that 
is floating about in the atmosphere over our heads…By public opinion we mean, therefore, 
simply any collection of individual opinions designated.”217  Bauer would echo this radical 
reconceptualization thirty years later, arguing “if the concept of public opinion is meaningful 
at all” it should be conceived as “the sum of all relevant individual opinions, as a cut through 
the peoples’ opinions.  It is thus nothing but summing of equal or at least similar opinion 
expressions of citizens inquired by ballot or opinion poll.”218  This is a striking example of 
how emerging research methodologies are not merely alternative modes or ways of ‘getting 
at’ the relevant question at hand, but can instead shift paradigms of study through the 
redescription of concepts and reordering the priorities of critical inquiry.219 
It is no surprise that Blumer, as a sociologist influenced by the work of George Herbert 
Mead, would become sensitive and resistant to the implications of early research on public 
opinion.  As in his influential theory of ‘symbolic interactionism,’ Blumer’s work was 
centrally concerned with the social origins of meaning and how socialized meaning is 
communicated and modified through interpretive processes.220  He argued strongly against 
the trend of structural sociological models that emphasize the standardized and routine 
expectations and behaviors of various social roles.  His insistence that the social sciences not 
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neglect the fluid and negotiated character of the social world thus relates directly to the 
aspirations of those who would advance Gallup’s vision.  Though his thought is difficult to 
capture summarily, the following is indicative of the broad thrust of his concern: 
 
The formation and expression of public opinion giving rise to effective public 
opinion is not an action of a population of disparate individuals having equal 
weight but is a function of a structured society, differentiated into a network of 
different kinds of groups and individuals having differential weight and 
influence.221 
 
According to Blumer, the statistical depiction of an undifferentiated ‘public’ fails to capture 
the hierarchical composition of the citizenry, and in placing the individual at the center 
neglects the harsh reality that not all opinions are created equal.  In many cases, responses 
have little weight or practical importance despite their ‘counting’ in polls. 
 Blumer’s broadside against the opinion poll might strike some as quaint and 
antiquated, given the advance of polling methods and technological supplements that have 
surely endowed the enterprise with a firmer basis for confidence.  With him and his 
intellectual progeny, however, I argue that the empirical study of public opinion and the 
mammoth industry which has grown up around it continually fail to distinguish their “generic 
object of study.”  The implied reducibility of public opinion to the measurements produced 
by polls, surveys, and other apparatuses indicates a worrisome level of intellectual laziness 
that fails to do justice to the complexity of the content under examination.  Again, the cutting 
bite of his critique should be presented in his own words: 
 
It may be argued that the isolation of a generic object…is a goal rather than an 
initial point of departure- and that consequently the present inability to identify 
public opinion as a generic object is not damning to current public opinion 
polling…However, what impresses me is the apparent absence of effort or sincere 
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interest on the part of students of public opinion polling to move in the direction 
of identifying the object which they are supposedly seeking to study, to record, 
and to measure…Their work is largely merely making application of their 
technique. 222   
 
An apparent obsession with methodology—rather than leading us closer to an understanding 
of the semiotic function of the phrase ‘public opinion’— has stymied academic pursuits in 
this area.  Blumer’s prescient critique has proved its staying power.  Many who have taken 
up his call to resistance recognize the limitations of a naïve approach to studying public 
opinion that fails to pay heed to the collective, interactive, and rational-discursive dynamism 
of intervening social and political forces.223   
One of Blumer’s lasting contributions was his emphasis that public opinion is formed in 
the context of groups, and that these groups have differential influence in society which 
results in the clash of political views and positions.224  This social dynamic shapes 
opportunities for expression, as well as the potential registration of such expressions by those 
who act strategically in response to public opinion.   By stipulating the originary impulses 
which give rise to public opinion, Blumer stakes his critique on the relevance of traditional 
notions of what it means to be ‘a public.’  As it stands, public opinion research guided by 
typical surveying and polling techniques continues to be frustrated in attempting to model the 
translation of individual opinions into “effective public opinion.”  This trend will continue, I 
argue, so long as these models fail to heed the complexities of the social world and the 
division of groups who interact within and between its hierarchical levels.225  It seems that 
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despite the claimed advances in public opinion research, we remain far from being able to 
confidently describe opinion processes and their relationship to the political agenda. 
Pollsters and those who support the paradigm usually point to the successful prediction 
of election results, but Blumer here too rejects the application of technique.  Though voters 
purportedly enter the voting booth as disparate individuals, each of whom has equal weight 
in relation to others, the same does not hold in the social processes through public opinion is 
formed.226  To hold that polling ‘captures’ the public’s opinion, according to Blumer, is not a 
defense of methods so much as it is a normative plea; one that proposes that “public opinion 
ought to be an aggregation of the opinions of a cross section of the population.”227  This is 
both insufficient and undesirable in Blumer’s view.  Mere referendum by an undifferentiated 
mass can, at best, operate as a “corrective supplement and not as a substitute” for the 
processes by which public opinion functions interactively, i.e. by “arousing, organizing, and 
effectively directing the opinion of people who appreciate that they have an interest in a 
given issue.”228  Institutional outlets and channels play an indispensable role in this process, 
but are secondary to the organic impulses uniting and dividing embodied beings in their 
various social stations.  Thus, Blumer maintains that the differentiated public is an essential 
engine of the democratic process and that prevailing trends in research do a disservice to the 
role of public opinion in this connection.  I argue that this remains the case today. 
 
 
The Construction of ‘Public Opinion’ 
 
Four decades after Blumer’s counter-rally, the introduction to the fiftieth anniversary edition 
of Public Opinion Quarterly featured Eleanor Singer’s triumphant announcement: “Blumer 
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was wrong!  However partial, misleading, or inconclusive the polls may be as indicators of 
public opinion, they are better than anything else we’ve got.”229  In the same issue, Phillip 
Converse would argue that “Blumer did not entirely understand the scientific tune” although 
also admitting that his rival’s definition of public opinion effectively directed studies in 
subsequent decades of research.230  Such premature dismissals notwithstanding, many have 
taken up Blumer’s call to question the association between opinion polls and public 
opinion.231  Although he may have underestimated the ability of survey modalities to 
describe important differences between groups in their dynamic positions in society, his basic 
challenge to researchers to do better in qualifying the social object under interpretation 
remains pertinent today.  In this section, I give a brief survey meant to reflect the diversity of 
these critical voices; united if by nothing else than their opposition to the ‘aggregative 
aspirations’ that arose in the early twentieth century. 
 Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the most well-known member of this critical cast, often 
associated with the shot heard round the research world when he declared “Public Opinion 
Does Not Exist.”  Though this audacious statement is often misunderstood by those 
uninterested or unwilling to read beyond the provocative title, this article identifies crucial 
assumptions made in studying public opinion that may not hold up empirically.  Bourdieu 
begins by stating three postulates.  First, “opinion polls wrongly assume that everyone is 
capable of producing an opinion.”232  This argument is based on what he referred to as 
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‘political competence.’233  Having opinions, he argues, is determined by one’s level of 
education, but even more importantly one cannot have an informed opinion if one does not 
perceive the political environment in the same way that a pollster does.234  Given the 
diversity of conceptual frameworks used to discern the political environment, some may not 
recognize pollsters’ questions as political at all (e.g. having to do with the choices and 
implementation of public policies).  As he argues, some might understand questions about 
their ‘vision of society’ as a moral question or as a question about educational, 
environmental, economic etc. policy rather than as a political question, per se.235  Aside from 
issues surrounding the interpretation of questions being asked, polls that deliberately exclude 
‘don’t know’ or ‘non-response’ answers to less familiar and more nuanced topics tend to 
exacerbate representational inequalities among groups.236  As Althaus writes, and in line with 
Bourdieu’s theory of the cultural reproduction of inequality, “when informed respondents are 
overrepresented in the pool of opinion givers, collective opinions give disproportionate 
numerical weight to the voices of socially advantaged groups.”237 
Bourdieu’s second postulate is that, “polls suppose that all opinions in a given survey 
are equivalent, in terms of value when this is rarely the case.”238  This criticism together with 
the first echoes Blumer’s critique of the assumption of uniformity or equality in opinion 
formation and expression.  He argues that the pretense to neutrality and objectivity in most 
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surveys denies or ignores the existence of real political controversies and social antagonisms.  
In order to create a more meaningful link of private opinion to political context, Bourdieu 
advocates that pollsters should report the “already formulated” positions of extant interest 
groups to respondents in order to replicate the ways in which most orient themselves in the 
real-world.  His third criticism is that, “conducting a poll about a particular issue or set of 
issues assumes that there is agreement or consensus about the importance of these issues.”239  
In the selection of a battery of survey questions, polls implicitly assume a consensus about 
the weight of the issues being included.  By ignoring the conflictual processes in which 
unequal opinions are formed and imposing an issue agenda, opinion polling creates an 
illusion “that a unanimous public opinion exists in order to legitimate a policy, and 
strengthen the relations of force upon which it is based or make it possible.”240  Coming from 
the perspective of critical theory, Bourdieu claims—contra Gallupian enthusiasts—that 
opinion polls are an example of the symbolic use of science and techno-rationalization that 
perpetuates the dominant influence of the powers that be. 
 Bourdieu’s intellectual mantle was taken up by Benjamin Ginsberg in the 1980s, and 
the latter may well be argued to have escalated opposition to the ‘poll-will’ equation.  In 
describing what he viewed as the poll’s contribution to the “domestication of mass belief,” 
Ginsberg  argued that the 20th century saw a ‘Second Great Transformation,’ one in which 
there was a boom of state power enabled by the government’s ability to extract revenue from 
its citizens.  In this transformation, there occurred four key parallel shifts in the formative 
origin and expressive character of opinion.  First, while earlier mass beliefs were formulated 
through devolved social processes, state agencies became intimately involved in their 
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formation.  Second, western governments shifted the social basis of public opinion from class 
to market, and in so doing converted the lower social classes from producers to consumers of 
opinion.  Third, governments restructured the political foundation of mass opinion by 
changing the political perspective underlying popular attitudes from an “adversary to a 
proprietary” view of the state.  The fourth shift came when governments recast the mode of 
expression of public opinion—where it once was a spontaneous, citizen-initiated act in terms 
of informal associations in civil society, it has now become a formal, routine, and pacified 
public function.241 
Ginsberg argues that polling has become a key, institutionalized process that exhibits 
many of the domesticating tendencies characteristic of the contemporary age of politics.  
Noting many of the same perverse influences that concerned Bourdieu, Ginsberg argues that 
polls do not merely tap the democratic pulse but are actively involved in producing a 
generalized and highly dubious picture of the mass public.  Complementing the changes 
discussed above, he provides yet four more ways in which polls in particular have played a 
part in the “transformation of opinion from a politically potent, disruptive force to a more 
docile, plebiscitary phenomenon.”242  First, polling alters what is expressed or taken to be the 
mass opinion when public opinion loses its voluntary character and becomes an externally 
subsidized matter.  Second, polling modifies the manner in which opinion is publicly 
presented when public opinion becomes an attitudinal rather than behavioral phenomenon.  
Third, the question of the origin of beliefs is redirected when public opinion becomes an 
attribute of individuals rather than a property of groups.  Finally, polling partially removes 
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individuals’ control over their personal public expressions of opinion by shifting public 
opinion from a spontaneous assertion to a constrained response.243 
One need not necessarily ascribe to a Marxist or Foucauldian reading of power 
dynamics and the moderns trend of rationalization in order to appreciate the challenges 
presented by thinkers like Bourdieu and Ginsberg to the industry of public opinion.  Susan 
Herbst takes up Blumer’s torch in arguing that public opinion should be considered a social 
construct—one that arises from ideas about contemporary democracy, the methodologies and 
technologies attempting to measure opinion, invocations by political leaders and policy 
makers, and especially the journalistic reporting and interpretation of polls and public 
opinion in mass media.244  In an approach inspired by Murray Edelman and indicative of the 
post-modern critical constructivist perspective, Herbst critiques the naïve positivism of 
empiricists who approach the measurement of public opinion as if it were some type of 
observable, unitary entity, ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered in the world and faithfully 
represented in reports.245  Instead, she argues that sample surveys and polling are facets of a 
narrow and distinctly modern understanding of ‘public opinion.’  On the face of it this may 
seem banal, but she argues that the implications of this claim are lost on those who forget that 
the ‘numbering of voices’ is symbolic and ceremonial, rather than a strictly scientific 
endeavor as some would like to believe.246  Symptomatic of the modern obsession with 
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technical mastery and rationalization, these scientific apparatuses may be useful for some 
political purposes, but can hardly ‘capture’ or do justice to the social processes that give rise 
to political identities and their expression.247 
It is not difficult to imagine objections to this understanding of public opinion as 
constructed and symbolic, especially given the vast amount of energy and resources that have 
been dedicated to developing gauges and metrics.  Herbst argues, however, that this would be 
to misunderstand the critique at hand.  It is not necessary to argue that opinion polls are 
useless, contrived instruments that waste everyone’s time by attempting to statistically 
conjure some illusory entity.248  A thorough-going appreciation for the contextuality of 
public opinion as a social construct, however, does dictates that we avoid narrowly equating 
the outcomes of polls or surveys with the vox populi.  Andrew Perrin pushes for a greater 
appreciation of the sociological aspects of public opinion, and argues that studies must 
consider the ontologically-obscure status of the public being represented.  He therefore 
argues for a conceptualization of public opinion that “relies upon polling techniques 
alongside other investigative modes but that understands public opinion as dynamic, reactive, 
and collective.”249  Viewing the paradigm of the sample survey and opinion poll as cultural 
forms opens up the possibility for appreciating other, more eclectic forms of popular 
expression.  Sometimes these communicative repertoires will fulfill textbook expectations of 
the citizen—e.g. as politically engaged, informed and interested—that implicitly guide 
political questionnaires.  More often, however, they will not. 
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Persistent Pathologies in Public Opinion Research 
 
The critiques above are indicative of a diverse ensemble of thinkers objecting to the 
limitations of public opinion research and its basic starting points.  The path dependence of 
Gallup’s surveying innovations in the early 20th century—driven largely by the intersecting 
interests of commercial, governmental, and academic organizations—has had significant 
ramifications for attempts to examine the relationship between democratic theory and 
practice.  While some from a more methodological bent are primarily concerned with the 
imperfect operation of polls and surveys —suggesting remedies by which we might more 
accurately represent the thing we call public opinion—my critique here is more fundamental 
and casts doubt upon the poll’s status as the paradigmatic ‘measure’ of public opinion.  
Critics such as Blumer, Bourdieu, Ginsberg, and Herbst are valuable for us today as they 
question what has become a deep commitment to the techniques and presuppositions 
characterizing the industry of public opinion.  As I stated at the outset, it is not my intention 
as a democratic theorist to dismiss these technologies and starting points out of hand; though 
in the end I do suggest they can have pernicious effects both conceptually and practically.  
Neither do I want to go down the path of political metaphysics in making an argument for the 
true meaning of public opinion and how it should be appropriately understood.  Like those 
critical voices discussed above, my modest hope is to clear some of the brush that has 
occluded ways forward in public opinion research. 
 Despite the limitations of labels and academic camps, I consider myself a 
deliberativist.  This term of course means different things to different people.  One tenet that 
is key to all who identify with this persuasion, however, is the centrality of public 
communication for legitimate, democratic decision-making.  This principle is invariable for 
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both those who argue for a more insulated, elitist conception of deliberation as well as those 
who envision a universally robust participatory model involvign all affected.  Blumer’s 
seminal work accords with the worries of those across the deliberative spectrum, as he 
questions the poll’s modus operandi in aggregating individuated responses to pre-generated 
questions and confidently identifying this as ‘public opinion.’  If this was a stylized academic 
fad, the need for concern may not be so great.  The poll is no flash in the pan, however, and I 
argue that it has generally hindered rather than progressed Gallup’s initial vision for a 
cultivating more thorough-going democratic relationship between the citizenry and the state.  
Despite the fact that polls are often presented by academic, journalistic and political elites 
with a paradoxical mixture of confidence and distrust, this ambiguity has generally not stood 
in the way of their enthusiastic embrace.  If this dissertation accomplishes nothing else, it 
will clarify that the phrase ‘public opinion’ truly connotes a mystery rooted in the 
mythologies of democratic theory, and thus cannot be used as narrowly as it is in current 
practice without doing a disservice to its intellectual heritage. 
 Salmon and Glasser do an excellent job characterizing the motivations and limitations 
of public opinion as currently studied.250  As an inspiration for this dissertation, they manage 
to acknowledge the embeddedness of polls in our political culture and discourse, while 
acknowledging their shortcomings and frequently-perverse influence.  As an example of their 
conciliatory approach, they write: 
 
Even at our contentious best, we would not suppose that polls of opinions could—
or even should— disappear.  Survey research can add considerably to our 
knowledge of the political processes.  When used to simulate the outcome of an 
election, for example, surveys of samples of likely voters can yield interesting and 
usually reliable results.251 
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This is important to note, for few would argue that the poll and pollsters should be dispensed 
with altogether, notwithstanding the dubious foundations for the enterprise.  As I stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, the poll is not practically pointless if it generates mobilization and 
countermobilization, greater attention to issues, and consistency between preferences, 
priorities, and policies.252  Surveys of public opinion can be developed with an eye towards 
context, group interactions, and longitudinal developments of attitudes and preferences.  
Gauges of public opinion may very well be symbolic and frequently used to sustain the status 
quo, but they can also have beneficial effects in terms of making the political process more 
inclusive and raising unaddressed issues to the foreground.  The key point, however, is that 
polls do not encompass many of the valences of public opinion.    Cue Salmon and Glasser’s 
haymaker. 
 
When used as a gauge of “public opinion,” polls not only miss their mark but shift 
the target…polls offer at best a naïve and narrow view of democracy; they posit a 
conception of participation that confuses a plebiscitary system with a democratic 
one.  Moreover, polls defy the “publicness” of public opinion; by operationally 
defining public opinion as a compilation of individual opinions, polls in effect 
disclaim any requirement for individuals to stake a public claim for their opinions 
and the reasons for them.  Basically, Blumer was right.253 
 
An uncritical embrace of the practice of polling not only fails to redeem early promises that 
these efforts would serve to enhance the legitimacy of democratic politics; the design, 
execution, and reporting of polls can and has been used to pacify a disenfranchised public 
and perpetuate undemocratic trends.  Polls may provide some ground, however shaky, for 
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253 Salmon and Glasser 1995, 449-50 
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generalizations about where the American people stand or sit.  This parsimony comes, 
however, at the expense of appreciating the thicker, dynamic processes that are formative for 
citizens of many different stripes. 
 The utilization of polls has effectively incorporated a voting framework into the study 
of public opinion.  As sociologists like Blumer and Herbst note, however, this seemingly 
innocuous application rests on assumptions regarding the average citizen and their approach 
to politics, not to mention the psychological distinctions between intrasubjective and 
intersubjective experience.  Salmon and Glasser liken this to the attempted adaptation of 
technologies for measuring heat to the measure of light—although the latter phenomenon 
often accompanies heat, it is conceptually distinct.254  Aside from questions of whether the 
rational choice model aptly describes the concerns guiding the active/engaged voter, it 
simply isn’t viable to think of the formation of public opinion within a market-based 
framework.  To subscribe to the idiomatic ‘one person, one vote’ in relation to public opinion 
misses the fact that preferences are often  unfixed, heteronomous, and not wholly-guided by 
self-interest, nor are they equally weighted as inputs or reached through reflection about the 
maximization of personal and societal goods.255   
 One of the most common defenses of public opinion as the results of polls is that, 
while imperfect, polling allows us to reliably predict the outcome of elections.  Aside from 
the growing body of substantial evidence that refutes this claim, I argue that this argument 
from results does not trump the deeper conceptual concerns of those who continue to resist 
the reductionism at hand. 256  As Blumer wrote, “the success attending polling in the 
prediction of elections gives no validity to the method as a means of studying, recording or 
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measuring public opinion as it forms and functions in our society.”257  Polls have become so 
dominant—both in the media landscape and as material for the strategic maneuvering of 
political insiders—that it is plausible to argue that they have contributed to alienating the 
public rather than enhancing its role in politics for the cause of democratic legitimacy.  The 
same critique applies to those who point to politicians’ attention to the results of polls while 
conducting campaigns or in their time in office.258  Rather than representing one modest 
measure of the opinion of the public amongst many other activities and forms of 
communicative expression, the poll and its cousin in the vote are now taken to be the 
paradigmatic if not solely efficacious signals of what is happening ‘out there’ in society.259  
Many still seem entranced by Elmo Roper’s claim that the public opinion survey represents 
“the greatest contribution to democracy since the introduction of the secret ballot.”260  I, for 
one, am not so sure. 
 
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Studying Public Opinion 
 
The scope of my task as an opponent to prevailing norms in public opinion research is 
admittedly daunting.  Researchers, media elites and political figures have invested a 
tremendous amount of energy and resources guided by the belief that current understandings 
and approaches to measuring public opinion have revealed information vital to the efficiency 
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and legitimacy of the American democratic process.  I share the general aspiration to enhance 
and democratize modes of political communication and the transparency of the political 
process, but argue that the ‘numbering of voices’ has been detrimental to these noble goals.  
The poll is no longer just one of many signals and measures of political climate, but has 
become the dominant paradigm that often purports to be synonymous with public opinion.  
As argued above, the poll almost always takes it starting point from individual responses to 
survey questions that attempt to solicit information about factual knowledge or general 
attitudes.  This is not undesirable, in itself.  Where polls become counterproductive or even 
malignant is when they take such aggregated results to be indicative or representative of a 
greater public in a strongly determinative sense.  Without supplementing these contrived 
gauges with other, more robust instruments of observation that examine the motivated 
formation and behavioral aspects of the public, we shall know little about the dynamics of 
how opinion is formed, shaped, and made effective in the political process.  Absent such 
thick descriptions and a faithful attention to the ways in which members of the public come 
into contact with politics (if at all), I reject the poll’s pretense as democratic.  
 The difficulty of waging this kind of attack on what seems to be an established 
enterprise is that my critiques are not merely methodological.  Indeed, what I find 
pathological in the current mode of opinion polling is intimately wed to a set of substantive 
and normative issues in political theory that have persisted for millennia.  If the poll’s 
accuracy could be bolstered by a greater attention to the subtle aspects of questioning, the 
nature of interviewing, sample bias and sample error, for example, the task at hand would 
merely be a matter of technical refinement.  What I am arguing is that the poll suffers from a 
deeper problem of philosophical validity, and that statistical measures such that they are fail 
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to live up to their accompanying normative rationales.261  I am not calling for the total 
abandonment of polls in light of this gap between theory and practice—not only because 
such a call would surely be ignored in the current intellectual and political climate.  The point 
of this dissertation is rather to unite the concerns of those who study the empirical aspects of 
political representation and public opinion with those of theorists and philosophers interested 
in the normative status of the citizenry vis-à-vis the state.  Howard Schuman frames the 
problem succinctly when he writes, “the aim is to understand as well as possible what we 
have measured and how it can best be interpreted in the larger world of which surveys are 
one abstracted part.”262  To properly appreciate the picture of the public provided by polls 
goes hand in hand with recognizing that they at best provide a narrow glimpse into the 
complicated dynamics—environmental and psychological—that drive opinion formation and 
political behavior. 
 Scott Althaus has recently offered a helpful corrective in describing ‘false starts’ and 
‘dead ends’ that have led empirical research on public opinion to misjudge normative 
rationales for modern democracy.  Two false starts which he discusses are related to issues of 
political epistemology directly relevant for this dissertation.  First is the presupposition that 
public opinion should serve to evaluate governmental policies.  This takes public opinion as a 
form of coercive feedback that helps to hold political leaders accountable for actions taken.263  
It is problematic in that it begins with a strong assumption that citizens should develop 
preferences over a broad range of public policies (functioning as ‘generalists’), an aspiration 
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which is hardly ubiquitous in normative democratic thought.264  Second, is the apparent 
problem of an ill-informed public and its consequences for democratic practice.  Althaus 
reexamines the founders’ distrust of mass politics and the fact that thinkers of the theoretical 
canon largely reserved expectations of engaged debate and sophistication for a select 
minority.  His criticism of this second false start is summarized in his claim, “for most of 
recorded history the political ignorance of ordinary people was more a ‘given’ than a 
‘crisis.’”265  These false starts give way to dead ends, especially when research is driven by 
an infatuation with competence that lacks clear philosophical moorings.   
In taking up the issue of voter competence and its relationship to the practice of 
surveying the people, Althaus is distinctly focused on the issue of opinion quality.  While this 
has not been the central theme of my critique here, its relationship to the use and abuse of the 
poll is of the utmost significance.  The following provides a helpful gloss of his argument: 
 
Sometimes collective preferences seem to represent something like the will of the 
people, but frequently they do not.  Sometimes they rigidly enforce political 
equality in the expression of political viewpoints, but often they do not.  In the 
final analysis, the primary culprit is not any inherent shortcoming in the methods 
of survey research.  Rather, it is the limited degree of knowledge held by ordinary 
citizens about public affairs and the tendency for some kinds of people to be 
better informed than others.266 
 
 
He notes that people who are more knowledgeable about politics tend to register their 
opinions with greater frequency than those who are less familiar with the political world.267  
This means that the registry of political voice is often unequal according to age, gender, race, 
and ethnicity when these are correlated with low information.  Another point is that those 
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who are well informed are better able to form opinions consistent with their political 
predispositions, broadly construed to include needs, wants, and values.268  These dynamics 
can compound to create information effects in the measure of public opinion, i.e. bias in the 
shape of collective opinion is driven by low levels and uneven social distributions of political 
knowledge.  This effectively grounds Althaus’ thesis that “strong and stable majority opinion 
can often be a figment of the public’s misinformation.”269 
The upshot of Althaus’ argument points to the importance of recognizing prevalent 
trends of civic inequality and the ways in which current practices of surveying seem to 
willfully ignore variation in political information and interest.  He is also masterful in driving 
a wedge between collective preferences and the vox populi, arguing that polls fall short of a 
standard of ‘active voice,’  but are also more influential than an ‘information only’ 
perspective might suggest.270  As he argues, the results of surveys should not be conflated 
with democratic will for several good reasons.  He first critiques the idea that matching the 
demographic characteristics of a sample to that of a population is a sufficient definition of 
representation, noting that descriptive representation can often clash with the representation 
of interests (however conceived).  He also takes issue with the supposition that descriptive 
representation in a sample of respondents translates into descriptive representation in the 
group of people who give opinions.  This is tied to the inequality driven by informational 
biases discussed above, and the issues posed by either including or omitting ‘Don’t Know’ or 
‘No Opinion’ responses.  His third critique of the survey’s claim to egalitarianism is that 
equality at the individual level is no guarantee of proportionality at the group level.  Due to 
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‘dispersion effects,’ the shared characteristics of individual inputs can create power 
inequalities among groups when votes or opinions are aggregated together.271     
In addition to the three critiques above, Althaus provides normative reasons for taking 
surveys with a grain of salt.  First, the population gives no formal consent to be represented 
by sample surveys.  This might be called the problem of authorization.  Second, respondents 
may well be unaware that they represent others and that their responses may carry weight in 
the political process.272  Third, survey results are not deliberative in the sense that they 
eschew the formative, intersubjective forms of discourse that ideally lead to an expanded 
view of interests and preferences.  Fourth, surveys create a public voice that is reactive rather 
than active (cf. Blumer, Bourdieu, and Ginsberg).273  Fifth, aggregative procedures produce 
results that may be at odds with individual preferences.274  Althaus is thus able to level 
fundamental criticisms at the practice of polling and its claim to bolster equal representation 
of voice, while also providing specific remedies in recognition that “opinion polling is here 
to stay.”275 
One of Althaus’ most important contributions is his advice for breaking out of 
hackneyed debates regarding the ‘nature’ of public opinion.  Rather than asking what it is, he 
recommends research focus on kinds of representation that polls might best provide relative 
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to other indicators of public opinion.276  In line with classic critiques, this would pay heed to 
the role of organized groups as a fundamental component of political representation.  
Viewing public opinion as a system of social indicators involving collective preferences and 
decisions, as well as various types of individual and group activities, is an important but 
neglected way forward in addressing these issues.  Althaus postulates that the abandonment 
of this conceptual framework, exemplified by thinkers such as Blumer, Key, and Lazarsfeld, 
was due to several key factors, including:  
 
the rise of the mass society paradigm for understanding public opinion processes, 
the waning influence of sociological theory and waxing importance of 
psychological theory in orienting contemporary public opinion research, the 
ascendancy of the sample survey as a dominant tool of social inquiry, and the 
increased specialization of knowledge that has accompanied the development and 
expansion of social science disciplines over the last 50 years.277 
 
Althaus does pay compliments to the general motivations of survey research, which has been 
continually refined and is increasingly alert to areas in need of improvement.  In terms of the 
appropriate political uses of the opinion survey in a mass democracy, however, he argues that 
researchers have pursued a methodological agenda that has “allowed normative inquiry to 
wither on the vine.”278  A more attuned sensitivity to the questions raised by normative 
inquiry might encourage a deeper discussion of what is valuable in citizenship and what type 
or degree of representation is desirable.279  The opportunities to revamp public opinion 
research will likely go unredeemed, however, unless we “orient our empirical findings to 
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familiar signposts, and check our philosophical assumptions using reliable touchstones.”280  
It is my hope that this dissertation will serve such a mutual reorientation in how we study, 
measure, and think about public opinion in liberal democracies. 
 James Druckman is the second of my academic exemplars who manages to unite 
empirical and normative questions on this front.  Building on his highly-influential work in 
political communication, he argues that for too long research on democratic representation 
and public opinion formation have largely ignored one another. 281  Although he is concerned 
with the inordinate amount of research that investigates citizens’ competence to engage 
meaningfully with politics, I view his more important contribution to lie in his emphasis on 
opinion formation’s endogeneity within the political process.  Building on Lisa Disch’s work, 
he challenges the basic presuppositions of democratic responsiveness in the terms of the 
‘bedrock norm,’ i.e. that citizens’ preferences serve as a foundation for social choice so that 
representation is “linear and dyadic.”282  Instead, he argues based on extensive research that 
citizens do not have the fixed and exogenous preferences as often assumed, but are shaped by 
the media, elites, and political events in substantial if indeterminate ways.  This is what Disch 
refers to as the ‘constituency paradox’: elite influence is strategic and takes place in a 
competitive setting over time so that representatives are actively involved in creating the very 
constituencies which they claim to represent.283  This is an important corollary to the 
argument posed by Althaus, as it takes up not only the low quality cognitive makeup of a 
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largely uninformed public, but also how opinion comes about through the unequal interaction 
of groups across the hierarchies of the public sphere. 
 Druckman makes important points about the shortcomings of the average citizen 
when measured according to the normative expectations of the ‘informed voter,’ also 
revisitinig whether or not deficits of knowledge matter in terms of effective governance.284  
For my purposes here, however, I am more interested in the conceptual pivots which he 
prescribes for the study of opinion.  In line with the deliberativist worries posed above, 
Druckman argues that we will not advance academically or politically so long as we remain 
mired in narrowly-framed understandings of public opinion’s constitution.  He advocates that 
focus less on “the content/substance of opinions...and more on the process and specifically 
the motivation that underlies the formation of that opinion.”285  A shift to issues of motivation 
could helpfully explore, for example, whether and to what extent people are driven by the 
motivation towards accuracy (i.e. arriving at the ‘best’ opinion given substantive 
information), directional and defensive motivation (i.e. defending prior opinions regardless 
of information), or an interaction of the two.286  As noted above, there is also much work to 
be done on the constitution of interest, and how values and emotion play a pivotal role in 
determining dispositions towards politics and political involvement.  In taking up the ways in 
which attitudes and preferences are formed, there is an opportunity to unite the literature on 
attitudes and behavior in both psychological and intersubjective dimensions.  It is for these 
reasons that I spend later chapters discussing the role for social contexts in shaping the 
                                                             
284 I come back to these in later chapters, especially in considering the proper adaptation of deliberative models 
in response to the paradoxical expectations of the citizenry posed by Disch. 
285 Druckman 2014, 24. 
286 Ibid., 25. 
 91 
citizen and her preferences, as well as the implications of this malleability for democratic 
theory and changing expectations of citizenship and democratic responsiveness.287 
 
Reimagining the Democratic Function of Public Opinion 
The foregoing themes do not necessarily point to a rampant culture of consumption or the 
refeudalization of the public sphere as have been often warned about.  The narrowing of the 
main concept under discussion does seem, however, to jettison the ‘public’ out of ‘public 
opinion.’  If it is true that all we observe today are nonpublic opinions, it is important to alert 
or remind those studying and acting upon polling data that their enterprise proceeds from a 
highly controversial starting point.  Despite the protests of those invested that this 
methodology represents the ‘best that we’ve got,’ I argue that polling is essentially 
constrictive in primordializing the individual and her attitudes over groups in their various, 
conflicting activities.  As I will argue throughout this dissertation, while the individual is 
generally important as a unit of analysis, studying her atomistically in an artificial setting and 
adding hers to a subset of other similarly isolated and constrained responses will likely tell us 
little to nothing very interesting about ‘public opinion’ in general.288  I argue that polls more 
often obfuscate than faithfully represent this white whale, and that it is high time to decide 
whether the ‘public’ is an entity worthy of respect in democratic theory, or is to treated with a 
wink and a grin. 
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 In this chapter, I have considered the status of public opinion research, most notably 
the purported democratic role of the opinion poll and sample survey.  Drawing on potent 
sociological and philosophical critiques, I’ve suggested that the poll is but one mode—and a 
deficient one at that—of understanding public opinion and thus represents something like a 
cultural form.289  The key danger is that producers and consumers of polls are often left with 
the impression that the outcome of highly-artificial solicitations drawing out individuated 
responses from more-or-less informed voters captures the opinion of the public.  An even 
greater cause for concern lies in the fact that, while politicians may not always lend much 
credence to the substance of opinion polls, they inevitably factor into the communicative and 
political strategies that are adopted in both legislative and executive politics.  In this 
connection, the sanguine belief that polls have and will continue to serve in bolstering the 
equal representation of political voice deserves sober revisitation. 
 Jill Lepore recently wrote a brilliant article examining the use of the poll in recent 
presidential primaries.  In her discussion of “Politics and the New Machine” she draws upon 
the history of polling discussed in this chapter as well as informed insights of insiders 
sensitive to the use and limitations of statistical methods in political connections.  Her central 
question of what the turn from polls to data science means for democracy reveals a troubling 
picture, to say the least.  She enumerates the problems associated with typical means of 
surveying via telephone landlines, and how generational and technological shifts severely 
complicate obtaining what are deemed to be representative samples of respondents.  Beyond 
these more implementational issues, however, are the substantive concerns shared by many 
democratic theorists.  She writes, “data science can’t solve the biggest problem with polling, 
because that problem is neither methodological nor technological.  It’s political.  Pollsters 
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rose to prominence by claiming that measuring public opinion is good for democracy.  But 
what if it’s bad?”290  This gets down to the crux of the issue, which has to do not so much 
with whether surveys and polls might be improved but if they work against their own raison 
d'être as a supposed democratic implement. 
 As Lepore notes, polls are largely unregulated and often misunderstood despite their 
currency in the political process.    The turn to data science since the 1960s represents one 
more step in this direction.  She writes, “if public-opinion polling is the child of a strained 
marriage between the press and the academy, data science is the child of a rocky marriage 
between the academy and Silicon Valley.”291  Updating and building upon Blumer’s attack 
on the fascination with method and technique rather than the original object of inquiry, 
Lepore discusses the dangers of social-science surveys run amok.  One specific problem is 
that academics are now selling their research to corporations who employ them.  When this 
happens, their work becomes proprietary and their methods are not available for scrutiny as 
they would be in a peer-reviewed academic journal.  An even more egregious trend is that 
given falling response rates to surveys, which today are usually in the single digits, it has 
become common practice for likely voters to be specifically targeted in order to hone election 
predictions.  Instanced by a company called Polimetrix, data scientists now can use ‘matched 
sampling’ in order to generate a random sample according to dozens of ‘variables of 
representativeness’ and to determine who will participate in polls.  The emerging norm of 
cherry-picking ‘relevant’ members of the public (i.e. likely voters) essentially violates one of 
the primary justifications of polling as egalitarian and in service of disenfranchised citizens.   
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The implications of utilizing enhanced technologies for political purposes were 
foreseen by political scientist and novelist Eugene Burdick fifty years ago.   
 
The new underworld [in American politics] is made up of innocent and well-
intentioned people who work with slide rules and calculating machines and 
computers which can retain an almost infinite number of bits of information as 
well as sort, categorize, and reproduce this information at the press of a button. 
Most of these people are highly educated, many of them are Ph.D.s, and none that 
I have met have malignant political designs on the American public. They may, 
however, radically reconstruct the American political system, build a new politics, 
and even modify revered and venerable American institutions—facts of which 
they are blissfully innocent. They are technicians and artists; all of them want, 
desperately, to be scientists.292 
 
 
While this might seem a variation of Cold-War technophobia, Burdick’s warnings contain a 
kernel of truth that is pressingly-relevant for public opinion studies.  From the beginning, 
polling has been inseparable from its roots in commercial research, and the new trend of 
data-driven politicking should come as no surprise to those familiar with this history.  The 
conjunction of scientific, capitalistic, and civic aspirations has spurred on an industry whose 
interest in and conceptualization of public opinion is foreign to the concerns of traditional 
democrats.  Though there are oft-cited concerns regarding ‘accuracy’ and ‘representiveness,’ 
insufficient attention is devoted to the more basic question of what is being sought in the first 
place.  The reduction of public opinion to the outcomes of surveys neglects important 
connections to other expressive and behavioral aspects of the opinion system. 
It might be argued that the critique I am presenting or reviving is one that draws 
unhelpfully on a bygone idealization.  Even in foregoing an attempt to define public opinion, 
some will read my criticism of the poll as alleging a perverted representation of the true 
nature and origin of public opinion.  Perhaps if we embrace the paradigm shift and eschew 
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any abstract notions of the public or its collective will in favor of numerical representations, 
the traditional debates regarding the problem of public opinion will be dissolved.  If analysts 
merely checked the temptation to generalize at the door, and discussed polling results without 
invoking public opinion and all its philosophical baggage, maybe we can move forward and 
accept the poll for what it’s worth.  All of this is very tempting, as I for one don’t see much 
promise in encouraging an antagonistic relationship between empirical and theoretical studies 
of democratic practice—divergent methods and interests notwithstanding.  That said, 
empiricists have never been content with the modest description of the poll as one type of 
tool among others.  Hedging by defining public opinion as “what opinion polls try to 
measure” or “what they measure with modest error” is to kick the can and avoid academic 
responsibility.293  Polls cannot speak for themselves, and must be interpreted.  It is because of 
this inevitability that theory continues to be relevant in comparing the conceptual and 
sociological backgrounding of public opinion with competing modes of measurement. 
 To their credit, early pollsters like Gallup and Roper intended their polling 
implements to be used democratically, for the ‘little guy’ against the special interests which 
have and continue to dominate the political machinations that characterize Washington.  
Despite disagreeing with their dubious claims to scientific rigor, I do empathize with their 
goal of facilitating healthy communication and mobilization in the political process.  As I see 
it, a telling problem with the runaway train that is the poll is that it is treated by both political 
insiders and outsiders with an ironic mixture of seriousness and mistrust.294  It purports to tell 
us what the ‘Average American’ is thinking, while also taking interest in how this thought is 
                                                             
293 Converse 1987, S14. 
294 Ample research has suggested that ordinary political actors have become increasingly skeptical over the last 
twenty years regarding polling’s ability to represent the public.  See Price and Stroud 2005; Loosveldt et. al. 
2008. 
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differentiated across ethnographic strata and geographical lines.  This paradox is captured 
well by Sarah Igo, who writes of the effects of modern surveys: 
 
The kind of public created by the dissemination of such knowledge about itself 
was at once highly intrusive and completely anonymous, self-scrutinizing and 
other-directed, familiar and impersonal.  In a word, it was the backdrop for some 
of the peculiar tensions of life in a “mass” society: between being ‘oneself’ and 
being known as a member of a group, between being an individual and being a 
statistic.295 
 
 
Even with new strategies of recasting the public into alternative publics, subpublics, and 
counterpublics, too much survey research continues to omit important information regarding 
the originating impulses behind individuals’ preferences.  This effectively staticizes dynamic 
social processes, or even worse, treats them as irrelevant to the new, post-theoretical 
understanding of public opinion.  It appears that this does not cause too much discomfort for 
the subset of political scientists that strives for parsimony and statistical rigor, as well as 
media and political elites who find the data convenient for their own purposes.  On the other 
hand, those interested in the intersectional influences driving the formation of public opinion 
have solid grounds for resisting the hegemony of the statistical tide.  Thus, while I advocate 
for a fruitful reconciliation between the theoretical and empirical studies of public opinion, I 
cannot see how this can come about unless the latter recognize and address the principled 
problems involved with current quantitative approaches.296  This goes beyond tuning up or 
substituting measures, and requires social scientists to revisit their most basic premises if 
they wish to sincerely claim a democratic justification for their enterprise. 
                                                             
295 Igo 2007, 281-2. 
296 To be sure, political theorists have also often failed in their own right to check their normative assumptions 
against empirical findings, and I later discuss this in the next chapter in my critique of deliberative theory. 
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 In what remains, I suggest that the tradition of deliberative democratic theory 
represents a direct response to the deficiencies of the polling enterprise.  Habermas, the 
figure around whom this dissertation revolves, has always been adamant that the socio-
political impulses associated with the rise polling in liberal-democratic states should be cause 
for concern and reconsideration on the part of academics and citizens alike.   
 
The public opinion once emergent from [the public sphere] has partly 
decomposed into the informal opinions of private citizens without a public and 
partly become concentrated into formal opinions of publistically effective 
institutions. Caught in the vortex of publicity that is staged for show or 
manipulation, the public of nonorganized private people is laid claim to not by 
public communication but by the communication of publicly manifested 
opinions.297 
 
 
Habermas is essentially concerned with the ways in which public opinion develops in a 
more-or-less considered fashion, passing through the various channels of the public sphere in 
which actual engagements take place between invested political actors.  Because of this, he is 
principally opposed to the aggregative conception of public opinion as a starting point given 
its lack of attention to the qualities of opinion formation processes.298  As will be made quite 
evident, I am not without reservations regarding developments in the deliberative tradition 
and do not suggest that it should be taken as a way to dissolve the ‘problem’ of public 
opinion.  The sentiment that I do think it captures, however, is that public opinion is 
something that is forged horizontally and vertically—in communications between citizens 
and with representative arms of the government.  How these discursive engagements are 
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to “encourage the accountability-free expression of poorly considered mass preferences and de-emphasize 
requirements of consistency, compromise-building, and the reflection on consequences. By inviting citizens to 
leap into the dark, they create irrevocable facts and preclude learning. They often betray minimal standards of 
rational policy formation, traces of which are institutionalized in even the most corrupted practices of 
parliamentary debate, party competition, and mass media reporting. They anonymize the locus of 
accountability.”  
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motivated, organized, and sustained is of central interest to deliberative theory.  This is why I 
view it as a helpful supplement to the work being done in survey research, as an appreciation 
of the socially-dynamic and public constitution of public opinion in discursive processes that 
facilitate public learning and debate.  The deliberative critique of the plebiscitarian approach 
is that if public opinion is to have democratic purchase, it must be viewed as the product of 
critical and genuinely public discussion.299  In this connection, deliberativists appreciate that 
majoritarian institutions and aggregative mechanisms are necessary in channeling public 
opinion so as to make it actionable.  These are insufficient in themselves, however, and a 
legitimate democratic politics will be dependent upon a political culture characterized by key 
deliberative norms, e.g. maximally-inclusive discursive practices aimed at fair and effective 
decision-making.  In the next few chapters, I trace the difficulties of fostering such a culture 
in the current context of American politics, and how this signals the mass public’s status as 
quasi-sovereign. 
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Chapter 3: Deliberation, Communicative 
Power, and Public Opinions 
 
Deliberation Then and Now 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that currently dominant understandings of public opinion—
often conflated with the results of polls, surveys, or other statistical breakdowns of the 
relevant population—fail to capture the dynamic, communicative, and socially-rich 
background of opinion processes.  I suggested that deliberative pictures of democratic will 
formation can serve as a supplement in this shortcoming.  Deliberation has demonstrated 
unparalleled resilience as a theory of democratic politics, and for good reason.  It gives us the 
promise of a better tomorrow, one in which members of the political community are involved 
in a respectful and inclusive political culture centrally characterized by reason-giving.  
Reason is effectively the key to achieving a more legitimate politics, as it demands greater 
accountability between ordinary citizens and political elites charged with responding to 
public opinion in the administration of law.  The intrinsic appeal of this counterfactual vision 
of politics has driven the ‘deliberative turn,’ such that currently “deliberative democracy 
constitutes the most active area of political theory in its entirety.”300  After a half century of 
research, deliberation may well be said to have ‘come of age.’301   
 The allure of this picture is difficult to deny.  Nonetheless, deliberative democracy’s 
normative goals and tenets— not to mention the means and scope of its implementation—
continue to be widely-contested among academics and practitioners from diverse disciplines.  
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Many have described the progress of deliberation across various ‘eras’ or ‘turns’ in order to 
highlight the theory’s responsiveness, not only to internal critiques of its stated principles, 
but also to the difficulties of countering non-deliberative forces in ‘the real world.’302   The 
first era, initiated most notably by Jürgen Habermas and followed up by theorists like Manin, 
Mansbridge, Bohman, Dryzek, Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson, was characterized by an 
attempt to conceptualize deliberation in its connection to democratic politics.  Although there 
continues to be conceptual debate over just what deliberation is and what it can do for us, the 
first generation of theories provided the general principles and outlines of deliberation as 
bound up with the practice of inclusive and effective reason-giving, leading to binding 
political decisions which are assumed to be legitimate in the eyes of those potentially 
affected.303   
The second generation, signaled by the ‘empirical turn’ or ‘institutional turn,’ gained 
momentum in the 2000s and took up applied problems regarding the design, implementation, 
and proliferation of deliberative sites.304  With this turn, academics focused primarily on 
mini-publics and discrete discursive forums, including: deliberative polls, citizens’ 
assemblies/juries, consensus conferences, constitutional courts, and legislatures (both open 
and closed).305  Sometimes members of the public engaging in these quasi-experimental 
deliberative procedures are endowed with decision or policymaking power, but more 
typically they serve in a consultative role vis-à-vis the policy process.  These types of studies, 
which remain a hotbed of academic interest, attract widespread attention given their 
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303 Manin 1987; Manin et. al. 1987; Cohen 1989; Dryzek 1990; Benhabib 1994,1996; Bohman 1996; Niño 
1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996,2004; Young 2000. 
304 Bächtiger, Steenbergen, and Niemeyer 2007; Rosenberg 2007; Sunstein 2007; Thompson 2008; Bächtiger et. 
Al. 2010; Dryzek 2010. 
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democratic applicability.  As such, they signal a departure from uncontextualized 
abstractions regarding citizens’ capacity to engage in a reasonable, respectful, and 
reformative manner.  The application of deliberative practice in these settings allows 
researchers to test the supposed transformative and legitimating potential of diverse 
deliberative fora.  Especially with the increasingly interconnectedness of public spheres via 
the internet and social media, many hypothesized that a new deliberative generation was on 
the rise.306 
The third and most recent phase of deliberation has been dubbed the ‘Systemic Turn.’  
Not denying the success of implemented deliberative experiments (however measured), 
scholars interested in deliberation have nevertheless become increasingly unimpressed with 
episodic instances of deliberative praxis.  ‘Systematists’ argue it to be highly unlikely that 
selectively choosing from a range of deliberative fora or even using them in concert will 
advance us beyond isolated and largely symbolic deliberative moments.307  Responding to 
the ‘problems of scale’ which emerge with attempts to design and institutionalize deliberative 
practices, these contributors argue that no matter how ‘ideally constituted,’ individual sites 
do not carry “the deliberative capacity sufficient to legitimate most of the decisions and 
policies that democracies adopt.”308  Instead, they suggest focusing on the achievement of 
deliberation more broadly across competing and overlapping levels of the public sphere.  We 
are to relax traditionally demanding criteria dominant in many practical applications of 
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307 Simone Chambers’ critique (2009) is indicative of this disillusionment.  She argues that the debatable 
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deliberation, and forego the attempt to check deliberative quality in every instance.  Rather 
than regretting the presence of power or otherwise unequal lines/forms of communication, 
they suggest focusing on macro-analyses and the ways in which deliberation can be realized 
holistically.  This analytical shift, they argue, allows the possibility for nondeliberative 
elements to bolster the overall deliberative quality of the system. 
The systemic turn has struck many as a pragmatic adjustment responding to 
structural, psychological, and cultural barriers frustrating the aims of deliberation.  It has 
been received as the most suitable way forward in reconceiving representative relationships 
and realizing deliberative potentials in practice.  In what follows, however, I suggest that 
loosening deliberative criteria, specifically the reason-giving requirement—which was once 
said to be indispensable—runs the risk of watering deliberative theory down to the point of 
democratic obsolescence.  Instead of reconciling normative aspirations (e.g. a critical public) 
with the perceived difficulties of realpolitik, I argue that deliberative theory is on the verge of 
running its course as a helpful way of thinking about democratic politics.  Despite 
themselves, contemporary deliberativists are nervously approaching Schumpeterian solutions 
to democratic problems; in which numbers and not reasoned argumentation determine 
political outcomes.  It is my suggestion that we take the implications of this slackening 
seriously, as it reflects directly on persistent problems in approaching deliberative democracy 
as a consummate ideal.  In making these points, I draw upon and contrast Habermas’ early 
and later work to show that he presciently anticipated developments following the 
deliberative turn, and adapted his discursive theory accordingly.  The ‘two-track’ model that 
he presents in his most mature work, Between Facts and Norms, is indicative of this 
evolution and significantly refigures the role of the everyday citizen and her opinions vis-à-
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vis the administration of state politics.  Although likely discomforting to those who possess a 
more ardent participatory zeal, this model of deliberative practice clarifies the relationship 
between deliberation and public opinion in a manner that I argue is amenable to a ‘realist’ 
perspective and that deflates traditional expectations regarding the performance of 
citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
 
What is Deliberation? 
 
Simply stating the general tenets of deliberation is a surprisingly difficult task, but this makes 
sense given that “deliberative democracy has never been a unified theory.”309  When 
surveying the literature, countless formulations abound, but there are key elements which can 
be identified.  Being that he serves as my main point of reference and as the originator of 
deliberative theory, I take Habermas’ recent definition to be authoritative.  He writes, 
 
The deliberative paradigm offers as its main empirical point of reference a 
democratic process, which is supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure 
of opinion and will formation that grants (a) publicity and transparency for the 
deliberative process, (b) inclusion and equal opportunity for participation, and (c) 
a justified presumption for reasonable outcomes (mainly in view of the impact of 
arguments on rational changes in preference).310 
 
 
Theorists of deliberative democracy or democratic deliberation have been attracted to the 
model due to its emphasis on the desirability of public and talk-centric political decision-
making that goes beyond self-interested competition governed by bargaining and aggregative 
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mechanisms. 311   There have been a number of justifications for privileging the deliberative 
model, including that it represents the ‘fairest’ of decision-making procedures, leads to 
decisions that are more just in aiming towards the public good, or that it encourages more 
“prudent, informed, rational and autonomous citizens.”312  Especially in the first generation 
of deliberative studies, scholars were greatly preoccupied with the tensions between 
procedural and substantive understandings of deliberation.  Weighing the value of epistemic 
proceduralism against the pursuit of substantive goals logically invites questions of whether 
deliberation as a process is good in itself (e.g. as democratic, inclusive, and educative) or 
good in terms of what outcomes it delivers (e.g. a more just and equitable society).  The large 
majority of deliberative proponents are not drawn to it merely because of the centrality of 
reason-giving and the optimization of preferences, but because of its democratic components 
such as publicity, equality, and the ideal of expanding participants’ perspectives through 
discursive encounters with unlike-others. 
 Habermas argues that modern democracies incorporate three core components: the 
private autonomy of citizenship, democratic citizenship (understood as the inclusion of free 
and equal citizens in the community) and “the independence of a public sphere that operates 
as an intermediary system between state and society.”313  These elements are meant to go 
hand-in-hand with the equal protection of law, equal participation of interested citizens, and a 
regulated public sphere which allows for the formation of considered opinions.   As he puts 
it, “Everywhere, these three elements constitute the normative substance of liberal 
                                                             
311 This distinction is made by Mansbridge (2007). She contrasts the more demanding philosophical 
expectations of achieving equality and liberty through reasonable discourse aimed at the common good, proper 
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governments, irrespective of the differences between constitutional texts, legal orders, 
political institutions, and practices.”314  Equal liberties, democratic participation, and 
government by public opinion are given different weights in different traditions, but 
nevertheless are “fused into a single design within the family of constitutional states.”315 
 To illustrate this differential prioritization of values, Habermas discusses three 
paradigmatic political philosophies. The liberal (Lockean) view contends that the democratic 
process is characterized by compromises among competing interests and demonstrates a 
preference for the liberties of private citizens.  Rules of compromise formation are supposed 
to secure fair results through universal suffrage, parliamentary representation, modes of 
decision making, and rules of order.  These formal rules are themselves justified in terms of 
negative liberal rights conceived in universal terms. 316  Liberalism demonstrates a deep 
suspicion of state power, and holds the best means to influence the administration of the state 
to be through the aggregation of individual wills in elections, the composition of 
parliamentary bodies, and the choice of government.  As such, political rights are 
instrumental and used to secure individuals’ choice of life plans and the enjoyment of their 
property.  It is for this reason that political liberalism bears an affinity to an economic theory 
of democracy, where the rule of law and the institutionalization of citizens’ liberties are 
meant to protect the autonomy of individuals operating in market society. 
 The second version of the democratic process is represented by the republican 
tradition.  Bearing a closer familial relationship to Habermas’ model, this position holds the 
democratic process of recognizing wills to involve active self-determination in political life.  
As an attempt to revive the enjoyed liberty of the ancients under the conditions of modernity, 
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however, republicanism promotes the importance of achieving an ‘ethicopolitical’ self-
understanding.317  This, in contrast to liberalism, draws not upon universal human rights but 
rather the particular ethical substance of a community united by a distinct history, culture, 
and general character.  Compared to liberalism—where plurality and incommensurate values 
are taken as given facts of modern life that reflect the importance of safeguarding private 
freedom—republicanism focuses on the need for solidarity, community, and shared 
traditions.  It places stock into a substantive view of popular sovereignty, and treats the law 
as an expression of will that must be traced to the people as the primordial foundation of the 
state, that itself is to be understood as constitutive for social life.318 
 The third view, Habermas’ own discursive theory, takes elements from both sides and 
integrates them in the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making.  
This procedural understanding “establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, 
compromises, and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption 
that reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and its 
proper handling have not been obstructed.”319  In Habermas’ picture of democracy, the 
achievement of reasonable and fair results is best accomplished through the 
institutionalization of deliberative processes coupled with the informal development of public 
opinions.  Furthermore, the success of the institutionalized discourse model rides on three 
demanding criterion.  A thorough-going deliberative system must, “mobilize relevant topics 
and claims, promote the critical evaluation of contributions, and lead to rationally motivated 
yes or no reactions.”320  Pace his critics, these conditions are not unrealistic or utopian as they 
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are implicitly embedded in our day-to-day discussions in which we request and offer reasons 
for the ideas we communicate to each other.321  Thus, the designs of these institutions do not 
abstract away from commonly exercised communicative routines, but instead are meant to 
reflect the roles of contributing actors as concerned participants dedicated to the sincere 
exchange of proposals.  They engage with one another under the expectation that their 
utterances are backed with validity claims which are rational, debatable and, hence, 
trustworthy.  This assumption that rational discourse entails a “competition for better 
reasons” thereby allows for active involvement in the interpersonal search for truth and a 
cooperative search for shared solutions to problems.322   
 It is impossible to understand Habermas’ theory of deliberative politics without 
explaining the central place of the “public sphere” in his account.   Rather than thinking of 
this as a spatial location, he recommends that we understand it as a ‘sounding board’ that 
allows for the registering of problems affecting society and a discursive ‘filterbed’ that 
allows for the sifting of interests and information related to the topic at hand and which arise 
from the unregulated processes of opinion formation.   Finally, the public sphere broadcasts 
the resultant ‘public opinions’ back onto the dispersed public of citizens, and submits them to 
the formal agendas of responsible decisonmaking bodies.  What sets the deliberative model 
apart from the other alternatives is that it locates will formation, deliberation, and decision-
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making in the “vibrant and maximally unregulated circulation of public opinions” with the 
effect of exerting a “rationalizing pressure towards improving the quality of the decisions.”323  
Though I discuss it more fully below, it is important to note the distinction made between 
will and opinion formation, and that these respectively take place in the context of an 
“intermediary system of communication between formally organized and informal face-to-
face deliberations in arenas at both the top and the bottom of the political system.”324   The 
formally organized arenas consist of common institutions of the political system (e.g. 
branches of government), that produce output in the form of legislation, verdicts, political 
programs, policies resulting from institutional deliberation and negotiation.  The public 
sphere is also constituted by informational and cultural networks originating in what he calls 
the “lifeworld.”  These networks work as sensors, providing information that is delivered 
through mediating channels.   The institutional realms are occupied by a wide array of 
influential actors who are responsible for the administration and transformation of public 
opinions into effective decisions.   
 In the first chapter, I briefly noted the three conditions that Habermas argues must be 
fulfilled if the deliberative model is to function appropriately.  Of these, the political public 
sphere is meant to accomplish only the first, as it must “mobilize and pool relevant issues and 
required information, and specify interpretations.”325   In so doing, it facilitates the 
preparation of agendas for political institutions by opening up space for the “formation of a 
plurality of considered opinions.”   Deliberation is thus exercised through a mediated system 
of communication, connecting both ends of the vertically aligned system.   Habermas 
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distinguishes an elite class of actors whom are indispensable for the functioning of a political 
public sphere:  professionals within the media system (i.e. journalists) and the political 
system (i.e. politicians). There are also secondary actors who work more or less 
conspicuously to exert their influence.  These include lobbyists, advocates, specialized 
experts, moral entrepreneurs and reputable intellectuals.  Habermas envisions a public sphere 
which is instituted in such a way so as to draw attention to “considered opinions” that merit 
institutionalized debate and potential action.  He writes, “From the viewpoint of responsive 
governments and political elites, considered public opinions set the frame for the range of 
what the public of citizens would accept as legitimate decisions in a given case.”326    
 The fact that this process remains a counterfactual ideal is a consequence of the often 
unmet preconditions of communicative action. There are two conditions which represent the 
‘rules of the game’ that must be met to redeem a discursive politics.  According to Habermas, 
the first mandates that, “a self-regulating media system gains independence from its social 
environments.”327  An independent media cannot be dominated by narrow political or 
economic interests if it is to effectively set the stage for the submission of considered 
opinions.  The second normative condition requires, “feedback between a self-regulating 
media system and a responsive civil society.”328  Habermas argues that a legitimate decision-
making apparatus must deal with the complexity of a public of concerned participants.  In 
order to accomplish this, citizens must be allowed to share their perspectives on pressing 
domestic issues and to respond to issues circulating in elite discourse (i.e. in the political and 
media spheres).  As will be discussed below, the important and yet tenuous means of 
transmission are crucial for the functioning of the deliberative system. 
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 Gutmann and Thompson—two central figures of the first era of deliberative 
research—build on Habermas’ basic formulation and put forward a model of deliberation 
meant to secure both procedural and substantive goods.329  They argue that deliberation is not 
only meant to constrain procedural discourse, but also achieve policies reflective of values 
inherent in society.  They write, “Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means 
for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.”330  In this sense, 
reason does not serve to establish theoretical foundations as in first order theories, which 
would be wholly inappropriate for settling political disagreement in complex societies.  
Instead, their account focuses on three characteristics of moral arguments that are especially 
important in politics: reciprocity (a form of mutual commitment to the reaching of 
deliberative agreement in the empirical realms that are relevant to moral argument), publicity 
(accessibility and transparency), and accountability (with regard to those who give the 
reasons and to those whom reasons should be given).331  They hold that their proposed model 
takes seriously the issues of scarcity (not all will get what they want), limited generosity, 
incompatible moral values (in light of the fact of pluralism) and incomplete understanding 
(given inherently limited epistemic capacity).332 
 Gutmann and Thompson refer to their model of deliberation as “middle democracy” 
as it combines the goals of constitutionalism and proceduralism, neither of which is sufficient 
on its own.333  The former tends to withdraw moral disagreements from ordinary politics and 
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assign them to elite institutions above the political fray (e.g. judicial courts).  They argue that 
constitutional democrats constrain democratic processes in adopting substantive standards 
without allowing disagreement about the interpretation of those standards.  Procedural 
democrats, on the other hand, seek to domesticate moral disagreement by having citizens 
agree to some basic rules of the political game (e.g. majority rule).  This move is also 
problematic, however, as procedures and protocols themselves necessarily embody 
substantive values.334  Instead, they push a second-order theory that carries substantive 
principles and thus has the capacity to criticize procedurally correct outcomes.  The version 
of deliberation proposed here purportedly permits the flexibility and provisionality necessary 
for the continued efficacy of institutions, since the process itself can be shifted according to 
the matters at hand.  Its strength, according to the authors, is that “it adopts a dynamic 
conception of political justification, in which change over time is an essential feature of 
justifiable principles.”335 
 The advantages of this model, assuming the principles are successfully sustained by 
the political process itself (what they call the “bootstrap conception”), will be fourfold.  First, 
deliberative democracy should help promote the legitimacy of collective decisions.  Though 
disagreements persist, participants will see that serious moral claims are fairly considered 
and that the process often ends in more desirable outcomes in the long-run.  Second, 
deliberation should encourage public-spirited perspectives on public issues.  As broader 
interests are favored over narrow ones, eclectic groups are included and popular deliberation 
(rather than power politics or manipulative bargaining) drive decision-making.  For this to be 
the case, it is crucial for their model that people trust and believe in the public process in 
                                                             
334 Ibid., 40. 
335 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 132. 
 112 
which they are involved.  Third, deliberation is meant to promote mutually respectful 
decision making.336  Civility and measured tone should help citizens observe the merit of one 
another’s claims, even in the inevitable persistence of disagreement.  Fourth, the practice of 
deliberation should help democracies rectify past mistakes and transgressions.   A premium is 
placed on experience, and only the thorough-going process of deliberation can perform the 
revelatory service needed for political learning.337 
 In summary, we can have all of these things and much more if deliberation is 
conducted appropriately and evenly throughout the political system.  Mendelberg 
summarizes the litany of advantages that theorists expect to be bestowed by a deliberative 
politics: 
 
Deliberation is expected to lead to empathy with the other and a broadened sense 
of people’s own interests through an egalitarian, open-minded and reciprocal 
process of reasoned argumentation.  Following from this result are other benefits: 
citizens are more enlightened about their own and others’ needs and experiences, 
can better resolve deep conflict, are more engaged in politics, place their faith in 
the basic tenets of democracy, perceive their political system as legitimate, and 
lead a healthier civic life.338 
 
 
Going beyond individual advantages, public deliberation might also enjoy a unique 
advantage in terms of reconciling competing perspectives and producing effective, 
collectively-binding decisions.  Especially in a political era marked by divisiveness over 
policy issues and partisan positions, deliberation partnered with traditional electoral and 
legislative avenues holds promise to break the gridlock that effectively harms the 
downtrodden and disenfranchised.  
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Where and How to Deliberate? 
 
The above discussion of the general aims and character of deliberative practice, while by no 
means exhaustive, outlines generally shared deliberative aspirations.  At first glance, it seems 
absurd to deny the attractiveness of this model.  After all, any democratic theorists who 
offhandedly opposed the abstract principles of publicity, inclusion, and reasoned, respectful 
discussion aimed at the transformation of perspective would likely find themselves ostracized 
in the academic world.  Very few have dared take this path, and those that have raised 
objections (e.g. ‘difference democrats’) usually critique aspects of political practice which 
are not consequences of deliberation, but which actually demonstrate a deliberative deficit.339  
A key problem that has spurred on empirical and institutional studies of deliberation, 
however, is an ostensible conflict between several of its key ideals.   First generation 
theorists were largely contented with enumerating the values and promise of deliberation, 
imbuing the theory with an essential moralistic dimension that has attracted many to the 
cause.  The second generation, however, was confronted with a basic challenge to the 
theory’s coherence.  Dennis Thompson writes that it may be a mistake to treat deliberative 
democracy as if it were a thoroughly-unified theory, entailing a “cohesive set of values that 
are jointly realized or jointly fail to be realized.”   
 
This ignores the possibility that its elements may conflict with one another, that 
not all the goods it promises can be secured at the same time, and that we have to 
make hard choices among them . . . Equal participation may lower the quality of 
the deliberative reasoning. Publicity may do the same. Public deliberation may 
also be less conducive to mutual respect than private discussion. Decision-making 
authority may encourage polarization and positional rather than constructive 
politics.340 
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Even among empathizers and those attracted to the basic framework of deliberative practice, 
there is general recognition of the problem posed here.  The least sophisticated version of the 
realist argument is relatively easy to refute: the distance between deliberative ideals and 
political reality reinforces, rather than contradicts, the normative importance of the theory for 
instructing practice.  The point above, however, represents an internal critique of deliberation 
on its own grounds—one that challenges the consistency of its most basic tenets.  What is 
most obviously at stake is the partnership of deliberation with democracy.  Practices of 
reason-giving and their potential for enlightenment must be organized and conducted so that 
they are perceived as legitimate by those who are affected by them.  Although few 
deliberativists take this to entail universal participation tout court, the tension between the 
epistemic (rationalist) and populist (inclusionary) elements still represent the most pressing 
dilemma for the theory.341 
 According to Parkinson, deliberation is beset by a serious ‘scale problem,’ in that 
“deliberative decisions appear to be illegitimate for those left outside the forum, while 
bringing more than a few people in which seem to turn the event into speech-making, not 
deliberation.”342  He argues that since the first generation, many theorists have implied that 
deliberation occurs in discrete spaces at discrete moments, often with a small number of 
participants bound by variously stringent procedures of public reason and sometimes 
facilitated by a moderator.343  As noted at the beginning of this chapter, second generation 
researchers would come to apply the model of small-scale decision making sites in a number 
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342 Parkinson 2006, 5. 
343 For examples of this implication, see Elster 1997 on ‘the forum’, as well as Cohen 1989; Gutmann and 
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of forms, including: citizens’ juries344, deliberative polls345, consensus conferences346, and 
parliaments.347  The empowerment of these mini-publics varies—sometimes they have a 
constructive agenda and attempt to design institutions embodying deliberative principles.348  
Other times, they have a critical agenda and use deliberative principles as a yardstick by 
which they measure claims made on the part of actors within established institutions.349 
 Those who advocate for the empowerment of mini-publics usually emphasize their 
tangible impact on the greater deliberative system.  These postulated effects range from 
actual decision-making, guiding public opinion, or informing public debates.350  The former 
almost never occurs, and the closest example is the 2004 British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly on Electoral Reform.351  The provincial government guaranteed that the 
recommendation of the assembly (composed of 160 randomly selected citizens) for a new 
voting system for the province would be put to a referendum and adopted if passed.  Even 
though the single transferrable vote (STV) recommended by the assembly received 57 
percent of the vote the following year, it fell short of the specified 60 percent threshold.352  
This was a blow to those who imagine a more decisive role for mini-publics (however 
configured), but it did point to the potential for these fora to heuristically serve as a guide for 
the outside public.  Whether good or bad, the vast majority of those who did cast their vote 
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for STV did so on the basis of their trust in an assembly of their peers who were presumed to 
be ‘like them.’ 
 James Fishkin’s deliberative poll is the most famous example of a deliberative forum 
aimed at the intersubjective examination of preferences and enhancement of public 
dialogues.  The basic design of a deliberative poll involves interviewing a randomly selected 
sample of the population on their views on an issue or set of issues before and after a 
weekend of deliberative workshops.  In these sessions, participants are engaged in briefings 
(that are as balanced/neutral as possible) by experts, moderated discussion among 
participants, and in the questioning of experts, politicians and stakeholders.  The equal 
chance at participation, inclusion of nuanced information on the sides of the issue(s) and 
exposure to the perspectives of others together are meant to simulate the transformative 
potential of deliberative encounters.  According to Fishkin, the process is meant to reveal 
“the views the entire country would come to if it had the same experience of behaving more 
like ideal citizens immersed in the issues for an extended period.”353  Now the claim to 
representativeness crucially relies on the claim that the population is truly randomly selected.  
The use of the standard telephone opinion poll is at least one commonality with the 
traditional poll, and should be eyed with suspicion for reasons I argue in the previous 
chapter.354  Ultimately, however, he argues that this social scientific model—operating 
ideally like a quasi-experiment—has the potential to uncover a counterfactual ‘deliberative 
                                                             
353 Fishkin 1995, 162. 
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public opinion’ that is then fed into public dialogues and, in some cases, the actual policy 
process.355   
 Subsequent empirical research has suggested that participation in deliberative polls 
facilitates political learning, promotes interpretable individual and collective opinion change 
on the policy issues discussed (suggesting a difference between informed opinion and ‘top of 
the head’ responses registered by traditional surveys), and increases political efficacy 
(potentially and indirectly linked to other aspects of citizenship such as political interest and 
civic/political participation).356  That said, Fishkin recognizes the persistence of the problem 
described above by Thompson.  The cost of adopting a view of deliberative democracy as 
containing “ideals without an ideal” is that the pursuit of some components comes at the 
expense of others.  He writes, 
 
Achieving political equality and participation leads to a thin, plebiscitary 
democracy in which deliberation is undermined.  Achieving political equality and 
deliberation leaves out mass participation.  Achieving deliberation and 
participation can be achieved for those unequally motivated and interested, but 
violates political equality.  With the choices posed by the trilemma, there is not a 
coherent direction of movement for realizing all three principles to a high degree 
at the same time.357 
 
 
Despite this intractable tradeoff, Fishkin argues that his version of the mini-public, especially 
when connected up with the larger political process, represents a ‘second-best solution’ 
which can serve as a proxy for ideal deliberation.  This is the significance of the deliberative 
poll’s counterfactual nature: its results represent the position that everyone would reach if 
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similarly engaged.358  It accordingly provides what Fishkin argues is the most practical 
opportunity for “overcoming the limitations of mass democracy and giving voice to the 
public’s considered judgments under good conditions.”359  Whether one finds this pragmatic 
adaptation attractive therefore hinges on the premium placed on widespread participation vis-
à-vis the deliberative values of equality and deliberation.360 
 One of the key justifications for restricting the scope of participation in mini-publics 
is that deliberative democracy is motivated not just to legitimate, but to rationalize the 
formation of opinion and political will.   The traces to Habermas’ discourse theory are 
unmistakable, as might indicated by the fact that he has often been called ‘the last great 
rationalist.’361  Across the iterative developments in his deliberative theory, Habermas 
consistently attempts to establish a postmetaphysical theory of reason which parts with the 
grand aspirations of the philosophers of old (e.g. Hegel’s philosophy of history or Kant’s 
philosophy of consciousness).  His theory of communicative action/reason moves away from 
subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory so as to 
redirect, rather than abandon, the project of enlightenment.362  Instead, through a cooperation 
of philosophical and empirical inquiry, he attempts to show how the general use of language 
and social interaction necessarily rely upon notions of validity, truthfulness, normative 
rightness, sincerity, and authenticity.363 
                                                             
358 His 2004 project with Bruce Ackerman, in which they describe a “Deliberation Day,” anticipates the much 
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 In its quality as rationalistic and cognitivistic, deliberation involves a ‘truth-tracking’ 
potential.364  Reasons, according to Habermas, are properly thought of as a currency used in 
discursive exchanges in order to redeem criticizable validity claims that have a rational basis.  
Communication for Habermas constitutes, in a strong sense, the basis for social integration 
accomplished through values, norms and mutual understandings.365  He writes, 
 
Communicative action depends on the use of language oriented toward mutual 
understanding.  This use of language functions in such a way that participants 
either agree on the validity claimed for their speech acts or identify points of 
disagreement, which they conjointly take into consideration in the course of 
further interaction.   Every speech act involves the raising of criticizable validity 
claims aimed at intersubjective recognition.366 
 
 
Habermas thus points to a reconstructed notion of a linguistic telos embedded in the 
presumptions and rules of discourse.367  Although this does not imply the availability of 
moral ‘truths’ in a scientific sense, it does suggest the determinable ‘correctness’ of norms.  
There is an underlying symbiosis between the forms of life and forms of communication 
which reproduce them, so that rationality is preserved in the expression of a “decentered 
complex of pervasive, transcendentally enabling structural conditions.”368  The ‘rules’ of 
communication do not tell actors what they ought to do, but instead exert a weak type of 
compulsion in recognition of the idealized norms and logic of communicative practice.  
These are not artificial formalities, but instead are embedded in the pragmatics of ordinary, 
everyday communicative practice.   
 
                                                             
364 Habermas 2006, 413. 
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Even the most fleeting speech-act offers, the most conventional yes/no responses, 
rely on potential reasons.  Any speech act therewith refers to the ideally expanded 
audience of the unlimited interpretation community that would have to be 
convinced for the speech at to be justified and, hence, rationally acceptable.369  
 
 
Playing this linguistic game with rather than against others leans heavily on an expectation of 
good faith.  The bittersweet fact is that agreements achieved through communication are 
always open to challenge, and thus serve as a precarious source of social integration.  
Nevertheless, Habermas argues that the procedural conditions of legitimate argumentation 
allow for the ‘unleashing’ of a higher-level intersubjectivity within the deliberating 
collectivity, characterized by sensitive and noncoercive coordination of different interpretive 
perspectives.370  As Wood explains, the rationalist drive in Habermas’ understanding of 
deliberative democracy is indispensable.  Rationalism is what allows us to think of ourselves 
as autonomous, responsible beings such that, “if rationalism is false, then we must abandon 
the ideas of autonomy and responsibility, together with the idea of human dignity, which is 
closely bound up with them.”371 
 This brief excursus is meant to demonstrate the origins of deliberation’s fascination 
with reason-giving and the refinement of ‘considered’ opinion.372  Mini-publics’ promise, 
especially the deliberative poll which is considered by some to be the ‘gold standard’ of 
deliberative fora, lies in the fact that they are small-scale opportunities for observing the 
transformational effects of deliberation in controlled settings. 373  Even if they are not 
conferred with decision-making authority, deliberating in an organized forum has been 
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shown to promote informed judgment and knowledge gains, especially in light of most 
citizens’ low informational baselines.374  By providing a discursive context in which 
participants are expected to exchange reasons and yield to the ‘unforced force of the better 
argument,’ many enthusiasts have seized upon mini-publics as accomplished instances of 
deliberative practice. 
 
 
Deliberative Systems 
 
As discussed above, the institutionalization and empirical testing of deliberation in mini-
publics enjoyed a brief period of widespread and ecstatic celebration.  Until recently, many 
trumpeted the diverse use of these fora as a panacea for various democratic ills, including the 
malignancy of the ‘democratic deficit’ in liberal democracies.375  Dissatisfaction has been on 
the rise in recent years, however, given the ambiguous and largely-isolated results of these 
“quaint, thinky-tanky [deliberative] experiments.”376  Fascination with neatly structured and 
replicable micro forums is predictable given the dominant research paradigm in political 
science, but many deliberativists initially drawn to applied experimentation became 
concerned with the conceptual narrowing of deliberation that occurred along the way.   
 Carolyn Hendriks provides a helpful dichotomy that captures the types and scope of 
deliberative practice in two broad theoretical models: micro and macro accounts.377  The 
former is characterized by a concerted effort to define the ideal conditions of a deliberative 
procedure.  Deliberation is conceptualized as an activity that takes place in structured forums 
where “free and equal participants come together to decide on an agenda, reason and argue 
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together, and settle on an outcome.”378  Micro accounts are inherently exclusionary given 
their small size, and tend to privilege deliberation over participation.  Macro accounts of 
deliberation, on the other hand, emphasize informal discursive forms of deliberation that take 
place in the wider public sphere.  Their primary focus tends to be on the unstructured and 
open conversations found outside formal decision-making institutions.  Thus, while the 
former tends to call upon civil society to adopt communicative forms of action through 
collaboration with the state, the latter prescribes participation in informal political activities 
“both outside and against the state.”379  Although these are sometimes treated as mutually 
exclusive frameworks, a systemic analysis focuses on the effects of a deliberative division of 
labor and the ties between formal and informal spheres.  
 Jane Mansbridge is arguably the most prominent and well-established American 
theorist in the field of deliberative democracy and has played a leading role in driving the 
systemic turn.  Since the 1980s, she has written extensively on the tensions and frequent 
contradictions of democratic aspirations.  One can already observe her cautious approach in 
treating democratic paradigms in her well-known work, Beyond Adversary Democracy.  
There, she discusses the problematic relationship between unitary and adversarial models of 
democracy that are often simultaneously assumed when discussing the ideal role of 
government in modern society.  In an approach similar to Habermas’ discussion of liberal 
and republican models above, Mansbridge notes a deep-seated ambiguity that occurs when 
‘unitary’ and ‘pluralistic’ understandings intermingle in debates about the desirability of 
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shared/conflicting interests, notions of equality, decision rules, and levels of intimacy.380  She 
writes, 
 
We actually mean two different things when we speak of “democracy” and we 
will not be able to deal effectively with crises of legitimacy until we recognize 
that neither conception is appropriate under all circumstances.  The task 
confronting us is therefore to knit together these two fundamentally different 
kinds of democracies into a single institutional network that can allow us both to 
advance our common interests and to resolve our conflicting ones.381 
 
 
The gist of her argument, when applied to deliberative paradigms, runs much the same: we 
cannot treat deliberation as a mold that will be replicated across all sites in a uniform fashion.  
Consistent with the manner in which Habermas weds action theory and systems theory, 
Mansbridge would guide the shift towards a complementary macro-micro model that better 
accounts for dynamism and discrepancies in the deliberative system. 
 In her discussion of ‘everyday talk,’ Mansbridge actively responds to commonplace 
criticisms of deliberation in its most rationalistic and formalistic understandings.  A 
substantial subset of democratic theorists sympathetic to Habermas’ discursive model would 
become dissatisfied with the constrictive demands of reason-giving and the allegedly- elitist 
overtones involved in promoting the development of ‘considered’ opinion.  Lynn Sanders, 
for example, would propose ‘testimony’ as an alternative to the rational-argumentative 
model, so as to encourage the expression of perspective in one’s own words.382  Iris Young 
for her part proposed including ‘greeting’ (mutual recognition and caring), ‘rhetoric’ (forms 
of speaking which reflexively attend to the audience), and ‘storytelling’ (which allows for the 
narrative exploration of the teller’s values) within the definitional boundaries of 
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deliberation.383  These extensions are not trivial, for they directly problematize Habermas’ 
depiction of the ideal speech scenario in which the force of the ‘better’ argument carries the 
day.  As astute critics such as Amelie Rorty and Martha Nussbaum have pointed out, 
encouraging the cool-headed examination of reasons for the opinions one holds risks 
propping up an antiquated understanding of the relationship between intelligence and 
affect.384 
 What then connects this emphasis on dialogic practice and style with the systemic 
turn which would occur decades later?  Those who represent the third wave of deliberative 
theory became disillusioned with the idea that the concerted replication of discrete, 
deliberative fora could compensate for a deficit of legitimacy in the broader democratic 
system.  In some ways absorbing the blows delivered by those representing ‘realist’ 
perspectives, they have attempted to reconcile shortcomings in the promise of deliberation by 
revisiting its goals and expected scope of implementation.  One way to do this is to 
appreciate the diversity of expressive norms as indicative of different repertoires and social 
locations in the political system.  Mentioned above, Chambers was a key figure in signaling a 
return to the importance of unequal standing in mass democracy, especially in her 
investigation of the idea of “deliberative rhetoric.”  She argued that the retreat into mini-
publics was essentially an abnegation of responsibility on the part of deliberative democrats, 
one which cordoned off practices of dialogic accountability so as to exclude the broader 
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public.385  Those who seize upon mini-publics as “more perfect public spheres” tend to do so 
at the expense of attempting a wider engagement of the public.386   
 Although not all those who have embraced the systemic turn share the same concerns 
regarding marginalization of the excluded masses, Chambers argument does hit on the 
importance of recognizing the intractability of certain ‘political’ elements.  This can be 
understood to include incentives that drive political bargaining and manipulation rather than 
sincerity and truthfulness aimed mutual understanding and consensus, or self-interest at the 
expense of solidarity and mutually beneficial outcomes.  On a more benign level, however, 
those involved in the revival of rhetoric as it relates to deliberation have emphasized the 
importance of emotion and character as legitimate forces of persuasion.387  Harking back to 
an Aristotelian—rather than Platonic— appreciation of rhetoric involves conceiving the art 
of persuasion as involving pathos, ethos, and logos in a complementary fashion.  Rather than 
appealing strictly to the logical coherence of the argument, the emotions of the audience and 
the character of the speaker represent diffuse elements that play important parts in opinion 
formation and decision-making.   
 Chambers’ contribution is notable as it exemplifies an emerging sensitivity to 
insurmountable plebiscitary tendencies in mass democracy.  Face-to-face dialogue that lives 
up to idealized speech is the rare exception rather than the rule, and a miniscule number of 
elites will continue to dominate political communication in an asymmetric fashion.388  All is 
not lost, however, as she seeks to show how rhetoric can be wielded in a more deliberative 
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fashion.  As she writes, “the threat is not that passion and artifice will replace reason and 
argument.  The threat is that the relationship between elites and citizens will always be 
dominated by plebiscitary tendencies.”389  As I see it, Mansbridge and those riding the 
systemic wave have attempted to redeem a return to mass democracy while avoiding a 
theatric politics of acclamation and demagoguery.  Unfortunately and despite this effort, this 
appears to capture much of the current political reality. 
 This brings us to the direct question of what a neo-systemic model of deliberation 
looks like.  In what many refer to as the ‘Manifesto’ of the systemic approach to deliberative 
democracy, Mansbridge, Bohman, Chambers, Christiano, Fung, Parkinson, Thompson, and 
Warren describe the benefits of moving beyond the confines of mini-publics so as to 
understand the operations of deliberative practices across the greater system.  By system, the 
authors mean: 
 
A set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent parts, 
often with distributed functions and a division of labor, connected in such a way 
as to form a complex whole. It requires both differentiation and integration among 
the parts. It requires some functional division of labor, so that some parts do work 
that others cannot do so well. And it requires some relational interdependence, so 
that a change in one component will bring about change in some others.390 
 
 
Taking a broader view is a direct response to the ‘problems of scale’ discussed by Parkinson, 
and allows for a consideration of deliberation that develops among and between individual 
sites over time.  No matter how ‘ideally constituted,’ no isolated site is capable of itself to 
secure legitimacy on a large scale.  Instead, the authors argue for a deliberative system. 
 
A deliberative system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political 
conflict and problem solving—through arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and 
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persuading. In a good deliberative system, persuasion that raises relevant 
considerations should replace suppression, oppression, and thoughtless neglect. 
Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged as a 
whole in addition to the parts being judged independently. We need to ask not 
only what good deliberation would be both in general and in particular settings, 
but also what a good deliberative system would entail.391 
 
 
This reflects the anticipated benefits of adopting “plural criteria” in line with the “neo-
pluralist tradition.” Mansbridge’s proposition is that we might recognize and advance the 
‘common good,’ “while at the same time valuing the expression of self-interest and 
legitimating aggregative procedures that rest on coercive power, such as majority rule.”392  
Another benefit of considering the interconnectedness of deliberative locations is that this 
helps to appreciate the frailty of individual sites, which can be compensated by the 
interworkings of the larger deliberative system.393  As the authors write,  
 
A systemic approach allows us to analyze the division of labour among parts of a 
system, each with its different deliberative strengths and weaknesses, and to 
conclude that a single part, which in itself may have low or even negative 
deliberative quality with respect to one of several deliberative ideals, may 
nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall deliberative system.394 
 
 
Rather than adopting an overly demanding burden in which a single site should embody all 
deliberative ideals, the systemic approach pays due heed to the fact that venues will often 
display deficiencies.395  Supposedly, these defects can often be offset if weak areas are 
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bolstered with the provision of deliberative supplements and institutional innovations.  It 
therefore becomes possible to take into account contextual issues and larger systemic 
inadequacies which impact individual sites and determine the likelihood of distributing 
‘effective’ deliberation.396  This shift of analysis “allows us to see more clearly where a 
system might be improved, and recommend institutions or other innovations that could 
supplement the system in areas of weakness.”397 
 A logical question that arises in response to this conceptualization of deliberative 
practice concerns the boundaries and the relative standing of parts of the system.  Modifying 
Habermas’ tiered or ringed depiction of the public sphere, the authors here divide the 
deliberative system into four parts or arenas: the binding decisions of the state, activities 
directly related to preparing for those binding decisions, informal talk related to those 
binding decisions, and arenas of formal or informal talk related to decisions of ‘common 
concern’ not intended to be decided upon by the state.398  Thus, not all talk is included as 
relevant for the operations of the deliberative system—it must demonstrate relevance to 
matters of common concern and be susceptible of practical application.399  Furthermore, 
although the types of deliberation at the ends of the system are categorically different in 
terms of their expressive and intentional (or actionable) qualities, that difference is not 
significant for judging the quality of the deliberation for democratic purposes.400  In this way, 
the standards applied to institutionalized deliberation hold for the messier mélange of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
gender etc.) inhibits the functioning of the system for somewhat obvious reasons.  Finally, entrenched 
partisanship (or otherwise intransigent cleavages) is inimical to the weighing of reasons and proposals.  
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discursive spheres in society.  As Mansbridge writes, “those standards must be loosened to 
accommodate the more informal character of the nongovernmental parts of the deliberative 
system, but in this loosening they do not lose their character.”401  I return to this contention 
below in discussing the difficulty of identifying deliberation in action. 
 This gives us at least a general idea of where deliberation occurs, but what does it do 
in the systemic account?  Supposedly, many of the functions remain largely unchanged when 
compared to the earlier statements above.  A premium is still placed on deliberation’s 
epistemic dimension, given that it is to produce preferences, opinions and decisions which 
are informed by facts and logic as the result of a “substantive and meaningful” consideration 
of relevant reasons (which are, of course, context dependent).402  An ethical dimension is also 
indispensable, in that the system is intended to promote mutual respect among citizens as the 
“lubricant of effective communication.”403  Deliberation is unthinkable without this 
component, as it is the starting point for establishing authorship and intersubjective 
recognition in the project of reaching mutual understanding (Verständigung) and 
reconstructing civic solidarity.  Finally, deliberative systems while hierarchically 
differentiated are meant to be democratic, i.e. they promote an “inclusive political process on 
terms of equality.”404  I argue below that this last leg is the most contentious of the three and 
exemplifies the tradeoff problem described above.  Recognizing that these ideals can come 
into conflict, particularly in weighting their relative importance, the authors endorse all three 
and argue that they will need to be worked out on a provisional basis.  
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 A cadre of deliberativists has followed up the systemic turn in considering how the 
twin goals of differentiation and integration in the system might best be achieved.405  For 
instance, Goodin has proposed that we think of deliberation as distributed- with different 
agents playing different distributive roles—as opposed to the ‘unitary actor’ model of 
deliberation.  Accordingly, he argues, it might be ‘good enough’ for various components of 
deliberative virtues to be displayed sequentially, over the course of deliberative stages rather 
than in isolated moments.406  Parkinson, in an individual project preceding the Manifesto, 
similarly describes the suitability of allocating legitimacy across “multiple deliberative 
moments and the wider deliberative system.”407  Hendriks advocates for an ‘integrated’ 
deliberative system, in which benefits of micro and macro deliberation are delivered without 
their respective “elitist and populist downfalls.”408  Niemeyer similarly believes that the latest 
generations are complementary and that mini-publics might be ‘scaled up’ and harnessed to 
the benefit of the system.409  Bohman describes the importance of ‘institutional 
differentiation’ which allows for multiple and intersecting processes of public deliberation.410  
Krause describes “different types of constraint on deliberation in each domain of the political 
system.”411  Thompson describes the nagging and yet insufficiently studied question of how 
deliberation should be ‘allocated’ within the democratic process.412  Dryzek suggests 
focusing analysis on the ‘deliberative capacity’ of the system.413  Kuyper argues that the 
systemic view offers a way to “advance normative ideals in the modern world that must take 
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context and design seriously.”414  Finally, Neblo has recently suggested that the way to 
overcome the impasse in deliberative theory is to distinguish among the “means, ends, and 
structure of a deliberative democratic system.”415  All of this is to say that the systemic turn 
has taken hold and represents what many take to be the most relevant and empirically-
informed understanding of deliberative democracy. 
 
 
The Promise and Dangers of Thinking Systemically  
 
The pivots described above represent laudable attempts to push the frontiers of scholastic 
inquiry and to reconcile normative theory and empirical realities.  That said, I argue that 
there is a double-edged, or Janus-faced, dilemma in judging deliberation as a systemic 
phenomenon.   On the one hand, compared to the second era in which deliberation came of 
age, taking a broader and somewhat looser view of deliberative practice eases concerns about 
the difficulties of proliferating deliberative fora.  The onus of replicating thoroughly 
deliberative sites is relieved if we take the message of the Manifesto to heart: deliberation is 
varied and unevenly distributed across a multitude of formal and informal arenas, only some 
of which are charged with reaching and implementing decisions with practical effect.  The 
emphasis on contextuality and incompleteness takes seriously the task of clarifying the 
elements of deliberation, conflicts between them, and structural relationships in the 
deliberative system.416 
 Additionally, as Mansbridge argues elsewhere in a collaborative article with a ‘who’s 
who’ of deliberative theorists, this move allows for a pragmatic reformulation of the 
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deliberative democratic ideal.  Whereas deliberative democracy has traditionally been 
defined in opposition “to self-interest, to bargaining and negotiation, to voting, and to the use 
of power,” thinking of the system as a complex compound of variously imperfect deliberative 
elements brings deliberative and political practice closer together.417  Coming to grips with 
the persistent (even essential) place of self-interest and the role of power in deliberative 
democracy need not entail a malicious politics of manipulation and deceit.  Instead, non-
deliberative mechanisms such as aggregated votes as well as “fair bargaining and negotiation 
among cooperative antagonists” can involve forms of coercive power that nevertheless are 
subject to deliberative justification (and are therefore legitimate).418   
 Regardless of whether or not one wishes to describe this move as a concession 
towards political ‘realism,’ it does seem to be productive insofar as it softens otherwise rigid 
antagonisms and dichotomies implied or specified in the classic ideal.  Though some may 
justifiably argue that this is a version of having one’s cake and eating it too, the authors 
contend that the central task of democratic deliberation continues to be bound up with mutual 
justification in the process of coming to decisions.419  The systemic approach takes seriously 
the complexity of processes undergirding the formation and enactment of political judgment.  
In so doing, it opens room for the appreciation of diverse “deliberative ecologies,” in which 
various situations bear out different forms of deliberation and caches of information.420  
Whereas Habermas and others of the early generation often posed deliberation and reason-
giving against partisanship and the use of heuristics, the systemic approach allows for the 
qualified appropriateness of certain niches in which these not-so-obviously-deliberative 
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devices can be used for orientation towards deliberative ends.421  In many ways, this 
deemphasizes the question of whether such elements are good-in-themselves, instead 
focusing on the ways in which such deficient instruments facilitate a more deliberative 
system when exercised in concert. 
 On the other hand, the explicit loosening effect of adopting a systemic lens 
complicates the attempt to preserve traditional deliberative and democratic cornerstones.  For 
example, lowering the bar on what it means to ‘reason together’—both in terms of the modal 
content of dialogue and the scope of involved participants—opens up problems for 
discerning inappropriate approaches (e.g. those involving insincerity, manipulation, or even 
violence).  Additionally, it requires that we confront the uncomfortable fact that contributions 
are weighted unequally and that imbalances in communicative power will persist and quite 
possibly worsen.  Perhaps even more inauspicious is the fact that in deliberative systems, 
“there need be no direct link between citizens’ perspectives and outcomes.”422  This might 
not be so disturbing if we conceive of representation less in terms of delegatory 
responsiveness (i.e. along a fixed, positional relationship between principals and agents) and 
more in terms of a proactive trusteeship.423  The latter, however, is not the basic starting point 
for many deliberativists seeking to bolster popular direction of governance.  In either case, 
proponents of the systemic analysis argue against both top-down and bottom-up conceptions 
of representation, suggesting instead a shared responsibility that will always admit of gaps 
between demands and outcomes in the overall system.   
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 A systemic analysis also regulates enthusiasm regarding the transformative effects of 
deliberation (in terms of being epistemically and procedurally ‘better,’ and yielding ‘just’ 
decisions or results).  This is the crux of systematicity: different institutional constraints with 
different social bases will yield entirely different sets of outcomes.424  Parkinson points out 
that indeterminacy is inherent in the complex workings of the broader deliberative system, 
and we cannot assume the same delivery of goods on a larger scale that mini-publics are 
supposed to deliver.  His hesitation is palpable when he writes, 
 
Perhaps, having opened up normative room for many different sites and modes of 
expression, systems come to be dominated by perspectives that are narrowly 
constructed, unreflective or self-interested.  Perhaps the powerful just exercise 
power in whatever way they can.  Perhaps discourses that are generated in the 
right way have no correlation with right content.425 
 
 
 David Owen and Graham Smith have recently summarized the motivations of the 
systemic turn with an impressive level of perspicuity.  In their analysis, they discuss the ways 
in which the recent turn breaks from attempts to isolate deliberative moments and effectively 
results in amorphousness.  They focus on the strong claim proffered by the authors of the 
Manifesto that the discursive totality, though differentiated, can be treated as a system 
susceptible to deliberative evaluation.  The problems involved here, however, are ironically 
bound up with the benefits of softening deliberative: deliberative democracy may well lose 
touch with its normative moorings.  As they write, 
 
The currently dominant articulations of the deliberative system could, we argue, 
result in judging a system as deliberative with little, or even nothing, in the way of 
actual democratic deliberation between citizens taking place…In our analysis, we 
take as the core justification of deliberative democracy as a political ideal that the 
legitimacy of our collective political arrangements (institutions, laws, policies) 
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rests on mutual justification enacted through deliberative practices amongst free 
and equal citizens.  We argue that this political ideal is easily lost in the current 
articulations of the deliberative system.426 
 
 
While I wholeheartedly identify with their critical position here, I am less confident in the 
two alternatives they propose.  For example, they suggest analyzing systemic responsiveness 
to a ‘deliberative stance’—i.e. the relationship of participants involved in a mutual enterprise 
of reason-giving ‘as if’ to reach shared practical judgments.  The problem of transmission 
(discussed above) is retained in their citizen-centered alternative as well, however, given the 
dubious expectation that the functioning deliberative system “integrates the sites and 
occasions of civic deliberation with those that embody decision-making power.”  Their other 
proposed twist on systemic theory is to obviate the question of whether democratic systems 
are deliberative in nature; rather we should scrutinize the “role of deliberation within 
democratic systems.”  I argue this too is problematic, as they merely restate the ‘comparative 
project’ of adjusting theory to practice, which requires “working through the roles and sites 
of democratic deliberation in different democratic systems.”  This appears to merely kick the 
can by pointing to the perennial problem of negotiating political norms and practices.427   
 Regardless of our disagreement, the significance of this criticism cannot be 
overestimated.  When proponents of systemic deliberation such as Goodin urge the 
abandonment of the unitary model of deliberation, they are effectively lowering the bar for 
what counts as deliberation in the system.428  As long as the processes taking place across 
sequenced institutions is “functionally equivalent” to a deliberative democratic exchange, the 
resultant decisions are acceptable in terms of being appropriately sensitive to relevant, public 
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reasons and are therefore taken to be legitimate.429  The authors of the Manifesto were not 
wholly insensitive to the dangers of consequentialist logic described here, and note the fine 
line that has to be walked in judging the system. 
 
A systemic analysis must be able to make judgments and must have the analytic 
tools to do so.  Without criteria to evaluate when non-deliberative, weakly 
deliberative, or even anti-deliberative behavior nevertheless enhances the 
deliberative system, one risks falling into the blind spot of old style functionalism: 
everything can be seen as, in one way or another, contributing to the system.430 
 
 
Steiner similarly points out that the purported advantages of loosening deliberative standards 
can alternatively be conceived as a worrisome variant of ‘concept-stretching,’ that often leads 
to “theoretical vacuity and practical confusion.”431  Picking up on this danger in a recent 
review of competing deliberative theories, Bächtiger and his colleagues argue that if almost 
every communicative act can qualify as ‘deliberative,’ this risks the promotion of an 
unconstrained conception of (non)deliberation that is “in danger of being directionless, or 
worse, meaningless.”432  To reiterate, this is the tradeoff presented by the systemic turn posed 
above—by forgiving deficient types and unequal distributions of deliberation, the theory 
risks watering itself down to the point of obsolescence. 
 The main challenges in adopting the ‘good enough’ evaluative metric are twofold.  
First, it becomes difficult to imagine how ‘meta-deliberation’ about the quality of the system 
is to be conducted and sustained, as this seems more appropriate for times of constitutional 
                                                             
429 Owen and Smith 2015, 7. 
430 Mansbridge et. al. 2012, 19.  Compare Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, 33) on the problem: “The general 
analytic point is that we should not leap too soon to find positive deliberative consequences in intrinsically non-
deliberative practices.” 
431 Steiner 2008, 190.  See also Sartori 1970 who provided a more extensive critique of this tendency in political 
theory. 
432 Bächtiger et. al. 2010, 48. 
 137 
crisis rather than mundane political moments.433  Second, the necessity to judge the 
relationship between the system and its parts would seem inhibited by the very dynamism 
that the systemic account is founded upon.  The shifted analysis is perilous in that it 
effectively ignores the problem of the unequal and non-random distribution of deliberative 
capacities and possibly condones deliberative ‘wrongs’ as unfortunate means to under-
specified ends.  In either case, the systemic approach is now often thought to be the way 
forward in reconciling the tight rationality requirements of deliberation with the loose 
requirements of democracy.  By sequencing, integrating, and distributing deliberative 
components, it becomes possible to appreciate anew the diverse and often conflicting roles of 
the average citizen, experts, media elites, political representatives and variously 
inclusive/deliberative decision-making bodies and procedures.  There are understandable 
reasons why so many scholars have embraced the systemic model of deliberation, including 
its flexible approach to the content and distribution of deliberative practice.  It allows for the 
division of labor among unequal parts in the political system, and pays greater attention to 
the role of rhetoric, as well as giving a place to diverse modes of expression and 
participation, self-interest, and non-communicative forms of power.  Rather than judging 
isolated moments of formal deliberation, it allows for a more general evaluation of the 
system as a whole and thereby acknowledges the piecemeal and imperfect distribution of 
deliberation across the levels of the system.   
 System deliberativists have attempted to reconcile their vision of democratic politics 
with the world as it is, and in the process have made concessions which have transformed the 
theory.  The worries of skeptics are to be assuaged by a softening of deliberative criteria and 
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walking back expectations for the ubiquitous replication of deliberative sites.  Despite or 
perhaps because of these accommodations, it becomes harder to see the work that 
deliberation can do in the interest of a mass public which remains vulnerable to “the 
repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power, structural violence, 
and systematically distorted communication.”434  The critique posed here goes beyond prima 
facie doubts about deliberation’s desirability or feasibility.  That most are practically 
disenfranchised when it comes to influencing the political system can and has been 
empirically-demonstrated, but it is also intimately felt by the mass of citizen-consumers in 
terms of “powerlessness, apathy and futility.”435  To answer Habermas’ recent question of 
whether democracy still has or ever had an ‘epistemic dimension’ seems less an open 
question than a symptom of the camp’s identity crisis.  It is my contention that the 
motivations driving the latest systemic turn may well anticipate the impending irrelevance 
and eventual abandonment of deliberative democratic theory. 
 
Turning back: Habermas’ Two-Track Model 
 
Deliberative theory has become steeped in metaphors.436  One of the most persistent is that of 
the ‘public sphere’—a famous Habermasian contribution.  From his earliest work discussing 
the transformation of the public sphere and modern developments in the relationships 
between the family, civil society, and the state, Habermas has long emphasized the 
communicative structures that allow for social cohesion and solidarity.  He describes the 
degeneration of these linkages to be the result of the modern welfare state’s expansion such 
that state and society become interpenetrated.  In a combination of other potent metaphors, 
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Habermas warns of the ‘colonization’ of diverse, organic ‘lifeworlds’ that has gradually 
occurred via the steering media of systemic forces.437  Indicative of his vocation as a critical 
theorist, Habermas has not ceased to warn readers of the fragility of democratic 
accomplishments, and the real potential for legitimation crises spurred on by the redefinition 
of politics in market categories.438  Despite celebrations of the ‘fact of pluralism’ and the 
post-modern supersession of antiquated worldviews, these developments open voids in which 
the exercise of power by the secular state must be justified by the processes of the democratic 
system itself. 
 In the face of this transformation, Habermas has continued to develop his discursive 
theory so as to emphasize the internal relationship between facticity and validity, i.e. between 
the legal and moral ‘crypto-normative’ dimensions of deliberative democracy.  In his latest 
work, Habermas has increasingly moved away from his earlier statements of the problems 
facing deliberation.  Although continuing to ground his model of discursive democracy on 
the ideal of “a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens,” this now means 
something quite different than it once did in his earlier work.439  In his treatment of the 
moral-practical self-understanding of modernity, as attested to by both “a universalistic moral 
consciousness and the liberal design of the constitutional state,” Habermas continues to be 
sensitive to the pressing need for regenerating social solidarity.440  The reality of society’s 
increasing complexity, however, dictates revisiting the relationship between individuals’ 
exercise of political autonomy, on the one hand, and the provision and preservation of 
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individual liberties by legal structures constraining and directing administrative power on the 
other. 
 As discussed above, Habermas has come to promote a greater role for law than he 
once did, e.g. in A Theory of Communicative Action.  Where it once served merely as a 
“democratic dam against the colonizing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the 
lifeworld,” legal infrastructure in Between Facts and Norms serves a much more substantive 
role in linking these domains.441  As Habermas writes, 
 
The legal code not only keeps one foot in the medium of ordinary language, 
through which everyday communication achieves social integration in the 
lifeworld; it also accepts messages that originate there and puts these into a form 
that is comprehensible to the special codes of the power-steered administration 
and the money-steered economy. To this extent, the language of law, unlike the 
moral communication restricted to the lifeworld, can function as a transformer in 
the society-wide communication circulating between system and lifeworld.442 
 
 
Habermas certainly does not abandon the foundational role of the ‘public,’ or the moral 
dimension of communication in his updated account.  Rather, he emphasizes that rationally 
legitimated orders involve mediated ties between differentiated parts of the system.    
According to this argument, legitimacy is not only secured by principles of discourse which 
specify valid processes of reason-giving in the search for understanding, but simultaneously 
by the de facto constraint and coercion of legal force.443 
 Given that the lifeworld and system are not to be understood strictly in an 
antagonistic relationship, how is communication conducted across the formal and informal 
layers of the system?  This brings us to Habermas’ ‘two-track’ solution, along with its 
attendant controversies.  Habermas uses this schema to describe the pluralization of the 
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public sphere, i.e. “the communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through the 
association network of civil society.”444  Though he prefers to think of the distributed parts of 
the public sphere as networked, rather than located in a system per se, Habermas anticipates 
the systemic turn in emphasizing a division of labor between the formal and informal levels 
and components of the public sphere.  The key move here is to divide the task of legitimation 
between institutionalized deliberative bodies and the informal communication of the public 
sphere, i.e. to differentiate administrative and communicative power.445  The organic public 
sphere and members of mass society still play a necessary role in the cooperative search for 
truth, but are largely removed from the process of decision-making.  In this sense, it becomes 
possible to pose a relatively demarcated boundary between processes of opinion and will 
formation in the political system.  As mentioned above, this locates discourse theory between 
liberal and republican counterparts.  Its success has more to do with the “reasonableness of 
discourses and negotiations than with the fair aggregation of the motives of success-oriented 
individuals or with the authentic character of the common will of a nation.”  Moreover, this 
requires that communicative processes and rationales be structured and appropriately 
distributed, drawing upon rough and informally developed public opinions so as to produce 
results that fulfill the expectation of reasonability.446 
 The separation between administrative bodies charged with decision-making and a 
more ‘wild’ and unorganized public sphere highlights the importance of communication 
between various sluices in the system.  It also suggests a significant degree of confusion 
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among theorists who have tended to fuse the reflective and decisive aspects of deliberation.  
Returning to Habermas’ divided tracks helps to highlight this teleological separation of 
functions.  As he writes 
 
The operative meaning of these regulations consists less in discovering and 
identifying problems than with justifying the selection of a problem and the 
choice among competing proposals for solving it.  The publics of parliamentary 
bodies are structured predominantly as a context of justification.  These bodies 
rely not only on the administration’s preparatory work and further processing but 
also on the context of discovery provided by a procedurally unregulated public 
sphere that is borne by the general public of citizens.”447 
 
 
“Weak publics” serve as an indispensable vehicle of public opinion, but only the political 
system can ‘act’ according to this model.  In significant ways, the wild and unorganized 
frontier is vulnerable to the disenfranchising forces of unequal social power, systemic 
violence, and the confusions of distorted communication.  On the other hand, the public 
sphere enjoys a type of unrestricted communication that is not procedurally constrained to 
the same degree as institutionalized discourse. 
 Here we have a model of deliberative public opinion formation that is sensitive to the 
frailties of a mass democratic model of control.  The public sphere is comprised of 
communicative structures which act as a “far-flung network of sensors” responding to 
societal problems, and catalyzing the development of influential opinions.448  The 
infrastructures of civil society provide an ‘intellectualizing effect’ in filtering political 
discussion, sending information to the functional system which then codes them.449  
Although the public opinion transformed through democratic channels represents a potent 
communicative power, it cannot act or rule of itself.  Instead, its influence lies in pointing the 
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administrative power in specific directions.  It does this by problematizing and thematizing 
issues which would otherwise be unlikely to register in the political system as warranting 
action.  The two-track model of deliberation therefore represents an attempt to conceptualize 
the operative processes undergirding the formation of ‘considered’ opinion.  Habermas 
underlines the importance of variously structured and organized deliberation relevant for 
system-level analysis. 
 
Processes of opinion-formation, especially when they have to do with political 
questions, certainly cannot be separated from the transformation of the 
participants’ preferences and attitudes, but they can be separated from putting 
these dispositions into action.  To this extent, the communication structures of the 
public sphere relieve the public of the burden of decision making.450 
 
 
This is an important rebuttal to leading deliberativists such as Joshua Cohen who suggest that 
an ‘ideal procedure’ of deliberation and decision making should be ‘mirrored’ in social 
institutions to the greatest degree possible.451  Decision-oriented procedures are not here 
intended to serve as a model for social institutions as a whole, nor are they appropriate for all 
government institutions.   
The two-track model provides a general framework for thinking about the function of 
public opinion in complex societies.  The sorting and weighting of opinion based on 
contribution may strike some as restrictive, culturally insensitive, and dubiously democratic.  
If we are not to succumb to the pitfalls described above, however, and open the floodgates to 
just any kind of discussion, his framework may help to identify the political function of 
discourse in the broader public sphere.452  Consistent with my polemic against the poll in the 
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previous chapter, it behooves students of public opinion to pay heed to the epistemic drives 
and rationales that distinguish ‘bundled opinions’ from ‘public opinions.’    
 
Public opinion is not representative in the statistical sense.  It is not an aggregate 
of individually gathered, privately expressed opinions held by isolated persons.  
Hence it must not be confused with survey results.  Political opinion polls 
provide a certain reflection of ‘public opinion’ only if they have been preceded 
by a focused public debate and a corresponding opinion-formation in a 
mobilized public sphere.453 
 
 
As uncomfortable as it may be for those who wish to neatly wed deliberative and democratic 
aspirations, there is a core cognitive dimension that cannot be dispensed with short of 
abandoning the theory of deliberation outright.  Although Habermas has become increasingly 
explicit in recognizing the value of diverse expressions in the public sphere, he has never 
abandoned the rationalistic impulse driving his theory.  His is a procedural understanding of 
deliberation, ultimately aimed at rational decisions that are legitimate in terms of being 
hypothetically acceptable to all those potentially affected.  It is not and has never meant to be 
a model to be uniformly and ubiquitously exercised by all citizens at the various rungs of the 
system.  In what remains, I argue that Habermas later and more mature formulations of his 
discourse theory offer ways of reorienting— rather than altogether abandoning—the 
impulses driving the latest turn in deliberative theory.  In particular, I argue that his most 
recent perspective demonstrates an astute sensitivity to the limited and indirect role played by 
the average citizen in the deliberative system.  In ‘decentering’ the ordinary and day-to-day 
processes by which said citizens come to form opinions, the ‘two-track’ model can play a 
part in the reconsideration of deliberative criteria.  This can be accomplished while paying 
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respect to the achievements of the systemic turn, especially its amenability to ‘real’ politics 
as characterized by self-interest, power, and the blurred boundaries between strategic and 
communicative action. 
  
Deliberation Come Full Circle? 
 
Habermas, as the forefather of deliberative theory, provides a sophisticated and yet highly 
inconclusive conception of the relationship between public opinion, deliberation, and 
communicative power.  The suggestion here is that the basic starting point of deliberative 
theory contains conflicting motivations; a problem shared with his intellectual heirs now 
engaged in system-level analysis.  Deliberativists continue in their efforts to connect or 
reconnect the ordinarily messy ‘lifeworld’ with the functions of the bureaucratized ‘system.’  
They attempt to leave open the exploration of different agendas through the inclusion of 
diverse voices and viewpoints, but also to provide structure through reliance on precedent 
and prescribed modes of political operation.  They attempt to reconcile visceral, affective, 
and aesthetic expression with the calm, cool-headed, and measured practice of reason-giving.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they attempt to retain radically-transformative 
democratic power while also paying heed to the practical dictates of operating a large-scale, 
welfare society. 
 While recent adjustments are argued to be practically- advantageous in bringing 
deliberation down to earth, the loosening of traditional requirements has been complicated by 
systematists attempting to smuggle in long-standing but ill-fitting deliberative goals.  Chief 
among these are epistemic and participatory/inclusionary premiums, which retain vestigial 
resemblances to classical deliberative tenets.  Though systematists purport to lower the 
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deliberative bar to bring theory in line with political realities, they also tend to revert to 
loftier visions of the average citizen and her capacity to inform or affect the political process.  
Omnicompetence is ostensibly renounced, but is nevertheless retained in evaluative criteria 
which presuppose sustained involvement and contributions from ordinary citizens at the 
periphery of the political system.  The deliberative enthusiast should take seriously the 
looming possibility that deliberation suffers from a chronic ambiguity at its core, one which 
no number of turns can avoid outstrip.  I’ve argued that this is inextricably linked to the 
mysteries surrounding communicative power, and the ambiguous trace of legitimation across 
permutations of the political system.  As it stands, it is increasingly difficult to say what 
exactly is deliberative about a system-level model which relaxes (to the point of abandoning) 
core expectations for the intersubjective exchange of reasons aimed at reaching mutual 
understanding, or at least collectively-binding decisions. 
 None of this is to say that Habermas ‘got it right,’ or that his successors have 
somehow missed obvious solutions to the obstacles inhibiting the realization of deliberative 
politics.  Jeffrey Flynn describes the persistent mystery regarding the origin and force of 
communicative power in Habermas’ later work.454  Even though Between Facts and Norms 
carries with it more radically democratic motivations from his early years, Habermas is 
increasingly at pains to explain just how the ordinary citizen—often consumed by the 
pressing needs of preserving herself in private life—is to see the operations of the state as 
responsive to her preferences or variably-informed opinions.   
 A networked or dispersed model of deliberative practice in the system must confront 
the ‘problem-solving’ and ‘power-generating’ functions of the administrative and 
communicative levels, tiers, rings, spheres etc.  Habermas emphasizes that the public use of 
                                                             
454 See also Scheuerman 1999. 
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unhindered communicative freedom should provide cognitive benefits, i.e. in enabling 
rational opinion and will formation.455  He also argues that such discursive practices should 
exert a ‘motivating force,’ through the power of argument and providing for the generation of 
‘power potentials.’  Obligations produced through the examination of validity claims are said 
to build up into a potential that “holders of administrative power should not ignore.”456  This 
implies a responsiveness of the system to the lifeworld, the latter being originary and serving 
as the bedrock for the public sphere.457  As Flynn argues, however, this conflicts with an 
alternative narrow reading of the origins of communicative power, in which legislative power 
rests with the entire citizenry in principium but is exercised in the largely-insulated political 
system.458  The problem I am pointing to here can be traced to the tensions of a “self-
limitation of radical-democratic practice” that is necessitated by conflicting demands of 
complex modern societies.459  The two-track model itself seems to preserve communicative 
power within the jurisdiction of the wider public, but other times it seems that a ‘conversion’ 
is required on the part of exclusionary ‘democratic’ procedures so that it becomes difficult to 
discern just what deliberatively political task is left for the masses.   
 As with issues in the signaling of public opinion (e.g. in the sensory role of the poll), 
the challenge here involves the transmission of reasons from the informal public sphere to the 
formal political system.  How might the two interact?  The obvious mainstream response 
would be in through general elections in which the public picks representatives or decides on 
                                                             
455 As described, this occurs through the “free processing of information and reasons, of relevant topics and 
contributions” so as to ground the presumption that results are anchored in correct and rational procedures in 
which participants take yes or no positions on validity claims.  Habermas 1996, 147, 119. 
456 Ibid., 147. 
457 Ibid., 157, 170, 385, 486. 
458 Barreyro (2018, 3) takes up Flynn’s discussion, herself arguing for a wide reading.  Under her reading of 
Habermas, “the informal public sphere is capable of generating communicative power independently of, and 
even against, the political system. This reading does not deny that communicative power can be generated 
within the political system; it merely denies that the political system is its only source.” 
459 Habermas 1996, 371. 
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referenda.460  This would be a clean, decisive, and predictably-structured ceremonial 
engagement in which communicative power is used authoritatively and in a binding fashion.  
Habermas himself argues these mechanisms are necessary, as when he writes, “Passing 
through the channels of general elections and various forms of participation, public opinions 
are converted into a communicative power that authorizes the legislature and legitimates 
regulatory agencies.”461  However, as any deliberative democrat should remember, voting “is 
not a particularly good example of political communication given its lack of discursivity.”462  
Although likely helpful in bolstering accountability for binding decisions that are reached, in 
many ways this does seem to signal the “defeatist surrender of the radical content of 
democratic ideals” that Habermas rejects.463  Thus, the ambiguous status of communicative 
power is no small matter, given that “determining the overall character of Habermas’ 
democratic theory hinges to some extent on defining the role of communicative power.”464  
The question of how permeable the decision-making apparatuses of the state should be 
remains central to untangling the problems facing the formulation of deliberative ideals and 
its implementation in practice.   
 Whether or not we should continue to talk about and pursue deliberation as a 
democratic ideal depends on how comfortable we are with the fact that most of us will 
resemble an anonymous face in the audience, often unseen and almost always unheard.  One 
can almost hear the sardonic chuckle of Carl Schmitt, who so greatly influenced Habermas as 
an intellectual adversary.  The problem of differentiating, filtering, or laundering 
                                                             
460 Ibid., 442 
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462 Flynn 2004, 447. 
463 Habermas 1996, xliii. 
464 Flynn 2004, 434. 
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‘considered’ public opinions and avoiding a politics of acclamation or decisionism continues 
to haunt his project.465  In a highly-revelatory passage, Habermas writes 
 
The more the audience is widened through mass communications, the more 
inclusive and the more abstract in form it becomes.  Correspondingly, the roles of 
the actors appearing in the arenas are, to an increasing degree, sharply separated 
from the roles of the spectators in the galleries.  Although the ‘success of the 
actors in the arena is ultimately decided in the galleries’, the question arises of 
how autonomous the public is when it takes a position on an issue, whether its 
affirmative or negative stand reflects a process of becoming informed or in fact 
only a more or less concealed game of power.  Despite the wealth of empirical 
investigations, we still do not have a well-established answer to this cardinal 
question.466 
 
 
Habermas apparently continues to place his faith in the internal workings of a dynamic civil 
society that is less plagued by communicative distortions characteristic of the system.  The 
persistence of his worries regarding a nonpublic and noncritical, mass culture of consumption 
has not yet dispelled his belief in the critical power of the public to constrain the otherwise 
perfidious tendencies of the system.467  
 There have also been proposals that not only recognize but attempt to counter 
democratic deficiencies in the policy process.  As John Boswell argues, it may be possible to 
identify institutional innovations and governing practices that can “embed aspects of 
democratic deliberation ‘downstream’ in the policy process in order to counter distortions 
and rebalance asymmetries.”468  Combatting the often-deleterious effects of the ‘wriggle 
room’ phenomenon—in which policy elites enjoy the flexibility to exercise considerable 
discretion in the application of decisions—might be one way of bolstering the transmissional 
channels of public opinion.  In order to recognize and resist the more insidious types of 
                                                             
465 Schmitt 1985, 16-7; 2008, 275. 
466 Habermas 1996, 375; quote within quote from Gerhards and Neidhardt 1990, 27. 
467 Habermas 1989, 175; 1996, 379. 
468 Boswell 2015, 1. 
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power that Habermas describes, Boswell recommends several implements.  ‘Scrutiny 
forums’ would force bureaucratic elites to justify interpretations of policy commitments.  
‘Contestatory reviews’ would allow actors in civil society to examine perceived biases in 
interpretations.  ‘Feedback funnels’ would enable inclusive reflection on the experience of 
service delivery.  In addition, governing practices such as ‘structured partnerships’ which 
guarantee less endowed actors informal access, and ‘co-production’ which elicits citizen 
participation in the provision of public services, might hold promise for better-legitimating 
state action.469 
 The dynamic problems of interconnectivity and transmission remain, however, and 
the depth of these issues has been severely underestimated by systematists to the theory’s 
detriment.470  The effective role for communicative action as well as the location of popular 
sovereignty is difficult to recognize when analysis is shifted to the depersonalized system.  
Consequently, the ‘cardinal question’ posed above by Habermas remains open, at best.  As 
Mendonça has recently argued, the popular embrace of system-level analysis has outstripped 
a more detailed consideration of the “conditions, factors, limitations, and contexts” which 
affect the transmission of opinions into the decision-making process.  As he warns,  
Deliberative systems cannot simply be a tool mobilized by scholars whenever 
they find criticisms against the normative ideals of deliberative democracy. If the 
concept is used carelessly, it may easily lose its critical potential and heuristic 
fruitfulness. Moreover, the idea of deliberative systems may end up paradoxically 
feeding both the radical critics of deliberation and the conservative liberals in 
their crusade against deliberative democracy.471 
 
Proponents of deliberative systems should be wary, not only of the effects of shifting or 
loosening normative criteria, but of the potential for real, practical dangers which accompany 
                                                             
469 Ibid., 4. 
470 For a discussion of the problem, see Boswell 2016. 
471 Mendonça 2016, 186. 
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this move.  Treating deliberative systems as a “panacea against any critique of deliberation” 
leads to new difficulties—both practical and principled—such as new political asymmetries, 
incompatible discursive dynamics, and most importantly the “fluidification of the legitimacy 
principle.”472  If deliberation is to retain any semblance of the critical function that Habermas 
envisions (i.e. if it is to have ‘teeth’), the task of tracing legitimacy through the various levels 
and sluices of the system—characterized by blurred demarcations between communicative 
and strategic action—remains an important and yet seemingly Sisyphean task. 
 Alternatively, coming to grips with the normalcy of a “public sphere at rest” might 
involve a return to appreciating the dramaturgical and constructive nature of representative 
politics.473  Stefan Rummens, drawing on the work of representation theorists such as Pitkin, 
Disch, Saward, Mansbridge, Urbinati and Hajer, argues that ‘staged deliberation’—involving 
traditional representative institutions—can provide for a kind of visibility that connects 
public reason to political power.474  The narrative structures of representative politics might 
foster the epistemic resources and sources of solidarity required in a large-scale democracy.  
It does this in such a way to avoid the pitfalls of “black box mini-publics or anonymous 
networks,” where power is obscured rather than jettisoned and can therefore go unchecked.475  
This might border on a type of ‘Schumpeterian Deliberation’ mentioned above, and resonates 
with Habermas’ explicit acknowledgment of the advantages enjoyed by those at the center 
(rather than periphery) of the system in their capacity to actively shape public opinions.476  
Rather than focusing on the deliberative capacities of the mass public itself, this renewal of 
                                                             
472 Mendonça 2013. 
473 Habermas 1996, 379. 
474 Rummens 2012, 25. 
475 Ibid., 42.  Alternatively, as Chambers 2004, 2005 has argued, publicity might not always lead to quality 
deliberation; suggesting a profitable role for secrecy and the ‘muddying elements’ which Habermas usually 
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interest in deliberative elitism might recommend greater attention on the situational contexts 
in which the public can—indirectly and infrequently—scrutinize or contest politics 
conducted in its name. 
The distance between deliberative and Schumpeterian models has steadily been 
decreasing as a reflection of the former’s disappointments as a theory of democracy.477  
Disavowals of functionalism notwithstanding, systematists have suggested that a ‘good 
enough’ achievement of deliberation in practice will not entail a radical transformation of the 
political landscape or its inhabitants.  It turns out that the realization of a deliberative system 
is neither robustly deliberative nor democratic, compared to traditional metrics.  Under the 
terms of these concessions, the mass public does not achieve the degree of differentiation 
necessary to sustain or reclaim a critical or decentered civil society.  Politics are conducted 
and presented as thinly-veiled spectacle, while the media system is beholden to the actors on 
the stage for the access needed to sustain consumership.  The minority of the interested 
citizenry that does engage (in intermittent elections, referenda or opinion polls) tends to be 
the least deliberative in terms of its amenability towards sustained debate and the 
consideration of conflicting perspectives or proposals.  Perhaps most troubling for 
deliberative aspirations is the increasing normalcy of denying the legitimate standing or even 
the existence of political opposition.  This dark age of politics—which may well prove to be 
more than a historical lapse—is trumpeted by the claimed legitimacy of ‘alternative facts’ in 
an age of ‘Post-Truth.’ 
These are not primarily matters of lacking proficiency or civic character amongst the 
citizenry, but reflect the reality that the functioning of the bureaucratic system does not 
                                                             
477 Goodin is a rare breed of deliberativist in his acknowledgment of this shrinking gap, and he suggests that we 
may have to regard “deliberative Schumpeterianism” as “good enough.”  Goodin 2005, 194. 
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require—and indeed encourages—widespread political abstinence and ignorance.   As 
mourned by Habermas, the administrative system can today act relatively independent of 
society and “procures the necessary mass loyalty and determines political goal functions 
more or less by itself.”478  All of this is to suggest that ours is a plebiscitary political culture 
steered by interests, acclamation, and the strength of numbers rather than anything vaguely 
resembling deliberation.  More importantly, it is one that deliberativists now suggest is ‘good 
enough’ for political life in the twenty-first century. 
 Whatever else might be said about the latest wave of deliberative research, tracing out 
the promises and dangers of systemic models will mandate attention be paid to institutional 
structures and boundaries.  Although I am increasingly pessimistic regarding deliberation’s 
prospects as an applied model of political practice, I do not (contra systematists) think it a 
viable path to water down deliberative expectations to meet the dictates of empirical ‘reality.’  
Instead, I side with critics such as William Smith who argue that “the conceptual coherence 
and normative integrity of the systemic turn can be preserved, but only if the boundaries of a 
deliberative system are drawn in a clear and compelling fashion.”479  Though I do not, like 
some democratic theorists, hold that normative ideals should be ‘free-floating’ in the sense of 
being wholly impervious to empirical reality, neither should they be adapted so as to fit the 
transient characteristics of the status quo.  Doing so would be to forfeit on deliberation as a 
regulative ideal.  If we are to follow Habermas in his crypto-normative approach, we should 
view disparaging findings—for example those regarding the cognitive makeup of the average 
voter, the degree of inequality between subsets of the population, and the general resistance 
of the political system to inputs— not to signal the defeat of deliberative theory, but as 
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“contingent constraints that deserve serious inquiry.”480  And although permitting some 
flexibility for deliberation’s definition might be prudent, it is also true that we should 
establish a threshold for what is tolerable in delineating deliberative systems.  As Smith 
writes, “the empirical and normative aspirations of the systemic turn would be poorly served 
by a core concept that is too fuzzy around the edges.”481  It is high time for self-described 
proponents of deliberation to revisit the premiums placed on respectful interpersonal 
discussion, cognitive/epistemic development, the resolution of collective problems, and the 
negotiation of political conflicts. 
 Ironically, we appear to remain lodged between facts and norms when it comes to 
deliberation and its connection to public opinion.  There are understandable reasons for 
becoming pessimistic, to which I am no stranger.  At least in theory, deliberation is said to 
liberate and illuminate.  With the exception of a very small and usually privileged minority, 
however, the vast majority of Americans has neither the time, resources, nor inclination to 
engage in deliberative practice.  As discussed above, those who do deliberate rarely have a 
discernable influence on the policy process, and decision-making is unlikely to be 
systematically devolved anytime soon.  If we keep in mind the two-track model which 
divorces the formation of public opinion amongst the citizenry from its being put into action 
via political administration, we appear to be only one step away from what is basically a 
Schumpeterian model of democratic leadership.  Regardless of whether the general public 
has a political will, it is unclear how this would be detected, measured, or acted upon by 
elites.  A skeptic’s likely answer: symbolically and rhetorically, at best.482   
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482 The prognosis does not look good when deliberative challenges are considered together.  Samuel Bagg 
doesn’t see much potential for a critical or transformative deliberative public.  He writes, “Conversion of 
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On the other hand, and as Habermas has consistently argued for decades, there are 
other deeply-embedded ethical and moral reasons for continuing to push deliberative 
research. 
 
Tendencies pointing to the collapse of the public sphere are unmistakable, for 
while its scope is expanding impressively, its function has become progressively 
insignificant.  Still, publicity continues to be an organizational principle of our 
political order.  It is apparently more and other than a mere scrap of liberal 
ideology that a social democracy could discard without harm.483 
 
 
Keeping with one of Habermas’ favorite metaphors regarding the Janus-faced nature of 
political life, democratic theory has an important role in calling into question the 
legitimation of the state vis-à-vis its citizens, but also a limited one in terms of 
changing political reality itself.  As Flynn notes, “the burden as always lies not with 
democratic theorists but with democratic publics to revitalize the public sphere as a site 
for realizing the radical content of democratic ideals.”484  Constructing models and 
paradigms is important to an extent, but will always trail the actual experiences lived 
out by ordinary citizens and the comparatively small minority who wield economic, 
journalistic, and political power.485  Thus, whether or not we wish or intend to nurture a 
deliberative culture is, as it has always been, largely out of the hands of the academic.  
As in all theory, the ideal will continue to follow in the wake of the real.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
citizens in democratic deliberations is triply disadvantaged. In the first place, individuals will never be able to 
approach political deliberation with the sustained focus exhibited by professional scientists and philosophers, 
who spend their entire professional lives working through a very limited set of issues. Second, even if we could 
approximate this focus in some sort of mini-public, we still could not reproduce the sort of widespread 
agreement about deliberative assumptions upon which disciplinary progress is based. Finally, the salient 
normative dimension of political choices cannot be eliminated, meaning that the special burdens of motivated 
reasoning about moral issues are here to stay. Despite their role in scientific progress, in other words, and 
despite their legitimate theoretical attraction, deliberative conversions are likely too expensive to play a central 
role in the fight against concentrated power.” Bagg 2015, 16-7. 
483 Habermas 1989, 4. 
484 Flynn 2004, 451. 
485 As Warren argues, a ‘models’ approach often leads to “unnecessary theoretical dead-ends.”  Warren 2012, 1. 
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 In the remaining three chapters, I trace the intense difficulties (political, social, 
economic, and cultural) facing deliberation, and how these in turn encourage an 
understanding of the public’s role in the state as quasi-sovereign.  Following a 
discussion of the trends which have worked against the realization of a collective 
deliberative culture, I argue that the difficulties facing deliberative theory are reasons 
for turning to the insights provided in political realism.  The two traditions together, in 
a relationship signified by ‘deliberative realism,’ offer us surer footing for analyzing 
democratic life in the current context of American politics. 
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Chapter 4: Is Nothing Sacred Anymore? 
Reconstructing the Bases of Solidarity and 
Popular Sovereignty 
 
Deliberative Disruptions and Redirections 
The concerns raised in the previous chapters revolve around the history of public opinion in 
democratic thought, the conceptualization and measurement of public opinion in the 20th and 
21st centuries, the role of deliberation in fostering ‘considered’ and ‘effective’ opinion-
formation, and the locus and efficacy of communicative action/power in relation to the 
business of state politics.   All of these issues, I argue, are relevant for the democratic project 
in postmodern times—i.e. the reconstruction of social integration and solidarity as bases for 
democratic legitimacy.  In this chapter I reflect on the factors driving a chasm between what 
Habermas refers to as the ‘lifeworld’ and the political ‘system.’  This is related to the 
aforementioned transmission problems between the two tracks of the political body (i.e. the 
center and periphery).  Though he has backed away from the language of ‘refeudalization’ 
and ‘colonization’ framing his earlier theses on the public sphere, Habermas continues to 
focus his energies in illuminating the structural and cultural asymmetries inhibiting 
legitimation processes.  Chief among these are the insufficient decoupling or independence 
of the media system from its social environment, and lacking feedback “between the 
informed elite discourses and a responsive civil society.”486  I focus on the latter here, given 
feedback’s relevance for the democratic legitimation of political authority and the challenges 
of integrating diverse publics. 
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 The chapter title above references the project of discovering a postmetaphysical basis 
for the democratic genesis of law.  Current deliberativists are essentially involved in this 
exact enterprise, even in adapting criteria for reason-giving and in deemphasizing the scope 
and degree of democratic involvement on the part of ordinary citizens.  The basic challenge 
is the reconstruction of the bonds and commitments necessary for maintaining the social-
welfare state.487  The arduousness of this task is compounded, however, given that in 
transitioning to modernity “the state has lost its sacred substance.”488  Habermas’ life’s work 
is an attempt to answer how we might translate and channel distinct discourses (e.g. practical, 
ethical, and moral) in the task of managing political plurality and conflict.489  Especially in 
Between Facts and Norms, the key is to pay attention to the structuration of discourses and 
their consequent (dis)empowerment.  This is the core of his epistemic proceduralism, which 
emphasizes “the universal combination and reciprocal mediation of legally institutionalized 
and noninstitutionalized popular sovereignty.”490 
 Analogous to the postmetaphysical abandonment of belief in a cosmological world 
order, there are observable trends which suggest widespread disenchantment with popular 
sovereignty as the sine qua non of politics.  This has seemingly occurred not only among 
cynics, realists, and democratic elitists—which would be unsurprising— but also among 
fatigued idealists who once argued for the contingency of democratic deficits open to 
remediation, if not radical transformation.  The defanging of deliberative theory is indicative 
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of this disillusionment.  Where it once was a ‘citizen-centered’ theory of democracy, 
proponents of deliberation have apparently cowed to the prevalence of non-deliberative 
forces.491  The motivation to empower a critical public by maintaining epistemic, ethical, and 
democratic goals is nominally retained, but I’ve argued that the failure to establish minimal 
deliberative-democratic thresholds signals the pacification and decline of the intellectual 
movement. 
 In this chapter I argue that the disappointments with deliberative theory might lead 
democratic theorists to appreciate the socio-political turbulence of American life in the 21st 
century, rather than treating it as a perversion or illness to be remedied.  Instead of attempting 
to persuade the average citizen to take interest in routinized politics— let alone attempt to 
participate in them in some fashion—scholars might consider whether there are good grounds 
for refusing to identify with the state or to treat it as an object worthy of trust or respect.  I 
wish to entertain the real possibility, however unorthodox, that social solidarity might have to 
be fought for despite rather than through the traditional mechanisms of politics.  Though 
troubling for those who still envision a consensual political culture aimed at the peaceful 
reconciliation of interests, it might be that the scope of solidarity is limited in post-traditional 
society and is better achieved within discrete publics rather than between them.  Finally, it 
might mean that the chimera of reasonable pluralism gives way to plurality as such, and that 
constellations of power are seen to be practically independent of their moral justifiability.  
This would entail confronting the fact that opposition and conflict are inherent in democratic 
politics, and that dynamics of alienation, domination, and oppression are ever-present as 
political latencies and reflected in the institutions of the state. 
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 It seems that pessimism in social-political theory is tolerated only insofar as it is 
moderated by positive prescriptions for the future.492  The characterization above may be 
taken as adequate reason for dampened belief in deliberatively-democratic political 
autonomy.  This should not, however, entail giving up on philosophical meaning or the 
possibility of shared felicity.493  Although human beings may not be free, in the sense of 
acting as autonomous subjects obeying “just those laws they give themselves in accordance 
with insights they have acquired intersubjectively,” it might still be possible to redeem some 
meaningful form of popular sovereignty in an insurgent approach to politics.494  Though it 
may be naïve and even dangerous to place one’s faith in the structures of government and its 
operatives, this need not entail that we cannot trust those with whom we ally and identify 
ourselves—even if these circles are conscribed and marked by limited rather than extensive 
sympathy.  Even if civil society is often penetrated by the imperatives of the welfare state, 
rather than representing an autonomous domain, this permeability can facilitate devolved 
counter-influence and a greater equalization of democratic control.  I argue that current crises 
of the lifeworld—beset by the pathologies indicative of the larger political system—set the 
stage for the enculturation of a distinctly-critical intersubjectivity and an extrainstitutional 
role for political agency to play in postmodern times.   
 
 
Foundations of the Lifeworld: Culture, Society, and Personality 
 
                                                             
492 Hochschild (2017, 16) suggests that while pessimism about American politics is not necessarily ‘wrong’ it 
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enervates revolutionary impulses. 
493 That is to say, with Aristotle, that we can distinguish between qualifications of the good (wo)man and the 
good citizen. 
494 Habermas 1996a, 445-6. 
 161 
In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas is centrally preoccupied with the ways in 
which communicative action in modern societies entails ‘rationalization’ via the discursive 
encounters of interlocutors who seek mutual understanding through practices of reason-
giving.  Some critical predecessors who influenced Habermas viewed rationalization as a 
product of bourgeois ideology (Marx), a driver of disenchantment and meaninglessness 
(Adorno and Horkheimer), or the source of the modern ‘iron cage’ entrapping us in a mindset 
(Zweckrationalität) of bureaucratic efficiency, rational calculation and control (Weber).  
Habermas diverges from these pessimistic responses to the events of the twentieth century in 
using the tools of rationalism to critique rationalism in a dialectical fashion.  His efforts in 
TCA can be read as performing this task in three broad ways.  First, Habermas moves away 
from the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory, 
which are bound up in the pitfalls of what he terms ‘the philosophy of consciousness.’  
Second, he describes a two-level concept of society that integrates the paradigms of lifeworld 
and system (the focus of the second volume).  Third, using this background, he sketches a 
critical theory which focuses on the pathologies of modernity and suggests “a redirection 
rather than an abandonment of the project of enlightenment.”495 
 The subject of the first volume, intersubjective communicative reasoning, has already 
been discussed above and so I pass over it here.  For the latter two objectives, Habermas 
appropriates the work of Mead and Durkheim.496  In the former, he finds the basis for 
reformulating social-action theory in light of his own communicative theory.  This adaptation 
allows for a reconceptualization of the relationship of self and society, in particular the ways 
in which individuals are socialized through communication and the ways in which 
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communication lends itself to the reproduction of the species.  Adapting Mead’s theory of 
‘universal discourse’ allows for both elements of universality and particularity.  Sharing in 
the universalistic framework involves a respect for autonomy, but members of society also 
use this autonomy to develop themselves “in their subjectivity and uniqueness.”  This makes 
possible membership in a post-traditional community that constitutes both the “I as universal 
and the I as individual.”497  In this way, the realization of selfhood can only be consummated 
in the context of intersubjective communication.  Mead, however, doesn’t go far enough in 
specifying how the generalized ‘other’ comes about in structured, external contexts.498  For 
this reason, Habermas supplements the account with a Durkheimian dimension. 
 Habermas takes from Durkheim the thesis that traditional sources of social 
attachment and collective identity (i.e. collective conscience) were derived from the moral 
authority of sacred symbols and rituals.  In tracing the ‘linguistification of the sacred,’ 
Habermas examines the way in which authority becomes disenchanted and social functions 
become fulfilled not primarily by ritual practice or religious symbolism, but by 
communicative action.499  Reason itself, however, is unable to serve as a self-standing source 
of legislative authority, once “the canopy of sacred law had collapsed, leaving behind as 
ruins the two pillars of politically enacted law and instrumentally employed power.”500  
Communicative power, central to the discourse-theoretic understanding of political 
autonomy, entails a differentiation of the concept of power.  Under this conceptualization, “if 
the sources of justice from which the law itself draws its legitimacy are not to run dry, then a 
jurisgenerative communicative power must underlie the administrative power of the 
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government.”501  The structures of communication, he argues, become more effective than 
the traditional forms of religious consensus in terms of encouraging cultural reproduction, 
social integration/solidarity, and personality formation.502  Societal reproduction comes to be 
dependent on communicative rationality—the rationally-motivated, intersubjective 
recognition of norms—as the engine driving continued traditions, the maintenance of 
legitimate orders, and the continuity of individual life histories.503  With the linguistification 
of the sacred, it becomes possible to understand the role that processes of rationalization play 
in transforming the relationship of individuals to the life form of their collectivity.504  On the 
other hand, the same dynamics invite questions about communication’s efficacy (and its aim 
towards rationally-motivated consensus) for achieving cultural reproduction, social 
integration, and socialization. 
 This is where the significance of Habermas’ adapted understanding of the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt) and its rationalization becomes appreciable.  He describes the lifeworld as the 
‘ever present’ horizon of social action, in which communicative actions are ‘always already’ 
moving.  Individuals cannot step out of their lifeworld, or adopt a ‘view from nowhere,’ as 
these are essentially constitutive for culture, society, and individual personality.  The 
regenerative processes mentioned above (cultural reproduction, social integration, and 
socialization) correspond to respective functions of communicative action (mutual 
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502 McCarthy (1984, xxii), in introducing the TCA, describes the ‘communicative liquifaction’ of religious 
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understanding, action coordination, and sociation).505  The lifeworld is symbolically 
reproduced through the “continuation of valid knowledge, the stabilization of group 
solidarity, and the socialization of responsible actors” so that new situations and problems are 
continuously placed in the context of the ever-unfolding lifeworld.506 
 Though precursors to this concept of the lifeworld were offered in various ways by 
his predecessors (e.g. Husserl, Durkheim, Parsons, Mead), Habermas advances an original 
understanding of how disturbances come about through the lifeworld-system distinction.  
Drawing upon systems theory allows Habermas to analyze the functional systems of modern 
economy and state administration that are governed by the steering media of money and 
power.  In order to avoid the ‘one-sidedness’ encountered in traditional analyses of modern 
society, Habermas argues that we must understand the ways in which society is reproduced 
both through the lifeworld of a social group (and its harmonious coordination of action) as 
well as through self-regulating systems (and their functional integration of action).  The latter 
is often (explicitly or implicitly) argued to be parasitic on the former, but Habermas argues 
that the two are necessarily intertwined and partnered in perpetuating both social and 
systemic integration.  Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish that social integration takes 
place through ‘action orientations’ and consensus (“whether normatively guaranteed or 
communicatively achieved”), whereas systemic integration is accomplished “through the 
nonnormative steering of individual decisions, not subjectively coordinated.”507  Connecting 
up the two strategies represents a “fundamental problem for social theory.”508 
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 The real danger giving way to the ‘paradoxes of modernity’ is that systemic 
mechanisms become estranged from the originary social structures of the lifeworld.   
Functionally-specified spheres of action, such as the organization of exchange relations in 
market economies and the institutionalization of political power in the modern state, are 
decoupled from the background conditions that were supposed (at least in principio) to be the 
foundation for their operation.509  This uncoupling, however, is not the primary reason for 
concern.  Instead, the danger of collapse is symptomatized by “the penetration of forms of 
economic and administrative rationality into domains of action that resist being converted 
over to the media of money and power.”510  The tragic irony is that the rationalized lifeworld 
itself makes possible the rise and growth of these very subsystems, “whose independent 
imperatives strike back at it in a destructive fashion.”511  It is in this sense that the lifeworld 
becomes ‘colonized’ by systemic logic, allowing for the reification of functional coding that 
is insensitive to communicative infrastructures and normatively-infused practices of 
everyday life.  This happens, for example, when corporate organizations “make most 
decisions regarding the use of resources, the development of technologies, the products 
available, and the working relations among people.”512  The relation between the steering 
powers (monetary and administrative) can also be seen in the corporate exercise of power 
through and over the state, which influences the issues open for consideration—e.g. through 
the infusion of money into the political process, or the control of information made public 
                                                             
509 The familial relation between Habermas’ theory of modernity and those of Marx and Weber is relevant here, 
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through the media.513  Marginalization of the lifeworld is made all the more possible with the 
increasing disappearance of institutions suited to protect private and public spheres from the 
reifying dynamics of the system.    This makes it possible for the system to ‘impose’ 
normative content upon members of the lifeworld (in something like a false consciousness), 
dominate the lifeworld so as to diminish members’ sense of efficacy, and in so doing 
incapacitate the reflexive operations that allow for public opinion’s effective circulation.514  
The danger is that the political system may be “pulled into the whirlpool of legitimation 
deficits and steering deficits that reinforce one another,” such that a continuous absence of 
democratic legitimacy becomes a fixed reality.515 
 
Sovereignty, Solidarity, and the Strains of Constitutional Patriotism 
 
It is in light of the lifeworld’s vulnerability that Habermas has recently suggested that 
‘constitutional patriotism’ may represent the best means of grounding moral reasoning within 
particular ethical communities.  Given that he admits of an “inevitable cleavage between ego-
identity derived from universalistic structures and collective identity bound up with a 
particular community,” his worries of the increasing absorption of the lifeworld within the 
system remain salient even in light of his recent advocacy for the legitimate role of law as a 
transformer of public opinion.516  Habermas’ anticipated role for universal precepts of 
morality in post-conventional societies further elaborates the socially-integrating function of 
                                                             
513 See Staats 2004. 
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the ‘sacred’ which was ‘linguistified’ in TCA.517  Communicative action continues to be 
indispensable for the reproduction of culture, the integration of society in a postconventional 
form of solidarity, and the socialization of individual personalities.  In ‘desubstantializing’ 
the idea of popular sovereignty, however, we are to locate the people’s power neither in 
concrete networks of associations, nor within members themselves.  Sovereignty instead is 
found “in those subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive 
opinion-and will-formation in such a way that their fallible outcomes of the presumption of 
practical reason on their side.”518  In its anonymity, sovereignty is ‘dissolved’ and withdraws 
into democratic procedures and the communicative presuppositions underlying their 
implementation.  In this way, sovereignty is set ‘aflow’ and becomes effective in the 
disembodied and circulated power of public discourses. 
This abstraction indicates a reconceived, postconventional collective identity, one that 
would "no longer require fixed contents" but instead would be centered on a shared 
"consciousness of universal and equal opportunity to participate in value and norm-forming 
learning processes.”519  Habermas understands the dedication to such universal principles to 
underpin an unbounded civic orientation that he calls ‘constitutional patriotism.’520  As he 
emphasized in the second volume of TCA, even this proceduralized understanding of popular 
sovereignty cannot operate without the support of an “accommodating political culture, 
without the basic attitudes, mediated by tradition and socialization, of a population 
accustomed to political freedom.”521  It is for this reason that the rationalized lifeworld must 
                                                             
517 For our purposes here, Habermas’ uses of the terms ‘postconventional’ and ‘posttraditional’ are equivocal in 
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meet will-formation (taking place in the center of the system) halfway.  The realization of 
constitutional democracy and its universal principles remains an ongoing project—never to 
be definitively accomplished — that relies on the contributions of a responsive political 
culture and civil society for its sustenance.522  Understood as a cultural-institutional dynamic, 
this constitutional project is, “at once the outcome and accelerating catalyst of the 
rationalization of the lifeworld reaching far beyond the political.” 523 
 The importance of backgrounding deliberative practices, which are to rationalize 
opinion and will formation, points to the fact that the discourse principle provides more than 
a cognitive service in filtering reasons, information, topics and contributions.  It also is 
ethically-practical, in that it establishes relations of ‘mutual understanding’ that unleash the 
generative force of communicative freedom.  Discursive law-making and the generation of 
communicative power interpenetrate in light of the motivational force of reasons in 
communicative action.  As Habermas describes it, this partnership is essential because 
“concrete, particular communities that want to regulate their life in common by means of law 
cannot fully separate the question concerning the normative regulation of behavior 
expectations from questions concerning collective goal setting.”524  Communicative action 
and its emphasis on mutual understanding as the lever for action coordination require the 
deliberative confrontations of validity claims.  These encounters are imperative for the 
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523 Habermas 1996a, 489. 
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“construction and preservation of social orders.”525  Thus, the social integration of 
“communicatively socialized individuals” can only be achieved through enacted law—itself 
representing a guarantee of our status as free and equal citizens—but the binding force of the 
law requires that it be viewed as legitimate (and hence a source of authority) by those 
potentially affected by its administration.526  Legitimation dilemmas arise in the case where 
illegitimate power is independently exercised; when civil society and the public sphere are 
anemic and unable to guarantee an uncoerced articulation of social interests.    
 One might ask how integration is to be achieved through reconstructed bonds in the 
face of daunting modern challenges like pluralization, social differentiation, and 
disenchantment.527  If Habermas’s suggestions resemble a type of Kantian republicanism, a 
reasonable worry might be put forth that universal principles embedded in the constitution 
are motivationally-deficient.  One might object that the modern, bureaucratized state hardly 
seems an adequate substitute for the sacred objects and bodies that enjoyed unquestioning 
loyalty in traditional political societies.  Duty and obedience are supposed to be procured 
internally from discursive processes networked across the public sphere, justifying coercion 
exercised on the part of the state.  Even bolder is the claim that ethical questions regarding 
the ‘kind of society’ in which we wish to live become secondary to moral questions 
                                                             
525 Habermas asserts that these orders “exist through the recognition of normative validity claims.” Ibid., 17. 
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527 Habermas (ibid., 26) reflects on how “disenchanted, internally differentiated and pluralized lifeworlds can be 
socially integrated if, at the same time, the risk of dissension is growing, particularly in the spheres of 
communicative action that have been cut loose from the ties of sacred authorities and released from the bonds of 
archaic institutions.” His answer: through law.   
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concerning justice (i.e. what is equally good for all).528  Nevertheless, Habermas appears 
confident that constitutional patriots are able to assert themselves as subjects through the 
support of reciprocal recognition “articulated in cultural traditions and stabilized in legitimate 
orders,” and the state is sustained in turn by the support of those subjects.529  The processes 
described above—cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization—therefore 
operate in a circular fashion so that culture, society, and personality presuppose one another. 
 The reconstructed role that Habermas envisions for law to play in addressing the 
eroded bases of political society is described over hundreds of pages in Between Facts and 
Norms, and I’ve only scratched the surface here.  He is sensitive to the association of 
nationalism with parochialism and xenophobia, and for that reason attempts to ground a 
distinctly modern form of citizenship upon communicative action—based itself upon the 
accessibility of validity claims and the functions of reason-giving.  Given the operative 
deontological rather than teleological status of law, Habermas bites the bullet and demotes 
self-understanding to a second-class objective of legislative politics.  He writes, “democratic 
procedure cannot draw its legitimating force from any prior agreement provided by the 
political ethos of a particular community…[it] must instead look for an independent 
justification.”530  Constitutional guarantees purportedly provide the stability needed for this 
synthetic task in the ever-ongoing process of legitimating law. 
 Habermas anticipates that constitutional patriotism can serve as a substitutive and 
reflexive form of attachment to the state, securing the allegiance and identification necessary 
                                                             
528 “The making of norms is primarily a justice issue, subject to principles that state what is equally good for all.  
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for cultural and societal regeneration.  The type of solidarity that obtains, however, is 
supposed to be independent of ethnically-achieved understandings if we are to avoid more 
invidious forms of nationalism.  In this sense, he can be read as attempting a reimagination of 
modern citizenship in line with Kantian and Rousseauean traditions.531  The challenge is that 
of securing a baseline for obligated citizenship and dedication to universal principles, 
themselves realized practically in intersubjective performances of reason-giving channeled 
by institutionalized procedures.  Habermas writes, 
 
Without religious or metaphysical support, the coercive law tailored for the self-
interested use of individual rights can preserve its socially integrating force only 
insofar as the addressees of legal norms may at the same time understand 
themselves, taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those norms.  To this 
extent, modern law lives off a solidarity concentrated in the value orientations of 
citizens and ultimately issuing from communicative action and deliberation.532 
 
 
This sense of constitutionalism incorporates a Kantian emphasis on the ties of legality to 
publicity—i.e. the rule of law rests on the public exercise of reason by autonomous 
individuals endowed with rights.  With Rousseau, it also reflects a core ‘democratic idea’ in 
the sense that the legal order can be rightly conceived as legitimate only if it is grounded 
upon “the socially integrative force of the ‘concurring and united will of all’ free and equal 
citizens.”533  It is for this explicit reason that the constitutional project remains essentially 
open and plays out over generations, retaining dual potentials for growth and degeneration. 
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 What is interesting about this notion of constitutional democracy is that while it does 
not strictly require a traditional national identity rooted in a common history or ethnic 
background, an appreciation of diverse, cultural forms of life needs to be moderated by 
socialization into a ‘common political culture.’534  This invites important questions regarding 
the requisite degree of cultural affinity needed to secure political loyalty.  How are distinct 
peoples removed from one another in ‘highly artificial communities,’ whom Habermas 
characterizes as estranged bearers of abstract rights, to feel politically responsible for one 
another?535  Why should they consider themselves to be actually involved in an 
intergenerational project of realizing the “still-untapped normative substance of the system of 
rights laid down in the original document of the constitution”?536  Despite his 
acknowledgments of the difficulties of grounding modern citizenship in this way, Habermas 
regards the complexity of society in all its diverse forms to present just as much of a promise 
as it does a challenge.  The ‘communicative mastery’ of ensuing cultural conflicts supposedly 
constitutes “the sole source of solidarity among strangers—strangers who renounce violence 
and, in the cooperative regulation of their common life, also concede one another the right to 
remain strangers.”537  Habermas stakes his confidence on the proposition that our shared 
constitutional status can breed the minimal degree of solidarity necessary for harmonious 
coexistence between such strangers. 
 Notwithstanding the precariousness of constitutional renewal and adaptation—which 
is susceptible to “contingent interruptions and historical regressions”—Habermas views 
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discursive self-constitution as a longitudinal “self-correcting learning process.”538  As he 
admits, this requires some substantive degree of continuity with the moment of founding, so 
that we regard the project as essentially the ‘same’ throughout history and therefore judge it 
from the ‘same’ perspective.  The democratic principle, once desubjectified in this form of 
discursive constitutionalism, is realizable only through the formal rule of law.  Given, 
however, that the regenerative processes of reconstitution are ‘self-referential,’ this seems to 
open up a potential regress.539  One might reasonably worry that granting the founding 
moment primary status violates the stipulation that what is civically-sacred be 
detranscendentalized and instead realized within ongoing, democratically-discursive 
practices.  Driving Habermas’ divergence with Rawls was the key thought that public reason 
should be open and reflexive in practice, as should be the interpretation, application, and 
supplementation of constitutional principles.  The danger I am indicating here is that the 
retreat of popular sovereignty into the institutionalized procedures—necessary for 
maintaining a constitutional democracy—may not narrow (and may instead exacerbate) the 
‘gaps in solidarity’ which undermine legitimacy in the first place. 
 McCarthy points to the tensions of construction and reconstruction in Habermas’ 
constitutional project.  The advantage enjoyed by the discursive approach to public 
justification is that it is ‘participant-centered,’ i.e. “it leaves the task of finding common 
ground to political participants themselves” which also involves “creating, expanding, 
contracting, shifting, challenging, and deconstructing common ground.”540  An oft-cited 
criticism of Habermas is that for all of his discussions of the challenges posed by rampant 
plurality and the erosion of communal ties, he continues to overestimate the reconcilability of 
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private and public autonomy.  Mere conformity to the law is insufficient for his program, and 
citizens must at least occasionally make their orientation to the ‘common good’ explicit in 
directing considered opinion and will formation.541  The troubling possibility entailed by the 
twin problems of motivation and integration, however, is that a deliberative culture may have 
to be propagated by dramatically non-deliberative means.  If the constitution is supposed to 
represent some Occidental mecca that exacts obligation from its subjects, it would seem that 
the system can little tolerate sustained and widespread challenges to its authoritative claim to 
legitimacy.  If the performance or value of the constitutional order comes under serious 
question, this opens up the strong possibility for conscripted, nominal dedication, given that 
“the less a legal order is legitimate, or is at least considered such, the more other factors, such 
as intimidation, the force of circumstances, custom, and sheer habit, must step in to reinforce 
it.”542 
 Even more troubling for constitutional patriotism is Habermas’ admission that the 
absence of a “massive background consensus” undermines the basic notion of the lifeworld 
and its legitimating function.  Communication is supposedly predicated upon this horizon of 
“shared, unproblematic beliefs” and the resources of the “always already familiar.”  Shared 
meaning is founded upon this “sprawling, deeply set, and unshakable rock of background 
assumptions, loyalties, and skills” that is necessary to abate “the constant upset of 
disappointment and contradiction, contingency and critique in everyday life.” 543  Coercive 
law in the modern paradigm was meant to be set apart from traditional, authoritarian modes 
of control by virtue of its connection to the shared value orientations of citizens and its 
amendability via legitimate lawmaking processes.  If, however, the required ‘common 
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political culture’ remains a mere postulate (and a vague one at that), it becomes harder yet to 
imagine how this model of liberal-democratic politics is to chasten the tension between 
facticity and validity or that between political positivity and acceptability. 
Habermas’ constitutional patriotism attempts to unify the twin goals (or problems) of 
motivation and integration, and purports to regenerate cultural traditions and foster societal 
integration via allegiance to founding principles and universal commitment to the discursive 
vehicle of moral reasoning.  Civic identity can thereby eschew ethnic roots and ethical 
divisions, so that popular sovereignty is transformed into a legal-procedural phenomenon.  
This certainly does seem like a pacifying type of redirection, as obligated citizenship is meant 
to overrule existential conflicts that nevertheless remain latent in pluralistic societies.  
Strangers in postconventional and multicultural environments—with radically different 
backgrounds, cultural repertoires, and worldviews—are expected to bond in light of their 
shared adherence to a living constitutional legacy; one that requires their input and support to 
be perpetually-renewed.  A formal system of equal rights grounds the expectation that the 
public—in all its amorphous shapes and colors—serves as the legitimate author of the 
coercive laws that regulate public life. 
 Furthermore, we need to counterfactually presuppose something like a ‘single right 
answer’ or a moral rubric if our politics are to make any honest claim to democratic 
legitimacy.  It is not enough that paths chosen be self-justified as being in line with what is 
‘best for us’ from ‘our point of view.’  Habermas is deeply-invested in an epistemic 
dimension of democracy, one which makes possible rationally-motivated mutual 
understanding and just/fair decision-making.  His recent formulations of the deliberative role 
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of law point to the cohesive value of universalized moral discourse, and the danger of 
becoming disillusioned with it. 
 
If questions of justice cannot transcend the ethical self-understanding of 
competing forms of life, and if existentially relevant value conflicts and 
oppositions must penetrate all controverted political questions, then in the final 
analysis we end up with something resembling Carl Schmitt’s understanding of 
politics…Deliberative politics would lose its meaning and constitutional 
democracy would lose its basis of legitimacy if participants in political discourses 
do not want to convince and learn from others.  Political disputes would lose their 
deliberative character and degenerate into purely strategic struggles for power if 
participants do not assume that controversial political and legal problems have a 
correct solution.544 
 
 
Although seeking to avoid the consequences of a Schmittian politics—in which the 
“inviolable moment of legal validity disappear[s] into a blind decisionism”—Habermas does 
realize that interpreting and applying constitutional principles is always influenced by path 
dependence and hegemonic contests of power.545  Questions of justice are inevitably placed 
against ethical horizons, such that particular self-interpretations and worldviews complicate 
the separation of asking what is ‘right for everyone,’ from what is ‘good for us.’546   
 Clarissa Hayward argues that an identity problem haunts democracy, and that 
Habermas’ constitutional-deliberative model is no exception.  Whereas Habermas expects 
that the constitution can serve as a unifier given the fact of pluralism, Hayward points to the 
difficulties of treating this as a sacred object capable of securing allegiance. 
 
Democracy needs some form of citizen-identity for purposes of integration.  
Individual citizens can be motivated to look beyond what they understand to be in 
their self-interest and what they understand to be in the interest of their familiars, 
and to do so for the good of their fellow citizens, who remain to them strangers, 
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only if they feel some sense of identification with those strangers; some sense of 
solidarity with them, some sense of sharing with them in a collective purpose or a 
collective project.547 
 
 
This is a problem which does not admit of a cure, but can potentially be treated and managed.  
The task is very much related to Habermas’ struggle to come to grips with German political 
identity after the past half-century.  Principled patriotism—born out of communicative action 
and intersubjective interpretation—is meant to be a salve for the painful memories of a not-
so-distant illiberal and anti-democratic past.   In this sense, the project is meant not only to 
cultivate the rational endorsement of universal principles, but also breed affective attachment 
to these interpretations through the practice of deliberation.  In short, the perpetual 
elaboration of the founding moment, involving an ‘intellectualization’ of the principles 
undergirding political society, is meant to win hearts and minds.548 
Despite Habermas’ claim that this move does not impugn the ‘intersubjective core’ of 
a communitarian variation of republicanism, critics like Taylor, MacIntyre, Sandel, and 
Michelman have objected that his proceduralism is too ethically-thin to accomplish its 
goals.549  They essentially agree with his thesis: “it is above all the resources of an exhausted 
economy of nature and of a disintegrating social solidarity that require a nurturing approach.  
The forces of social solidarity can be regenerated in complex societies only in the forms of 
communicative practices of self-determinations.”550  They disagree, however, when 
Habermas argues that solidarity arises (in large part) from the legal structures facilitating 
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symmetrical relations of recognition between “abstract bearers of individual rights.”551  In 
emphasizing the depersonalization and abstraction of citizenship, communitarians argue that 
Habermas does a disservice to the rich socio-political backgrounding that gives citizenship its 
flavor and motivates allegiance to the polity.  As such, dedication to the constitution “cannot 
inspire civic solidarity and trust.”552   
A number of critics argue that constitutional patriotism falters for three reasons: it is 
insufficiently particularistic with regard to ‘our’ nation, it is insufficiently constitutive for 
political identity, and it is insufficiently naturalized.553  Others argue that constitutional 
patriotism is overly thick, given that “it is always through the lens of particularistic identities 
(which people experience as constitutive and as natural) that citizens interpret liberal and 
democratic constitutional principles and develop affective attachments to a political 
culture.”554  The latter is sometimes called the circularity objection; constitutional patriotism 
is itself parasitic on a prior, prepolitical definition of the ‘people’ and requires some shared 
characteristics if the democratic project is to ‘get off the ground.’  These two lines of 
criticism complement and build upon each other—where the first argues that if constitutional 
patriotism existed, it wouldn’t work, the second argues that there is no such thing (keeping 
the camel’s nose out of the tent, as it were).  As I understand the situation, the inability of 
Habermas and his successors to identify or suggest how the sources of obligation necessary 
for the sustenance of a deliberative culture might be discovered or created represents a severe 
problem for the theory. 
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552 Hayward 2007, 186. 
553 See Spinner-Halev 2008; Cronin 2003; Connolly 2000; Smith 2003; Canovan 1996, 2000; Miller 1995, 
2000. 
554 Habermas 1996a., 187.  See Bader 1997; Laborde 2002; Markell 2000; Yack 1996, 2001, 2012. 
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 In treating constitutionalism as a learning process, Habermas is dedicated to the 
possibility of redeeming post-conventional citizenship independent of nationality.   
Especially as of late, this has motivated his interest in the dilemmas facing the European 
Union and the potential for postnational civic constellations.555  The problem, as Hayward 
points out, is that the drawing of boundaries between constitutional identities always involves 
a demarcation of ‘us’ and ‘them.’  It might seem reasonable to exclude or even evict the 
illiberal or anti-democratic from our circle of constitutional patriots (thus circumscribing 
what counts as ‘reasonable pluralism’).  The obscurities of categorization, however, are 
vulnerable to hijacking by political elites who stand to benefit from manipulating and 
exploiting any “strong, affectively-based civic identification.”556  With Habermas, she 
supports the reading of civic identity as an open-ended and ongoing reconstructive process 
that necessarily involves democratic contestation but doesn’t value destabilization for its own 
sake.  Reconstructive approaches require caution, however, given that they themselves (when 
successful) generate new identity problems.557 
 Habermas’ bold contention is that the practice of constitution-making provides a “thin 
yet sufficiently strong base to be shared by citizens in their interpretive struggles—within 
pluralist society as well as in the supranational sphere.”  His confidence in the practical 
efficacy of this kind of patriotism is sufficient for Habermas to deny the “inevitable threat to 
the legitimacy of constitutional regimes arising from the unavoidability of endemic 
disagreement.”558  What I want to suggest here is that Habermas can be read against himself 
                                                             
555 Habermas, 2008(a)(b). 
556 Habermas 1996, 190. 
557 Ibid., 193. 
558 Ibid.  He therefore denies the seriousness of Michelman’s (1999, 1023) hypothetical, in which “it turns out 
that the constitutional ‘principles and ideals’…are just words papering over unresolved and deeply divisive 
political-moral disagreements.” 
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in anticipating the secured legitimacy of the regime.  This is a reflection of his tendency, 
even in later works, to underestimate or understate the degree of conflict—along lines of 
class, race, gender, and religion— that effectively fragments the public sphere.  Even if we 
accept that the constitution is a living document worthy of our respect, this seems to open up 
more room for conflict and turbulence than a state of harmonious stability achieved through 
steadfast dedication to abstract principles. 
 
In the public process of transmitting a culture we decide which of our traditions 
we want to continue and which we do not. The debate of this rages all the more 
intensely the less we can rely on a triumphal national history, on the unbroken 
normality of what has come to prevail, and the more clearly we become conscious 
of the ambivalence in every tradition.559 
 
 
The reproduction of a common political culture seems to require a society that is at least 
minimally integrated and marked by solidarity—however abstract that may be.  The question 
at this point seems to be how ‘bloodless’ universal principles are to motivate civic 
engagement and orientation towards the common good, independent of the conflicting 
backgrounds that inevitably animate the interpretations and implementations of these 
precepts.560 
 Given that he explicitly rejects the equation of socialization with assimilation, 
Habermas struggles to persuasively explain how a common political culture can get up and 
running in a postnational polity.561  Inevitably, attachments to the procedures and principles 
represented in the constitution have to be affectively inculcated in a less than deliberative 
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fashion.  Given that different demographics and subpopulations will view these traditions 
through their own lenses—focusing issues according to the experience of socio-economic 
and cultural (dis)advantages and (dis)empowerment—a strong likelihood remains that the 
practice of reconstitution will produce deep cleavages between estranged circles.  Thus the 
problems facing the civic republicanism of Kant and Rousseau are retained for 
deliberativists.  Without the convenient device of ‘The People’ as the placeholder for popular 
sovereignty, from where is the state to draw its power?  What holds up the umbrella?562 
 Of course, integration in Habermas’ account is not only driven culturally—by values, 
norms and mutual understanding–but also systematically through markets and the 
administrative use of power.563  The latter do not coordinate actions through the intentions of 
participants, but instead operate “objectively, ‘behind the backs’ of participants.”564  Modern 
law is nominally linked with all three integrative resources—cultural, economic and 
administrative—which makes the relative impotence of the first all the more alarming.565  
This brings us back to the problematic dominance of systemic imperatives that fosters a trend 
in which interest positions “win the day only because they are stronger and use the 
legitimizing force of legal forms to cloak their merely factual strength.”566  It is in light of 
such dominance that the average citizen today seems to have good reasons for skeptically 
regarding many of the state’s prioritized activities as infected by cronyism, cooption, and 
                                                             
562 Canovan 2000, 423. 
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 182 
subterfuge.  Democratic politics (on either side of the aisle) often appear a sham when 
compared to the counterfactual picture of democratic legitimation Habermas sets out.  It 
seems irresponsible, therefore, to proceed as if the constitutional project remains open in a 
robust sense, or to place one’s faith in ostensibly well-meaning elites or self-correcting 
institutions.  It may be appropriate and productive instead to examine the potentials for 
‘extrainstitutional’ or ‘siege-like’ forms of patriotism that take seriously the need for 
disturbances, provocations, and refused identifications with the state.  In what follows, I 
discuss how the retention of communicative power’s democratic potential requires an 
adversarial dimension—one that is at odds with the stability of Habermas’ constitutionalism 
but is also faithful to his view of public opinion’s insurgent role. 
 
 
Extrainstitutional Identities, Alliances, and Sieges 
 
As we’ve seen, the deep problem of solidarity parallels other issues facing deliberation that 
I’ve discussed earlier, such as the problem of public opinion’s transmission and circulation 
across the public sphere.  Patchen Markell describes Habermas’ resort to constitutional 
patriotism as an apparent attempt to ‘make affect safe for democracy.’  Rather than relying 
on potentially dangerous identifications as in ethnic nationalism, Habermas attempts to fix 
civic bonds through dedication to universal principles (as instanced in the constitutions of 
liberal-democratic states).  As Markell describes it, this may potentially represent a ‘strategy 
of redirection,’ whereby the state can inspire citizens with civic nationalism while keeping 
“the divisive force of other, more pernicious attachments at bay.”567  The problem with this 
move, if it truly is the one Habermas is making, is that even a reliance on civic affect requires 
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that citizens be tied to historical institutions and specific cultures that never quite match up to 
the universal principles they are meant to instantiate.568  The worry is that the attempt to 
transcend the limitations and dangers of conventional collective identities (e.g. shared 
attributes shaped by kinship, ethnicity, and common territory) and to establish a 
postconventional identity involves the emptying of necessary affective content.569  Habermas 
argues that this independence is appropriate for a politics that has “learned to stand on its 
own two feet,” in a context marked by diverse “cultural life-forms, ethnic groups, religions 
and worldviews.”570  Despite his efforts, however, Habermas can be read in the end of BFN 
as pleading agnostic regarding the reliability of abstract forms of integration to accomplish 
the task traditionally performed by particular ethnic identifications and affective allegiances.  
Given that such skepticism was his motivation for focusing on “the tension between facticity 
and validity in the first place,” he is by no means sanguine about the “fragile basis of 
unleashed communicative liberties.”571  De-subjectifying popular sovereignty is no easy fix, 
and places a dubious reliance upon the role of law to moderate diverse discourses and discord 
between actors.  The language of the constitution as an ongoing project points to this exact 
difficulty, as the locus and character of the ‘people’ is constantly in flux and refuses strict 
identifications.   
This is far from a dry, academic issue.  Americans are feeling the acute strains of 
broken cultural traditions, social disintegration, and dislodged personality structures which 
symptomize life in many western democracies.  Habermas in TCA suggested that a failed 
                                                             
568 Yack (2001, 530) argues that this (liberal) attempt to purify popular sovereignty “merely replaces old myths 
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reproduction of necessary socio-political repertoires and habits results in perceptible ‘crises’ 
at the cultural, societal and individual levels.  These are manifested in ways that reflect 
societal trends today; losses of meaning, withdrawals of legitimation, confused orientations, 
anomie, the destabilization of collective identities, alienation, psychopathologies, 
breakdowns in tradition, and withdrawals of motivation.572  This becomes all the more 
pertinent with the increasingly-evident symptoms of acclamatory and populist politics.   
 
The more the bonding force of communicative action wanes in private life spheres 
and the embers of communicative freedom die out, the easier it is for someone 
who monopolizes the public sphere to align the mutually estranged and isolated 
actors into a mass that can be directed and mobilized in a plebiscitarian manner.573 
 
 
Habermas’ warnings have ostensibly been validated and bear upon the unconsummated 
expectation that the public sphere ‘linguistifies’ sacred bonds through communicative 
practices.  Recent shifts in political tectonics merely symptomize the long-unfolding 
legitimation crises facing modern constitutional democracies.  The abstraction of popular 
sovereignty effected by Habermas’ resort to constitutional patriotism seems to exacerbate 
rather than work against this trend, and evades the depth of disagreement that allows for the 
mobilization of coalitions in a decidedly non-deliberative fashion. 
For these reasons, Markell argues that we can alternatively read Habermas as 
appreciating an antagonistic aspect of constitutional patriotism, “as a habit or practice that 
refuses or resists the very identifications on which citizens also depend.”574  Instead of 
constitutional identification representing a hub-metaphor, in which citizens direct their 
attachment to the ‘nation’ as the embodiment of universal principles, it is worth considering 
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the sociological primacy of horizontal attachments between fellow citizens.  Though he does 
seem to emphasize the abstract bonds of rationality uniting something like an Andersonian 
‘imagined community’ or a Peircean ‘unlimited interpretive community,’ it might also be 
possible to allow “love, sympathy, indebtedness, or gratitude toward particular others to 
generate new and different affects toward the state, the constitution or the political 
culture.”575  As suggested by Markell, these affects might include more vitriolic expressions 
such as fear, anger, and shame.  This reading bucks against the pacified or defused 
understanding of civic ties, and resonates with Habermas’ suggestion that “the trivial and 
everyday must be open to the shock of what is absolutely strange, cryptic, or uncanny.”576  
To use one of Habermas’ prized metaphors, this suggests that even constitutional patriotism 
is ‘Janus-faced’—necessarily keeping open the facticity-validity divide and the potential for 
deep conflict.  It also means that identification is fraught with failures of equivalence.  This is 
why Markell urges us to consider the fragility of the ‘collective imaginary,’ since “the pursuit 
of universality requires the risky supplement of particularity, the answer cannot be to 
abandon the project of pursuing intimations of universality found in ambivalent and 
dangerous particulars.”577 
 Rather than turn to a dangerously quiescent version of constitutional patriotism, as 
might be attributed to Habermas if he truly is deploying a tactic of redirection, I suggest that 
we step back and appreciate the soil of critical theory from whence visions of deliberative 
democracy took root.  Many democratic theorists today seem motivated to neatly reconcile 
the vibrancy and turbulence of civil society with state politics so as to salvage the latter’s 
legitimacy.  It is important to remember, however, that the former’s democratic function is 
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only intelligible insofar as it demonstrates an adversarial and distrustful relationship to the 
latter.  The primary challenge of retaining the radical-democratic content of deliberation is 
bound up with responding to the present realities of social complexity and polarization 
without seeking to understate, diminish, or dissolve these dynamics. 
 Habermas has recently suggested that the grounding of solidarity in ordinary political 
times may not be sufficient for critical or emergency situations in which institutions and 
procedures are overwhelmed.  Whereas he once argued “justice conceived deontologically 
requires solidarity as its reverse side,” he has now recanted his arguments for the moral-
deontic structuring of solidarity because this leads to “a moralization and de-politicization of 
the concept.”578  In his ‘re-politicization’ of solidarity, he entertains the possibility that 
extraordinary times may call for some variation of an Arendtian ‘action in concert,’ or 
‘solidarity-in-struggle.’579  This entails that solidarity can and should take on an “offensive 
character” so that it is characterized by “striving or even struggling to discharge the promise 
which is invested in the legitimacy claim of any political order.”580   The “forward-looking 
character” of solidarity becomes relevant in the context of social and economic 
modernization, when the “overstretched capacities of an existing, but eroding, political 
framework” must be adjusted in light of systemic interdependencies.  Solidarity becomes all 
the more important when these interdependencies are perceived as constraints on what 
otherwise “should be within the reach of the political control of democratic citizens.” 581 
 It is here that we might revisit the democratically-motivated conception of citizenship 
threatened by some understandings of constitutional patriotism.  The constitutional project 
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need not aim at resoultion or communion in order to be sustained.  This is the significance of 
my suggestion that we remember Habermas’ description of the insurgent role of opinion in 
the political process.  In BFN, Habermas writes,  
 
Communicative power is exercised in the manner of a siege.  It influences the 
premises of judgment and decision making in the political system without 
intending to conquer the system itself.  It thus aims to assert imperatives in the 
only language the besieged fortress understands: it takes responsibility for the 
pool of reasons that administrative power can handle instrumentally but cannot 
ignore.582    
 
 
This suggests that the public can speak truth to power, despite lacking a comparable wealth 
of political resources.  But what if these given reasons, however evinced, are consistently 
ignored?  Evidence demonstrably shows that responsiveness is skewed according to 
affluence, and that entry into the political process is by no means equal.  Why then should we 
hold on to the idea of popular sovereignty, even if it is a proceduralized (desubstantialized) 
understanding?  What purchase does this intellectual inheritance have vis-a-vis contemporary 
politics?  Now that we have become disenchanted—so that the state no longer commands 
reverence as a sacred object of our affection or respect—how can it reliably ensure 
compliance short of the threat of force?  Habermas expects that liberation from 
circumscribed chains of allegiance will have a maturation effect.  People will relate to each 
other by virtue of their shared dedication to constitutional principles and ‘basic human rights’ 
so that politics can stand on its ‘own two feet.’  What if these new ideological legs prove to 
be underdeveloped; insufficiently sturdy to support the weight once born by sacred traditions 
and unquestioned authorities?   
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 Habermas anticipates the real potential for dissatisfaction to lead to disillusionment 
and disavowal in light of the modern challenges of politics.  This is why the glue of political 
culture is dubious as a substitute for nationalism and prepolitical identities.  Abstract 
principles will not suffice, and democratic membership must ‘pay off’ not only in terms of 
liberal individual rights and participatory rights, but also in “the enjoyment of social and 
cultural rights.”583 
 
The citizens must be able to experience the fair value of their rights also in the 
form of social security and the reciprocal recognition of different cultural forms of 
life. Democratic citizenship can only realize its integrative potential – that is, it 
can only found solidarity between strangers – if it proves itself as a mechanism 
that actually realizes the material conditions of preferred forms of life.584 
 
 
Intersubjective recognition in light of an anticipated or imagined ‘communication 
community’ is all well and good; but what about those on the margins whose situations 
require a more tangible form of recognition in terms of ‘cashing out’ the rights of 
citizenship?585  Though he consistently concedes that the constitutional project will 
inevitably be viewed through particular backgrounds and in light of distinct and incompatible 
interests, Habermas often appears to overestimate the degree to which these cultural-
biographical elements can be procedurally sublated (preserved and overcome) in constructing 
more rational, postnational constellations. 
 It is in light of these unreliable foundations that I consider below the potentials for 
inducing a vigilant civil society piecemeal; i.e. through the organic, bottom-up development 
                                                             
583 Habermas 1998, 118; 2001, 77. 
584 Habermas 1998, 119. 
585 Take, for example, the disenfranchisement of millions of African-American citizens who have reentered 
society after incarceration but cannot vote.  Or the unequal status of more than half of the gendered population 
in the workplace and in representative institutions; the suppression of those identifying as LGBTQ; the neglect 
and de facto abandonment of the poor, mentally ill, indigenous etc. etc. 
 189 
of extra-institutional personalities and linkages.  Though surely unsettling for the proponents 
of a pacified constitutional patriotism mentioned above, I want to propose that Habermas’ 
discussions of the redemption of popular sovereignty do not preclude but in fact require the 
encouragement of a political culture characterized by visible struggle, non-cooperation, and 
intense disagreement.  Drawing upon a reading of public opinion as insurgent—perpetually 
engaged in a siege upon the ‘Bastille’ of the political system—it might be possible to 
reconcile agonistic forms of deliberative disavowal with the securities and formal rights that are 
supposed to issue from a legitimate constitutional state. 
 
 
Democratic Mores and Counterpublics in an Age of ‘Post-Truth’ 
 
Given their emphasis on the constitution’s openness to interpretation, it is striking that many 
proponents of constitutional patriotism have not attempted to specify what it would take to 
fulfill the duties and obligations of citizenship in a postnationalistic context.  Perhaps the 
procedural emphasis can eschew these expectations in favor of a passive reception of 
formalized rights—so that the consent of ‘all affected’ can be assumed or imputed even if the 
masses play an insignificant role in directing state activities.  This move would be highly 
consequential, however, given that proposals over the past couple decades have frequently 
invoked some legitimizing or monitorial role for the public to play; considering dismal levels 
of civic engagement and knowledge to be problematic phenomena in terms of continuing the 
project.  I want to suggest that the disengagement of the mass public from politics is a direct 
consequence of a constitutional order which is not democratic and was never intended to 
be.586  I discussed above reasons for appreciating the relevance of Schumpeterian democracy 
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and the ways in which deliberation has edged increasingly closer to this understanding of 
politics.  Now the question becomes what consumer-citizens are to do with the fragments of 
their political life, given the realities of disempowerment and the dissipation of political 
community.  Despite the fact that popular sovereignty increasingly looks to be a paper tiger 
in the face of systemic steering forces, social science as public philosophy is more important 
than ever.587  Given that the vast majority on the periphery will be consequentially affected 
by system imperatives, questions guiding socio-political research are increasingly relevant 
for reconstructive projects.   Questions like, “How ought we to live? How do we think about 
how to live? Who are we, as Americans? What is our character?” are important topics to hash 
out with our colleagues, neighbors, friends, loved ones and rivals—especially now that we 
have reportedly entered an age of ‘post-truth.’588 
 The heightened relevance of the trends noted by Bellah and his colleagues three 
decades ago suggests that social scientists continue to underestimate the exceptionally-
turbulent state of political culture, and the subsequent strains upon national allegiance.  In 
particular, the ‘culture of separation,’ the erosion of social-moral ‘ecologies,’ and the 
prevalence of ‘ontological individualism’ (i.e. “the idea that the individual is the only firm 
reality”) have become such endemic realities as to render ridiculous the notions of undivided 
popular sovereignty and a shared constitutional legacy.589  Patterns of fragmentation and 
individuation have paradoxically appeared side-by-side with the nominal continuation of 
‘biblical and republican traditions.’  Rushing headlong into the uncharted territory of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
we have any right to expect otherwise given current arrangements, or to suppose that this is an indictment of 
democracy.  While prospects for encouraging truly democratic political possibilities are constrained by the 
constitutional system, there is room to begin considering ways of strengthening local possibilities for 
meaningful self-governance.  One of the first requirements for such a consideration, however, is to challenge 
the notion that our current system can be meaningfully called a democracy.” 
587 Gaus 2013. 
588 Bellah 1985, vii. 
589 Ibid., 276, 284. 
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future while simultaneously expressing nostalgic yearning for a return to former glory seems 
to characterize whatever is meant by ‘post-modernity.’  Whether the goal is to ‘Win the 
Future’ or to ‘Make America Great Again,’ sustaining national cohesion requires ideological 
programming and the maintenance of fabricated consent.  The ‘fact of pluralism,’ however, 
complicates the reproduction of culture and the socialization of individuals—especially if the 
law is to somehow act as the transmissional medium holding together whatever is left of the 
lifeworld and the administrative system.  It is not simply that modern subjects have 
differences in terms of tastes, preferences, and worldviews.  Rather, the making explicit of 
political antagonisms and ideological incompatibilities suggests an oppositional relation 
between publics that cannot be eradicated through centralized institutions; which themselves 
reflect deep social severances.  
 Reconstructing or reconstituting the weathered concept of popular sovereignty 
requires a new understanding of political integration.  We can take from Habermas the 
ethical importance of communal memories, while refraining from associating these strictly 
with the state.  Instead, it may be the case that distinct, vigilant publics may have to band 
together if communicative power is to effectively act as a siege on the political system.  
These alliances will not be universal, and contests for power between subpublics will 
inevitably spill over to the extra-institutional realm.  However disquieting, disintegration 
should be acknowledged as the norm for the current era rather than received as an aberration 
to be resolved through technocratic means.  Coming to grips with this ‘new normal’ doesn’t 
require that we deny the intrinsic (human) need for recognition underlying a deliberative 
understanding of communication’s function; we can still appreciate and treat human beings 
as vulnerable, interdependent, social creatures.  Neither does this require, however, assumed 
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identification with rights-bearing strangers with whom we happen to share the continent.  
National citizenship, channeled into binary political parties, need not be a defining part of our 
identity.  Our fate need not be intimately bound up with that of the state and its various 
chambers.  A reconceived civic consciousness may instead have to be aroused through less 
than comfortable means across a variety of competing public spheres and between groups 
that are more or less ‘entitled’ in terms of their respective social, economic, and political 
standing.590 
 Just because the state’s business is not really our business in an operational sense 
does not mean there is nothing to be done.  On the contrary, the work necessary to regenerate 
democratic energies is endless.  Though social movements are usually associated with 
sanctioned picketing, marches, boycotts and non-violent expressions of identity, they can 
alternatively be read in their day-to-day manifestations.  This is why cultural transformation 
can be characterized as insurgent, taking place in subpublic spheres and seemingly non-
political channels.  As such, it is subtly subversive and contains a radical, “anarchistic 
core.”591  A deliberative movement may well deviate from the consensual approach often 
associated with deliberative ethics, instead serving to “threaten crucial interests, disrupt 
customary alliances and ordinary ways of doing things, and create crises.”592  This is 
consistent with the dual nature of communicative action—though commentators often focus 
on its linkage with social acceptance and stability, the premium of validity leaves the door 
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open to contestation, coercion, and dissolved agreements.  This is essentially the 
“emancipatory promise of public sphere theory.”593  Although the rationalization of the 
lifeworld can and has often been received as connoting maturation, it also acts to eliminate 
the previously unquestioned (sacred) bonds which once provided a thick basis for the 
sustenance of traditional societies.  At the same time, the integrating functions of 
administrative and economic powers actively discourage the functions of public reason and 
communicative power.  The proposition that coercive legal mechanisms can independently 
yield a sufficient level of stability becomes all the more dubious, given that “Among 
strangers, the potential for violence is harder to contain.  Indeed, it can be so close to the 
surface that argument becomes impossible.”594  In this sense, pacified discourse and civility 
may prove to be out of place in critical moments where the national fabric is frayed, if not 
torn asunder. 
 Habermas’ project might be advanced through the decentralized enculturation of a 
form of critically-engaged patriotism—one which redeems the antagonistic role originally 
imagined for civil society.  As put forth by Laborde, this orientation would be “both more 
‘situated’ and more radical than ‘neutralist’ constitutional patriotism.  It emphasizes the 
motivational prerequisites of democratic governance, stresses the need to preserve existing 
‘co-operative ventures,’ and demands that existing political cultures be democratically 
scrutinized and re-shaped in an inclusive direction.”595  This reorientation might highlight the 
value of a modern brand of republicanism, one which emphasizes the democratic function of 
contestability in the political sphere.596  Taking seriously the idea that reasons and rationales 
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guiding the administration of state power should be open to examination, assessment, and 
challenge encourages efforts to revive the critical function of diverse publics and partnerships 
between intermediary institutions.  In this respect, a republican understanding of citizenship 
as practice might do more to encourage the contested hegemony of systemic integration 
when compared to a liberal notion of citizenship as a legal status.  The republican adage that 
the price of liberty is eternal vigilance resonates with my advocation for deliberatively-
extrapolitical forms of scrutiny and resistance. 
 Going beyond the shortcomings of constitutional patriotism might also point to the 
merit of appreciating the plebeian experience and its democratic potentials.597   Even if 
democracy tends to be Schumpeterian in its modal approach to collective decision-making 
(admitted even by Habermas to be increasingly the case) this does not entail that we must 
give up on the notion of popular sovereignty in toto.  Picking up on Habermas two-track 
model, in which the public does not act as or play a substantial role in will formation, it can 
still be intelligbly said that popular rule remains definitive for democratic life.  Even if 
“citizens lack definite policy opinions and even if their opinions result in part from elites’ 
efforts to manipulate them,” the absence of centralized, hegemonic control over public 
opinion and the potential for ramping up competition in the political environment provide 
grounds for democratic hopes.598  If socialization into a common political culture is necessary 
for integration, and that political culture is a ‘lived experience,’ it seems pertinent to analyze 
the strains of solidarity from the perspective of the everyday layperson, whose loyalties are 
                                                             
597 See Green 2010, 2013,2016; McCormick 2011.  As described by Breaugh (2013, 241), the plebeian 
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not principally (if at all) enlivened or directed by constitutional principles.599  In paying 
attention to the sociological underpinnings of active/inactive citizenship, it might be possible 
to distinguish between types or modes of passivity.  For example, while ‘unengaged’ and 
‘disillusioned’ citizens might be consistently passive and unlikely to stand up to perceived 
wrongs or misdeeds, ‘standby’ citizens’ may be more alert, watchful and prepared for action 
should the circumstances present themselves.600  Even if publics appear dormant, the 
potential for rupture preserves the popular place of sovereignty in liberal-democracies. 
 Faith and confidence in the self-regulation of liberal democracies are decidedly not 
widespread dispositions at present.  Instead, many are demoralized by feelings of 
detachment, disorientation, and malaise.  The fact that those on the periphery seek solace 
outside of politics should therefore not be surprising, or reason for self-righteous rebukes by 
academics.  As argued above, it may be the case that temporary exits and refused 
identifications can disrupt and reconfigure politics, so that civic responsibility is first made 
possible by contests between associations and devolved communicative processes.  The signs 
that our political context is characterized by ‘post-truth’ symptomize the precariousness of 
the reconstructive project in post-modern times.  As Wydra writes, “The political rests on 
communal experiences of participation and active quests for meaning.  Politics and the sacred 
are ‘twin powers’ that are in permanent reciprocal engagement in order to make sense of the 
extraordinary.”601  Reconstituting collective identities in the absence of communal sacred 
rites and inherited self-understandings may well require imaginative reinterpretations and 
                                                             
599 I argue this holds despite the common invocation of ‘rights’ in a variety of everyday situations, whether in 
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even outright violations of rules of conduct and institutional constraints.602  If the binding 
force of law is to be seen as legitimate—securing allegiance through means beyond than 
threat of punishment—attention to the informal structures of civil society and their mediated 
relationship to the system is required if we are to understand the fragility and partiality of 
social integration. 
 In short, as Scruton put it, “The public sphere cannot stand so serenely above the 
loyalties that feed it.”603  Strategic and communicative action have often been pitted against 
one another in deliberative theory, but it is important to remember that Habermas does not 
mean to demonize the former outright (even if his tone sometimes suggests otherwise).  
Though strategic action is usually associated with the pragmatic and competitive incentives 
of interest bargaining, sometimes the disadvantaged and downtrodden will require tools other 
than reasoned argumentation in order to effectively band together, be heard, and effect 
change.604  Similarly, while many continue to emphasize the intellectualizing function of 
communicative action, i.e. the rationalizing process through which considered opinions are 
worked up and transmitted, the ‘warning function’ is also definitive for the operations of civil 
society.  The latter, as described by Hove, is “relatively common, anarchic, and spontaneous” 
and “has the potential to unblock public discourse that has become stagnant, unfair, or 
repressive.” 605  If we think of public opinion’s operation as a siege, which becomes 
especially appropriate in extraordinary political times, we should also appreciate the 
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implications of Habermas’ suggestion that the “unruly life of the public sphere” represents 
the state’s “open flank vis-à-vis civil society.”606  Social movements in their ordinary, 
everyday appearance—both in face-to-face and cyber formats—preserve this emancipatory 
potential of the public sphere.  Although these are admittedly exceptional and often obliquely 
linked to political achievements, these practices exemplify how social power can be 
exercised in the construction of diverse publics’ identities, in the articulation of their 
interests, and in the pursuit of their demands.607 
 Given that a liberal political culture, and its reproduction through socialization and 
other sources of solidarity, are “functional requirements for stabilizing democratic regimes,” 
it seems that reconstructive efforts must take into account the constitutive functions of mores 
and ‘habits of the heart’ that include “consciousness, culture, and the daily practices of 
life.”608  To this end, abstract attachment to the mythological moment of constitutional 
foundation is almost surely insufficient for bringing conflicting parties together, let alone 
achieving mutual understanding or consensus.  An effective socio-political investigation into 
the changing nature and role of public opinion today (e.g. increasing polarization, indirect or 
neglible influence on lawmaking) must then focus on public attitudes, their originations, and 
their complexity across different contexts and over time.  Attitudes, interests, and their socio-
ideological origins are not only relevant for studying the political process and factors driving 
political change, but are worthy of investigation in their own right.609  If we are interested in 
the “state of society, its coherence, and its long-term viability,” prevailing methodological 
                                                             
606 Habermas 1996a, 307. 
607 Bennett (2012, 30) describes a new type of movement as “do-it-yourself” politics that displays “openness to 
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See too Lee 2014. 
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politics in the next chapter. 
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trends and agendas in social scientific research (political science in particular) are often self- 
limited in their ability to say something meaningful on this front.610 
 Problematizing popular sovereignty directly bears upon ongoing research into the 
intersections of social capital, trust and civic engagement.  Of particular interest here is the 
purported ‘virtuous-vicious’ cycle in which, “trust breeds involvement while also being 
inspired by it, just as distrust and disengagement go hand in hand.”611  The causal arrows 
between these variables continue to be debated and research has yet to settle the relationship 
between trust and engagement.612  Nevertheless, an interesting question is how/when 
disaffected, cynical citizens might become mobilized so as to critically engage and contest 
power exercised in their name.613  Discussed in the first chapter, there is persuasive evidence 
that socialized political interest and civic habits (e.g. engagement in voluntary social 
organizations/associations) are most effectively ingrained early on during the formative 
years; but also that these dispositions reveal themselves gradually and variably across the 
life-cycle.614  There is thus an undeniable political role for parents in molding critically-
democratic citizens.  Socialization in the home and school, while very important parts of the 
story, are not the only factors at play.  Research shows that the political climate and 
experience of critical events during these formative years can also have a significant effect on 
developed political traits and behaviors later on.  Because polarization has set in so deeply 
over the past several decades and now characterizes American political culture(s), the 
formative experience of living in a divided nation may well predict further entrenchment and 
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ideological division in future generations.615  The implications of how citizenship is 
socialized will be elaborated in the next chapter in my discussion of the affective nature of 
partisanship as a form of social identity.  Suffice it to say, the fact that our early 
environments has determinative influence on our political bearings as adults leaves open the 
possibility for inculcating critical-deliberative dispositions.  Alternatively, the stickiness of 
non-deliberative character traits and their consequential political phenotypes may undermine 
a communicative approach to solidarity, trust, and civic feeling.  
 Against the civic decline hypothesis made popular by Putnam and Skocpol, there is 
strong evidence of a generational shift in terms of how citizens conceptualize and activate 
their citizenship.616  As Dalton summarizes the evidence from his collected volume, modern 
democratic culture is being affected by changing values and orientations towards 
contemporary publics.  In particular, there has been a shift from “the allegiant political norms 
of the past to a new, assertive citizenship in both developed and developing nations…there is 
an assertive spirit encouraging people to claim control over their lives.”617  In this sense, 
pluralized publics today still reflect a deep normative commitment to democratic ideals, but 
simultaneously demonstrate a deep dissatisfaction with how governments fulfill or come 
short of these ideals.618  Low voter turnout—often decried as a civic deficit—is symptomatic 
of this institutional dissatisfaction.  The real danger, as many point out, is not disillusionment 
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with the agents of government (the bums whom we can ‘throw out’), but instead a looming 
sense that basic institutions themselves are systematically corrupted at their core.619  This is 
all the more significant given research finding that “trust is a fragile commodity that once 
lost is difficult to regain.”620 
 Generalized trust has traditionally been thought of as an indispensable source of 
social cohesion, but the premium of an assertive and critical culture deserves serious 
examination even as it throws into question the bases of many popular empirical and 
normative models of politics.  Lenard describes this tension as the paradox of trust and 
democracy: although effective democratic governance does require trust in order to be 
sustained, she also suggests “we need to implement institutions that suggest a deep distrust of 
what our legislators [and other officials] will do when offered an opportunity to control the 
levers of power.”621  As laid out by Rosanvallon, appreciating this paradox highlights the 
value of a democratic form of distrust and dissent, or what he calls ‘counter-democracy.’622  
This is not the opposite of democracy but rather an alternative form that “reinforces the usual 
electoral democracy as a kind of buttress, a democracy of indirect powers disseminated 
throughout society—in other words, a durable democracy of distrust.”623  Reviving the 
critical role of civil society may well entail a direct challenge to the typical understanding of 
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public engagement and social capital as tied to diffuse support.624  Instead, a counter-
democratic model of civic duty might emphasize decentralized organizations and 
contestatory activities typified by “powers of oversight, forms of prevention, and testing of 
judgments.”625  To this end, democratic theorists might consider the worth of encouraging 
skeptical citizens, whose socio-civic practices are characterized by “vigilance, denunciation, 
and evaluation” in the surveillance of institutional exercises of power.626  The ‘Tribunal of 
Public Opinion’ may yet exercise a counterbalancing and insurgent role vis-à-vis 
representative claims that prove vacuous or untrustworthy.627 
 Re-democratizing deliberative theory and practice requires attention to the structural 
linkages and antagonisms between associations in civil society, the informational role of the 
media, and its dependence upon the state.  Structural implements facilitating communicative 
transmission will surely be an important in facilitating a monitorial role for those outside the 
policymaking arena.628  Though I’ve argued that social movements can be understood more 
broadly in their informal, subaltern, and insurgent manifestations, certain institutions like 
‘knowledge associations’ and ‘intermediary advocates’ may well serve the democratic 
purpose of challenging patterns of oligarchic and technocratic rule.629  Drawbacks of design, 
implementation, and multiplication of mini-publics remain relevant, but the rare instances in 
which these forums are endowed with binding decision-making powers could demonstrate 
the democratic potency of public interjection and disruption.630  As these sites become 
increasingly visible and valued as a strategic part of the political process, they may become a 
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meaningful counterweight to otherwise unaccountable bureaucracies and self-serving elites.  
This seems all the more plausible as faith falters in traditional ‘democratic’ devices—such as 
the vote and opinion poll.631 
 These proxies and supplements cannot, however, serve as substitutes for sub-altern 
and counterpublics in their less visible but more continuous role in civil society.  The wild, 
vibrant, and conflictual nature of the public sphere will defy even approximate degrees of 
representation; decisions reached in its name will most always be synthetic, nominal, and 
subject to controversy.  Similarly, those who would encourage a renaissance in membership 
and associational life should consider the diverse motivations which encourage ‘joining up.’  
As pointed out by Rosenblum, “Insulated from government, people form associations to meet 
all sorts of emotional and ideological needs, amplify selfish interests, and give vent to 
exclusionary impulses.”632  Though many have emphasized a putative decline in 
associational life, it is also worth considering the reasons why certain forms of membership 
are viewed as irrelevant or unrewarding.  Exploring the connections and gaps between the 
(dis)inclinations to associate and (dis)trust in government problematizes congenial 
understandings of civil society’s function.  Moreover, taking these shifts seriously might 
entail that associational life “is no longer a resource on which governments can count to 
sustain their legitimacy or their capacity to govern effectively.”633  Rather than serving to 
build bridges, banding together may exacerbate competition and conflicts between 
subpublics, complicating the cultivation of a common political culture and cooperative 
governance.634    
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 Nietzsche wrote, “If a temple is to be erected, a temple must be destroyed.” 635  Just 
as the adage suggests that a changing world requires a new science of politics, so too does it 
merit a normative reconsideration of the social practice of citizenship.  As Rosanvallon 
suggests in his philosophical history of democratic legitimacy, “Gone are the ideas of a 
demos and a general will, if we take these things to be already constituted.  In their place, 
however, comes a new recognition of the need for constant generalization of the social.”636  
Society is not some wholly distinct entity or demarcated sphere, but shares blurred 
boundaries and is in constant interactions with the state.  On the other hand, the state is not 
identical with the impulse of the democratic principle, and as I’ve argued disenchanted 
citizens have good reasons for distancing themselves from the spectacular and dysfunctional 
approach to problem-solving in politics as usual—charitably assuming this is a primary 
function of politics.  With Durkheim, I continue to believe that “democracy is the political 
form whereby society achieves the purest consciousness of itself.”  But there is a proviso: 
“The greater the role of deliberation, reflection, and critical spirit in public affairs, the more 
democratic the people.”637  Public affairs today can hardly be said to be very deliberative, 
reflective, or conducive to critical spiritedness.  These are serious issues that merit concern.  
Trusting systemic imperatives (i.e. economic and administrative steering powers) to improve 
our situation, however, is to misunderstand the primary social mechanisms through which 
democratic energies can be unleashed.  To this end, disillusionment can serve to awaken and 
consternate the many that are disempowered and disserved by the political status quo.  This 
does not necessarily entail or invite nihilism or violent insurrection, but may well call into 
question vertical lines of allegiance and promote horizontal mobilizations and 
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countermobilizations.  In this sense, the grounds for (selective) social trust need not be lost in 
a climate where wider political trust is hard to justify. 
  
 
Reconstructing Sacred Meanings in a Disenchanted Age 
 
There are many political scientists and theorists today that could rightfully be criticized for 
having their heads in the sand.  Attempting to sugarcoat trends of disenchantment and the 
general feeling that “the ultimate and most sublime values have withdrawn from public life,” 
many otherwise brilliant thinkers appear aloof in their counterfactual descriptions of 
American political society and the efficacy of liberal-democratic institutions.638  Perhaps 
nowhere else has the disconnect between social science and ‘the real world’ been more 
perceptible than in the broad subdiscipline of public opinion studies.  As I’ve argued not only 
in this chapter but throughout the dissertation, researchers have continually mistaken form 
for substance and their measures for descriptive realities.  Theorists and philosophers have 
perpetrated follies no less severe, however, in transposing an idealized model of consensual, 
reason-based, and constitutionally-allegiant citizenship onto the conflictual, visceral, and 
non-deliberative plane of political reality.  There has emerged a definite contradiction 
between the political principle of democracy and the sociological principle.639 
 Confusion and dissonance are also evident in familiar calls for greater participation 
and civic engagement.640  These advertisements are in line with deliberative agendas that 
seek to refine and intellectualize raw public opinion in order to make it actionable as 
                                                             
638 Weber 2004, 30. 
639 Rosanvallon 2008, 292.  “The political principle consecrated the power of a collective subject whose solidity 
the sociological principle tended to dissolve and whose visibility it tended to reduce.” 
640 As Berger (2011, 1) makes the case, democratic theorists have become muddled in calls for social, political, 
and moral engagement; conflating them under the general umbrella ‘civic engagement’ and rendering the phrase 
a conceptual kitchen sink.  “Born of a movement to analyze, promote, and possibly save democracy, nurtured 
with the best of intentions, the term civic engagement has grown out of control and has outlived its purpose, 
sowing more confusion than clarity.” 
 205 
‘considered’ public opinion.  There are many expectations driving these solicitations.  The 
good citizen should have a consistent, refined, and sophisticated ideological makeup—
allowing them to navigate current events and evaluate proposed policies—but she should also 
be open to the force of arguments and unbiased as possible in her cognitive processing.  
Diversity is treated as a democratic hallmark; polarization as a defect or illness.  We can and 
should disagree with each other, but this disagreement should be moderated by respect (or at 
least tolerance) in light of our shared constitutional status as free and equal citizens.  ‘The 
People’ as the foundation of the state should be interested, engaged, and active—but signals 
its will intermittently and with little effect in the ballot box or in responses to surveys.  
Despite gross inequalities in wealth and income, and intense divergences in worldviews and 
doctrines, citizens are to see each other as equals involved in an intergenerational project.  It 
is purportedly through this shared act of (re)construction that popular sovereignty is 
actualized and the state legitimized in its approach to public problems.  These assumptions 
(and many more) apparantly continue to shape research projects published in high-tier 
journals and volumes. 
 I have avoided deterministic statements regarding democratic possibilities.  As my 
tone and focus of concentration suggest, however, I am not optimistic that many of us will 
‘find ourselves’ through traditional ceremonial engagements or identifications with state 
activities.  I do not think it fruitful to downplay the intense divisions among subpublics, not 
to mention the highly-disproportional influence of ‘strong’ over ‘weak’ publics.  For many, 
the sense of malaise and being in the throw of unseen forces is very real.  Constant’s 
characterization of modernity as disorienting is unmistakably linked to the absence of divine, 
sacred meanings, “Lost in the multitude, the individual almost never perceives the influence 
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he exercises.  His will never leaves its mark on the whole.  He sees no tangible evidence of 
his cooperation.”641  Evident trends of consumerism and privatization should come as no 
surprise given the disincentives of living in a large-scale capitalist state, and the waning 
sense of commonality.  Being virtuous or civically-minded seems to be symbolically valued 
rather than practically necessary to get ahead in the twenty-first century.   
 People surveyed today in many western democracies, particularly the U.S., speak to a 
feeling that the vestiges of national identity are fading, if not gone altogether.  Divides along 
the familiar liberal-conservative spectrum are becoming less relevant compared to the new 
poles of ‘cultural pluralism and monism.’  Those on the other side of the aisle (or tracks) are 
increasingly perceived not to merely have opposing views about which we can debate and 
respectfully disagree, but instead to have categorically different and incompatible visions of 
America and its future.642  On a deeper level, popular control by the many is perceived to be 
increasingly symbolic compared to the continuous and dynamic influence wielded by interest 
groups and political-economical elites.  Under most any ambitious democratic theory, 
equality of political opportunity is incompatible with a system that repeatedly grants “a 
disproportionate share of power to the members of an identifiable specific, family, caste, or 
class.” As is well known by those familiar with basic political history, however, “this specific 
class is that of the wealthy.”643  To the extent that this is true—and most all empirical 
evidence suggests it is—the partisan battle lines which have been drawn will likely continue 
to serve those same notables (economic, media, and political elites) and disserve the vast 
majority whose fate hangs in the balance.  It is realistic to expect that these propped up 
alternatives will continue to prove useful politically in directing antagonisms between 
                                                             
641 Constant [1819] 1872, 547. 
642 Jones 2017. 
643 Tremblay 2015, 383. 
 207 
publics, even as they tend to erode the possibilities for posttraditional solidarity and greater 
democratic equality. 
 It is for these reasons that I’ve argued that traditional recommendations for 
institutionally-focused solutions to democratic problems miss the mark.  Unqualified trust is 
an inappropriate disposition for the average citizen to adopt towards the class of elites 
(regardless of partisan stripes) that in essence decides which issues to address and directs the 
operations of government.  As a rule of thumb, we should not expect that the prime movers 
of political society—who are disproportionately wealthy—are committed to rule in the 
general interest.644  Subsequently, it is not a sign of paranoia to suspect that sanctioned means 
of conveying our inclinations, preferences, and wishes—such as the vote or poll—effectively 
serve the status quo.  None of this is to deny outright the potential instrumentality of these 
forms of participation or the democratic function of mediating institutions in general.  Rather 
I am suggesting they need to be supplemented and continuously challenged through 
politically devolved practices if we are to describe our system as democratic.  A critical 
reading of civil society’s function has never been more relevant—what is needed is an 
exerted siege taking place in the everyday, ordinary context of the political periphery.   This 
will not be a one-shot deal, and requires that we take seriously Habermas’ depiction of the 
intergenerational project as a conflict-ridden, slow-going process through which we become 
what we are (and learn what we are not).  Only after coming to grips with democratic 
disappointments and deficiencies can we imagine new paths forward for realizing a better 
world that we construct ourselves, one which is imbued with sacred meaning.   
 The next chapter reflects upon barriers to this democratic goal, and discusses the 
factors that have encouraged polarization, partisanship, and populist themes—most notably 
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captured by ‘Trumpism.’  I argue that these together symptomize a spectacular, acclamatory 
politics in which hopes for deliberation are often dashed.  Nevertheless, I urge that these 
themes taken together should compel scholars and citizens alike to consider the discrepancies 
between the democratic ideal and the current state of politics, and how a realist perspective 
might help to overcome a willful naiveté that inhibits the imagination and pursuit of 
alternative democratic possibilities.  
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Chapter 5: Partisanship, Populism, and 
Spectacular Politics 
 
 
Us versus Them:  Hyper-Partisanship and Affective Polarization 
 
U.S. politics today exemplifies a profound depth of disagreement not only over issues of 
public policy, but also regarding existential questions of what it means to be a participant in 
the American experiment.  The extent of animosity that has degraded discourse and driven 
public displays of violence is a reflection of the trends of disenchantment and faltering 
solidarity that were described in the previous chapter.  E.E. Schattschneider—whose classic 
work inspired the current exploration of the vagaries of public opinion and popular 
sovereignty—is best remembered as a theorist of political conflict.  His main thesis in 
Semisovereign People posits that “the nature of political organization depends on the 
conflicts exploited in the political system, which ultimately is what politics is about...we shall 
never understand politics unless we know what the struggle is about.”645  Conflict is 
essentially contagious in free societies and its outcome depends upon the extent of the 
audience’s involvement; i.e. the scope of contagion. 
 
Nothing attracts a crowd as quickly as a fight.  Nothing is so contagious.  
Parliamentary debates, jury trials, town meetings, political campaigns, strikes, 
hearings, all have about them some of the exciting qualities of a fight; all produce 
dramatic spectacles that are almost irresistibly fascinating to people.  At the root 
of all politics is the universal language of conflict.646 
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The art or strategy of politics, therefore, is essentially concerned with the scope and contours 
of this conflict.647  Political parties, defined by Schattschneider in Party Government as 
“organized attempt[s] to get control of the government,” are the key movers involved in the 
expansion or contraction of conflict.648  Despite thousands of recorded debates across the 
literature, the dictum for which he is most well-known continues to be repeated with 
veneration by many who study politics, “political parties created democracy and modern 
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.”649  Where they were treated by the 
Founders as a source of faction and hence a threat to constitutional order, parties are now 
thought to be crucial for the organization of mass politics and the contested representation of 
popular sovereignty.   
Optimistic scholars who positively regard the functional status and outlook for party 
politics have not yet gone extinct, but they are increasingly the minority.   Some continue to 
hold that parties remain the key movers in the political process; serving to link or mediate 
society and the state in addressing issues of public concern.  Relevant to the discussion of 
deliberative systems above, parties are meant to serve as ‘transmitters’ in the democratic 
process, allowing for the refinement of raw opinions so that they can be debated, voted upon, 
and ultimately translated into effective state policy.  Scholars like Nancy Rosenblum and 
Russell Muirhead have developed a theory of ‘ethical partisanship,’ characterized by a 
willingness to engage in debates about specific conceptions of the common good all in the 
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spirit of ‘regulated rivalry.’650  Other scholars suggest that parties can serve an important role 
in the encouragement of a democratic ethos—i.e. the collective mobilization of participants 
into political practice marked by the provision of public justifications for various projects.651   
In terms of political pragmatics, other scholars argue that clearly-distinguished parties give 
voters a clearer set of choices, serving as a simplifying heuristic and bolstering electoral 
stability.652   
 On the other hand, if parties are expected to serve as the safeguard for competition 
and even democracy itself, it would appear that we are in deep trouble.  Peter Mair 
provocatively writes, “The age of party democracy has passed.  Although the parties 
themselves remain, they have become so disconnected from the wider society, and pursue a 
form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer seem capable of 
sustaining democracy in its present form.”653  There is no easy explanation for the ‘hollowing 
of democracy’ that Mair describes, but several recognizable trends are well-evidenced in the 
research on political representation.  Among the most notable is the disappearing political 
center and the increasing polarization of party politics.  There is little to no ideological 
overlap between the parties and moderates are on the way out.654  This has occurred over the 
last several decades despite the fact that American citizens are cut from a different political 
cloth than their representatives, the vast majority remaining non-ideological and 
operationally moderate.  When the former does hold and express policy preferences, they are 
far less extreme compared to partisan elites and their voting behavior.655   Nevertheless, inter-
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party compromise in policymaking is a rarity, deadlock is the norm, and low-productivity is 
indicative of ongoing legislative dysfunction.656   
 Questions remain as to what is driving the partisan divergence and whether or not it 
reflects an ideological divide in the wider public.  It is well-documented that the parties, 
members of congress, and activists themselves have themselves become polarized in terms of 
nestling around the ideological poles of the left-right continuum.657  That said, it is more 
difficult to determine the degree of ideological sorting in the wider public given the relative 
scarcity and unreliability of data on the public’s positions.  This has led to a clash of research 
findings on the question of whether citizens are leading, following, or defecting from 
polarized politics.  One set of scholars suggests that the public is polarized, and that they 
have adjusted and pegged their partisanship and issue stances to reflect ideological 
allegiances.658  The other argues to the contrary, that the evidence showing public 
polarization is misleading in tracing causation.  Under this interpretation, members of the 
public have regrouped or ‘sorted’ according to parties but their views and attitudes have not 
changed all that much.659  As a consequence, these dissenters reject declarations of an 
impending or ongoing ‘culture war’ as hyperbolic and alarmist rather than descriptive.  
Despite the prevalence of literature centered on this question, the debate continues to rage on. 
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 Recent studies have attempted to intervene in this academic controversy through the 
introduction of alternative measures of polarization and specifications of the relationship of 
ideology to partisanship.  Ideology can be distinguished according to two constructs: a set of 
issue positions and a social identity.660  Marc Hetherington has recently suggested that both 
sides in this debate capture partial truths when it comes to diagnosing divides in the body 
politik.  He finds that ordinary Americans are in fact polarized, but not so much in terms of 
policy preferences.  Instead, partisans are affectively polarized in their feelings about their 
political opponents, such that “Republicans and Democrats simply do not like each other to 
an unprecedented degree.”661  The increasing hostility between reds and blues in the 
electorate is indicative of how partisanship is steeped in social identity.  This sociological 
understanding views partisanship as driven by the need for group membership, rather than 
being a consequence of well-constructed belief systems linked to policy options.662  Party 
identification, which has been found to be one of if not the most reliable predictor of political 
attitudes and behavior, facilitates a psychological attachment to others belonging to the same 
‘club’ or ascribing to the same ‘brand name.’663  Citizens regularly update the image of their 
group category, Republican or Democrat, in order to maximize the comparative level of ‘fit’ 
with their delineated collective.  As Lupu explains, “a citizen who thinks she closely 
resembles the typical Republican will feel most strongly about her identity when she also 
perceives the typical Democrat to be very different. All else equal, the more different a 
person perceives these party prototypes to be, the more strongly she will identify with a 
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party.”664  In this sense, partisans do not have to understand the ideological backgrounding of 
political divisions or the constellation of issues under debate in order to make use of the 
labels.665 
 Given the socialized nature of partisan conflict, Hetherington argues that the most 
important development in recent decades is the polarization of trust.  He finds that partisans’ 
increasingly-negative feelings about the other side have played a large part in the rise of 
distrust.  This has consequences not only for the likelihood of open discourse and civility, but 
also for the requirements of co-governance and legislative productivity.  As he finds, 
partisans tend to view the political world differently depending on whether their choice party 
is in or out of power, and whether they are judging the performance of the ‘government’ as a 
whole or in terms of specific representatives and programs.  As anticipated by the theory of 
motivated reasoning, partisans also selectively update their evaluations of trustworthiness 
based on self-supporting criteria, paying attention to information favoring allies and 
disfavoring adversaries.666   
Trust in the face of disagreement is necessary in order to obtain the minimal degree of 
consensus required for legislative productivity.  Given that the faith of out-party partisans in 
their competitors is the bridge to overcoming partisan gridlock, Hetherington pessimistically 
concludes that “the bridge has washed away.” 
 
Without consensus, public opinion will not nudge representative toward 
moderation and compromise.  Instead, the public will reinforce polarization in 
Washington.  In short, the polarization of political trust has rendered an 
ideologically moderate (or perhaps nonideological) mass public an inert force in 
overcoming polarization in Washington.667   
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The polarization of trust has increased dramatically since the 1970s, occurring 
disproportionately among Republicans compared to Democrats and carrying distinct 
repercussions for the normalcy of gridlock.668  Given that trust is especially required for 
policies that entail a high degree of governmental involvement, and that people are more 
willing to sacrifice their material or ideological interest when they trust the national 
government, the current climate of distrust substantially hinders the passage of ambitious 
redistributive social programs and regulative policies.669  On top of this, because elites have 
self-serving incentives to vote the party line, and relatively moderate Americans are willing 
to stomach the ideological and partisan excesses of those in Washington when voting for 
their familiar incumbent, there do not appear to be solid reasons for expecting a reversal in 
the adversarial climate anytime soon. 
The dearth of trust in polarized times has consequences not only for public policy, but 
has worked to fuel pessimism in the theorization of politics.  One popular line of attack on 
deliberative theory is that it fails to recognize certain ‘facts’ or at least observable trends in 
human behavior; i.e. we are not very deliberative people for the most part.  This critique 
usually holds that norms of intolerance, ignorance, and emotion driving political decisions 
(particularly in the American context) represent nonstarters for a deliberative politics.  Of 
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course, defenders of deliberation can parry this charge by softening dichotomous divisions 
between reason and unreason, or by acknowledging that politics are conflictual and socially-
valenced and so will rarely result in substantive consensus over divisive issues.  
Nevertheless, reason-giving and the regulative aim of reaching binding agreements remain 
core deliberative ideals, whether taking place in elite chambers of decision-making or in the 
devolved spheres comprising the mass public.  No matter the depth of disagreement over 
worldviews or more mundane political programs, deliberativists expect norms of good faith 
and reciprocity can be pursued so as to overcome the ‘muck’ of politics-as-usual.  The fact 
that the most salient and paralyzing divisions are affective rather than ideological (as 
typically defined), however, presents a deeper problem than many recognize when discussing 
the consequences of polarization.  The raison d'être of deliberative politics is the peaceful 
contestation of ideas, proposals, and worldviews through reasoned discourse.  The darker 
lessons of social psychology, however, indicate that negative feelings about the other side 
can infect the way we think about most any given issue.  If affective polarization is 
proliferating through cyclical and regenerative processes, with constituents and 
representatives mutually-incentivizing the demonization of the other side, this ostensibly 
forecloses the potentials for compromise and problem-solving.  Though citing situational 
factors which might work against this type of ‘blind loyalty,’ Lavine and her colleagues 
admit that rigidly-reinforced partisanship may well represent an “intractable scourge on the 
body politic.”670 
 
Despite the availability of a wide array of decision aids, partisan cues dominate if 
not entirely engulf the field.  They frame discussions in the media; they structure 
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the options that the public may choose between; and perhaps most important (for 
better or worse), they activate our desire for positive social identity.671 
 
 
The mounting evidence suggesting the main driver of polarization among Americans 
is group identification—and that issue-based cleavages are largely derivative—represents a 
serious obstacle for the refinement of political discourse and the efficacy of co-governance.  
Partisan rancor is driven primarily by questions of ‘who we are’ and only secondarily by 
debates on the policies or paths we should pursue.  As Mason describes it, this has given rise 
to what might seem a counterintuitive result in the prevalence of ‘uncivil agreement.’  
Consistent with Levendusky’s ‘sorting’ thesis, the increasing alignment between partisan and 
ideological identities have had behavioral consequences, such that Americans have become 
“highly biased against other partisans, more active in politics, and increasingly angry at each 
other, while still agreeing on most issues.”672  This disaffection largely precludes the 
discursive consideration, let alone resolution, of deep political disagreements rooted in 
identity.  Reconceptualizing ideology as a social phenomenon—driven by the affinities of 
membership and less by principled doctrines or the pragmatic assessment of policy 
effectiveness—therefore carries troubling implications for the potential of reasoned argument 
to contend with the real trends of political tribalism.   
Although the public and its opinions did not create polarization in Washington, it 
continues to condone if not reward the style of oppositional politics that has ensued.  Given 
the diminished power of the party to coercively reign in its members, and the electoral 
motivations to remain uncooperative with the other side deemed to be ‘unworthy’ or morally 
reprehensible, it is no surprise that the trope of dysfunctionality in Washington has become a 
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state of normalcy.  The dearth of public pressure for political reconciliation and co-
governance means that out-party political leaders, particularly on the right, are permitted to 
“put their short term gains above the health of the country without the risk of reprisal from 
their reelection constituency.”673  Warring symbolism and vitriol now characterize partisan 
contests, and the current reality of dysfunctional partisan politics represents a direct 
challenge for representative democracy, not to mention deliberation itself. 
 
 
Where’s the Beef? Confusion, Anger, and Asymmetric Partisanship 
 
The state of American political affairs is one that bucks not only against kumbaya visions of 
consensus, but against the minimal expectation of peaceful disagreement.  It can be said in no 
uncertain terms that the last several decades have witnessed rampant ‘conflict extension,’ in 
which social divisions have increased in political salience without displacing the 
conservative-liberal divide.674  This is consistent with findings in political psychology, as 
issues like race, religion, and morals are deeply-affective, symbol-heavy subjects that have 
the greater ability to polarize as compared to more cognitively-demanding orientations (e.g. 
ideological belief systems).  As Republican-Conservative and Democratic-Liberal views on 
cultural/identity issues become increasingly aligned and distinguished, there are incidental 
spillover effects into other policy domains.  If politics is understood more as a competition 
over values and visions of the ‘good,’ and less as a question of matching means to ends, 
Schattschneider’s understanding of the contagiousness of conflict helps to explain the 
bellicosity of politics today.  Jacoby provides a pithy summary of this point, “there is a lot at 
                                                             
673 Hetherington 2015, 226. 
674 Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman et. al. 2010. 
 219 
stake if people connect their partisan affiliations and issue preferences to their basic beliefs 
about what is good and bad in the world.”675   
 The development of polarization between the two parties has also occurred in an 
asymmetric fashion.676  Members on both sides distrust and dislike each other, but the parties 
themselves have tapped into different publics and utilized distinct rhetorical repertoires, 
appeals, and strategies.  As Matthew Grossman argues, the two parties are dissimilar in terms 
of their internal organization, governing styles, degrees of ideological homogeneity, and 
electoral appeals.  Most importantly, while Democrats represent a group coalition, consisting 
of a hodgepodge of single-issue interest groups and social movements, the Republican Party 
is characterized as the vehicle of an ideological movement.   The diverse pool of voters who 
make up the latter are united not in light of common social groups or identity-based interests, 
but instead by a perception that they represent the defenders of American values like 
individual liberty and traditional morality.677  The divergence in philosophies, demographic 
composition, and policy goals is consequential as it deepens the deficit of mutual 
understanding between the parties and their members.  As Grossman writes, “The existence 
of a durable mismatch in the central purpose and behavior of the two parties contributes to 
the contemporary challenges faced by both sides in achieving their substantive goals, while 
also exerting a visible and often detrimental effect on the health of the larger political 
system.”678 
Noted above, the consequences of partisan mismatch are particularly acute for 
policymaking directed at governmental regulations and the creation or maintenance of social-
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welfare programs.  Consistent with the findings that the vast majority of the electorate is non-
ideological, there is evidence of ambiguous policy preferences particularly among self-
identified conservatives.  As posed by Ellis and Stimson in their study, many Americans face 
a basic conundrum when it comes to staking out their political identities; their ideological 
self-understandings are frustrated by the tension between attractive symbols and concrete 
preferences.679  Generally, the ideological tropes remain relevant—liberals are supportive of 
the expansion of government power in order to provide equal opportunity and to remediate 
social justice while conservatives support economic freedom and traditional social order.680  
The crux of the matter, however, is when ideas of government and its role clash with 
concrete decisions regarding public policy.  Ellis and Stimson find that one-sided 
generalizations regarding polarization in the mass public have tended to be misleading.  The 
majority of Americans does identify with conservative symbology, but is simultaneously 
attracted to leftist policy solutions.   
 
Facing a choice between a larger government that takes on more responsibilities, 
spends more, and taxes more and the opposite, smaller government with less 
spending and lower taxes, Americans on average choose more and bigger over 
less and smaller.681 
 
 
This represents an uncomfortable partnership of symbolic conservatism and operational 
liberalism.  In speech, many would like the government to be small enough to ‘drown in a 
bathtub’ and for individuals to take responsibility for their own lives with minimal 
interference.  In practice, however, the value of governmental services that have become 
familiar (e.g. social security, Medicare) tend to override this ideological commitment.  
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Appreciating the affect-laden determinants that draw voters to their selected or inherited 
partisan brands helps us to reassess the long-standing question of why voters purportedly 
vote against their ‘interests.’  If interests are conceived less in functionalist terms or under the 
assumptions of economic rationality and more as a messy constellation of values and 
subconscious motivations, it is clearly inappropriate to scold the conflicted partisan on the 
basis of their inconsistency.  It is important to note, however, that this internal conflict is 
currently more prevalent amongst Republicans than Democrats.  Furthermore, the significant 
portion of Americans that Ellis and Stimson characterize as ‘conflicted conservatives’ have 
important influence over the tenor and performance of representative politics, particularly in 
their role as swing voters.682 
 Despite the fact that Republicans conceptualize politics in ideological terms more so 
than do Democrats, studies on the former’s ideational makeup have produced somewhat 
surprising findings.  Whether measured in terms of citizen’s self-reported ideological 
identifications, core values, or issue attitudes, the evidence tends to show that the right is 
more ideologically diverse and inconsistent compared to the left.683  Lupton and his 
colleagues argue that this social-psychological dynamic is one that yields consequences both 
for inter-party and intra-party democracy. 
 
Republicans speak the language of abstractions and symbols and Democrats 
operate on the level of policy specifics as a form of coalition maintenance.  
Specifically, Republican rhetoric reflects the need for the party to mitigate internal 
policy divisions over specific programs as some activists push for ever more 
conservative issue positions against the objections of others, whereas Democratic 
rhetoric serves to satisfy the shared demand of the party’s constituent groups for a 
more active government across multiple policy domains.684 
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Lupton and his colleagues’ study focuses on party activists, a pool that is statistically more 
likely to exert influence over party platforms, political elites, and their decision-making.  
This carries important implications for the contest between different partisan breeds.  In 
particular, if the direction of political influence tends to run from elites to the general public, 
this may well mean that the public—particularly republican voters—are not so much poorly-
equipped recipients of political messaging.  Instead, the issue may be conservative elites 
holding inconsistent attitudes and sending out incongruent messages in the first place.685   
If the foregoing account holds true, and partisanship is characteristically affect-laden, 
symbolic, expressive, and rooted in identity—rather than strictly ideological, issue-based, or 
instrumental—a richer diagnosis of the current state of polarized politics may be available.  
In particular, it helps to explain the recent influence of conservative self-identity on the 
political process.  Whether the result of Washington notables tapping into and representing 
the existing sentiments and preferences of their constituents over the last several decades, or 
the product  of elites engaging in an effective strategy of partisan branding and realignment 
(consistent with the evidence above), the contested image of Republicanism has shifted the 
political landscape.  Grossman describes the rise of the Tea Party, resulting from “an 
electorally potent mobilization of populist sentiment,” as the most visible consequences of 
asymmetric polarization.  As a precursor to Trump’s occupation of the presidency, this 
militant population exhibited vehement opposition not only to Barack Obama and his 
Democratic bloc in Congress, but also to longtime Republican officeholders deemed ‘soft’ or 
otherwise inadequately committed to their ideological banner.  The electoral leverage exerted 
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by activists, media elites, and primary voters over Conservative politicians to maintain 
“doctrinal purity” represents a dynamic that, as of now, has no parallel on the left.686 
One important lesson from asymmetrical partisanship is that accounts attempting to 
gloss over or otherwise minimize differences between the parties miss an important part of 
the picture.687  Whether for the sake of parsimony or to avoid charges of political bias, much 
of the research on polarization in public opinion assumes or at least fails to challenge the 
notion that the parties and their members are alike, for the most part.  Disturbing this 
convention is necessary, however, if we are to understand the recent success of the GOP’s 
confrontational approach in which it rejects pragmatic strategies of compromise in favor of 
“maximizing partisan conflict, emphasizing symbolic acts of ideological differentiation, and 
engaging in near-automatic obstruction of initiatives proposed by the opposition.”688  A 
number of factors put the Democratic Party at a disadvantage in this contest, not least of all 
the legislative bias towards the status quo and the fact that liberal policies are easy targets 
that faciliate attacks by self-proclaimed enemies of ‘big government.’  The effective 
mobilization of voters by the right over the past decade is intimately linked to the ideological 
charge of its appeal.  Meanwhile, the left has no comparative capacity to wage ideological 
battle on an equal footing given its cobbled composition of groups and movements, and the 
absence of an easily-invoked set of alternative concepts and values to unify its policy goals.  
The consequences of this heterogeneity have begun to unfold in the aftermath of 2016, as 
challenges to long-term democratic incumbents have successfully been waged from the left.  
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It remains to be seen if the failures of the Democratic Party in recent campaigns—combined 
with the rise of a comparatively progressive generation of young voters—will consequently 
shift the political playing field for the partisan battles to come. 
In short, ideology cuts both ways.  The diversity of the Republican base, united under 
an amorphous banner of ‘Americanism,’ complicates attempts to speak for (let alone unify) a 
mélange of constituencies.  This reflects a difficult crossroads for the Republican leadership, 
particularly household names within the establishment.  Faced with the real threat of political 
purge (a la Cantor and Boehner), many Republicans have focused energy on demonstrating 
their ideological bona fides at the expense of crafting and enacting feasible legislation.  The 
fact that many Americans do appreciate extensive policy programs, their symbolic 
conservatism notwithstanding, complicates this predicament all the more.  Campaign pledges 
to shrink government, reverse leftist policies, and promote conservative cultural values are 
common refrains, but have rarely played out once offices are won and majorities secured.  As 
a result, there has been a spiral of extremism driving fragmentation in the Republican Party 
itself.  This represents a dangerous cycle, one in which “conservative hopes, dashed by a 
disappointing Republican governing record, grow into even more vociferous demands for 
sweeping policy change, encouraging increasingly desperate promises by Republican leaders 
that are in turn even more difficult to satisfy.”689  Whether unable or unwilling to realize a 
conservative transformation of public policy, the promotion of traditional morality, or the 
security of American dominance in the international scene, dissatisfaction with the 
performance of Republican leaders and their insufficient commitment to their pledges paved 
the way for the popularity and electoral success of political extremism in 2016.690 
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Some have proposed that a silver-lining of partisan polarization is that it makes 
choices clearer and therefore easier for citizens who would otherwise have real difficulties 
charting the terrain of politics.691  Perhaps bright divisions could clarify the (dis)connections 
between operational and symbolic preferences, thereby reducing the ambivalence 
demonstrated by conflicted conservatives and allowing a more thorough-going sorting of 
publics with real differences.  In this way, polarization might even serve the promotion of 
deliberative goods.  Ellis and Stimson are not very optimistic about this proposition, 
however, given that elite polarization and clarified partisan messages “have done nothing to 
reduce the number of citizens who mismatch operational and symbolic attitudes.”692  Their 
evidence shows that the confused usage and identification with labels is systematic, 
pervasive and enduring in American politics, rather than being a product of transient political 
and economic times.  Grossman concurs with this pessimistic reading, noting that fault for 
our political mess lies not only with self-serving elites or one party in particular, but is 
indicative of the confusions of America’s collective mind and the contradictory messages it 
conveys to elected officials.  
The durable presence of partisan asymmetry over many years of American 
political history reflects an enduring mismatch between the operational and 
symbolic predispositions of the nation’s citizenry.  The parties have responded 
rationally to—and further reinforced—this pattern, adapting their strategy, 
rhetoric, and policymaking efforts to the American public’s insistent, if 
inconsistent, demands for a smaller government that addresses a greater number 
of problems.  Neither party can claim a record of courage in confronting the long-
standing incoherence of the national electorate; instead, leaders merely seek to 
shift the level of debate to the level of specificity that systematically favors their 
party’s own position.693 
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Without going so far as to describe the American voter as ‘schizoid,’ and recognizing that 
questions of value and practicality can clash as distinct considerations, the present diagnosis 
of the state of party politics is one with worrisome implications.  The fact that divisions of 
the self are paralleled in the larger political body brings us back to a central problem in 
democratic theory: “the electorate as a whole is fundamentally confused, even regarding the 
basic principles of what it wants and what it values.  How can a citizenry whose preferences 
are this fundamentally contradictory be able to send meaningful cues, place meaningful 
checks on policy maker activity, or resist the rhetorical appeals of political elites?”694  
Producing satisfactory answers to these questions becomes even more of a daunting task in 
the disorienting context of hyper-partisanship and populist politics. 
 
Trump, Post-Truth, and the Shadow of Populism  
 
Many have chalked up the most recent presidential election as a political backlash; one that is 
symptomatic of widespread anger and disillusionment with the Washington machine.   
Donald Trump’s rise to power is the consequence of many factors described earlier: the 
affective polarization of parties since the 1970s, the dearth of political moderation and 
compromise in policymaking resulting in governing crises, and the potency of ideological 
appeals directed at a confused but politically-energetic minority of the U.S. electorate.  The 
unprecedented outcome of Trump’s successful insurgency, and the popularity of his promise 
to ‘Make America Great Again,’ is therefore not a complete mystery.  If ideology is 
understood to be significantly constituted by identity and group membership, it becomes 
easier to conceive how voters could be drawn to a candidate devoid of political experience, 
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insensitive to basic rules of decency and decorum, and non-committal when it comes to 
concrete policy action. 
 In part due to his enigmatic and iconoclastic character, many have labeled Trump a 
populist.  Although this designation is widely used and contested, in this case its deployment 
appears fitting.695  If characterized by worshipping the concerns of ‘The People,’ his 
campaign undeniably evinced populist overtones.696  A large part of his appeal derived from 
his self-proclaimed identity as a political outsider, one who would get down to brass tax, help 
America ‘Win,’ and ‘Drain the Swamp’ that is Washington DC.  As Jan-Warner Müller has 
recently warned, however, many who are quick to label Trump a populist have done so 
reactively, in order to denigrate or dismiss his appeal to voters rather than explain its origins.  
A key insight of Müller’s path-clearing book is that, for all the talk about populist politics, 
we lack a theory of and criteria for populism.697  Because representative politics are always 
characterized by competing claims to represent the ‘people,’ a populist potential is always 
latent within democracy such that “populism is neither the authentic part of modern 
democratic politics nor a kind of pathology caused by irrational citizens.  It is the permanent 
shadow of representative politics.”698  As such, decrying populism as toxic or celebrating it 
                                                             
695 Following Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 382) who note that “it is an axiomatic feature of literature on the topic 
to acknowledge the contested nature of populism.” 
696 Ionescu and Gellner 1969. 
697 Noted a half century ago by Ionescu and Gellner (1969, 1), “There can, at present, be no doubt about the 
importance of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive 
and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? 
Or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?” 
698 Müller 2016, 101.  Panizza (2005, 30) also notes this familial relationship, “populism is neither the highest 
form of democracy nor its enemy, but a mirror in which democracy can contemplate itself, warts and all, and 
find out what it is about and what it is lacking.”  With Singh (2017, 21), “populism represents an endemic 
presence within democratic space. US democracy, with formal equality coexisting alongside massive material 
and social inequality, is especially vulnerable to populist temptations.”  Finally, as suggested by Arditi (2005, 
77), the populist experience can be treated as an “internal periphery of liberal-democratic politics….as a mode 
of representation, as a politics at the more turbulent edges, and as a threatening underside.” 
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as a source of democratic salvation are both premature responses that misconstrue the matter 
at hand—populism can represent both a corrective and a threat to democracy.699 
 Müller attempts to redeem the concept by supplying hitherto unspecified 
qualifications for populism.  Perhaps the most familiar is that of anti-elitism, but while 
necessary this is not a sufficient quality.  In addition, populists are always antipluralist—they 
claim that they alone truly represent the people.  This is essentially a moral claim, one which 
pits the champion of the real People in all their purity and righteousness against competitors 
who represent the immoral, corrupt muck of the establishment.700  As part of the logic and 
rhetorical appeal, populism is always a form of identity politics.  This is why populism’s 
primary danger lies not in its illiberality—though it can be—but in its essential nature as anti-
democratic.  In particular, the fantastical notion that there is a “single, homogenous, authentic 
people” that cannot err is antithetical to the basic democratic requirement for pluralism; i.e. 
the recognized need to find fair terms of coexistence as “free, equal, but irreducibly diverse 
citizens.”701  However illusory, this myth tends to be quite effective and self-fulfilling as it 
allows the populist leeway in claiming to represent an ontologically-elusive constituency. 
Müller also addresses the pervasive idea that populism is bound to breakdown and 
that ‘populists cannot govern’ once elected.   Though this thought is ostensibly reassuring, he 
argues that populists tend to effectively exercise their power through three central strategies: 
occupation of the state, mass clientelism and corruption, and the suppression of anything 
resembling civil society.  What is notable about the first is not that populists attempt to gain 
or maintain political power, but that they undertake colonization “openly and with the 
                                                             
699 Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013. 
700 ibid., 3. 
701 ibid. 
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support of their core claim to moral representation of the people.”702  The exchange of 
various favors for mass political support is similarly transparent and legitimized by this 
moral claim, and even allows populists to utilize ‘discriminatory legalism’ in subjectively 
applying the legal system to friends and foes.  As long as these extralegal measures are used 
for the sake of supporters—the deserving ‘us’ rather than the immoral or alien ‘them’— 
populists can deflect and shield themselves from charges of corruption.  This disconcerting 
fact is one that Müller observes is largely lost on liberals, who express the ‘pious hope’ that 
all they have to do is expose corruption in order to expose populists and restore the rule of 
law.703  Finally, populists are not receptive to dissent or demonstrations, and tend to respond 
harshly to nongovernmental organizations that raise a fuss.  Given that counter-claims to 
representation reveal divisiveness that is antithetical to the populist agenda, populists tend to 
fall back on hand-waiving.  They dismiss ‘fake’ emanations of civil society in the form of 
protest or disruption that do not stem from the ‘True People’ over which they hold a 
representative monopoly. 
 In observing these characteristics, Müller’s thesis about populism as the ‘shadow of 
representative politics’ in many ways describes the American scene today, and persuasively 
backs his measured observation that all is not well for democracy. 
 
The danger to democracies today is not some comprehensive ideology that 
systematically denies democratic ideals. The danger is populism-a degraded form 
of democracy that promises to make good on democracy's highest ideals ('Let the 
people rule!"). The danger comes, in other words, from within the democratic 
world-the political actors posing the danger speak the language of democratic 
values. That the end result is a form of politics that is blatantly antidemocratic 
                                                             
702 ibid., 44. 
703 ibid., 48.  Instead, whistleblowers would also have to demonstrate quite demanding facts, for example that 
“for the vast majority, populist corruption yields no benefits, and that a lack of democratic accountability, a 
dysfunctional bureaucracy, and a decline in the rule of law will in the long run hurt the people—all of them.” 
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should trouble us all-and demonstrate the need for nuanced political judgment to 
help us determine precisely where democracy ends and populist peril begins.704   
 
 
For reasons laid out above, charges of irresponsibility or illegitimacy largely miss the point 
when it comes to populist politics.  Though many self-assured liberal democrats may have 
previously assumed a politics of Post-Truth was unsustainable, if at all possible, what we 
have thus far observed of Trump’s administration bespeaks the potency of populist politics.  
It also points to the misleading, if not irresponsible attempt to implicitly or explicitly level 
blame at specific socioeconomic groups as the soil or manure of populism.  While it is true 
that voters who support populist candidates tend to share certain ethnic, income and 
educational profiles, these demographic factors are not decisive explanatory variables given 
that populist bases are often composed of diverse socio-economic strata.705 
 Similarly, there is a perceptible urge to reduce or explain away pro-populism as an 
affective product of fear, anxiety, frustration, and/or anger.  Emotion is certainly an 
important part of the story, but emerging theories positing that ‘politics of resentment’ have 
been driven in large part by animosity towards ‘otherness’ or cultural anxieties about 
displacement and dispossession risk caricaturing those in Trump’s base.706  Linked to 
modernization theory, and sharing its blindspots, these kinds of reductions often tend to 
overstate the role of reactivity as a driver of populism.  Frequently patronized as pathetic 
‘losers’ who have failed to transition in a complex and globalized world,  festering with 
ressentiment and driven by authoritarian mindsets, the knee-jerk reaction apparent in some of 
                                                             
704 ibid., 6. 
705 Manza and Crowley (2017,  test the popular “working class authoritarianism” thesis (Lipset 1960) that is 
widely invoked to explain Trump, and find instead that his primary support “was not systematically derived 
from successful appeals to disadvantaged or downwardly mobile voters. Trump’s voters were, on the whole, 
significantly more affluent and better educated than the average voters in primary states. We find slightly higher 
levels of Trump support among those who think it is harder to climb the economic ladder in bivariate analyses, 
but when statistical controls are applied this finding is significantly moderated.” 
706 Cramer 2016; Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Hetherington, Long and Rudolph 2016. 
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the literature effectively belittles the population that made Trump’s siege possible.707  It also 
risks perpetuating the stagnant dualism between reason and emotion, disparaging the 
common mob that succumbs to irrational political appetites.708  This conflation of political 
beliefs, socioeconomic positions and psychological states not only fails to explain the 
phenomenon under consideration—it works in the political favor of populists who can point 
to this condescension as indicative of an ‘out-of-touch’ academic and political elite. 
It is tempting to point the prevalence of turbulent passions as a tidy explanation of 
Trump, but this parsimonious account doesn’t do justice to the situational factors that opened 
his political window.  The fact that academics need to be reminded of this is suggestive of the 
limited progress of public opinion research.   
 
The simple fact is that "anger'' and "frustration" might not always be very 
articulate-but they are also not "just emotions" in the sense of being completely 
divorced from thought. There are reasons for anger and frustration, which most 
people can actually spell out in some form or other...simply to shift the discussion 
to social psychology (and treat the angry and frustrated as potential patients for a 
political sanatorium) is to neglect a basic democratic duty to engage in 
reasoning.709  
  
 
In order to avoid over-simplifying a very complex state of affairs, it is helpful to consider the 
relative benefits and potential complements of ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ accounts of 
populism’s appeal.  The latter include many of the studies that attempt to locate and 
operationalize attitudes, perceptions, motivations, or predispositions in order to understand 
when and how populism becomes attractive.  As suggested, these tend to hypothesize a 
central role for emotion in explaining the gravitation towards populist rhetoric, in which 
                                                             
707 cf. Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher 2016; Spruyt, Keppens, and Droogenbroeck 2016; Rico, Guinjoan 
and Anduiza 2017. 
708 For more on the blurred lines between cognition and affect, see Marcus et. al. 2000; Marcus 2002; Marcus et. 
al. 2005. 
709 Müller 2016, 16. 
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citizens identify with the monolithic ‘Us’ against the villainous ‘Them.’  These dividing lines 
tend to reflect responses to salient cultural issues.  In the American case, and as 
foreshadowed by the rise of the Tea Party, these include the general sense that the country is 
changing for the worse, whether because of the supposed ubiquity of liberal values (e.g. 
LGBTQ politics) or racial-ethnic concerns about the overthrow of white protestants as the 
demographic majority.710  These shifts are thought to entail perceived threats to status and 
thereby affect discomforting emotions like anger or anxiety that can then be used 
strategically to mobilize or countermobilize.711 
Alternatively, from the perspective of ‘supply-side’ frameworks, there is an emphasis 
not so much on the psycho-sociological motivations drawing people to populist politics, but 
the ways in which the political environment fosters populist potentials.  Here there is more 
focus on the broader factors determining the (non)provision of political goods.  Colin Hay 
makes the case that the examination of political disenchantment tends to be skewed towards 
demand-side explanations, if for no other reason than they are intuited to be relevant and 
easier to identify.  By neglecting the macro forces at work that influence civic dispositions 
and demands, however, scholars predictably continue to struggle in explaining trends like 
disaffection and disengagement.  As these are associated with the rise of populist politics, 
considering broader sociological and institutional trends may very well help to fill out the 
picture.  Some of these trends include “changes in the content of the appeals that the parties 
                                                             
710 Consistent with Hochschild’s (2016, 221) synthesis of three main factors since the 1980s leading up to 
Trump, the “emotions candidate.” Those she interviewed most always unanimously reported feeling on ‘shaky 
ground’ economically (breeding aversity to anything resembling ‘redistribution’; feeling culturally marginalized 
or ridiculed as ‘backwards’; and feeling part of a demographic decline as a “besieged minority.”   
711 As Berlet (2012, 48) argues, the related success of the Tea Party was facilitated by the rhetoric, tropes and 
frames of right-wing populism and the narrative of ‘producerism’, in which activists perceive their political 
adversaries through ‘fear-based dualism’.  Views of the opposing side as truly ‘other’ are “intertwined with 
long-standing right-wing conspiracy theories about liberal betrayal...left ideological opponents are demonized 
and scapegoated as consciously or unconsciously destroying the America of liberty or freedom.”  
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make to potential voters, changes in the character of electoral competition, changes in the 
substantive content of the ‘goods’ that politics offers to political ‘consumers’, and changes in 
the capacity of national-level governments to deliver genuine political choice to voters.”712  
One advantage of bringing in a supply-side analysis is that the evident urge to saddle 
the blame on reactive and cognitively-deficient voters is checked, if not abated.  Though 
social-psycho-cultural hypotheses regarding his constituencies hold some water, they can and 
should be partnered with an appreciation of the real (and well-founded) grievances—arising 
from the deficient supply of political goods—that drove dissatisfaction with the political 
status quo.  This two-pronged approach allows for the consideration of both objective and 
subjective dimensions of populism’s appeal.  For example, we can read Trump’s brand of 
populist politics as an exploitation of different feelings of economic, cultural, and political 
vulnerability (e.g. relative deprivation, anomie, perceived lack of political efficacy), that may 
or may not reflect objective standing (e.g. material wealth, educational attainment, cultural 
capital, and internal political efficacy).713  His success might then be understood as the 
consequential failure of the mainstream parties to respond to these diverse grievances.  This 
                                                             
712 Hay 2007, 55.  There are also a number of supply-side factors that Hay (2007, 159)  argues are distinctly 
related to trends of depoliticization, including “privatization, the contracting-out of public services, the 
marketization of public goods, the displacement of policymaking autonomy from the formal political realm to 
independent authorities, the rationalization and insulation from critique of neoliberalism as an economic 
paradigm, and the denial of policy choice (for instance, in discerning the imperatives of competitiveness in an 
era of globalization).”  
713 Spruyt et. al. 2016, 344.  This is not at odds with recognizing Trump’s base concerns over status.  As 
Mendelberg (2016, 144) writes, “a status framework can thus help to explain why economically deprived 
groups do not act to maximize economic resources. It does so not by pitting economics against identity, culture, 
or values, but by combining all of these ingredients into a powerful stew. Economic concerns do matter, but it’s 
the relative resources that matter, and often by symbolically signaling social esteem. Signals of the cultural 
inferiority of an in-group defined implicitly by social class are what rankle most. Needless to say, all this seems 
highly relevant for understanding the rise of Donald Trump. Trump seems to appeal to people who are not so 
much economically insecure, or unable to meet basic living expenses, as to people who feel symbolically 
displaced from the status hierarchy and cast into its nether regions. Making America “great again” is vague 
enough that it allows people to project their particular status discontent onto it. Trump draws disproportionately 
from the groups that have suffered the greatest relative decline over the past several decades: White working-
class men.” See too Disch (2012, 133-4) for an account of ‘white citizenship’ movements, i.e. “action in defense 
of material benefits that confer ‘racial standing’ in a polity that purports to deny precisely that — special 
standing based on race.” 
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is the conclusion that Oliver and Rahn reach in their forensic treatment of the ‘Rise of the 
Trumpenvolk’. 
 
The improbable emergence of Donald Trump is ultimately rooted in American 
party politics. Yes, Donald Trump’s simple, Manichean rhetoric is 
quintessentially populist.  Yes, his supporters combine the distinct traits of a 
strong nationalist and ethnocentric identity with a deep suspicion of elites and 
cultural pretenses.  But the opportunity for a Donald Trump presidency is 
ultimately rooted in a failure of the Republican Party to incorporate a wide range 
of constituencies...American populism in the twenty-first century has a 
conservative tinge and is most acutely felt in the political turmoil of the 
Republican Party.714 
 
 
Related to Mair’s description of the ‘hollowing of democracy,’ it is likely the case that a key 
driver of American populism is the empirically-demonstrated ‘representation gap’ that 
describes a disconnect between parties and those they claim to stand for.715   The populist 
rupture might then be linked to crises of representation, in which political institutions are 
formally operative but economic and political power is reserved for and exercised by a small 
few—indicative of politics in post-democratic times.716                     
The differences dividing Americans today and making populism possible are not just 
matters of ‘politics’ as the saying goes, or questions of fitting means to ends.  The depth of 
disagreement and the dysfunctionality of the political system certainly seem to signal that 
American democracy is in crisis.  Of course, this term is often a self-serving catchall used for 
the sake of emphasis.  As Benjamin Moffitt points out, this does not mean that there is “no 
                                                             
714 Oliver and Rahn 2016, 202.  
715 Roberts (2015, 141) observes a direct link between populism and these crises.  He defines the former as “a 
political strategy for appealing to mass constituencies where representative institutions are weak or discredited, 
and where various forms of social exclusion or political marginalization leave citizens alienated from such 
institutions.”  This is consistent with Tormey’s (2015) suggestion that we view the ‘contours of crisis’ from 
both above (in terms of voter turnout, membership in parties, trust in politicians, and interest in mainstream 
politics) and below (in emerging extra-institutional forms/styles of political practice such as social movements 
and protests). 
716 Crouch 2000, 2016; Katsambekis 2017. 
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such thing as a crisis” but that “we hit something of an ontological brick wall when using the 
concept: we cannot separate ‘crisis’ from the words we use to describe the phenomenon.”717  
While in Greek the term krinō traditionally referred to a crucially decisive moment that 
would ‘tip the scales,’ crisis in modern parlance has become associated with the experience 
of deficient or failed decision-making.718  This experience is obviously a subjective one, but 
nonetheless carries direct implications for the political exploitation of crisis politics.  Moffitt 
argues that crises are neither exogenous to nor independent of populism, but are actually 
better understood as a product of populist strategy themselves.719  He writes, “a crisis only 
becomes a crisis when it is perceived as a crisis – when a failure gains wider salience through 
its mediation into the political, cultural or ideological spheres and is commonly accepted as 
symptomatic of a wider problem.”720  As such, it is helpful to move away from doomed 
attempts to identify the objective conditions of crisis and instead consider that crises may be 
constituted by and actualized through performance.721  
Whatever else might be said of him, President Trump has proven himself adept as a 
‘performer’ of crisis.  Moffitt distills six main steps of populist performance, all of which are 
                                                             
717 Moffitt 2015, 195. 
718 Koselleck 2006, 358. 
719 There is a relevant and ongoing debate (see Gidron and  Bonikowski 2013 for a review) on whether 
populism should be conceived as a strategy/mode of organization (Weyland 2001), as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ 
(Abts and Rummens 2007;Mudde 2007, 2009; Canovan 2002), as an inherent logic of democracy  (Laclau 
2005, 2006; Mouffe 2005) as a quality of discourse (Howarth 2000, Aslandis 2016), or as a stylized 
performance (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, Moffitt 2015).  I am not suggesting these frameworks are mutually 
exclusive, e.g. discourse and ideological worldviews are inextricably linked (Hawkins 2010), as are political 
style and strategy (Barr 2009. Jansen 2011).  The advantage of viewing populism as a style is that it avoids 
problematic categorization inherent in some approaches and is uniquely suited to the analysis of politics under 
conditions of ‘reflexive modernity’ (e.g. legitimation crises and representational breakdowns, decline of 
ideological cleavages and class-based politics, and the alienation of ordinary citizens from party politics).  As 
politics become more and more spectacular, focusing on populist mannerisms is a promising way of 
approaching the topic. 
720 Moffitt 2015, 197. 
721 This complements Disch’s (2012) suggestion that representation itself is performative rather than passively 
receptive.  Representation is a reflexive and constructive activity that  ‘makes present’ a public.  Arditi (2007) 
argues a similar function for populists appeals, where ‘The People’ is both the central audience of populists, as 
well as the subject that populists attempt to ‘render present.’   
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discernable in the recent campaign and moves made by the administration.722  First is the 
identification of a failure, which is easier if a set of issues thought indicate failure are 
politically salient (‘We Don’t Win Anymore’).  Then, the failure must be elevated to the 
level of crisis by linking it to a wider framework and adding a temporal dimension.  Various 
sub-failures are put into association in light of an overarching ‘event,’ and together are 
claimed to be symptomatic of crisis.  This gives the appeal potency in light of the exigencies 
of the situation at hand, which cannot be adequately handled through politics as usual lest 
something terrible and irreversible should happen.  Bold and decisive action—rather than 
negotiation and compromise as in ‘slow politics’—is required in order to prevent apocalyptic 
ramifications (‘Our country is going to hell.  But we’re going to make it great again!’).723  
Third, as noted above, the populist stands for ‘The People’ against those who oppress them, 
i.e. those responsible for the crisis.  This monolithic collective remains a vague signifier, and 
populists tend to be more sure of who they are not than who they are.724  Nevertheless, this is 
an effective double-negation, in which “the demonization of social groups, and particularly 
the antipathy towards the elite, provides populists with an enemy, but it is also a crucial 
component of the attempt to construct an identity.”725  Trump is with ‘Real Americans’ and 
anyone who dissents is contributing to the problem.  As he put it in a campaign speech, “The 
only important thing is the unification of the people – because the other people don’t mean 
anything.” 
                                                             
722 Moffitt 2015, 198-207. 
723 Saward 2011.  This likely necessitates going around incumbrences like checks and balances, or even taking 
steps to render them politically moot. 
724 Laclau (2005, 77;105)  describes this as the linkage of heterogeneous and unfulfilled demands in an 
‘equivalential chain’.  The initial demand functions as a ‘floating signifier’ that performs an integrating 
function, while itself remaining substantially empty.  Emptiness expresses the sense that “there is a place, 
within the system of signification, which is constitutively irrepresentable; in that sense it remains empty, but 
this is an emptiness which I can signify, because we are dealing with a void within signification.” 
725 Taggart 2000, 94. 
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The fourth part of the populist strategy is the use of the media to propagate the crisis.  
The media effectively ‘breaks’ the crisis, allowing for the identification of those representing 
the ‘enemies of the people.’  Regardless of partisan slant, the media have a logical and 
pecuniary interest to provide a spectacular portrayal of the alleged crisis, and therefore play a 
pivotal role in its perpetuation.  Trump’s direct appeal to his base, most notably through 
social media like Twitter, allows him to inject issues into public discourse and engage in 
opinion building.  The proactive promotion and staging of these events goes beyond mere 
‘inspiration’ and allows for greater control of the narrative.  Once failures are linked to crisis, 
battlelines drawn, and the stage set, populists present simple solutions and strong leadership.  
Portraying the establishment as inept, weak or otherwise degenerate, the populist instead 
offers parsimonious approaches to the problems at hand (‘We’re going to build a wall’, 
‘We’re going to build up our military’) and advocates for the simplification of procedures 
and institutions that are unnecessarily convoluted.  The populist presents himself as a 
‘straight-shooter’—unladen by ideological baggage and uncontaminated by politics—who 
will therefore be able cut through red tape and restore ‘common sense’ to politics.726  
Finally, the performance must be kept up and the crisis propagated.  This may be the 
most difficult stratagem, as Moffitt notes “it can be difficult to continue to attract attention 
and prolong panic and concern about one’s chosen crisis, especially if it becomes clear that 
one’s notion of crisis is not particularly convincing, or if the issues that one’s notion of crisis 
revolve around become less salient to voters or media.”727  Here, however, the populist can 
prove himself politically-adroit in switching the notion of crisis employed or in extending the 
                                                             
726 “Rather than acknowledging that many complex and intertwined factors cause systemic failures, the aim of 
the populist performance of crisis is to point the finger squarely at the enemy of ‘the people’. The key point is 
that somebody must be responsible for this mess.”  Moffitt 2015, 206. 
727 Ibid., 206.   As Trump promised, “I'm not a politician, thank goodness. I have no special interests, no special 
interests telling me what to do, I have no donors telling me what to do.  I'm going to do what's right for you.” 
 238 
purview and size of the breakdown.  Given the depth of affective polarization and distrust 
that Trump has drawn upon in constructing the American crisis, his claim to authority as the 
mouthpiece for ‘the people’ can be politically maintained.  So long as his supporters continue 
to identify with his nebulous pledge to restore American greatness, and believe in his 
comparative ability to deliver on the cultural (if not economic) restoration of those who have 
been marginalized, deprived, or dispossessed, the populist style of anti-politics can be 
expected to remain effective. 
 In view of the above criteria, Donald Trump as a populist candidate has successfully 
exploited diverse strands of dissatisfaction in his presidential insurgency.  Conceptualizing 
populism as a performative type of crisis politics helps to explain how Trump was both 
tapping into and manipulating an extant rightwing reaction to politics as usual, especially in 
light of the representative failures of the Republican Party.  Attempts to explain his upset 
victory are understandable and worthwhile on the whole, but too much of the emerging 
scholarship is fervent and characterized by simplistic narrative.  His base is described as 
racist, resentful, vindictive and uneducated.  Whether because of cultural or economic woes, 
his appeal is said to reflect the backwardness of deplorables and the reactivity of ‘losers’ who 
were victims of modernization.  This reflects the widespread dismissal of his campaign as an 
unsubstantial ‘sideshow,’ at least up until his victory.   
 The basic fact is that prominent commentators have consistently underestimated the 
deep-seated trends that would allow Trump to claim the mantle of the presidency.  In 
obsessing over the indeterminacy of his policy positions and uncouth rhetoric, there has been 
a great misunderstanding of his attraction to voters and the sustainability of his approach to 
political rule.  In particular, the vacuity of his ideological commitments is consistent with his 
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nimbleness as a political grandstander and a purveyor of conflict.  In word and action, what 
once would have been considered political heresy is now proving effective in an age of 
distrust.  The point is that many Americans are fed up with political institutions, particularly 
the parties of ‘tweedledum’ and ‘tweedledee,’ and disturbed by a general sense that the 
health of the body politic is declining.  As such, the stage was set for Trump as a champion 
of ‘Real Americans.’  While polemical, however, Trump is not exceptional—he is an empty 
symbol that can reflect and incorporate a broad range of variably articulated impulses.  The 
fact that millions gravitated towards him is politically and philosophically consequential, and 
has exposed cracks in the American system of representation.  Rather than treating this as a 
mistaken blip in the inevitable return to political equilibrium, the Trump presidency should 
serve as a reminder of the central roles of identity, symbolism, and rhetoric that together 
represent the populist underbelly of democratic politics.  
 
Symbolism, Rhetoric, and the Precariousness of Political Communication  
 
Among other lessons to be learned from the renewed relevance of populism is the power of 
symbolic appeals and the deployment of rhetoric in representative politics.  Murray Edelman 
was acutely aware of the quirks and frailties of psychological processes and how these 
frustrate analyses of public opinion’s role in the political process.728  One primary reason for 
his mixed reputation has to do with his emphasis on the inherent ambiguities of political 
experience and the ways in which political analyses often proceed in a hopelessly naïve 
fashion, striving for some positivistic form of objectivity so as to make politics more 
                                                             
728 It is easy to see Lippmann’s (1922, 1925) influence in this regard, especially in terms of stereotypical 
thinking and the ‘manufacture of consent’.  There is also an obvious connection to Lasswell (discussed above) 
who described propaganda as “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant 
signals.” Lasswell 1927, 629. 
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predictable.  Edelman instead focused on the ‘uses’ and ‘construction’ of political symbols, 
the ‘actions’ they perform, the ‘success’ they enjoy, and the ‘misinformation’ that they often 
produce.729  Central to his thesis is that the steering of the political-symbolic system is often 
an unconscious product of the “ideology of the community.”730 
 
We are seldom aware how easily and frequently our beliefs about causes and 
consequences are created and changed by subtle or unconscious cues. Quite to the 
contrary: we ordinarily assume that we live in a world in which the causes and 
consequences of actions are stable and fairly well known. Neither the media nor 
academic studies pay much attention to the fundamental political work that makes 
the benefits and the deprivations [imposed on people by government decisions] 
politically possible: the continuous creation and remolding of the public beliefs 
about the causes of particular outcomes, thereby justifying some actions and 
building opposition to others....The character, causes, and consequences of any 
phenomenon become radically different as changes are made in what is 
prominently displayed, what is repressed, and especially how observations are 
classified. Far from being stable, the social world is therefore a chameleon, or, to 
suggest a better metaphor, a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can 
be readily evoked by altering the ways in which observations are framed and 
categorized. Because alternative categorizations win support for specific beliefs 
and policies, classification schemes are central to maneuver and political 
persuasion.731  
 
 
Despite the fact that elites are susceptible to the power of the symbols which they wield 
themselves, this style of politics has produced a modern public that often resembles a 
quiescent and unthinking mass that is steered, selectively-activated, and in some cases 
purposively-manipulated.  Politics increasingly represents a political spectacle in which 
cultural signals and implicit messages have the power to infiltrate the thinking of political 
insiders and outsiders, agents and bystanders alike.732  Moreover, this relationship is 
                                                             
729 These elements are indicated in the titles of his main works; see Edelman 1964, 1988, 1971, 1977 and 2001 
respectively. 
730 Edelman 1964, 126. 
731 Edelman 1992, 1. 
732 Edelman’s focus on these issues bear a close resemblance to his contemporary, Clifford Geertz, who in 1964 
called on political scientists to appreciate ideologies as “systems of interacting symbols, as patterns of 
interworking meanings” rather than independent or dependent variables as in public opinion or political 
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sustained by virtue of the reflexive and mutually-reinforcing relationship between culture and 
politics—cultural influences produce political action or inaction and symbols and belief 
systems are constituted by politics in turn. 
 Edelman’s work suggests a valuable starting-point for public opinion studies, in 
which the connections between (non)ideological thinking, widespread ignorance, apathy, and 
nonparticipation becomes clearer.  Taking symbolic interactionism seriously leads to 
important questions that can helpfully direct research, e.g. “How does culture influence the 
way people think about politics, if they do at all?” or “How do political beliefs get expressed 
or understood through culture or symbolic systems of meaning?”733  Tracing the link between 
political science and related fields like cultural studies, it becomes possible to better 
appreciate William Gamston’s declaration that “it is not through force or coercion that a 
regime maintains itself but through its ability to shape our worldview.”734  In this sense, the 
discussion of political occlusion and popular (non)influence becomes less a matter of 
identifying the ‘boogeymen’ disrupting or displacing democracy than discerning the ways in 
which diverse and competing cultural repertoires sustain the effectiveness of the system’s 
logic and continued operation. 
Emphasizing the role of political symbolism also brings us back to important themes 
discussed above, such as the socially-endogenous formation of preferences and attitudes, 
motivated engagement with news and information, and the dominance of pre-packaged 
(partisan) thinking.  It also demonstrates the relevance of sociological argument (discussed in 
chapter two) in relation to the pretenses of opinion polling; i.e. that both the social and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
psychology research.  The more interesting and deeper question, for Geertz, was “how symbols symbolize, how 
they function to mediate meanings.”  Geertz 1964, 56-7 
733 Wizniewski 2007, 138. 
734 Gamson 1992, 65. 
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material are prior to and constitutive for the political.735  Finally, refining and building upon 
insights like Edelman’s should shift debates about the malleability or gullibility of ‘The 
Public’ in general, to considerations of how influence and ignorance are distributed 
unequally among different groups in political society.  This would involve developing more 
sophisticated models of influence in recognition of the shortcomings of classical theories of 
mass culture.  As John Fiske writes, 
 
A homogenous, externally produced culture cannot be sold ready-made to the 
masses: culture simply does not work like that.  Nor do the people behave or 
live like the masses, an aggregation of alienated, one-dimensional persons 
whose only consciousness is false…The people, the popular, the popular forces, 
are a shifting set of allegiances that cross all social categories.736 
 
 
With the benefit of nearly a century of research on media effects, social-psychological 
processes, and the conditional responsiveness of the system, we can better appreciate certain 
nuances when it comes to public opinion and the exercise of popular sovereignty.  For 
example, the average citizen is neither wholly autonomous, nor is she a dupe.  She is neither 
ideologically-sophisticated, nor is she a dimwit devoid of attitudes or beliefs.  She is neither 
ignored by political elites out-of-hand, nor is she unilaterally heeded in the electoral and 
policy process.  These caveats should certainly serve to check the hyperbole characteristic of 
many depictions of ‘mass politics,’ but they should also refocus our attention on the 
                                                             
735 For example, Percheron (1982, 55) writes, “As a function of his adhesion to a particular subculture or of his 
borrowing from several subcultures to which he is linked, each individual acquires a certain number of values 
and norms which decide, in large measure, the choice of symbols and signs to which he will have access, and so 
the particular perception of the political which he tends to adopt.  This is no longer simply a question of 
recognition but of adopting a collection of values which favour certain actors, modes of action and behaviour.”  
736 Fiske 1989, 23-4. 
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implications of an extant political culture that does not meet lofty expectations of rational 
discourse and widespread participation.737 
 If public opinion studies are to help us understand the current moment, it is important 
to analyze how political concepts are arranged and dispersed through the evocative use of 
political symbols and ‘classification schemes.’  Related to the issue of how ideologies 
propagate and proliferate is the structuring of political discourse, in which implicit cultural 
ideas or tenets are anchored by ‘key signifiers’ with which audiences or subjects are meant to 
identify.  This represents the basic issue of rhetoric in politics.  Our standard definition of 
rhetoric comes from Aristotle, who suggests that rhetoric might be thought of as the art of 
persuasion, or “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion.”738  As described by Dryzek, rhetoric “facilitates the making and hearing of 
representative claims spanning subjects and audiences divided in their commitments and 
dispositions.”739  Related to the focus on ideological messaging above, rhetoric might also be 
thought of in terms of “outward-facing expressions, responses to events, defenses against 
attack and attempts to win the assent or consent of those not already thinking within the 
ideology in question.”740  Despite having an important place in the history of political theory, 
rhetoric has only recently enjoyed a renaissance in political science and communications 
theory.  
As should be familiar to any student of political theory, rhetoric has long been the 
subject of intense controversy.741  Plato is the prototypical opponent of rhetoric.  For him, it 
                                                             
737 As Wisniewski (2010, 101) pithily summarizes in a fashion reminiscent of Walter Lippmann, “the world is 
complicated, time is infinite, and the capacity of the human mind is limited.”  
738 Aristotle 1946, Book 1.2 
739 Dryzek 2010, 319. 
740 Finlayson 2012, 758. 
741 Given the wide scope of thinkers on rhetoric-from antiquity through the middle ages, Renaissance, 
modernity and up to the present- the alternative perspectives described here merely serve to indicate the polarity 
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represented everything that reason was not.  As Eberly put it, Plato put the ‘ick’ in rhetoric, 
and many of those who condemn ‘mere rhetoric’ today implicitly follow his belief that it 
works to obstruct truth in politics and in communication more generally.742  Common reasons 
for wariness towards rhetoric typically involve the suspicion that it involves the emotional 
manipulation of an audience’s mood, and therefore acts in a coercive fashion.  Linked to the 
problem of sophistry, rhetoric is also said to involve one-way, unilateral or monological 
communication that is antithetical to reflection or effective contestations of meaning.  It 
thereby represents an insidious form of persuasion, “one providing conviction without 
knowledge.”743  Kant shared Plato’s concern, arguing that oratory propagates “appealing 
illusions,” that violate rational agents’ autonomy.  Rhetoric is therefore the enemy of Kant’s 
notion of ‘publicity’ in which the use of public reason involves justification which in turn 
relies upon ‘reasonableness.’  Rhetoric allows for “deceiving by means of a beautiful 
illusion, rather than mere excellence of speech, is a dialectic that borrows from poetry only as 
much as the speaker needs in order to win over people’s minds for his own advantage before 
they can judge for themselves, and so makes their judgment unfree.”744  As I will discuss 
below, many democratic theorists (deliberativists in particular) continue to follow Kant in 
adopting a version of rationalism that opposes rhetoric as a source of communicative 
distortion and manipulation. 
  Despite its traditionally polemical status, there have been a number of classical 
theorists who entertain a more nuanced and even positive regard for the political role of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
of attitudes towards rhetoric.  For example, I will not discuss the role of Italian humanists (e.g. Machiavelli and 
the Tacitists) in adapting Greek and Roman thinking on rhetoric, Hobbes’ theory of political discourse, Locke’s 
ideas on argumentation and public reason, Hume’s concerns about eloquence, faction and fanaticism, or the 
authoritative ability of Rousseau’s legislator to ‘persuade without convincing’, as important as these thinkers 
and their contributions may be. 
742 Eberly 2003, 47. 
743 Plato 1987, 454e. 
744 Kant 1987, 197. 
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rhetoric.  Mentioned above, Aristotle counterposed Plato in his sensitivity to the varied styles 
and purposes of speech.  In his account, rhetoric involves persuasion in a variety of forms: 
ethos (the virtue or credibility of the speaker), pathos (emotion or frame of mind), and logos 
(argument or proof).745  The intent of the persuader is to appear credible, which involves 
prerequisites like competence, good intention and empathy.  It involves self-portrayal in a 
performance drawing upon both nonverbal (gestures, facial expressions, body language) and 
paraverbal factors (e.g. tone, pitch).  The speaker seeks to put the audience into an 
appropriate emotional state, tapping into anger, pity, fear and other provocative passions.  
This involves familiarity with the audience and its values and belief systems.  It also makes 
important techniques and presentation styles (e.g. storytelling, lecturing) in relation to evoked 
emotions.  Finally, the successful persuader presents arguments which at least appear to be 
sound or valid to the audience.  This is to say, content matters insofar as it lends itself to 
suitable interpretations.746  Aristotle therefore adopts a public reason can take on a greater 
diversity of rhetorical forms and be reconciled with both the passions and practical judgment 
(phronesis) of individual citizens.747   
Cicero also had a keen understanding of rhetoric in politics, both in terms of its 
technicalities and codification (e.g. in De inventione) as well as its indispensability for good 
rulership in general (in De oratore).  The ideal orator, for Cicero, would evince a persona 
which reflected “the subtlety of a logician, the thoughts of a philosopher, a diction almost 
                                                             
745 Aristotle 1356a 2,3. 
746 Ibid. 
747  Speech can be divided into its composite parts and functions, but it is also significant that for Aristotle 
discourse takes on different functions according to institutional setting.  For example, as the two main locations 
of rhetorical activity in Athens, courts (dikasteria) and the assembly (boule) encouraged different argumentative 
modes of persuasion (mainly by virtue of their retrospective and prospective concerns, and divergent goals of 
justice and advantage).  It is therefore plausible to classify rhetoric into three types: forensic (legal), deliberative 
(political) and epideictic (ceremonial); and to posit a link between the internal and external ends of rhetoric.  
See Garsten 2006, 2011; Finlayson 2012; Yack 2006; Rorty 1996; Garver 1994; Nichols 1987. 
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poetic, a lawyer’s memory, a tragedian’s voice, and the bearing of the most consummate 
actor.”748  Furthermore, the ideal politician was vir bonus decendi peritus—the good man, 
speaking well.749  The second condition is not mere ornamental dressing, but instead is 
crucial for the flourishing of free nations.  It also points to the pragmatic realization that, in 
governing complex societies, orators and political persuaders are required to balance 
competing goods and to adjust their performance according to circumstance.  In De 
inventione, Cicero ranks three necessities in order of importance: the necessity of doing what 
is “honorable,” the necessity of “security,” and the necessity of “convenience.”  The techne 
of political leadership sometimes requires us to weigh these necessities against one another, 
to determine when the exigencies of the situation mandate a shift in priorities.  It is thus 
prudent to sometimes adapt ethics to circumstance. 
 
There are then certain matters that must be considered with reference to time and 
intention and not merely by their absolute qualities.  In all these matters one must 
think what the occasion demands and what is worthy of the persons concerned, 
and one must consider not what is being done but with what spirit anything is 
done, with what associates, at what time, and how long it has been going on.750 
 
 
Against the criticisms of Platonists and Kantians, however, Cicero also maintains that 
adaptability does not directly conflict with core rhetorical values, such as the republican 
interest of discovering or forging a ‘common good.’  For classical rhetoricians, propriety 
extends beyond speech into the realm of action.  Nevertheless, as with Aristotle, the practice 
of oration differs from other modes of conversation by virtue of its political essence.  The 
task of the rhetorician is to abide by the ‘sense of the community’ and to respect the 
                                                             
748 Cicero 1976, xxviii. 
749 The phrase is attributed to Quintillian, a brilliant theorist of rhetoric in his own right, but was first articulated 
by Cicero hundreds of years before. 
750 Cicero 1949, 2.58.173-6.  For more on Cicero’s ideas on rhetoric, see Gronbeck 2004; Remer 2000. 
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audience’s capacity for practical judgment, while also guarding against the vulgarity of 
‘common opinion’ and discerning the appropriateness or fit of argumentation to circumstance 
(including both audience and occasion).   
 The nuances of rhetoric and its role in politics have remained a controversial matter 
for scholars across disciplines.  Until recently, the suggestion that rhetoric represents an 
important part of political communication and representation did not receive much support or 
attract empirical testing.  In their role in the revival, Bryan Garsten and Bernard Yack have 
argued that an appreciation for rhetorical politics carries significant potential to reorient, if 
not resolve, many key conceptual quandaries in democratic theory.751  In imagining how we 
might ‘save persuasion,’ Garsten adopts an Aristotelian understanding of rhetoric as speech 
‘designed to persuade.’  He argues that while rhetoric was important to Greek and Roman 
society—representing a fundamental part of civic education and the political experience—its 
darker aspects have given way to the conventional wisdom that rhetoric is inextricably linked 
to a set of twin dangers.  First, political elites who attempt to persuade often end up 
manipulating their audiences.  This suggests a perverted, top-down relationship in which the 
people is never actually sovereign, but blindly follows the leadership of smooth-talkers ruling 
through charisma and cunning.  Second, rhetoric is linked to pandering, which is associated 
with a type of populism in which the ignorant and many direct (at least formally) the actions 
of their delegates.  As Garsten argues, these alternatives are indicative of the ‘dual character’ 
of persuasion itself and identify a central characteristic of democracy as ruling and being 
ruled in turn. 
                                                             
751 See also Abizadeh 2001, 2002, 2007; Martel 2004; Nieuwenberg 2004; Pnagia 2003, 2004; Scherer 2007; 
Shanks 2010; Smith 2008; Urbinati 2010. 
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 Acknowledging that rhetoric can be used to the detriment of democratic politics, 
Garsten focuses much of his energy pointing to its value as “the currency of the democratic 
realm.”752  His central claim is that “the politics of persuasion—in which people try to 
change one another’s minds by appealing not only to reason but also to passions and 
sometimes even to prejudices—is a mode of politics worth defending.”753   He argues that a 
return to rhetoric is important particularly for those who detect a democratic deficit in 
contemporary politics—deliberative democrats in particular.  Conducting an overview of 
political thought from the Greeks, Romans and modern European contract theorists, he shows 
that the dominant suspicion of rhetoric arose side-by-side with a ‘crisis of confidence’ in 
citizens’ capacity to exercise judgment and deliberate.  He also demonstrates the important 
linkage between a wariness of rhetoric and fear of the masses more generally, symptomized 
by the specter of mass society in 20th century America.  Nevertheless, he submits that 
persuasion is invaluable as a mode of engagement in that it requires us to “engage with others 
wherever they stand and to begin our argument there,” as opposed to expecting them to 
conform to some expectation of ‘reasonableness.’754  Ironically enough, by refusing to appeal 
to people as they are—opinionated, self-interested, sentimental, partial to friends and family, 
and often-times unreasonable755—the avoidance of rhetoric may result itself in new and 
potentially more dogmatic forms of rhetoric; e.g. rhetorics of representation, prophetic 
nationalism, and public reason.756 
                                                             
752 Garsten 2006, 2. 
753 Ibid., 3 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid., 4. 
756 Ibid., 175.  Yack (2006, 417) notes that the idea of ‘public reason’ in deliberative theory has no equivalent in 
Aristotle’s ideas on deliberation.  As he writes, “Public reason in these models is a constrained reason, a form of 
deliberation that sharply limits both the form and substance of political argument to facilitate cooperation 
among free and equal individuals.  Aristotelian public reasoning, in contrast, lacks such constraints.” 
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 Garsten examines deliberativists’ treatment of rhetoric and argues that, despite their 
supposed interest in plural modes of discourse, many have tended to neglect the roles of 
partiality and emotion in practical reasoning.757  Despite their interest in disagreement and 
respectful conflict, Garsten argues that many deliberativists remain “within the grip of the 
campaign against controversy and the art of controversy.”758  He instead offers a theory of 
rhetorical deliberation which he takes to reflect truer and more thoroughgoing respect for 
citizens’ capacity for judgment.  This alternative deemphasizes typical deliberative values, 
such as “impartiality, publicity, and respect for autonomy,” and instead privileges 
“deliberative partiality, privacy, and respect for judgment and opinion.”759  This move is 
consistent with Stanley Fish’s’ critique of the rationalism in deliberative theory.  Fish 
suggests that ‘mutual respect,’ a dominant deliberative value, actually promotes a politics of 
exclusion in which many positions and types of communication are ruled out from the 
start.760  This critique builds on Iris Marion Young’s earlier argument that, in setting out from 
Enlightenment ideals of reason and structured conversational procedures, deliberation rules 
out valuable types of discourse such as greeting, storytelling, and rhetoric.761  The latter 
reflect indispensable cultural differences and modes of expression which should be 
incorporated if inclusion is truly integral to deliberation.  Discussed in the third chapter, 
Mansbridge has pushed for attention to ‘everyday talk’ in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
overly-rationalized deliberative models.762  More recently, John O’Neill has situated 
deliberative democracy as founded in and reliant upon enlightenment (Kantian) values.  He 
                                                             
757 Rawlsian accounts of public reason are indicative of the “rationalistic turn,”, and so also suffer from the 
shortcomings of narrow definitions. 
758 Ibid., 191.  Such theorists include Benhabib 1994, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; and Cohen 1997. 
759 Ibid., 176. 
760 Fish 1999. 
761 Young 1996. 
762 Mansbridge 1999. 
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argues that models which understand deliberation in “purely intellectual terms as the 
exchange of arguments” are bound to founder insofar as they neglect the role of rhetoric in 
politics.763  Arash Abizadeh has also forcefully argued that the philosophy/rhetoric binary 
(i.e. the privileging of pure and freely-exercised reason threatens to render it “motivationally 
impotent” and therefore inept for achieving social integration.764 
Eminent members of the deliberative camp, such as Simone Chambers, and John 
Dryzek, have recently attempted to incorporate these insights and criticisms into modified 
models of democratic deliberation.765  As described earlier, Chambers argues that the second 
wave of deliberation studies threatened to dislocate deliberation from the mass-scale in 
focusing on insulated minipublics.  She recognizes the antipathy often shown towards 
rhetoric motivates this withdrawal, and argues that there is a way to embrace rhetoric without 
thereby surrendering to the dominance of nondeliberative forces.  It is for this reason that she 
poses ‘deliberative rhetoric’ against ‘plebiscitary rhetoric.’  The former recognizes the 
importance of emotion and character in the legitimate process of persuasion, but also respects 
the capacity for practical judgment between participants placed in dynamic relationships.  
What is important is that rhetoric retains its dialogical character, and avoids the monological 
traits which lead to plebisitarian politics.  For Chambers, plebiscitary rhetoric refers to 
speech that is primarily concerned with “gaining support for a proposition, and only 
secondarily with the merits of the arguments or persuasion for that matter.”766  She describes 
several symptoms of plebiscitary politics that are unmistakably familiar: 
 
                                                             
763 O’Neill 2002, 268. 
764 Abizadeh 2007, 445.   
765 See also Rehg 1997. 
766 Chambers 2009, 15. 
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Plebiscitary rhetoric reigns with campaigns are vapid and vacuous, when voters 
are given no information, when the press only covers strategy and never policy, 
when politicians say anything to get elected, and finally and most importantly, 
when the audience, that is citizens, remains passive.767 
 
 
Chambers argues that the dual threats described above, pandering and manipulation (via 
“crafted talk” or priming) represent the two ends of a plebiscitary spectrum in which there is 
a lacking deliberative relationship between the speaker and the audience.768  Studies which 
find the use of public opinion data is used for shaping rather than passively responding to the 
public mood suggest the importance of deliberative counterweights in an otherwise dominant 
plebiscitary culture.  For Chambers, this fusion of deliberation and rhetoric should encourage 
a more critical view of ethos (the speaker’s character), the enhancement and multiplication of 
citizen-citizen encounters, a less reactive, profit-seeking media culture, and the 
deliberatization of procedures, rules, and institutions (e.g. referenda and ballot initiatives, 
more informed and transparent presentation of polling data).769 
 John Dryzek heeds Chambers rallying-call and takes up the rehabilitation of rhetoric.  
He himself pushes for an adjustment of deliberative models so as to appreciate rhetoric’s dual 
potential to “enable effective communication between differently situated actors” and to 
“both establish and maintain deliberative systems.”770  What I take to be interesting in 
Dryzek’s proposal is that there is a way in which we can “evaluate rhetoric” so as to discern 
its nature as either deliberative or plebiscitary.  Following Chambers, the former is supposed 
to encourage thought and reflection, enlarge perspectives, and provide information in the 
cultivation of knowledge.  The ephemeral performance of rhetoric complicates this type of 
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769 Chambers 2009, 19-21. 
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evaluation, however, as actors have indeterminate political incentives and draw upon various 
communicative repertoires depending on the situation at hand.  Furthermore, Dryzek 
acknowledges that political performance often takes on a dramaturgical appearance before 
diverse audiences.771  Categorical tests, such as those which distinguish ‘bridging’ and 
‘bonding’ types of rhetoric, are not always useful or appropriate for distinguishing ‘safe’ or 
‘dangerous’ modes of communication.772  Nonetheless, Dryzek argues that it can be possible 
to evaluate rhetoric, not just after the fact, but in the interest of constructing an “effective 
deliberative system joining competent and reflective actors on the issue at hand.”773   
 Garsten, who once argued the compatibility of deliberative practice with forms of 
rhetoric now seems less than optimistic that it will prove possible to keep the more 
‘dangerous’ elements of rhetoric at bay.  For example, he notes that an Aristotelian role for 
rhetoric was structured according to institutional venues and the activities appropriate to 
them.  A key problem is that whereas the Greek audience participated in the activity of 
ruling—in reaching verdicts of guilt or innocence, choosing punishments, or selecting 
policies—the relatively small proportion of modern citizens who vote today do not 
participate in the activity of rule, but merely judge the rulers from where they sit (socially 
speaking).  Their thinking or logic, therefore, is not structured by criteria appropriate to those 
activities of rule.  As such, it is no accident that campaign rhetoric has come to bear a close 
resemblance to advertising.  The latter aims to close the sale, just as campaigns aim for the 
vote, so that the “external end dominates in each case.”774  Insofar as political campaigns 
resemble market competitions for votes, “they will be indifferent to the distinctive internal 
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ends of argumentative rhetoric and therefore, in practice, they will tend to encourage the 
easier and apparently more efficient plebiscitary sort of rhetoric.”775  When political 
discussions do occur, they often revolve around the choice of a figurehead, rather than the 
selection of ends or policies to be pursued.   
 Now it is no revelation that campaign and public-relations strategies have been 
dramatically transformed in the modern era—driven by marketization, the privatization of 
public arenas, changing organization, practices and technologies of public opinion and media 
research, among other important developments.776  The end result, as has often been 
mourned, is the rise of ‘consumer-citizens’ who bear a passive relation to the state.777 Garsten 
argues that we shouldn’t be surprised that our political culture does not encourage 
deliberative rhetoric, when the activities of ruling and being ruled are categorically separated.  
What we should focus on instead are the ways in which political structures over-determine 
the conditions of discourse.  The primary problem is not, therefore, the existence of a ‘mass 
public,’ the convolutions of our media culture, or the asymmetry between speakers and the 
audience.  Instead, he argues that the difficulty of encouraging deliberative rhetoric is linked 
to the gap between judging and ruling described above, itself a reflection of the structure of 
modern representative government.  As Garsten concludes, “the usual calls for media 
responsibility and civic education will only go so far in making our rhetoric more 
deliberative, and studies of deliberation will only go so far in helping us to understand and 
evaluate democratic rhetoric.”778   
                                                             
775 Garsten 2011, 176. 
776 Aune 1994 notes other effects of commercial society’s boom, such as the fragmentation of traditional 
communities, a dominant culture of individualism, and the tenuous relations between different spheres of life all 
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778 Garsten 2011, 177. 
 254 
It is my suggestion that the urge to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ rhetoric is a 
product of what is perhaps deliberation’s largest stumbling-block: its false division between 
strategic and communicative action.  Even while purportedly allowing that ‘pure’ 
communication is an unachievable ideal, deliberativists continue to pose insenserity and 
instrumentalism against deliberative communication.  Mentioned above, Abizadeh makes a 
powerful argument that the theory of deliberation, inextricably rooted in Habermas’ socio-
political theory of discourse, relies upon a reiteration of certain binaries, e.g. between reason 
and passion, the abstract and concrete/practical, and the universal and particular.  This 
encourages an aversion to rhetoric and elite persuasion generally as violations of citizens’ 
exercise of reason in the public sphere.  Abizadeh alleges that thinking in dichotomous 
terms—a traditional albatross for fruitful theory—has in this case resulted in frustration for 
deliberativists attempting to reconcile social integration, political rule, and individual 
freedom.779  Abizadeh describes the depth of the problem as follows: 
 
The central axis of Habermas’ social theory is the distinction between strategic 
action and communicative action. Indeed, the distinction is central not just to 
Habermas’ social theory, but to his political theory as well: it provides the basis 
for Habermas’ answer to the central modernist dilemma of how to reconcile social 
integration and political rule with freedom. For Habermas, political legitimacy 
can be secured only in a society with a particular social, legal and political 
system, one in which citizen freedom is secured by grounding the political 
exercise of power in a communicative rationality which holds at bay the 
arbitrariness of naked exercises of power.780 
 
 
Discourse for Habermas is driven by the motive of reaching understanding through the 
rational, intersubjective examination of validity claims.  It is therefore categorically distinct 
                                                             
779 Abizadeh 2007, 445. 
780 Ibid., 450.  For more on the problems posed by the division between strategic and communicative action, see 
White 1987; Johnson 1991, 1993; Flynn 2004; Disch 2011, 2012; Mansbridge et. al. 2010, 2012; Steiner 2012; 
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from strategic uses of language, such as negotiating or bargaining, that are accompanied by 
“antecedently given goals, interests and power asymmetries external to the speech 
situation.”781  The problem, however, comes with the supposition that the power of reason 
can rationally motivate the agreement of her interlocutors through the provision of warranted 
claims without regularly engaging the passions through strategic means.782  Abizadeh argues 
that even in his later works, Habermas subordinates persuasion to reason by “eliminating the 
former’s rhetorical force.”  Because of this, Habermas is unable to provide an account of how 
practical discourse itself motivates action.  Recourse to legal validity is simply insufficient 
for resolving the deeper problems created within the parameters of the “philosophy/rhetoric 
binaries.”783  In this sense, the tension between ‘facts and norms’— facticity and validity—
persists so long as rhetoric is not recognized as a condition for discourse.784  Returning to the 
foregoing conversation, rhetoric and the art of persuasion might well be indispensable for 
effective discourse and the attempt to reach understanding, even as actors pursue strategic 
and conflicting ends.785   
Given that strategic and communicative acts are both types of social action, the 
tendency to scorn one and privilege the other is a dubious move, both conceptually and 
politically.  The onus is on deliberativists to demonstrate the insufficiency of strategic or 
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instrumental understandings of politics, and to move beyond an assumed ‘telos of 
consent.’786  Especially given challenges with the reconstruction of social integration, it is 
pertinent to consider how strategy is employed not only out of self-interest, but in the 
struggle—within and between groups—for recognition, inclusion, and efficacy in the 
political process.  This also problematizes the association of strategic action with force or 
influence, and the assumed connection between communication and consent.  The foregoing 
discussion of rhetoric is particularly relevant if we are to critically examine Habermas’ 
central belief that communication involves the provision of ‘warranties,’ and that participants 
implicitly guarantee to redeem validity claims as a reflection of ordinary rules of 
communication.  If convincing and persuading are often oriented toward success and not just 
understanding, this highlights the important variability in how language is deployed—
particularly in the realm of politics.  At the very least, deliberative theory cannot advance 
without addressing the stale binaries that stymie conceptual clarification.787 
  
 
Spectacular Politics: Power, Acclamation, and a Dearth of Deliberation 
 
The blurred boundaries between strategic and communicative action, if not their outright 
collapse, undermines the idea that the public sphere—and its discursive processes embedded 
in social structures—is governed by an untainted logic.  Drawing upon debates on 
polarization, populism, and rhetoric,  I’ve attempted to make the case that the symptoms of 
mass politics taken together signal a political culture more appropriately characterized as 
plebiscitary than deliberative; a reflection of the public’s quasi-sovereign status.  Those few 
                                                             
786 White 1987, 26; Johnson 1991, 191. 
787 Johnson (1991, 195) similarly exhorts critical theorists to address themselves to two crucial tasks.  “They 
must explicate more fully the coordinating force of communicative action.  And they must elaborate a typology 
of rational action that adequately incorporates strategic action.” 
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symbolic interactions that occur today between the average citizen and various 
representatives of the state are most always acclamatory, and hardly resemble the type of 
critical interactivity for which Habermas hopes, or at least once hoped.  As described by 
Agamben, acclamation can be understood in its classical form as a “public rite with both oral 
and gestural performative elements.  It is an exclamation of praise, triumph, or disapproval 
accompanied by the waiving of flags or handkerchiefs, applause, or the raising of hands.”788  
It can serve in a juridical role as the expression of popular consensus, and various forms of 
‘voicing’ may serve to express collective (dis)approbation.  As Mauss and Fauconnet argue, 
we might conceive of acclamation as type of social institution, or “a grouping of acts and 
ideas already instituted which individuals find before them and which more or less imposes 
upon them.”789  Acclamation does not require its participants to be deeply-reflective on the 
meaning of the ceremony, to believe in the cause which is being acclaimed, or to be 
emotionally invested in order to participate in ritualistic expression.  This collective 
engagement often expresses a collective affect rather than serving to convey individualized 
or private feelings, i.e. “the meaning does not depend on the reflexivity or degree of 
internalization of any participant in particular.”790  It should be immediately obvious that this 
is antithetical to the expectations of most all deliberativists who privilege discussion and 
critical reflection as key aspects of citizenship. 
 Notwithstanding his persistent promotion of public discourse, Habermas is no 
stranger to the realities of representative publicity and the dangers posed to a fleetingly-
critical public sphere. 
                                                             
788 Agamben 2011, 168-9.  See Mitchell Dean (2010, chapter 8) for more on his idea of acclaim in relation to 
glory. 
789 Mauss and Fauconnet 2005, 10. 
790 Mariot 2011, 210. 
 258 
 
The public sphere has become more an arena for advertising than a setting for 
rational-critical debate.  Legislators stage displays for constituents.  Special-
interest organizations use publicity work to increase the prestige of their own 
positions, without making the topics to which those positions refer subjects of 
genuine public debate.  The media are used to create occasions for consumers to 
identify with the public positions or persona of others.  All this amounts to the 
return of a version of representative publicity, to which the public responds by 
acclamation, or the withholding of acclamation, rather than critical discourse.791 
 
 
While Carl Schmitt’s account of public opinion as the “modern type of acclamation” was 
limited by his insistence that it is singularly-constitutive for democracy, his controversial 
reflections nonetheless inspired Habermas’ attempt to reconstruct public opinion’s role in 
modern representative democracies.792  For Habermas, the ‘colonization’ achieved through 
the machinations of impersonal forces (economic and political) against social actors 
represents perhaps the greatest threat to a legitimate constitutional order.  Motivations 
conforming to the logic and needs of the system continue to encourage prescribed 
(plebiscitary) modes of political activity, and as a result the communicative power of the 
public continues to be forfeited to the dominant regime.   
Mitchell Dean picks up on important changes in mass culture industries that continue to 
perturb Habermas, and argues that increasingly sophisticated media technologies and 
techniques have made acclamation even more relevant for studying the evolving functions of 
public opinion vis-à-vis the state.   
 
If we allow that public opinion has been and continues to be shaped by the mass 
media, and the public relations and propaganda apparatus that has grown up in 
relation to it, then we have a clearer specification of the modern liberal-
                                                             
791 Calhoun 1992, 26, 275.  Kellner (2000, 265) echoes this description, "[For Habermas] the interconnection 
between a sphere of public debate and individual participation has been fractured and transmuted into that of a 
realm of political information and spectacle, in which citizen-consumers ingest and absorb passively 
entertainment and information.” 
792 Schmitt 1923, 1928, 275. 
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democratic public sphere as one no longer dependent on the direct presence of an 
acclaiming people but on the more diffuse and invisible presence of the people 
(whether as demos or ochlos) in this domain of public opinion—with all its 
attendant manipulations, suppressions and exclusions. Public opinion is thus not 
simply the outcome of rational and open discussion, but exists, at least partially, 
as a second form of political acclamation.793 
 
 
In an important sense, the achieved ubiquity of the web—and social media in particular—has 
effectively made most proceedings public.  This must be distinguished, however, from 
evaluations of the functioning of the public sphere (Öffentilichkeit).  To make proceedings 
public (Publizität) describes the degree of public effect generated by a public act.  As 
Habermas stipulates, “a situation can arise in which the form of public opinion making is 
maintained, while the substance of the public sphere has long ago been undermined.”794  This 
has direct bearing on the increasingly-public role that opinion polling plays, not to mention 
the novel uses of big-data, social media, the real-time recording and reporting of what is 
‘trending,’ and other contrivances which attempt to measure shifts in public moods. 
 The parallel increases in publicity and the liquefaction of the public sphere, as 
described by Habermas, points to the irony that defines neo-mass politics and inhibits the 
broad realization of deliberative practice.  Baudrillard captures the compound feeling of 
dislocation, alienation and anomie that is exacerbated, rather than abated, by publicity 
implements such as the opinion poll.795  As he argues, the information that these apparatuses 
provide is largely imaginary and exists only on the basis of a widespread “disappearance” of 
political subjects from the public space.  This exodus results in a scenario in which “the 
                                                             
793 Dean 2016, 9. 
794 Habermas 1974, 55. 
795 Likewise present in Benjamin’s (1999, 26) description of the modernity as the “the world dominated by 
phantasmagorias”, i.e. distractions of pleasure, image and illusion.  Debord’s Society of the Spectacle is also a 
poignant description of modern conditions of production promoting the “immense accumulation of spectacles.” 
Debord (1995 12, 22)   observes that “spectators are linked only by a one-way relationship to the very center 
that maintains their isolation from one another.”  
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masses have no opinion and information does not inform them.  Both of them, lacking a 
scene where the meaning of the social can be enacted, continue to feed one another 
monstrously—as the speed with which information revolves increases continually the weight 
of the masses as such, and not their self-awareness.”796  Given this state of affairs, it should 
be unsurprising that the multitude engages with the state in a largely acclamatory fashion, as 
it is overwhelmed by an excess of information (even treating that information as 
entertainment) and accustomed to its passivity.  As such, private individuals may well be 
rational in preferring to maintain their roles as spectators, removed from participating in the 
theatrics of the political stage.797 
 Given these general observations, it may well seem that “the logic of the spectacle 
has colonized public space so completely that it becomes difficult to even imagine an 
alternative.”798  It also points to the commonplace naiveté of proponents of deliberation (and 
other active/strong models of democracy) who beg the importance of the people’s voice and 
the urge the removal of barriers that keep it from being heard.  This same criticism applies to 
deliberative systematists, who maintain the hope that a functional deliberative system can 
leveraged in pursuit of institutional transparency and democratic accountability.  Jeffrey 
Green has recently sparked no small controversy in advocating that theorists and empiricists 
alike should turn away from classical or ‘folk’ models of democracy that are almost always 
apocryphal and in stark contrast with political experience.  Instead of focusing on political 
                                                             
796 Baudrillard 1988, 211. 
797 The paradox is also captured in Jodi Dean (2002, 4), where she considers the ‘impasse’ in an ideal of 
publicity that works “simultaneously to encode democratic practice and market global technoculture: precisely 
those technologies that materialize a promise of full political access and inclusion drive an economic formation 
whose brutalities render democracy worthless for the majority of people.”  
798 Kohn 2008, 480. 
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‘voice,’ he proposes an ocular or visual account of democratic accountability, one much 
more sensitive to a political culture marked by spectacle and consumption.  He writes, 
 
The vast majority of our political experience, whether voter or nonvoter, is not 
spent engaged in action and decision making, but rather watching and listening to 
others who are themselves entirely engaged.  Such spectatorship is inscribed in 
the very nature of political action itself…most citizens most of the time are not 
decision makers, relating to politics with their voices, but spectators who relate to 
politics with their eyes.799 
 
 
Given that most all signs point to the fact that our politics are, and have long been, best-
described as a type of plebiscitary democracy, this suggests the comparative advantage of a 
theoretical perspective attuned to and respectful of the ways most ordinary people experience 
politics.  As such, it can better account for the realities of passivity and inequality and 
deemphasize lofty ideals such as autonomous, uncontaminated discourse, pluralist equilibria, 
or politically-responsive representation.800  Shifting from a vocal to an ocular conception of 
publicity suggests the suitability of a principle of ‘candor’ in which leaders are held publicly 
accountable to appear—in situations they do not control—before the gaze of the public eye 
and to perform, joining actions to words.801   
 People under plebiscitary democracy can still be understood to control “the means of 
publicity,” though this need not entail an understanding of popular sovereignty as self-
legislation or bound up with decision-making.802  As such, this reconfiguration uncouples 
democratic rule from any notion of popular will as some dynamic of voice, therefore 
rendering citizens’ preferences and opinions largely irrelevant.  Instead, plebiscitary rule is 
                                                             
799 Green 2010, 4. 
800 Ibid., 6-7. 
801 Ibid., 22. 
802 Ibid., 14. 
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the “rule of a principle: specifically the principle of candor.”803  A political culture centered 
on candor would be resistant to the demagogic use of rhetoric on the part of elites who 
attempt to speak up for mystical entities, e.g. the People, and instead promotes making 
popular sovereignty “real, relevant, measurable, and safe.”804  It does so by abandoning the 
pretense that citizens serve in a capacity to form opinions and provide direction on 
substantive issues, and instead understands the democratic functions of the spectacle itself as 
a performance that the audience can judge from their seats.805 
 Though Green attempts to salvage a type of monitorial role for the citizen through his 
principle of candor and emphasis on the critical ‘gaze’ of the public, it is important to note 
that this problematically relies upon a personalistic and dyadic relationship between the actor 
and audience. The common oversight shared by Green and the system deliberativists is that 
both the vocal and ocular potentials to constrain or motivate elite actions seem to presume 
the achievability of some clear-cut distinction or boundary between communicative and 
strategic action.806   Both presume that the masses can, in some sense, ‘recognize’ corruption, 
dissemblance, or selfish motivations in the performance of actors working within the system 
                                                             
803 Ibid., 207. 
804 Ibid., 210. 
805 He argues that this plebiscitary perspective also carries the potential to “burden and disrupt” rather than 
“ignore, celebrate, or otherwise simply condone” elitism in democratic society in ways that deliberative models 
cannot.  This entails a radical shift in how we think about the performance of our leaders: “For the plebian, 
whose very second-class civic status reflects the imperfection of any given liberal-democratic regime, the 
commitment to the public burdening of a society’s most powerful citizens stems from a non-legislative but still 
legitimate need for public performances that recognize, in a spirit of repentance, that something other than the 
full-realization of free and equal citizenship is being practiced in contemporary mass liberal-democratic 
regimes.” See Green 2013 427, 430 
806 Fitzgerald (2015, 311) pushes Green on his ocular model and its ability to redeem a significant role for 
democratic bystanders.  He concludes, “Green may well be correct to insist that it is time that everyday 
spectators were taken more seriously as a component of political life. This is particularly so if politics is to be 
considered as theater, because spectators are a constitutive component of theater. However, he does not press 
the implications of his use of the metaphor and this leads not just to the contradictions noted in his model but to 
a failure to consider his own position as a spectator.” 
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and react accordingly in an effective manner.807  I would argue that Habermas today has a 
comparatively greater appreciation of the fact of the public’s removal from the sites of 
decision-making.  The question of whether processes are legitimate or “more or less 
concealed games of power” seems wide open once we’ve abandoned the pretenses of a folk 
theory of democracy.808  This holds whether we are to observe singular performances—in 
order to judiciously applaud, censure, or shame the actors—or if we are analyzing such 
performances collectively to determine the overall (non)deliberative character of the system. 
 This is the crux of the issue: if adapted modes of citizenship—including the 
deliberative model—are to retain a critical function vis-à-vis the state, this seems to require a 
citizenry that enjoys a significant degree of autonomy and aptitude for politics, not to 
mention access to institutional channels through which it can signal its assent, dissent, or 
ambivalence on the issues at hand.  Democratic theorists and empiricists alike continue to 
hold out hope for some substantial role for the hoi polloi in contemporary politics.  Whether 
in forms rationalistic or expressive, in deliberative fora or via social movements, through 
face-to-face or virtual encounters, many seem to believe that the general public ‘matters’ 
politically and that a more robust democratic era is coming.  This reading seems to neglect 
the upshot of accumulated  and well-demonstrated evidence indicating that the inclined 
citizen can do little more than passively observe the operations of the state—at least those 
permitting her access—and engage in intermittent and largely-symbolic ceremonies that 
confer political power to elite insiders.809  Contra worries from the past century, this is not 
                                                             
807 It seems only a matter of time until someone proposes an ‘olfactory’ model of citizenship: even if we cannot 
clearly see, hear or vocally respond to political insiders, we can ‘follow our noses’ and vigilantly remain alert to 
politically-fishy behavior. 
808 Habermas 1996, 375. 
809 While I do not find his terminology of ‘fairness’ to be very helpful, Green in his most recent book reiterates 
reasons for rejecting a “sunny” view of the present liberal-democratic regime.  “Three elements—the 
differentiation within political life between a select cadre of leaders and a great many with no expectation (let 
 264 
because the state unilaterally disseminates propaganda and manipulates an ignorant and 
lethargic mass.  The reality of how power is currently exercised is much subtler, frustrating 
academic and journalistic attempts to identify its sources and check its operations.810  As I’ve 
argued, this point is demonstrated by Trump’s success and the parallel failures of political 
scientists to anticipate how our political context made his reign possible. 
 Samuel Bagg discusses many of the difficulties that I am emphasizing here, pointing 
to the contributions of psychological, fiscal, communicative, and political factors that work 
against democratic efforts to ‘neutralize’ power.  He examines deliberativists’ attempts to 
identify potential sites of resistance in which motivated and mobilized citizens can identify, 
check, and weed out ineptitude or corruption in the service of reducing wider distortions in 
the political system.  He argues that proponents of deliberation collectively demonstrate a 
shortcoming, reflective of democratic theory more generally, in failing to maintain clearly-
defined norms and virtues that are to serve as evaluative cornerstones.  Echoing my criticism 
above, they presume that we will know something is politically ‘wrong’ when we somehow 
detect it, and that illegitimate uses of power will be found out and the transgressors 
jettisoned.  In line with the discussion of hegemony and ideology above, however, this 
underestimates power’s embeddedness in social and linguistic structures. 
 
Power corrupts, in other words, but not primarily by tempting citizens to pursue 
their selfish interests at the expense of the common good. Rather, power frustrates 
deliberative attempts to neutralise it by shifting our view of the common good 
itself; or, more subtly, by shaping the sorts of reasons that could count as valid 
considerations in the first place; or, more subtly still, by guiding our perception of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
alone possession) of formal political power, the profound unverifiability besetting determinations of 
representation, and the plutocratic incursion of socioeconomic status into the spheres of educational and 
political opportunity—constitute the most fundamental elements of the shadow of unfairness.”  Green 2016, 5 
810 As Lukes (1974) put it, “power is an essentially contested concept.”  This is the reason that Dean (2013, 2) 
urges students to “maintain a sense of the essential mystery of power as a set of concepts and practices, that 
power is not as obvious as we think it or as passé as some contemporary thinkers maintain.” 
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the deliberative norms of consistency, publicity, evidence, explicitness, and 
justification.811 
 
 
The power of the average citizen, or even the most politically-astute, is dramatically-
moderated from the start because the tools by which we are supposed to constrain or direct 
the political system are pre-given and reactive for the most part.  Without chastising the 
benevolent impulse behind their progressivism, I argue that those who continue to invoke 
civic capacity and engagement tend to either miss or ignore these important points.   
 As suggested by Achen and Bartels in their defense of realism, many scholars appear to 
persist in their schizophrenia, “recognizing the power of the critical arguments but hoping 
against hope that those arguments can somehow be discredited or evaded, allowing the 
lackluster reality of democratic practice to be squared with conventional idealistic democratic 
thinking.”812 Resembling the ‘mystical democrats’ that Lippmann chastised, these dreamers 
envision a robustly democratic political reality which has or will soon be reached if we can 
only overcome contingent deficits.813  Much of the weight is put on institutional remedies, 
such as rebooting civic education, restoring the integrity of mass media, effectively 
mobilizing the poor, revising campaigning or districting laws, or through good-old-fashioned 
moral exhortation in public settings.  I’ve argued that the current state of American politics—
symptomized by fragmentation, polarization, and inequality of various and intersecting 
                                                             
811 Bagg 2015, 12. 
812 Achen and Bartels 2012, 16.  Although the impulse behind this critique will be one that I echo, I agree with 
Medearis (2018, 160) that the authors here base their dismissal of democratic potentials too heavily on 
psychological ‘facts’ that undermine the capacity of the average voter to meaningfully participate.  This 
represents an inferior understanding of realism, in which emphasizing the “broadest features of human 
psychology may come at the expense of realism as to conflict, ideology, and power in society.” 
813 Kadlec and Friedman (2007, 22), for example, reflect on the difficulties of insurmountable power in the 
political system, but their rosy conclusion nevertheless smacks of this other-worldly flavor: “there exists an 
enormous range of possibilities for the advancement of meaningfully democratic practices and policies that may 
be realized simply for the price of improving our capacities and enlarging our opportunities for collaborative 
inquiry about common problems. Moreover, capitalizing on even a small number of these opportunities could 
well have unanticipated positive impacts on both the structures of governance and the democratic habits of 
citizens.” 
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types—belies the feasibility of these various strategies (at least taken individually) to effect 
deliberative or democratic transformation.  The odds, stacked as they are, seem to point 
against political optimism. Nevertheless, in the next chapter I argue that an appreciation for a 
‘realist’ understanding of politics does not entail inaction or a surrender of radically-
democratic aspirations.  Instead, it may well help in restoring the critical dimension of 
deliberative theory and revitalizing public opinion as a force to be reckoned with in its 
insurgent role vis-à-vis politics.   
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Chapter 6: The Quasi-Sovereign People:  The 
Realistic Outlook for Deliberative Democracy 
 
A natural response to the foregoing chapters, which describe various ways in which 
normative expectations of public opinion have been frustrated, is to demand suggestions for 
improved democratic implementation and reform.  I have intimated that categorical 
declarations of doom and gloom are inappropriate as an immediate response to this account 
of the trends of democratic politics, i.e. as spectacular, acclamatory, dramaturgical, and 
disproportionately responsive to economic-political interests.  Even if institutions domestic 
and international tend towards path dependency and resist popular inputs, I have suggested 
that democratic contingencies and the ineliminable social basis of politics give us a basis for 
maintaining democratic hopes.814  In this final chapter, I attempt a defense of this stubborn 
optimism and reflect upon the role that democratic theory can play when wedded to 
transformative social-democratic processes. 
 
 
What’s the Point of (Deliberative) Democratic Theory Today?   
 
In the previous chapter, Schattschneider served as a jumping off point for the discussion of 
party politics, polarization, and populism in contemporary politics.  His suggestion that 
managing the scope of conflict determines democratic outcomes seems to have been 
vindicated by recent political developments.  This is suggestive of the realist thread that 
shapes his view of American democracy as essentially conflict-driven.  The consistent depth 
                                                             
814 As Christopher Lasch (1991, 81) clarifies, hope should not be understood as the feeble belief that things will 
work out for us.  “Hope implies a deep-seated trust in life that appears absurd to those who lack it…The worst is 
always what the hopeful are prepared for.  Their trust in life would not be worth much if it had not survived 
disappointments in the past, while the knowledge that the future holds further disappointments demonstrates the 
continued need for hope…Improvidence, a blind faith that things will somehow work out for the best, furnishes 
a poor substitute for the disposition to see things through even when they don’t.” 
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and affective origins of political disagreement, widening political and economic inequalities, 
and the atrophy of democratic energies together raise the stakes for such power contests. 
 It is in light of such empirical realities that it can often be difficult to plead the case 
for studying political theory.  Charges of utopianism, hyper-abstraction, jargon-heaviness, 
otherworldliness, impracticality and plain irrelevance arise when encountering counterfactual 
visions of politics and democratic performance.  A general defense of the enterprise is, 
however, available:  even if principled expectations bear scant resemblance to what happens 
in the ‘real world,’ theory can provide us prescriptive or regulatory ideals against which we 
can measure practice.  Especially for the more dogged among us, the hypothetical picture of 
a better, fairer, or more liberated world motivates action in service of the ideal.  While we 
may not get there in our lifetime, political theory (particularly democratic theory) has a role 
to play in exposing the frailties of our prejudices, illuminating injustices, and encouraging the 
reimagination of political horizons by which we can more fully realize ourselves individually 
and collectively. 
Currently, the most influential variant of democratic theory is deliberative democracy.  
Deliberation offers us a picture of democratic politics that is citizen-centered.  Members of 
the public communicate their needs, preferences, and worldviews horizontally amongst 
themselves and vertically to the political system through a pluralized network of media 
channels. Public opinion operates reflexively in this understanding of democratic politics; i.e. 
the communicative paths of influence between the informal and formal spheres of political 
society are conducted in a circular and reiterative fashion.  Public discourses are highly 
influenced by intermediary institutions and power structures, but at the same time there is a 
necessary reliance of the system and its bureaucratic structures upon a comparatively organic 
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and public base—i.e. ordinary people.  Because of this public orientation, a critical streak is 
evident across otherwise diverse deliberative theories.  The public sphere, broader than and 
conceptually distinct from the state itself, requires for its sustenance a political culture in 
which the populace is willing and able to check excess, contribute to the consideration of 
matters of common concern, and ensure the accountability of those representatives acting on 
its behalf.  In this sense, civil society is indispensable as a buffer between immediate social 
groupings and the government.815  Following classical theorists of modern democracy (e.g. 
Tocqueville), many deliberativists hold civil associations and their empowerment vis-à-vis 
state politics to be the lifeblood of popular control.  Despite important differences in 
theoretical and applied modeling, the shared expectation is that a more deliberative political 
culture should entail a more legitimate politics.  Deliberation delivers by establishing an 
expectation that political results can be publicly defended to those affected with the support 
of defensible reasons.   
Despite this optimistic outlook, deliberative theorists continue to struggle in 
identifying the place of popular sovereignty in the modern state.  The shifts of emphasis 
between the second and third generations of deliberative theory reflect the difficulties of 
locating and organizing popular inputs across the system.816  Habermas has recently summed 
up the normative-empirical gap, imploring proponents to attend to the tough road ahead. 
 
Today political theories in the social contract tradition express an abstract 'ought' 
which clashes with sobering facts in our increasingly complex societies. This 
seems to be especially true of the deliberative model of democracy, which 
explicates the legitimacy conferring power of the democratic procedure in terms 
of the rational character of opinion and will formation. This model seems to 
                                                             
815 Cohen 1992. 
816 Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Fung 2003; Warren and Pearce 2008. 
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constitute a particularly drastic example of the ever-widening gap between 
normative and empirical approaches towards politics.817 
 
 
Deliberation takes as its starting point that politics in large scale liberal democracies are 
disproportionately determined by elitist, technocratic, and pecuniary/interest-based 
influences—but insists they need not be.  Proponents thus refuse to take oft-cited challenges, 
including “institutional incentives against deliberation, political-cultural barriers in the form 
of social norms, and psychological barriers of personal values or character traits,” to 
represent a defeat of the theory.818  Deliberativists counter skeptics and self-proclaimed 
‘realists’ that while prevailing trends are real and worrisome they reflect contingent facts of 
life that are remediable through social-cultural, economic, and political change.  The key 
questions are how deliberation is to be realized, and what it will look like in practice.  The 
broad consensus seems to be that it is not to supplant ordinary politics or existing institutions, 
but rather work as a supplement and operate in an imperfect partnership.  The challenge is 
integrating deliberative elements and practices with other features of the political system, 
including aggregative measures of public opinion like the poll and ballot, the claims of 
(un)elected officials, the perspectives of interest advocates seeking influence, and the 
pluralized universe of invested actors in civil society.819  
 Attempting to realize deliberation on the mass-scale carries risks.  As discussed in the 
third chapter, one troubling potential is that bringing deliberative elements into the system 
may require accommodations that effectively water it down to the point of normative 
irrelevance.  If we accept that unequal distributions and slipshod measures of deliberation in 
the system (however defined) are ‘good enough’ in functional terms, this endangers the core 
                                                             
817 Habermas 2009, 139. 
818 James 2015, 515. 
819 Karpowitz and Raphael 2014, 6. 
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of deliberative expectations as articulated by first generation theorists.  If deliberation is 
supposed to retain critical potential, diffusing and abstracting away from concrete practices 
may effectively ‘defang’ the theory.  Another related danger is the potential cooption of 
deliberative fora by dominant interests, whereby the premiums of transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy are ostensibly forfeited.  One could argue that quasi-
deliberation credited to the ill-defined ‘system’ is even more worrisome than ‘politics as 
usual’—providing a veneer of legitimacy without much any deliberation actually taking 
place.  Finally, even if these institutions are put into action, it might simply be the case that 
the cards are stacked against deliberation.  Scheuerman voices this worry in his discussion of 
how deliberative theory has tended to alienate itself from a materialist starting point; 
underestimating the resistance of power structures to popular inputs. 
 
Amid rising material inequality, or the manifest irrationalities of our crisis-ridden 
version of financialized capitalism, for example, it is hardly self-evident that new 
opportunities for improved participatory and deliberative oversight in the existing 
social welfare state—to the extent that it has yet to be dismantled!—will result in 
much more than a hodgepodge of institutional band-aids.820 
 
 
These points together endanger deliberation’s critical potential to highlight social ills, work 
on behalf of the disenfranchised and downtrodden, and hold the powers that be accountable.  
In the end, an unchecked willingness to make concessions to realize some minimal form of 
deliberation may well result in quiescence and the forfeiture of democratic and deliberative 
potentialities. 
 I submit that current mainstream interpretations of deliberative democracy are 
becoming increasingly estranged from the movement’s intellectual roots in critical theory.  
The charge of ‘social weightlessness’ is applicable to much current research on the theory 
                                                             
820 Scheuerman 2012, 835. 
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and practice of deliberative democracy.  Of serious concern is the detachment of political 
thought from its social conditions, a severance that effectively “empties it of much content 
and vitiates its relevance to the everyday practices that sustain and renew it.”821  
Consequently, deliberativists today demonstrate deep ambivalence towards the goals of 
empowerment, epistemic mobilization, and mass participation that were once central to the 
theory.  This results in a discontinuous gulf between the ideals of deliberative-democratic 
change, one the one hand, and the hard realities facing the people whom the transformative 
theory is supposed to benefit.  In neglecting the social conditions that would be necessary for 
cultivating democratic agency—assuming that we still aim to make people themselves and 
not only systemic processes more deliberative—many proponents appear to take for granted 
the existence of ‘ready-made political subjects.’822  If political legitimacy is supposed to be 
traced to the authorization of ordinary citizens, the recent trend of dislocating deliberative 
practice and loosening deliberative criteria merits serious reconsideration.   
 There is no shortage of symptoms indicating how far American politics are from 
being properly described as deliberative.  Political, cultural, and economic inequalities 
abound.  Antagonistic groups in civil society are increasingly being polarized by the system 
and its administrators, and in turn incentivize extremism and intransigence themselves by 
granting electoral and monetary support.  Toleration and the celebration of diversity run up 
against the disclosure of xenophobia, bigotry, misogyny, and generalized distrust.  Opposed 
members of conflicting publics tune in to their preferred media outlets—resulting in echo 
chambers and information silos—and dismiss the other side as untrustworthy and under the 
spell of ‘Fake News.’  The preferences of constituents and the voting behavior of 
                                                             
821 McNay 2014, 15. 
822 ibid., 17.  See Shapiro 2007. 
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policymakers continue to be misaligned, while the dynamics of partisanship allow the latter 
to enjoy the perks of incumbency that border electoral immortality.  The Washington 
machine continues to respond disproportionately to the influence of the affluent—as reflected 
in its legislative agenda—working to the detriment of those whose livelihood and survival 
depends on practical problem-solving. 
 In sum, deliberativists of various stripes and concentrations all too often tend to 
diminish the very real trends of oppression, inequality, and antipathy which shape American 
power politics.  They attempt to keep open the possibility of democratic revitalization, 
through implements like civic forums and co-governance institutions, as if these trends are 
mere aberrations to be remedied orthodoxically through familiar, convenient, and peaceful 
means.  This naiveté reflects an unwillingness to face the severity of legitimation crises 
facing liberal democracies, not least of all in the United States.823  Papadopoulos provides an 
especially poignant description of our position, in which “the declining role of parliamentary 
institutions, the uncoupling of the sphere of the political dramaturgy and the sphere of 
decision-making that operates under the influence of technocrats or of particular interests—
all of this makes prospects for the quality of democracy none too optimistic none too 
bright.”824  Without getting hysterical or yielding to fatalism, it is crucial to realize that the 
manifest crises facing democracy and inhibiting a more robust vision of deliberative politics 
are structurally-embedded and culturally-reproduced.  Attempts to mobilize or otherwise 
bolster popular control which are half-baked, overly-accommodating, or reliant upon 
                                                             
823 As Karpowitz and Raphael (2014, 8) note, “the contemporary state’s large scale, the growing complexity of 
the issues it must address, the increasing diversity of its peoples, and the rise of supra-national institutions and 
actors that challenge the state’s power to regulate economic and political activity which all raise questions about 
whether it can govern effectively and responsively.” 
824 Papadopoulos 2013, 242. 
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normalized procedural politics are therefore unlikely to transform the political landscape or 
deliver deliberative goods. 
In this final chapter, I suggest a way in which deliberation can attend to these realities 
without losing its critical purchase.  Controversially, I argue that Habermas is not as 
estranged from the realist tradition as many critics assume, despite his association with other 
exemplars of ‘high-liberalism’ like Rawls and Dworkin.  His take on ‘what is to be done?’ in 
considering deliberative, democratic potentials is itself recognized as a question belonging to 
“fact, practice, and politics, not one that lies beyond these in the very conditions of 
legitimacy.”825  Deliberativists can and should take realism’s demand for contextualism 
seriously—appreciating that modes of politics are historically determined and rejecting the 
attempt to universally apply first-order principles.  Deliberative and realistic political thought 
can both be read as attempting to address the first political question (posed by Hobbes) 
regarding “the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of 
cooperation.”826  Most importantly, both realistic and deliberative theory are centrally 
devoted to critique— i.e. uncovering the exercise of diverse types of power within and 
through social forms, and contesting representative claims made by authorities.  In general, 
being realistic and deliberating are both motivated by the idea that examining the tension 
between political facts and norms can bear emancipatory goods, cognitive and civic, for 
those who are vulnerable to political realities. 
In realism as in deliberative theory, there is a central role for discourse in the 
interpretation of real political situations and in judging the decisions made by political elites.  
Doing realistic theory and deliberating similarly involve the scrutiny of validity claims.  The 
                                                             
825 Williams 2005, 17. 
826 Ibid., 3-4. 
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ability to criticize these claims and say ‘no’ represents the normative fault line that “marks 
the finite freedom of persons who have to be convinced whenever sheer force is not supposed 
to intervene.”827  Rather than representing a free-floating ideal, understanding reached 
through discourse is sensitive to the context at hand.  Interlocutors draw upon inherited 
communicative resources—exercised informally in everyday settings—the efficacy of which 
depend on evolving political practices and legal paradigms.  Even the all-important 
democratic practice of “self-determination on the part of free and equal citizens” is 
historically-situated.  Thus, Habermas’ advice for theorizing sovereignty bears a distinctly 
realistic tone when he warns, “those involved must start with their own current practice if 
they want to achieve clarity about what such a practice means in general.”828  In this way, the 
value of collective political autonomy and the potential for its fuller realization are preserved 
even in the face of countervailing political realities.  This tension between facticity and 
validity is not accidental, but instead serves as the backdrop for democratic contestation.  
Realistic deliberative theory recognizes this tension as given in post-traditional, highly-
complex liberal-democratic societies, because “for us, who have developed our identity in 
such a form of life, it cannot be circumvented.”829 
 In what follows, I consider the realistic outlook for cultivating inclusive democratic 
practices and critically-deliberative citizenship.  Notwithstanding the difficulties facing these 
aspirations that I’ve already discussed, I argue democratic theory has an important role to 
play in reconsidering the political relationship of the many to the few.  I suggest that 
                                                             
827 Habermas 1996, 324. 
828 ibid., 387. 
829 ibid., 446.  Compare to Larmore’s (1996, 57) discussion of the historical context of morality.  He argues that 
norms and their consideration for those in the West (in liberal-democratic states) yield liberal answers to the 
modern problem of ‘reasonable disagreement.’  These liberal answers emphasize ‘rational dialogue’ and ‘equal 
respect.’  The source of these norms’ authority is that they are quite simply central to “our form of life.” While 
our way of life is historically contingent, it is itself authoritative for our conduct in that “it has made us what we 
are.”   
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deliberative and realist theories of democracy can work in tandem here in, highlighting the 
fractional nature of modern politics as reflective of the realities of power and powerlessness.   
‘Deliberative realism’ represents a way to check the idealization of politics—attending to the 
sources and depth of conflict and inequality in political society—without thereby ruling out 
grounds for democratic hopes and aspirations.  It can take its starting point from the political 
world as it is and human beings as they are, while envisioning practices that would enable 
public opinion to work as a siege vis-à-vis the policymaking process.  As will be made clear, 
this is an intergenerational project that faces daunting challenges and should by no means be 
taken for granted as a ‘way out’ of the dangers of politics.  The regulative ideal of 
deliberation can instruct democratic practice, while realism for its part serves to anchor 
deliberative-democratic expectations in attending to the contemporary context of politics and 
all of its frustrations.  As a response to the charges laid out at the beginning of the chapter, 
hopeful visions of deliberation are important and relevant in the sense that they expect more 
of us as participants in a democratic project.  Deliberation urges collective engagement in 
pragmatic experimentation and moral development, but at the same time is sensitive to the 
contingency of social-political arrangements and the precariousness of democratic 
achievements.  I argue that their shared task of addressing legitimacy as a basis of politics in 
liberal-democracies makes possible their reconciliation and partnership going forward in the 
theorization of politics.  The sobriety provided by realism is desperately needed if democratic 
theory—deliberation in particular—is to be awake to the dangers of our time and the 
darkness in which we find ourselves.  Realism on its own, however, is unlikely to provide a 
sense of civic purpose, contribute to the betterment of the many, or to work against patterns 
of irresponsibility, corruption, and abuse.830  In the end, I argue that coming to grips with the 
                                                             
830 Sigwart (2013, 432) identifies the tradeoff in a realist approach to politics, given that “Realism in all clarity 
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gloominess of our situation makes deliberation’s promise all the brighter—as an ideal by 
which we can guide our sights, measure ourselves, and pursue the unfulfilled promise of a 
democratic way of life.           
 
 
Realism and Deliberative Democracy: An Uncanny Marriage?   
 
The tradition of realism has been recently renewed as a way of problematizing how we think 
about popular sovereignty and consensual politics.831  Although realism itself is somewhat of 
a conceptual umbrella, and prognostications for the future vary widely among members of 
this tribe, it can be said to reflect a distinctly hostile disposition towards the ideal-
theorization of politics.832  In general, realists reject a moralistic understanding of political 
theory as ‘applied ethics’ or as the ‘enactment’ of principles, concepts, ideals, values etc.  
Instead, realists hold that “the sources of political normativity are not—or not exclusively— 
to be found in pre-political moral commitments, but in a form of normativity inherent to 
politics.”833  Politics involves the navigation of deep and unresolvable moral disagreement 
and conflicting interests, rather than serving to realize a priori principles with pre-established 
value.834  It is for this reason that the political should be viewed as distinct from other realms 
(e.g. the moral, economic, aesthetic) and so the criteria we use to evaluate politics as a public 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
raises the question of how to preserve moral integrity on the slippery slope of power politics. Its weakness lies 
in the fact that it ultimately does not provide clear criteria to answer this question.”   
831 Classical realists focused on issues that have influenced the recent revival, including “the complex 
relationship between ethics and politics, an appreciation of the political as a sphere of human activity that 
provides order in a context of disagreement but which cannot be reduced to morality, a scepticism towards the 
power of reason and morality in political life, and the difficulties inherent in judging political action.”  See Carr 
2001; Herz 1951; Morgenthau 1967; Morgenthau 1946; Niebuhr 2011; Niebuhr 2005. 
832 Which is why Galston (2010) describes its members as sharing in a “dissenting movement in political 
theory.” 
833 Prinz and Rossi 2017, 350.  This reflects the influential statements of realist theory provided by Williams 
2005 and Geuss 2008. 
834 Sleat (2016, 36) argues that theories which take into account the conflictual nature of politics but 
nevertheless seek to transcend these conditions are not realistic, properly speaking.  “It is not enough for a 
theory to simply accept the fact of conflict in politics in order to count as realist. It must recognise that such 
conflict is a constitutive element of politics.” 
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activity should likewise be differentiated from those used to judge the private conduct of 
individuals.835  Adopting realism as a starting point not only allows political theorists to 
avoid the conceptual confusion characteristic of ideal theory, but also the practical dangers 
accompanying attempts to graft these ideals on to the real world of politics.  
 Realists have tended to portray deliberative theory as the very type of theorizing that 
should be avoided.  A common accusation is that deliberativists neglect the realities of 
politics as governed by “discord and disagreement rather than consensus and concord.”836  
Related is the allegation that deliberation is treated as a panacea by its proponents, who 
imagine that cooperative discursive practices can sanitize or rationalize politics and thereby 
fail to recognize the determinative influence of power and interests.  Proponents of 
deliberation are read as privileging cool-minded discursive practices; persisting in their naïve 
hope that public discussions can breed a fair and inclusive exchange of ideas between well-
meaning participants.  This effectively neglects variation in political contexts, and in the vein 
of Enlightenment thinking places too much faith in the civilizing power of reason to yield 
mutual-understanding or consensus.  In a nutshell, deliberativists fail to appreciate the extent 
to which politics is essentially about conflict.837 
 In many ways, the general thrust of these charges hit their mark and reflects the 
impetus behind recent shifts in deliberative theorizing.  The substantial production of 
theoretical and empirical research on deliberation notwithstanding, many deliberativists have 
                                                             
835 The ‘circumstances of politics’ are directly related to the problem of ‘dirty hands’ which Bellamy (2010, 
414) discusses:“in serving the public interest it will be hard for the politician either to act in the same way as a 
good private person might be expected to do, or to be responsive to all our private interests.  So politicians will 
gain ‘dirty hands’ in part because those they serve (the rest of us) make conflicting and exacting demands of 
them…Hence the difficulty: we desire principled politicians but expect— even oblige— them to commit 
unprincipled acts.”  See too Walzer 1972; Williams 1978; Hollis 1982. 
836 Sleat 2012, 655. 
837 Geuss (2014, 61) is particularly unimpressed by the deliberative model that spawned under the influence of 
“the debased liberalism of Habermas and his neo-Kantian ideal speech theory.”   
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tended to persist in an awkward limbo in their attempts to understand the conditions under 
which a deliberative politics might emerge.  The maturation of deliberative theory as an 
intellectual understanding of democratic realities and potentialities requires a serious degree 
of soul-searching among its proponents with regard to the (dis)alignment of their 
expectations with the disharmonious state of U.S. politics in the 21st century.  Without 
denying the validity of these criticisms against certain statements of idealized deliberation, 
however, I submit that realist charges tend to be overstated and overgeneralized.  
Deliberativists can not only stomach the realist critique, but can indeed hold on to certain 
deliberative postulates even in the face of political realities characterized by deep conflict, 
wide inequality, and self-interested contests for influence across a nebula of more-or-less 
coordinated institutions.  Rather than attempting to transcend politics—often understood to 
be the deliberativists’ goal in idealizing discourse—deliberation is suitable as a regulative 
ideal in addressing rather than avoiding conflict.  Furthermore, if realists view deliberative 
theory as overly idealistic, deliberativists for their part suspect that realism tends to restrict 
itself to description and is thus unable to provide much in the way of inspiration.  Realists 
interested in the question of legitimacy and the activation of democratic energies stand to 
benefit from reconsidering the propriety of certain deliberative ideals (e.g. open-ended 
inquiry, truthfulness, and reflexivity) for guiding political conduct and the critique of 
dominant ideologies.  
Reflecting on variations among realist thinkers is especially relevant in light of recent 
debates over realism’s ambition to effect political change.  In particular, some have 
questioned whether realism’s apparent proximity to ‘non-ideal’ as opposed to ‘ideal’ theory 
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betrays a conservative bent that undermines its political potentialities.838  The worry is that 
realism’s emphasis on concretion and contextuality (i.e. starting from where/who we are) 
borders a quietist acceptance of the status quo and thereby fails to serve those who are 
effectively disenfranchised.839  Prinz and Rossi have recently described the realist 
predicament as defined by the tension between conscious situatedness and possibilities for 
transcendence. 
 
Even theorists who are friendly to the realist enterprise express worries as to the 
approach’s ability to radically criticise the reality to which, in some important 
sense, any realism worth its name must be tied. When it comes to prescribing 
alternative political scenarios this problem becomes, predictably, even more 
pressing. Crudely, there appears to be a problematic trade-off between a theory’s 
groundedness in facts about the status quo and its ability to consistently envisage 
radical departures from the status quo.840 
 
 
This uncertainty is reflective of the differences between interpretive and prescriptive realism.  
Where the former attempts to give an empirically-based account of the features of the 
political with the aim of bettering our understanding of politics, the latter provides 
recommendations and justifications for political action under the limitations of the world as 
we find it.841  Thus, realists vary in their emphases on “diagnostic critique” and/or “action-
                                                             
838 See Sleat 2016 for a problematization of realism’s relationship to ideal theory, the tendency for its elision 
with non-ideal theory, and the ways in which the ideal/non-ideal methodological debate takes place within the 
liberal framework. 
839 Finlayson 2015. 
840 Prinz and Rossi 2017, 348. 
841 Freeden 2012, 1.  The parallel enterprises of political realism obviously overlap, in terms of their shared 
origin as a reaction to the defects of mainstream theory, but also diverge in important ways.  “A prescriptive 
political realist explores what can be recommended and aspired to, and even asserted normatively, within the 
constraints of political life and, most significantly, of human nature. An interpretative political realist is 
concerned with ascertaining—as far as is possible within the limits of interpretation, translation and reception 
theory—what the thought-patterns that a society adopts or harbours look like. The one sees politics as the arena 
in which we may yet make the best out of a bad job and secure what we can in a flawed social universe; the 
other is as interested in the bad and the indifferent as in the good and tries as hard as possible to abstain from 
value judgment. The one pursues truth as a normative morality, however circumscribed; the other pursues truth 
as knowledge, however circumscribed. The one tends to focus on political conduct; the other on the ubiquitous, 
yet under-researched, social practice of political thinking. The one sees her or himself as a political philosopher 
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orienting normative evaluation.”842  In general, however, it is safe to say that to be realistic is 
not to deny the relevance of normative ethics, nor does it entail a defeatist attitude towards 
political, economic, or conceptual arrangements.  Realism is not reducible to pessimism, and 
one can remain hopefully optimistic while recognizing the conflict-laden nature of politics 
and the way that power is wielded by the few over the many.  Since feasibility concerns are 
more strictly related to non-ideal theory than realistic theory per se, the latter can 
acknowledge that ideas of legitimacy are shaped by power structures and nonetheless insist 
that these beliefs can be critiqued and reconfigured.843  Thus, there is a distinctive place for 
imagination in facing up to harsh political realities.  One might say the darkness of empirical 
life requires the ability to picture a better state of affairs for which we might strive.  In this 
sense, realism is not necessarily anti-utopian—one can be realistic and demand the 
impossible.844 
What I will argue here is that realism and deliberative theory share a mutual starting 
point in maintaining that “the conditions of [legitimacy] in the modern state present a 
progressive project.”845  As will be emphasized, this progressive project involves the 
consideration of “more radical and ambitious forms” of political engagement, and how the 
obstacles hampering the activation of citizens’ critical capacities might problematize the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
whose role is to be teacher and missionary; the other as a political theorist whose role is to be elucidator and 
explorer.” Ibid., 3-4. 
842 Prinz and Rossi 2017, 349.  It is for this reason that realism does not represent a single cohesive project but 
instead “a diverse family of approaches: realists will differ significantly in their visions of political life.” 
Medearis 2018, 162.  
843 Hall and Sleat 2017, Hall 2017; Sleat 2016. 
844 Geuss 2010; Rossi 2015; Prinz 2016.  Geuss in an interview described his understanding of this connection. 
“There is a pole of realism and there is a pole of utopianism. There is a pole which tells you don’t be a victim of 
wishful thinking, don’t be a victim of ideological illusion, don’t be a victim of various kinds of repressive 
identities, and then there is a pole of cultivating what you want and taking your desires seriously and clarifying 
them, even if they are utopian in their content, even if they can’t be satisfied in the life that we lead. And it 
seems to me that both of these things are an important part of [realism] ... Political philosophy has to be both 
fully realistic and fully utopian.” 
845 Williams 2005, 17. 
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supposed legitimacy of the state.846  An important intersection for deliberation and realism 
concerns the capacities for judgment on the part of political subjects.  Despite this important 
common interest, I argue that realists have tended to reject deliberative theory on the basis of 
well-worn characterizations that do not necessarily apply to more mature understandings of 
what deliberation requires or entails.  In effect, this premature dismissal forfeits upon the 
capacity of deliberative practice to bear emancipatory goods in the contestation of ideological 
power structures and the exercise of political authority.  I make the case that marrying 
deliberation and realism allows for recognition and even appreciation of the conflictual 
nature of politics, but does not therefore preclude the normative purchase of key deliberative 
ideals like reflexivity and truthfulness.  Redeeming this partnership effectively bolsters the 
theories’ relevant strengths, and mitigates their respective weaknesses.  The opportunities for 
collaboration between sober deliberativists and ambitious realists should therefore be 
recognized as grounding enthusiasm for the theorization and practice of politics in liberal-
democracies. 
 Bernard Williams, one of most influential contemporary realists, clearly expresses 
this connection between his and Habermas’ projects.  First, they share a basic sociological 
point, “the legitimations appropriate to a modern state are essentially connected with the 
nature of modernity...This includes organizational features (pluralism, etc., and bureaucratic 
forms of control), individualism, and cognitive aspects of authority.”847  Second, they both 
reject the strict derivation of political legitimacy from either the formal properties of moral 
(Kantian) law, or from an ethical (Aristotelian) conception of civic republicanism.  Instead, 
                                                             
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid., 9. 
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both emphasize political context and the ways in which historicized cultural repertoires play 
into the communication of ethical self-understandings between citizens.  Williams writes, 
 
Taking these two points together—the facticity of modern societies and the 
refusal of a mere moral normativity—I can agree with Habermas also in trying to 
situate these issues ‘Between facts and norms.’  Moreover, this is not merely a 
verbal agreement: the project of taking seriously in political theory an 
understanding of what modern social formations are is very fundamental.848  
 
 
In order to avoid diminishing important differences between them, it must be noted that 
Williams views Habermas’ project as leaning on the universalistic/transcendental moral 
tradition they both purport to criticize, especially in the idealization of discourse and in 
linking the rule of law to deliberative democracy.   I’ve made the case in previous chapters 
that while early articulations of his discursive ethics and communicative politics may have 
been vulnerable to these charges of rationalism and moralism, his later theory is much more 
sensitive to the practical/strategic functions of language and the separation of public 
discourse from the administration of political decision making.   
Bringing together deliberation and realism represents an unexplored and yet 
promising way to avoid the traps of folksy accounts of popular sovereignty in democratic 
politics.  It is also appropriate as an intellectual response to the empirical realities that I’ve 
discussed in this dissertation.  Patterns of social disintegration, polarization, political 
passivity, and inequality together are symptomatic of the tenuous relationship between public 
opinion and government, where the former exercises indirect and indeterminate influence as 
reflective of the public’s quasi-sovereign status.  Though invested in discourse as the path to 
democracy legitimacy, deliberation is also alert to the distinctiveness of the political; i.e. “the 
ways that institutions actually function; the motivations that people actually have; the 
                                                             
848 ibid., 10. 
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importance of order and stability; the contingency of all political arrangements; the limits of 
political possibility; and the ubiquity of conflict and disagreement.”849  Both deliberation and 
realism are dedicated to the idea that critique, while historicized and couched in dominant 
cultural norms, makes possible the clarification of political perception and the ethical self-
understandings of individuals and communities.  The belief that criticism and engagement 
can cut through inherited ideological frameworks, contest power structures and authorities, 
and in the process serve to enlighten and thereby emancipate political subjects is appropriate 
even under a realist understanding of politics and its limits.  This does not require consensus 
achieved on the back of universal moral foundations, nor does it assume that a substantial 
share of the citizenry will regularly take part in such discursive practices.  I suggest that the 
absence of pre-given moral and cultural foundations, a key starting point for realists, 
demonstrates a place for critical discourse especially in the context of conflict.  That said, 
deliberation and realism share in the struggle to interpret the modern state’s status of 
legitimacy.  I argue that for both, the exercise of sovereignty on the part of ordinary citizens 
is a necessary aspect of legitimation.  It is in light of this commonality that realists might well 
reconsider their opposition to the aspirations underpinning deliberative practices. 
 
 
Indeterminate Legitimacy and the Opacity of the ‘Deliberative’ System 
  
It has recently been said that where the concept of ‘justice’ has been central to western 
political theory since Rawls, ‘legitimacy’ plays a similar role in uniting resurgent strains of 
realist political thought.850   For all its variety, realism can be understood as occupying the 
                                                             
849 Hall and Sleat 2017, 280-1. 
850 Sleat 2014, 315.  As in most political theory, legitimacy indicates the “justification of coercive power or the 
justification and sanctioning of political authority, where authority usually signifies the right to rule and in most 
cases entails political obligations.”  Erman and Moller 2013, 217. 
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space between moralism (politics as applied ethics) and Thucydidean Realpolitik.851  A key 
difference between neo-realism—led by Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss—and the 
tradition of Realpolitik is that legitimacy makes sense as a political criteria and desideratum 
in the former but not in the latter.  This is because realists hold that “politics is not merely a 
relationship of brute domination but represents an activity that generates order and stability 
through the provision of authoritative and commonly binding decisions in conditions of 
disagreement.”852   
 Williams argues that a polity can achieve legitimacy (LEG) only insofar that it meets 
the ‘Basic Legitimation Demand’ (BLD).  It is crucial to note, however, that this BLD is not 
prior to politics as a moral principle, but represents a demand for legitimation that arises 
within the political itself because it is “a claim that is inherent in there being such a thing as 
politics.”853  Williams goes so far as to argue that it is a universal truth that “legitimate 
government is not just coercive power.”854  If subjects are to recognize the state as 
authoritative, a basic condition for any subsequent politics, the latter must be capable of 
offering justifications of its power in ways that ‘make sense’ (MS) to the former in their 
particular time and place.855  In this sense, legitimation may well involve moral appeals, even 
though demands for justification are independently rooted in the logic of politics itself.856  
                                                             
851 Sleat 2014. 
852 Sleat 2016, 33.  See Philp (2007, 2010, 2012) for more on politics involving a ‘right to rule,’ and hence the 
provision and examination of claims to legitimacy. 
853 Williams 2005, 5.  See Hall and Sleat 2017;Sleat 2014; Sagar 2018 for an elaboration of the realist (as 
opposed to moralist) function of legitimacy in political thought. 
854 Williams 2001, 94. 
855 Williams 2005, 10-11.   
856 Larmore (2018, 44) argues that Williams is insufficiently clear on this point, arguing that it is imperative to 
distinguish “between the demand and the legitimation the state offers to satisfy the demand. The latter, I have 
argued, does involve a morality prior to politics inasmuch as it must appeal to some conception of the 
conditions under which coercive power may be justly exercised.  True, this moral principle purports to govern 
how an essentially political problem, the exercise of coercive force, is to be handled. In this sense, it may be 
said not to represent a morality prior to the politics. But in another, very important sense, it is a prepolitical 
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Furthermore, liberalism is the only satisfactory way of addressing the demands of legitimacy 
‘here and now,’ as can be read from Williams’ formula “LEG + Modernity = Liberalism.”857  
The difficulty with the retention of legitimacy in realist thought involves determining 
appropriate criteria for (non)justified coercion.858  If power isn’t self-legitimating, the 
question becomes which demands for justification are legitimate and when justifications are 
therefore owed.  Williams subscribes to the “critical theory principle,” which specifies that 
“the acceptance of a justification does not count if the acceptance itself is produced by the 
coercive power which is supposedly being justified.”859  In this way, legitimation in 
Williams’ account requires authorization through democratic confrontations, even if it 
doesn’t demand that the public as a whole be engaged, informed, or regularly in control of 
decision-making.  The critical theory principle bears a resemblance to Habermas’ 
understanding of discourse ethics, which involves the ‘unforced force’ of the better argument 
(the latter’s quality being a matter of historical and social context for us, here and now) and 
the public redemption of validity claims.860  The obvious problem that remains is determining 
when acceptance is “produced by” the relevant coercive powers in such a way so as to 
undermine the BLD.  This conundrum is one that is explicitly shared with deliberative 
democratic theory, in which pathways of authorization are oblique and specifications of 
‘acceptability’ are indeterminate.  Neither Williams nor Habermas, however, require 
universal acceptance of the state’s responses to legitimation demands.   Nor do they argue 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
principle since it is assumed to possess a validity independent of the political role it is invoked to fill: it serves 
to justify the exercise of power and thereby to found the state’s authority.” 
857 Williams 2005, 9. 
858 On this difficulty, see Wendt 2016; Bavister-Gould 2011; Erman and Möller 2013, 2015; Larmore 2013; 
Sagar 2018. 
859 Williams 2005, 6. 
860 This connection, while substantiating my argument here, has caused a good deal of discomfort among many 
realists, given that it “open[s] the door to precisely the kind of demanding normative theorizing that the 
principle’s chief inspiration, Jürgen Habermas, has systematically pursued for many decades.”  Scheuerman 
2018, 282. 
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that legitimacy is ‘all or nothing’—assessments of congruence between the dominant order 
and the beliefs, values, and principles of its subjects are never fully settled, and represent the 
stuff of political debate.  I suggest that if legitimation is understood as a performative activity 
or process, the importance of exercising public reason in the development of opinions might 
well lead realists like Williams to entertain a deliberative understanding of politics. 
Raymond Geuss can be said to espouse a more extreme variation of realism given his 
skepticism about political normativity, and he often appears to reject the attempt to adapt a 
liberal principle of legitimacy.861  Compared with Williams, he is much less sanguine that our 
ideological commitments—e.g. to liberalism— can remain intact once we approach politics 
with clear-eyes.  He does not hold back in chastising political theory’s tendency towards 
sterility, in which it deemphasizes or willfully neglects the dominant influence of power 
configurations.862  For these reasons, he can be understood to be less interested in the 
progressive constructivism evident in Williams’ work.  Nonetheless, even Geuss rejects the 
crude idea that ‘might makes right’ and acknowledges that issues of legitimation have real 
political importance.   
 
The legitimatory mechanisms available in a given society change from one 
historical period to another, as do the total set of beliefs held by agents, the 
mechanisms for changing beliefs, or generating new ones (newspapers, 
universities, etc.), and the forms of widely distributed, socially rooted, moral 
conceptions. These are all important parts of what makes a given society the 
society it is...If one wants to attain a moderately realistic understanding of why a 
society behaves politically in a certain way, one will have to take account of the 
specific way the existing forms of legitimation work.  There is nothing “realistic” 
                                                             
861 Though Geuss himself considers the desirability of a liberal politics that is “action-oriented and resists utopic 
energies” (e.g. Geuss 2002, 336; 2005), more often he is critical of the attempt to wed liberalism and realism.  
For example, he accuses Williams of paddling about in the “tepid and slimy puddle created by Locke, J.S. Mill 
and Isaiah Berlin” (2014,184). 
862 Geuss 2008; Prinz 2016. 
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about closing one’s eyes to the fact that such warrants for action exist and are 
taken seriously.863 
 
 
Geuss is emphatic that adopting a realist perspective of politics mandates that theorists revisit 
inherited understandings of legitimacy, especially if these are founded upon ‘bedrock norms’ 
in which the public exercises unilateral influence in the authorization of policymaking.  On 
the other hand, it is because he takes seriously warrants for legitimacy that Geuss’ is not a 
‘hard-edged’ variant of realism, in which “power and material self-interest are all that 
matter.”864   His discontent with liberalism as a dominant ideological framework and social 
order which has “for a long time seemed to lack much inspirational potential” might lead him 
to appreciate the comparatively critical mode of political engagement that deliberativists 
promote.865  Deliberation carries with it ambitions to emancipate and enlighten political 
subjects; and these goals need not be balked at by realists.  The impulse behind deliberation 
in fact coheres with Geuss’ suggestion that historical contingencies make possible 
transformations “in our politics, our social arrangements, our economic circumstances, or 
perhaps simply an improvement in our powers of theoretical imagination.”866   
Despite these concessions, Guess is deeply-pessimistic when it comes to the potential 
legitimation of the system, viewing legitimation stories as largely serving to provide a facade 
for power politics.  He gives little credence to a substantive notion of ‘public opinion,’ as 
indicative of the operative enactment of democratic sovereignty, and attempts to sever ties 
with what he views to be hopelessly naïve and distortive in mainstream theorizing.  Williams, 
for his own part, is cautiously optimistic that democratic accountability can remain a 
                                                             
863 Geuss 2008, 35-6. 
864 Geuss 2010, 38-9f. 
865 Geuss 2002, 320. 
866 Ibid., 321. 
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coherent ideal even in practicing a realistic approach to politics, as indicated by his 
formulation of the BLD.  Although he holds doubts about the inherent link between 
participatory politics and demands for legitimation, he himself cedes the point that “some 
kind of democracy, participatory politics at some level, is a feature of [legitimacy] for the 
modern world...Any theory of modern [legitimacy] requires an account of democracy and 
political participation, and of course such an account may take its place in a programme of 
improvement.”867  Nevertheless, he shares with Geuss a distaste for ‘wishful thinking’ and 
this ambivalence leads him to embrace a liberalism of fear (inspired by Shklar) with limited 
ambitions for mass empowerment or democratic transformation.868   
James Tully, arguably the third most influential of the neo-realists, is the most 
emphatic when it comes to the public role of political philosophy.  He similarly interprets 
political philosophy as a practice involving a critical attitude, one that can shed light on 
relevant struggles which constitute political problems.  Even in the absence of stable, moral 
truths, these investigations can clarify and transform our understanding of the political order 
and our place within it.  This is not a purely academic affair, and Tully envisions an 
important democratic role for university research to shine a critical light on oppressive 
practices of governance and the social ills of inequality.  With more than a hint of 
deliberative orientation, he advocates for the redemption of scholarship through the 
cultivation of a “communicative relationship of reciprocal elucidation and mutual benefit 
between political philosophy and public affairs.”869  Tully is distinct in his thorough-going 
                                                             
867 Williams 2005, 15. 
868 Shklar’s liberalism of fear is not grounded on a summum bonum, but instead a summum malum: “That evil is 
cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself.”  Shklar 1998, 10-11.  In Williams’ (2005, 61) 
understanding, liberal democracy takes the “condition of life without terror as its first requirement,” which is 
why Hobbes’ first political question captures the starting point of politics not based on domination alone. 
869 Tully 2008, 37. 
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optimism, and holds a view of philosophy’s critical function as essentially and robustly 
democratic; a perspective that is quite similar to John Dewey’s.  Compared to Williams and 
Geuss, he goes further in pursuing the idea that historically-contextualized interpretation can 
provide critical purchase for political subjects in reflecting on their inherited ideological 
frameworks.  Tully’s position suggest that even staunchly anti-foundational realists holding 
that politics is sui generis as a logic need not deny that those affected by political rule can 
reflect and evaluate the narratives and rationales that accompany policymaking.   
Despite the fact that he associates Habermas’ work with the attempt to reach a 
universal theory of legitimacy, Tully’s essential understanding of the democratic project 
carries deliberative resonance.  Honig and Stears describe his realist outlook as particularly 
aspirational in that he does not want mere stability or even legitimation but ‘just agreement’ 
in which there occurs, “an ongoing, transformative dialogue of equal parties in contention 
with each other.  He wants those parties to recognize that they are bound in a sense of shared 
fate, mutual respect, and common future and a shared past that is marred but not exhausted 
by relations of domination and acts of injustice.”870  Tully therefore represents the 
imaginative and perhaps even utopian bent of realist thought, in which history attunes us not 
only to political limits but also exposes horizons of potentiality.   As a realist he recognizes 
that political philosophy needs to attend to the nature of politics as adversarial, but he does 
not understand this to essentially limit citizens’ capacity to interpret, judge, and critique the 
political norms and arrangements that affect them.871  
                                                             
870 Honig and Stears 2011, 197.  See Tully 2008. 
871 Tully (2008, 534) therefore understands political philosophy as an “ongoing critical activity that helps to 
render visible, conceptualize, and unmask authorities, rendering perspicuous the ways in which practices and 
institutions affect individuals’ lives and constitute and constrict subjects’ practical horizon, thereby making it 
possible to explicitly take a stance toward them.” 
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 To be clear, an honest reckoning of deliberative democrats and their ability to ‘get 
real’ will require coming to grips with the intrinsic quality of politics as conflict-laden.  It is 
because disagreement is endemic and deeply-seated that issues of legitimacy, as essentially 
political, are never clear-cut or capable of definitive resolution.872  Matt Sleat supports the 
position stated above (a la Williams) that a normative concept of legitimacy is necessary in 
order to distinguish politics from successful domination (i.e. Realpolitik), while emphasizing 
that this concept cannot be supplied prior to politics as in applied ethics.  Though legitimacy 
carries normative weight in realist theory, Sleat suggests that determining its relative 
achievement is just as contestable as questions of justice, freedom, rights, and equality given 
its place at the “forefront of the battle between the numerous competing ideological 
responses to the need for collective action.”873  The inevitability of conflict over these 
questions is not itself a problem, nor is the fact that moral reasoning will often be invoked in 
determining whether justifications ‘make sense’ to us in our time and place.874  Some may 
well observe a significant degree of congruence between the current political order and our 
normative beliefs and expectations of political authority (conceptually and culturally-
specific), others will surely deny such a correspondence.  This reflects disagreement not only 
                                                             
872 Knight and Johnson (1994, 289) argue that deliberative theorists must take into account not only the grounds, 
but also the limits of democratic legitimacy, given that “the appearance of new and hitherto unheard 
constituencies in deliberative arenas will unsettle, if not altogether subvert, any extant shared understanding 
about the dimensions of political conflict. This is the root of our skepticism about the feasibility of deliberation 
and its capacity to ground democratic legitimacy.” 
873 Sleat 2012, 653. 
874 As Sleat (2014, 322) explains, “By insisting that the demand for legitimation arises from within the political 
rather than moral domain, realist theory can draw upon moral considerations when making judgements 
regarding legitimacy without having to assume that morality has antecedent authority over politics...And, 
crucially, those moral considerations do not determine the limits, nature and content of the political sphere. 
Politics has an identity distinct from morality; hence moral, values, considerations and principles are part of 
politics but they are not constitutive of it.” 
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over the general legitimacy of political rule, but the complex, haphazard, and often 
disordered arrangement of ideas guiding such judgments.875 
 The more critical challenge that realists and deliberativists both face is the blurring of 
core analytical concepts; particularly the permeable distinction between politics (legitimate 
rule) and non-politics (illegitimate rule through successful coercion/domination).  Adopting a 
‘detoxified’ view of power as bound up with the logic of politics means that legitimation 
processes necessarily involve mechanisms of “control, coercion, and influence.”876  Sleat 
points out that this jeopardizes even a minimalist view of political authorization, in which the 
state is answerable to those over whom it exercises monopolized violence. 
 
Political rule does demand or necessitate the use of coercive power that is (at best) 
insufficiently legitimated. At least in part every political order will be partially 
imposed by coercive force because it cannot be fully or sufficiently legitimated to 
all those who are subject to it. While the fact that the use of imperfectly 
legitimated political power takes place in a context in which the state is widely 
recognised to have the right to wield coercive force (in legitimate states, at least), 
there will always be some within the state’s borders who obey its instructions in 
response to that coercion (or the threat of it) rather than out of recognition of its 
legitimacy.877 
 
 
The difficulty if not impossibility of coming to a shared judgment of legitimacy— even via 
different rationales—stands as a test for deliberation and realism’s commitment to plurality 
and disagreement.878  I’ve argued that the idea of communicative power becomes 
                                                             
875 A central point made by Geuss 2008. 
876 Sleat 2014, 330.  See Prinz 2016 for more on this detoxification. 
877 Sleat 2014, 329. 
878 Sleat (2012, 655) describes this as the attempt to ‘ground’ politics.  “As it has become more widely accepted 
that conceptions of justice might also be the subject of reasonable disagreement, and that such consensus is as 
untenable on justice as it is in morality, theorists have now begun to shift the location of agreement to 
legitimacy. The strategy is the same: we find that our previous ground of consensus is untenable and so we try 
and build our political association on some potentially firmer ground of agreement...The lesson I think we really 
need to learn now, especially given that we live in a world characterised by radical political disagreement, is 
that no such havens of consensus are available in human life. The question that should therefore preoccupy 
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problematic in a political environment where the lines between reasoned persuasion and 
strategic manipulation are often, if not always, muddied.  If political and moral logics are 
distinct, as claims the realist, the fact that legitimation must take place within the political 
fray seems to jeopardize the claimed distinction between realist thought and Realpolitik.   
This represents a central challenge for those who would embrace realistic theory while 
attempting to realize a democratic process in which force is not self-justified.  As Sleat 
concludes, the difficulty is imagining how we could even achieve the critical distance 
necessary for such judgments, given that “there is no way in which legitimacy can float 
completely free from the power relations in which it is engaged (and to think that it can is to 
repeat the moralist mistake of thinking that our assessments of political legitimacy can take 
place wholly independently of politics itself).”879 
 Systemic deliberation and realism are in a similar predicament here.  The first, while 
acknowledging the imperfect execution and unequal distribution of deliberative practices 
across the system, still maintains an interest in determining the deliberative quality of the 
composite democratic machine as well as its parts.  Realism is similarly interested in the 
justifiability of political arrangements to those subjects who are affected by them, even if this 
does not require express or tacit consent as in the classic liberal model.  Systemic 
deliberativists have edged closer to the realist position in adjusting (if not abandoning) what 
were once core principles.  They admit that the outcomes of politics will often be determined 
by the competition of exclusionary interests which may or may not involve the deliberative 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
political theorists, and maybe especially liberal theorists, is how we conceptualise political society and political 
legitimacy in conditions of political discord and disagreement rather than consensus and concord.” 
879 Ibid., 330. 
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exchange of reasons.880  Habermas inspired this move, especially in Between Facts and 
Norms, in his recognition that political outcomes are often the product of steering by 
monetary and administrative powers.  Though communicative power continues to be 
invoked, mature deliberativists are attuned to the difficulty of locating popular sovereignty 
across a political system in which relationships between those in power and the vast majority 
on the periphery (who are deeply divided amongst themselves) are characteristically abstract 
and asymmetrical.  To repeat a strikingly straightforward quote from Habermas, “the 
question arises of how autonomous the public is when it takes a position on an issue, whether 
its affirmative or negative stand reflects a process of becoming informed or in fact only a 
more or less concealed game of power.  Despite the wealth of empirical investigations, we 
still do not have a well-established answer to this cardinal question.”881  In this sense, 
deliberativists and realists’ respective interests in popular sovereignty and legitimacy 
represent shared concerns over the deployment of power and its justifiability to those 
affected in liberal democracies.  
 In a recent review, a number of commentators have taken stock of the state of 
deliberative theory since its transition to the third wave.  In their introduction to the 
collection, Mansbridge and Fishkin describe the difficulties facing systemic understandings 
of deliberation.  They reflect on the real possibility of manufactured consent, pointing to 
Brexit and the U.S. election in 2016 as worrisome examples.  They admit that the widening 
theoretical-empirical gulf has fueled critics’ indictment of deliberation as a ‘folk theory of 
democracy.’  In a strange move, however, they seem to embrace certain folksy ideas that 
                                                             
880 Though they continue to pay lip-service to certain ideals, whether epistemic, ethical, or democratic.  See the 
first chapter of Parkinson et. al. 2012. 
881 Habermas 1996, 375. 
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were ostensibly challenged by the move to systemic analysis in the first place.882  For 
example, they continue to invoke vaguely-imagined deliberative goods that will somehow 
obtain through the messy processes of real politics.  They suggest, “If the many versions of a 
more deliberative democracy live up to their aspirations, they could help revive democratic 
legitimacy, provide for more authentic public will formation, provide a middle ground 
between widely mistrusted elites and the angry voices of populism, and help fulfill some of 
our common normative expectations about democracy.“883   Much of the legwork will 
purportedly be done through the development of deliberative institutions that could affect 
“real decisions in actual ongoing democracies,” provide a “positive effect on legitimacy and 
lead to better governance,” and secure a “better connection between the public’s real 
concerns and how they are governed.”884 
 As I understand it, this represents a refusal of deliberative theorists to commit to the 
realist implications of the recent turn.  Not only are the ends of deliberation increasingly 
ambiguous (Does it aim at a politics sensitive to the power of argument?  Widespread 
democratic inclusion/participation? Epistemic clarification/revelation? Mutual respect 
between interlocutors who nevertheless have deep disagreements?) but so are the means by 
which they will attain.  In some ways, systemic deliberativists seem to be operating within a 
non-ideal theory of liberal-democracy, but with an inconsistent attitude towards the 
incorporation of feasibility constraints.  Paul Gunn makes this point forcefully in responding 
                                                             
882 They reinterpret Achen and Bartels (2016) critique of theory’s ‘folksy’ tendencies as indicative of empirical 
naiveté, suggesting instead that “its very status as a folk theory reflects how widespread this normative 
expectation is.”  Fishkin and Mansbridge 2017, 7. 
883 ibid. 
884 Ibid.   They seem to suggest a democratic deficit in the transmission of public opinion to governance, in 
which the normative causal arrow points in the ‘wrong’ direction.  This, however, goes against the message of 
the ‘systemic turn’ that both have endorsed.  “Popular deliberative institutions are grounded in the public’s 
values and concerns, so the voice they magnify is not the voice of the elites.  But that voice is usually also, after 
deliberation, more evidence-based and reflective of the merits of the major policy arguments.  Hence these 
institutions fill an important gap.”  Ibid., 8. 
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to deliberativists (in)ability to achieve their aspirations (whatever they might be) in the ‘real 
world.’   
 
the idea of “deliberative systems” does not provide a new set of tools so much as 
it applies old and somewhat blunt tools to newly recognized problems. To be sure, 
the systemic turn should be credited with admitting citizens’ interests back into 
democratic theory, but as yet it has no way of explaining how and why its 
conception of democracy is suited to advancing those interests.885 
 
 
Gunn recognizes that the new concentration on deliberative systems at least moves the debate 
in the right direction by reflecting on the conditioning of democratic practices.  But it does so 
while retaining vestigial first principles that seem at odds with deliberative divisions of labor 
and an understanding of politics as defined by conflict.886  In the end, by reincorporating 
questions of “interests, the common good, and therefore, the outcomes of deliberative 
processes” the systemic turn pays attention to complex empirical questions but also risks 
committing “the oversimplification inherent in values-based conceptions of political conflict 
and deliberation.”887  Given deliberation’s flirtation with functionalism (discussed above), the 
key question becomes “whether deliberation after the systemic turn can remain an end in 
itself, or whether it has ineluctably become a means to addressing citizens’ ends.”888   
                                                             
885 Gunn 2017, 103. 
886 For another example, see Chambers’ (2017, 274) attempt to balance the goods of epistemic quality and equal 
participation, which requires an ethos of ‘generalized respect.’  She writes, “Deliberative democracy ties 
legitimacy to the twin values of epistemic quality and equal participation. When these become differentiated in 
a system model of the macro-public sphere, they need to be mediated by an ethos of generalized respect. That 
ethos need not reach a high threshold of individual behavior but instead needs to underpin an ongoing critical 
scrutiny of the way elite and expert discourse potentially violates ideals of citizen autonomy. This violation 
comes in the form of manipulative and crafted speech that is intended to create public opinion rather than to 
channel and translate public concerns into public policies. This ethos is also minimal and realistic in the sense 
that it does not presuppose that the majority of public sphere actors will shed strategic or partisan motivation; it 
assumes an already existing presupposition of democracy (that elites should not treat citizens as pawns) can be 
leveraged into a strategy of publicizing and shaming elites who are egregious violators of autonomy.” 
887 Gunn 2017, 107. 
888 Ibid., 110.  Kuyper (2017, 330) attempts to parry these accusations, but his response seems to merely kick 
the can by acknowledging the unfulfilled task facing researchers.  She points out, rather unhelpfully, that “how 
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Deliberation sets itself apart from other understandings of politics (e.g. aggregative, 
Schumpeterian) in proposing that legitimate democratic processes must be undergirded by 
popular inputs and a political culture that encourages public discourse.  Traditional 
components of liberal-democratic orders such as universal suffrage are necessary in this 
regard but not sufficient.  There also must be feedback between the political system and civil 
society, filtered and transmitted through maximally-autonomous media outlets.  The shift of 
focus from actual discursive practices in discrete sites (formal and informal) allows system 
deliberativists to relax the puritanical demands attributed to earlier theoretical frameworks.  
On the other hand, by deemphasizing criteria that made deliberation vulnerable to criticism 
as a ‘folk theory,’ its proponents revealed a depth of confusion with regard to a basic 
question: how exactly are deliberative systems either deliberative or democratic?  As it 
stands, deliberativists appear to be placing less and less emphasis on the value of deliberation 
in and for itself.  Rather, the general supposition seems to be that deliberative elements can 
be grafted onto extant political institutions, serving as a supplement and helping to ease 
political dysfunction.   
Reason-giving and widespread inclusion lose their former privileged status in the 
move to deliberative systems theory.  They are purportedly not abandoned altogether as 
deliberative goods, and a successful system will supposedly encourage practices of 
persuasion through which relevant considerations influence the policy process and replace 
“suppression, oppression, and thoughtless neglect.”889  Somehow these will help to check 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
we think about the role of expertise, what constitutes good outcomes, and the ways in which systems are 
designed in 
these pursuits require much more normative and empirical work…the challenge is to envisage how the 
normative 
ideal of deliberation can be borne out at the systemic level in ways that counteract—and even build upon—
these problems in productive ways.” 
889 Mansbridge et. al. 2012, 5. 
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(but not defeat) patterns of strategic manipulation, interest-based lawmaking, partisan 
sideshows, and exclusionary decision-making that together represent the darker side of 
democratic politics.  This partnership is an uneasy one, and despite the growing body of 
literature describing ways to ‘scale-up’ and link networks of deliberative practices, theorists 
have struggled to articulate how the recent turn will help us to overcome these ills.  Ian 
Shapiro, representing one of the sharpest voices questioning the coherence of deliberative 
theory, makes this point in his appraisal of deliberative systems theory.  Deliberation’s 
incorporation into governance is not only questionable in terms of implementation, but is also 
worrisome in terms of producing unintended consequences that might deepen legitimation 
crises.  As Shapiro suggests, “If it is purely consultative, it is not clear why anyone will or 
should pay attention to it.  Yet if rules are created to institutionalize deliberation and give it 
real decision-making teeth, they can all too easily undermine political competition and 
empower people with leverage to appropriate them for their own purposes.”890   
This serves as a sharp reminder that deliberativists cannot simply acknowledge the 
facts of interest and power, but must articulate an understanding of how deliberation works 
within the context of conflict.  Realism does not suggest that politics is merely about power 
and its exercise, but the onus remains upon deliberativists to defend the idea that public 
discourse can motivate the ‘taming’ of power (i.e. that communicative power can hold its 
own).  If advocates cannot get clear on how the realization of their proposed practices will 
foster democratic competition, the refinement of discourse, or the rationalization of 
governance, it may well signal the swan song of deliberative theory as a helpful 
                                                             
890 Shapiro 2017, 80.  Consistent with his earlier critiques (1999, 2011), he suggests that deliberation’s failures 
are indicative of democratic theory’s more general refusal to engage with political pragmatics.  As he 
concludes, “it is hard to see what the hype surrounding deliberation amounts to. Regardless, the most pressing 
political challenges in the United States do not result from lack of deliberation. Rather, they stem from the 
increasing subversion of democracy by powerful private interests.”  Ibid., 83. 
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understanding of politics and political possibilities.  In what remains, I want to suggest ways 
in which deliberative practice can retain a critical edge, even in light of the non-deliberative 
trends that define our current political reality. 
 
 
Can Deliberative Realism Maintain an Epistemic Function? 
 
In addition to their shared interest in legitimacy, I’ve intimated that deliberative and realist 
thought have a stake in the epistemic function of critique.  Prominent realists like Williams 
and Tully share a basic idea with Habermas that legitimacy is best thought of as the ability of 
the administrative power and its representatives to respond to validity claims when and 
where they arise.  The repertoires which are drawn upon in answering such demands are 
specific to the context at hand, so that questions of legitimacy depend upon ongoing 
contestations and reflexive opinion processes responding to the circulation of these 
discourses.  Deliberation’s political value lies in its potential to cultivate critical citizens able 
to check the exercise of political power.  In confronting the ‘functional illusions’ of social 
life and the discomforting realities of politics, deliberative realism holds promise as a heroic 
enterprise in demanding intellectual honesty from the political thinker.891  It is also ‘ethically 
serious’ in recognizing the inescapability of moral conflicts and the subsequent weight of 
responsibility placed upon actors in political society, given that “any attempt to realize 
ethical principles in this world by the political means of coordinated collective action is 
morally ambiguous.” 892 
 Against many characterizations, deliberation does not require an aim towards 
consensus and recognizes that political outcomes will often be determined by factors having 
                                                             
891 Sigwart 2013, 429. 
892 Ibid., 431. 
 300 
little to do with reasoned argumentation.  This does not mean, however, that it must therefore 
give up on epistemic premiums altogether.  Despite its opposition to political rationalism and 
moralism, realism itself does not deny that there are better and worse responses to political 
claims.  This is reflected by William’s condition that responses to the BLD must ‘make 
sense’ to us in light of our place in history and our situated ethical commitments.  
Answerability matters even when thinking about politics in a realistic fashion and democratic 
disagreements over core values and their realization in policy do not represent mere ‘talk.’  
Beliefs and propositions may bear an oblique relationship to the motivations, mechanisms 
and processes of politics, but the ways in which the former are held and expressed do matter 
and are appropriate subjects for political theory.893  Despite his debatable reception as 
promoting a Kantian brand of democratic politics, Habermas in this connection can be read 
as a realist thinker who views liberal-democracies to be driven by conflict, but also 
necessarily reliant upon communicative processes and their underlying ethical logic.  His 
understanding of those processes as situated within and communicated across institutions—
that themselves reflect dynamic social hierarchies—coheres with the realist’s interest in 
“power, its acquisition, distribution, and use.”894  In this connection, both have a stake in 
tracing the implications of the ‘systemic turn’ in deliberative theory, especially when it 
comes to the question of evaluating legitimacy in polyarchic conditions.  Habermas writes, 
 
We must take into account the fact that in complex political systems the 
democratic process unfolds in a variety of different arenas involving different 
communicative settings and functions. Only from the perspective of the functional 
                                                             
893 Geuss (2008, 11) controversially claims that “politics is about action and action contexts, not about mere 
beliefs or propositions.”  Freeden (2012, 3) takes him to task on this point; e.g. “The disparaging of beliefs as 
‘mere’ does a great disservice to what the political contains, because it is impossible to ignore the patterns of 
political thinking in a society if one wishes to say something serious about it….Thinking politically is a 
phenomenon or occurrence that tells us not only what people do when acting collectively or for collectivities, 
but what they are as participants in collective life.” 
894 Geuss 2008, 96. 
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division of labor between the arenas is it reasonable to expect that the system as a 
whole will fulfill the presumed epistemic functions of a discursive process of 
opinion and will formation. This expectation loses its excessively utopian 
appearance once we recognize the everyday roots of the intuitive expectation that 
communicative actors in favorable communicative settings can clarify 
controversial validity claims, learn from one another, and jointly solve 
problems.895  
 
 
 Especially in the strains of realist thinking that emphasize the role of democratic 
legitimacy—even under perverse and deeply nondeliberative conditions—there is a distinct 
premium for the clarification of thought through demonstration and discussion.  If politics is 
not simply another name for ‘might makes right,’ then there are no obvious reasons why 
engagement in democratic controversies must be simply expressive in nature, on the one 
hand, or driven by the goal of universal consensus on the other.  Rather, a realist model of 
deliberation may value discursive destabilizations that “increase the agents’ awareness of 
their own pain, frustration or unhappiness or to make them dissatisfied with the limitations of 
their present mode of existence.”896  Both are concerned with contested designations of 
authority, and how the legitimacy of the state requires widespread acceptance of authoritative 
claims.  It is in this sense that deliberative and realist thought bear a familial relationship to 
the tradition of critical theory, particularly in the form of Ideologiekritik.897   
 Even Raymond Geuss can be said to share this understanding of political 
philosophy’s task vis-à-vis the public; i.e. rousing political consciousness.898  Though his 
disagreement with Habermas ostensibly revolves around the latter’s idealized model of 
                                                             
895 Habermas 2008, 147. 
896 Geuss 1981, 84. 
897 In her discussion of critical social realism, Sally Haslander (2012, 29) describes social critique as a means to 
challenge ideological binds, in “a process of rethinking the practices that we constitute partly through our 
thinking, of trying out new responses to the world in place of the old responses that have come to seem 
problematic. The task is to situate ourselves differently in the world, not just to describe it more accurately.” 
898 He writes (albeit in a non-committal fashion), “if ideologies exist, it does not seem outrageous to assume that 
analyzing and criticizing them is a reputable task for a political theory.” Geuss 2008, 55  
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discourse, he is similarly interested in how political subjects—reflecting on their own context 
and culturally-historical inheritances—might be transformed through the conscious 
consideration of alternatives.899  Indeed, one might ask what the practical point of doing 
realist theory is if not the attempt to enlighten political subjects (and not just academics) to 
the real limitations of popular sovereignty and to adjust their approach accordingly.  Given 
that realism is not identical with non-ideal theory, i.e. theory which considers feasibility 
constraints and adapts its normative ambitions accordingly, it is not a stretch to suggest that 
realism shares with deliberative theory an attention to the historical conditioning of ideology 
with the aim of confronting, challenging and perhaps even subverting hegemonic patterns of 
thought.900 
 Realistic deliberative theory acknowledges that the mass of political subjects are not 
the movers and shakers when it comes to administrative actions of the state; that political and 
moral disagreement is endemic and likely intractable; and that the results of politics often 
bear at most a tangential relationship to visions of ‘the good.’   That does not mean, however, 
that it is necessarily conservative or complicit in perpetuating the status quo.  Prinz and Rossi 
have recently proposed that realism (properly understood and undertaken) can provide a 
critical standpoint in the vein of immanent critique; one that facilitates the scrutiny of 
normative commitments that supposedly underpin institutions and practices (particularly 
                                                             
899 He associates Habermas with Kant, whom for Geuss represents “what is most wrongheaded and retrograde 
in modern philosophy.”  This seems to be the root of his distaste for the “debased liberalism of Habermas and 
his neo-Kantian ideal speech theory.” (Geuss 2014, 12; 61) 
900 This contestation does not need to suppose that enlightenment involves the remedy of ‘false consciousness’, 
as supposed by some Marxian analyses.  As Sagar (2018, 128) points out, “the term false consciousness is a 
misleading way of engaging the relevant issues.  What is at stake is not truth or falsity but the normative 
acceptability of certain states of belief and attendant understandings of how agents should be and act in given 
social and political structures.”  Deliberative inquiry guided by the insights of realism therefore does not and 
should not aim at the discovery of stable truths, e.g. ‘the true interests of the working class.’   
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those in liberal-democracies).901   Drawing upon the theories of analytic epistemological and 
metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology and social construction, they make a 
compelling case that a critical foothold can be obtained by relying upon epistemic (rather 
than moral) commitments.  Combining diagnosis and critique allows for a realist version of 
ideology critique that is “locally normative, but not normativistic,” meaning that 
 
it allows checking particular claims to authority or legitimising rationales against 
their own aspirations while opening up hermeneutic resources for challenging the 
norms, criteria, valuations on which these aspirations are based.   It challenges the 
conservative bias in current liberal-realist thought and the anti-empirical 
tendencies of ideology critique. Realism as ideology critique in particular seeks to 
be an instrument for agents’ understanding of their political and social order, an 
understanding which may include preference-formation, ideas of the good, a 
hierarchy of values, the parts of the order immunised from the political process.902  
 
 
The idea that reflection on the origins and operations of ideological beliefs can yield a type of 
cognitive (if not democratic) benefit is quintessentially deliberative.903  Indeed, it would be 
rather unrealistic to deny outright that people can change their minds, distance themselves 
from former self-understandings, and subsequently alter the manner in which they engage 
with other members of the political community—propositions that continue to drive 
deliberative energies.  Deliberative realism takes its bearings from the realities of politics 
(e.g. as contestatory, coercive) but this does not mean that it is devoid of imagination or that 
it must forsake attempts to improve the political plight of the many.   For his part, Tully 
                                                             
901 Following Williams (2005, 37) who suggests, “What we are left with, if we reject foundationalism, is not an 
inactive or functionalist conservatism that has to take existing ethical ideas as they stand.  On the contrary, once 
the resultant picture of ethical thought without foundationalism is made historically and socially realistic, in 
particular by registering it in the categories of modernity, it provides a possibility of deploying some parts of it 
against others, and of reinterpreting what is ethically significant, so as to give a critique of existing institutions, 
conceptions, prejudices, and powers.” 
902 Prinz and Rossi 2017, 362.  Sleat (2018, 6-7)  similarly counters the idea that normativity has no place in 
realistic theory, “the ambition is not to develop a political normativity in which all other considerations are 
absent and only properly political considerations (whatever they might be) are deemed salient, but rather one in 
which the nuanced and complex relationship between politics and morality is better understood.” 
903 See Stanley 2015. 
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serves as a reminder that if realists care about legitimation and deny the outright reducibility 
of politics to successful domination (as most all do) they cannot abandon the ‘ought’ in favor 
of the ‘is.’ 904  Instead, and in line with a deliberative perspective, it should be appreciated 
that certain ethical norms are embedded in political practice.  In what follows, I discuss how 
realists might appreciate the normative dimension of deliberative interactions in connection 
to their interest in legitimation. 
 
The Pragmatics of Deliberative Stance-Taking 
One way of redeeming the critical purchase of deliberative realism may be to rethink the 
questions we ask as political theorists.  As Thomas Fossen makes the case, there is a distinct 
relationship between the realist tradition and what he calls the ‘pragmatic turn,’ both of 
which suggest the limits of diagnosing politics through the normativistic approach of moral 
theory.  I’ve discussed difficulties revolving around attempts to identify conditions under 
which political authority is legitimate (e.g. that judgment itself might be an ideological 
product of the system under scrutiny).  An alternative, more pragmatic way of approaching 
this type of analysis may instead be to reflect on what we do when we call political authority 
legitimate or illegitimate.  If legitimacy claims and counterclaims are essentially contestable, 
i.e. “deployed and disputed in political practice,” a performative interpretation of the 
relationship between what is legitimate (de jure) and what is merely taken to be legitimate 
(de facto) may become tractable.905  It also should enable us to avoid a pure descriptivism in 
                                                             
904 Scheuerman (2018, 284) argues that realists, in identifying politics as a distinct domain of life, often risk 
swinging too far in attempting to de-prioritize normative concerns.  He asks, “Can the new realism offer a 
genuinely hard-headed account of politics without succumbing to Schmitt’s hostility to “normativities”? How 
might realists transcend Williams’s failure to ground normativity without embracing a “pure politics,” in which 
the links between politics and morality become even more frayed?” 
905 Fossen 2013,428. 
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which the former is reducible to the latter, which would make impossible the democratic 
confrontation of political subjects and authorities. 
 A pragmatic adjustment suggests how a realist orientation can be used in democratic 
practice.  In particular, it presents the interesting question of how/when citizens can come to 
adopt a deliberative ‘stance.’906   Rather than starting with a comparison of the relation of 
legitimacy claims and specific moral principles, this way of interpreting legitimacy would be 
centered on the perspectives of situated participants engaged in intersubjective inquiry.  
Fossen writes, 
 
the concept of legitimacy has its political point and purpose in the context of 
relations of rule, in which subjects are confronted by, attune themselves to, and 
potentially contest political authority. Politics is conceived as the practice of 
stance-taking between subjects and authorities. This enables us to interpret the 
practical role of ‘legitimacy’ as expressive: to call an authority legitimate or 
illegitimate is to make one’s political stance explicit, which makes it possible to 
dispute stances with others.907  
 
 
This suggests a strategy for dealing with Sleat’s warnings regarding the essential 
contestability involved in legitimation.  In this account, normative concepts can be 
understood as making explicit the “implicit proprieties of practice.”908  Concordant with 
Habermas’ understanding of the pragmatics of language as driven by ethics of discourse, a 
pragmatic approach to legitimation focuses on how implicit norms (embodied in social 
practices, habits, institutions, speech patterns etc.) are made explicit through discursive 
practices and disputations.909  Commitments and the stances of participants are a matter of 
first and second-personal accountability, rather than understood in the abstract as a third-
                                                             
906 Cf. Owen and Smith 2016. 
907 Fossen 428. 
908 Ibid., 433.   
909 Brandom (1994, 649) is especially influential for Fossen’s argument here, as he understands communication 
as the activity in which we “mak[e] explicit the implicit structure characteristic of discursive practice as such.” 
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personal state of affairs.  Political power’s authority is checked by the scrutiny of subjects, 
insofar as attempts to rule affect their “practical horizon.”910  In this sense, a pragmatic-
realist-deliberative orientation to questions of legitimacy underscores the essentially political 
deployment of the concept in social-practical contexts.   
 Understanding legitimation as the practical stance-taking between subjects and 
authorities leaves open subjects’ potential responses to their performative ‘treatment’ as 
responsible agents.  Subjects can recognize the latter’s claim as normative and hence treat 
themselves as responsible, or they can reject it by treating it as an imposition.911  In the 
former case, authority is treated as a ‘source of reasons’ worthy of obligation.  In the latter, 
no such authority is recognized and subjects can withhold attributing the faux-authority an 
entitlement to rule.  Of course, this rejection can take a number of forms, more or less 
subversive, in which the normatively-laden situation and its circumstances determine 
appropriate courses of action (e.g. resistance, self-removal, or reluctant compliance) that vary 
across subjects.  Making one’s stance explicit in political speech and action is motivated by 
the goal of altering such patterns of commitments and entitlements attributed in the 
relationships between subjects and authorities.  This is essentially political, as it involves a 
performative practice in which actors attempt to convince others to “shift their stances and 
rethink their responsibilities” by giving and asking for reasons.912 
 Viewed in its performative dimensions, the making explicit of political stances 
through contested commitments suggests a way in which the pragmatic deployment of 
deliberative realism can retain a critical edge.  It is critical both in terms of the activity of 
persons involved in such contests, as well as indicating the character of the political scene as 
                                                             
910 Fossen 2013, 436. 
911 Ibid., 437. 
912 Ibid., 439. 
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symptomatic of a crisis situation.  Consistent with the refinements in deliberative theory, 
stance-taking is not reducible to conversation.  Other modes of action traditionally 
considered non-deliberative (e.g. “public ridicule or implicit parody of authorities, 
desecration of public symbols, gather and marching in protest, acts of violence”) may be 
suitable for the achievement of deliberative ends.913  Nevertheless, the success of making 
stances known publicly requires that they are comprehensible to others as the activity of 
stance-making.  This suggests that those performative subjects are accountable to other 
members of the political community whom they would persuade to recognize authorities as 
(il)legitimate.  Consequently, interlocutors must be able to provide good reasons (the ‘why?’) 
for their claims.  Although the exercise of political judgment here does not require explicit 
moral knowledge, it does involve making explicit how we relate to authority and concrete 
others, challenging these relations in a civic practice that involves the give and take of 
reasons.914   
 The tricky distinction between de facto and de jure legitimacy exemplifies the more 
general tension between acknowledged and actually-undertaken commitments.  Evaluating 
the appropriateness of political stances involves an ongoing and interminable process, in 
which we distinguish between, “how others represent an authority, what they count as good 
reasons for treating it as entitled to rule, and who they count as its addressees; and on the 
other hand, what one oneself takes to be an adequate representation of that authority, what 
reasons one takes to actually count as good in the present case, and who counts as a subject 
                                                             
913 Ibid., 440.  See Fung 2005; Smith 2016.  
914 It also opens up (a la Dewey) the importance of democratic practice in the absence of moral foundations, 
even though this is not emphasized by most realists like Williams and Guess.  As Festenstein (2016, 46) 
concludes, “Viewing realism through the pragmatist lens reminds us that realists cannot help themselves to 
specific conceptions of the political (as the domain of legitimacy, pathos-laden decision, tragic, conflict-ridden, 
agonistic, a realm of elite action or democratic deliberation) without awareness that this conception is exposed 
to contextual and practical trial.” 
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to that political authority.”915  It is also reflexive on an individual level, in that political 
subjects are often forced to compare those commitments with which “one happens to find 
oneself, and whichever ones one ought to acknowledge.”916  These distinctions make possible 
participants’ interpretation of the value and coherence of their stances and those of the other, 
and allow for the analysis of attributed commitments and entitlements.917  The question of 
which arrangements are legitimate and which are taken to be so represents a permanent and 
irresolvable tension, and is a basic feature of political subjectivity that necessitates critical 
engagement.  Similar to the realist axiom that politics is about the contest of power, a 
pragmatist and socio-perspectival account of legitimation posits that politics is “stance-taking 
all the way down.”918  It is through intersubjective inquiry that these stances are made 
known. 
 This performative understanding of legitimation is one that I argue is compatible with 
the purpose of ideological critique in the realist tradition.  Fossen notes the complementarity 
of his account with the more obviously-political recommendations from Tully.  With the 
latter, he suggests that questions of legitimacy usually involve three basic determinations: 
identity, represented authority, and eventfulness.  First, political contestation of various 
demands and claims are in large part constitutive for our political identities, understood as a 
sense of membership in a political community.  Second, the way in which authority is 
represented affects how relevant terms are applied, which expectations are raised vis-à-vis 
the exercise of authority, confidence in the efficacy of one’s own actions, and the 
                                                             
915 Fossen 2013, 444. 
916 Ibid. 
917 This resonates with the pragmatic understanding of social inquiry from Dewey, in which beliefs and 
judgments are drawn upon in the attempt to resolve problematic situations.  As Putnam (1990, 304) describes it, 
“‘what we have are practices which are right or wrong, depending on how they square with our standards.  And 
our standards are right or wrong depending on how they square with our practices.  This is a circle or, better, a 
spiral’—but a virtuous one.” 
918 Fossen 2013, 445. 
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determination of which stances would therefore be appropriate for subjects to take.919  Third, 
the political situation is shaped by eventfulness.  This is to say that happenings spanning the 
gamut from local immediacy to world-scale history have constitutive and contested 
significance for political stances.920   
These three components can differentially problematize or clarify our understanding 
of the political situation and what it calls for.  Fossen like Tully suggests that the richness of 
the political environment and its contestable interpretations provide normative resources that 
safeguard radically-democratic potentials.  This is plausible because “there is not one way of 
understanding it but many, because the situation is open to a range of possible descriptions 
and framings, and we are held responsible to these ways of understanding, by ourselves and 
by others. To judge politically is not to stand above the fray of competing perspectives, but 
rather involves the ability to navigate different perspectives.”921  In judging of legitimacy, the 
pragmatic-realist turn suggests not just the unsuitability but impossibility of applying 
independently-secured moral knowledge.  Nevertheless, it preserves the place for normativity 
in politics, such that interlocutors share in practices which necessitate giving and asking for 
reasons in the course of examining their commitments.   
 One might say that deliberative practices of stance-taking are means by which we can 
become more realistic; aware of the grounds and extent of conflicting interests, 
commitments, and identities.  The ethos which deliberative practice encourages (e.g. 
practices bound by truthfulness) is therefore not at odds with the permanence of conflict; 
indeed it is through the act of stance-taking that conflict is revealed.  Even if the state’s status 
                                                             
919 For example, if one views liberal-democracy to be farcical as a cover-up for hegemonic patterns of 
oligarchy, this would likely breed more resistant stances and attitudes.   
920 Fossen 2013, 449. 
921 Ibid., 450. 
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of legitimacy is essentially contestable, this underscores the role that discourse plays in 
connection to active, ongoing processes of legitimation.  Understood in this new theoretical 
framework—and premised on the realities of vulnerability, fallibility, and uncertainty—
democratic practices involving mutual engagement and critical discourse can be said to 
infuse politics with deliberative promise.   
 
The Quasi-Sovereign People: Deliberation, Realism, and Democratic Hope 
 
Deliberative realism represents a way of making intelligible our current political experience.  
As I’ve argued, it combines the sobriety of the realist tradition—i.e. the recognition of 
politics as essentially conflictual and rejecting a view of politics as applied ethics/morality—
with the deliberative premiums of critical inquiry and democratic engagements across the 
public sphere.  Habermas’ intellectual development over the last few decades anticipates this 
shared ground between realism and deliberative democracy.  Marrying these traditions allows 
for a reconceptualization of the state’s legitimacy as bound to practices of legitimation (e.g. 
in deliberative stance-taking).  Their union encourages deliberativists to check their ideals 
against the conflict-ridden realities of politics, but also relaxes the realists’ unnecessary 
aversion to a deliberative ethos embedded in political engagements.  This reconciliation, 
rather than extinguishing democratic energies or chastening political aspirations, highlights 
the significance of norm-laden public practices that allow for a collective consideration of 
our political selves and futural commitments. 
 A realist understanding of the mass public’s role in liberal-democracies as quasi-
sovereign highlights the precariousness of the phrase, ‘government by the people.’  With 
Schattschneider, we can understand the structuring of politics to involve the public in the 
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course of determining the contagion of conflict.  Shifting political alignments have important 
implications for the momentum or inertia of various conflicts, and these determine the 
consideration of alternatives in public policy.  Conflict is multi-dimensional here, and politics 
involves the unfolding of both explicit and latent conflicts.  In this sense, competition for 
influence can often entail the ‘conflict of conflicts’ itself, in which contested frames of 
reference run up against one another.  Politics is identifiable as “the socialization of conflict,” 
through which what is private becomes public.922  The terms of conflict that characterize the 
political ‘game’ also determine allowance for entry into the political arena, so that the 
definition of alternatives represents perhaps the most potent tool of political power.   
 Schattschneider and Habermas share a basic starting point when it comes to the 
function of a democratic system and the roles for conflict, competition, leadership, and 
organization.  Reaching popular decisions requires that government and political 
organizations interact with the public and incorporate its support in order to “define the 
alternatives, to organize the discussion and mobilize opinion.”923  Both thinkers recognize the 
contingency of power’s exercise, and Habermas’ discussions of legitimation crises would be 
intimately familiar to Schattschneider, who writes  
    
The most important thing about any democratic regime is the way in which it uses 
and exploits popular sovereignty, what questions it refers to the public for 
decision or guidance, how the alternatives are defined and how it respects the 
limitations of the public…What we need is a movement for the conservation of 
the political resources of the American people.  Above everything, the people are 
powerless if the political enterprise is not competitive.  It is the competition of 
political organizations that provides the people with the opportunity to make a 
choice.  Without this opportunity, popular sovereignty amounts to nothing.924 
 
 
                                                             
922 Schattschneider 1960, 39. 
923 Ibid., 139. 
924 Ibid., 140. 
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I’ve attempted to make the case that the American people’s status as semi-sovereign, which 
would already be taken as a disappointment for many democratic theorists, is itself 
jeopardized by a severe deficit of genuine political competition.  Our quasi-sovereign status 
suggests that the people’s supreme status as the basis of democratic politics is increasingly 
undermined by political realities.  The contemporary ‘problems of the public’ should 
therefore not be underestimated.  As emphasized within the realist tradition, and increasingly 
in deliberative theory as well, politics is characterized by conflict between unequal 
participants.  Expectations that reason should guide policy and decision-making run up 
against the realities of bargaining, hostage-taking, and backroom dealing, such that the 
material interests of the few continuously have legislative priority over those of the many.  
The political parties that are supposed to filter and transmit ‘considered opinions’ bear an 
oblique relationship to their constituencies.  The latter, a vast majority of whom are 
comparatively moderate, nonetheless persists in signaling its electoral allegiance due to the 
polarization of political alternatives.  A combination of these factors have allowed for the rise 
of Trumpism and its yet-to-be-seen consequences for American representation.  The 
attraction and political currency of populist appeals have revealed deep-seated dissatisfaction 
with cultural and economic developments, and a significant degree of ideological confusion 
among a mobilized minority of Americans.  This disarray in itself is suggestive of the 
corrective clarifications that a pivot to a realist understanding of politics can provide. 
 A disintegrating sense of Americanism presents distinct possibilities for theorizing 
citizenship, public opinion, and popular sovereignty.  On the one hand, we can embrace 
something like Schumpeter’s model of democratic politics as analogous to armed conflicts, 
where numbers (and not reasons) carry the day and determine the outcome of the policy 
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process.  Some realists have taken this route, construing the democratic process as providing 
a modus vivendi by which extreme consequences of plurality and disagreement might be 
mitigated.  This retains a place for political identification, in which we relate to those on ‘our 
side’ against political opponents; the terms of the opposition being defined in and through the 
organization of political conflicts.  On the other hand, recognizing democratic deficits in a 
realist fashion might inspire an appreciation of the “functional necessity of distance” between 
elected officials and the governed.  This characterizes a specific relationship of governance 
distinguishable from the electoral connection.925  It also highlights public opinion’s function 
as a siege, guided by well-placed distrust and counterdemocratic practices such as oversight, 
impeachment, and judgment.  In decentering democratic practice, unincorporated agencies 
(e.g. oversight bodies, regulatory agencies) would take on both defensive and offensive roles 
vis-à-vis the state and its administrators.   
 Counter-democracy offers a way of reinterpreting the pursuit of legitimacy on the part 
of ordinary citizens, not only through familiar means like the ballot box but in critically-
discursive and demonstrative practices.  It can be read as an instantiating a “realistic positive 
theory of democracy,’’ that is realistic in acknowledging the distance between governors and 
the governed but positive in pointing to the way toward an “effective social reappropriation 
of power.”926  It provides a means of avoiding the extremes of democratic swings, between 
hope and disillusionment/despair, fleeting moments of commitment and longer periods of 
withdrawal.  It also is realistic in acknowledging the insufficiency of separating institutional 
powers—instead emphasizing the real struggle between majoritarian powers and the 
devolved, counterdemocratic currents on the periphery.  The argument is not that the former 
                                                             
925 Rosanvallon 2011, 220. 
926 Ibid. 
 314 
can or should be abandoned, but that traditional mechanisms of representation and decision-
making are insufficient in terms of balancing the democratic goods of conflict and 
cooperation.  Re-politicizing politics requires bolstering democratic regulation, which is 
largely procedural, but also attending to the substantive construction of democratic regimes 
and the continual remaking of political society.  As Dewey put it, “to form itself, the public 
has to break existing political forms,” and in order to do so it might have to go beyond 
discussion; taking up courses of action that are “buoyant, crusading, and militant.”927  A 
realist approach to deliberative practice anticipates that coercive means can serve democratic 
ends when used to “provoke rather than resolve democratic inquiry,” even in the face of 
engrained habits, ideological commitments, and the subtle influence of institutions that 
inhibit public reflection on public problems.928 
 Public opinion’s ability to siege upon the center of the political system becomes 
especially salient in times of crisis.  Normally, the core of the political system operates 
according to routine.  “Courts deliver judgments, bureaucracies prepare laws and process 
applications, parliaments pass laws and budgets, party headquarters conduct electoral 
campaigns, clients exert influence on ‘their’ administrations—and all these processes follow 
established patterns.”929  The critical potential of Habermas’ discourse model of democratic 
politics concerns the decisive question of “which power constellations these patterns reflect 
and how the latter can be changed.”  The normative issue is whether such routines remain 
open to renovating impulses on the periphery, so that in cases of conflict the normal 
operations of politics give way to widely-inclusive processes.  These would be characterized 
by “a consciousness of crisis, a heightened public attention, an intensified search for 
                                                             
927 Dewey 1927, 30-1; 1937, 11. 
928 Livingston 2017, 523. 
929 Habermas 1996, 357 
 315 
solutions, in short, by problematization.”930  Of course, the effectiveness of this 
problematization in the assignment of political responsibility is contingent upon the 
communicative transmission mechanisms (or what Habermas calls ‘sluices’) that are meant 
to connect distinct spheres across the system.  Legislative and judicial institutions are 
therefore indispensable even in critical moments, so that the ability of publics to disrupt the 
exercise of power is itself dependent upon functional structural arrangements that resist 
popular control.  This entails that the democratic instruments and organizations needed for an 
effective ‘siege’ would have to be developed from the bottom-up and over time; often 
without the sanction of the administrative power complex. 
 Deliberative and realist theories both bear upon the relevance of utopian energies in 
contemporary politics.  Habermas is realistic in asking himself “how a radically democratic 
republic might even be conceived today,” given that the meaning of legitimacy has taken a 
new form in the abstraction of popular sovereignty.931  The distinction between 
communicatively generated power and administratively employed power points to the 
tension between opinion formed spontaneously in autonomous public spheres and the 
strategic extraction of mass loyalty on the part of the political system.  The nuance of the 
realistic deliberative position suggests that while the assumption of an unsubverted political 
public sphere is indeed unrealistic, its pursuit is not utopian in a pejorative sense.932  The 
revitalization of a critical public sphere would require the development of opinion-formation 
associations, whose visibility would influence the spectrum of values, issues, and reasons 
that are unleashed, filtered, and channeled by mass media, unions, associations, and parties.  
The development, reproduction, and effective influence of this network would depend on a 
                                                             
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid., 471. 
932 Ibid., 488. 
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“liberal-egalitarian political culture sensitive to problems affecting society as a whole—a 
culture that is even jumpy or in a constant state of vibration, and thus responsive.”933  This 
represents the desublimation of popular sovereignty, and underscores the promise of 
communicative power while noting its contingency upon socio-cultural dynamics and the 
comparatively dominant influence of economic and political steering powers. 
 The feedback between “informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society” is 
said to be a prerequisite for the legitimacy of deliberative systems.934  This feedback is 
enabled primarily through structural and legal rules in liberal-democratic states, such as the 
freedom of the press and constitutional protections for an open civil society.  In the absence 
or severe deficiency of such feedback, however, there are good reasons to suspect that the 
constitutional order cannot of itself be said to enable the exercise of self-determination by 
free and equal citizens.  Given that the rule of law (constitutionalism) and democracy 
(popular sovereignty) are supposed to be equiprimordial in deliberative politics, this raises 
practical questions about the place of the subject facing a regime with dubious legitimacy.935  
The challenge is to imagine, design, and implement generalizable practices that might foster 
citizens’ capacities to scrutinize, monitor, judge, mobilize, do and somehow hold accountable 
those authorities who actively shape public opinion in the course of their decision-making. 
As I’ve suggested, a role for critique and performative stance-taking are required for 
deliberation to maintain its political edge in the disclosure and confrontation of power 
structures.   
 Democratic remedies are not going to come from the internal corrections of the 
political system itself, especially in light of the hegemony of dominant steering forces.  
                                                             
933 Ibid. 
934 Habermas 2006, 412. 
935 Habermas 1996, Ch.3-4. 
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Articulations of public opinions will have to be filtered and translated into “the official public 
problem language of the liberal public sphere” if they are to be effective in terms of political 
influence.  That said, it is crucial that distance is cultivated and maintained between the 
informal and formal spheres, so as to allow the governed to monitor and critique those that 
govern.  In encouraging the redemption of the critical liberal approach, of which deliberation 
is a sub-species, Tully writes, 
 
The critical public problems and their underlying ethical practices have their 
greatest influence and effectiveness outside the official channels of the liberal 
public sphere.  The citizens engaged in them change the world directly by 
changing their lifestyles and the relationships that govern their conduct in their 
everyday activities.  These practices in the ethical public sphere then provide the 
resources for engagement in democratic public sphere communication and action.  
In engaging in ethical and democratic public spheres, citizens work in, on (by 
negotiation), and around the limits of the liberal public sphere.936 
 
 
In many ways, this coheres with Dewey’s understanding of public politics’ rootedness in 
ethical engagements between actual citizens.  Reading public opinion as constituted by 
communicated “results of social inquiry” suggests that a central problem of the public 
remains “the improvement of methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion.”937   As I’ve argued above, being realistic in our assessment of deliberative 
practice does not entail abandoning an ethics of truthfulness or reasonableness, nor 
succumbing to the debilitating notion that politics is purely about power and successful 
domination.  If “part of what politics is about is that we wish to be and live as people of a 
certain kind,” there is still a normatively significant role for criticism as action-oriented and 
orienting.938  The ethos of critique entails a “set of attitudes, habits, and practices connected 
                                                             
936 Tully 2013, 195. 
937 Dewey 208 
938 Geuss 2010, 41; Prinz 2016, 779. 
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with continual criticism and self-criticism, and in general an openness to new experience.”939  
While a melancholic mood may be tempting in the turbulence of contemporary politics, 
maintaining a stubborn belief in a place for truth in politics can instruct practice and help 
avoid “the defeatist surrender of the radical content of democratic ideals.”940  Radical 
experimentation in social-scientific inquiry is only viable, however, in the event that 
democratic subjects are invested and adequately equipped to disrupt the very status quo that 
so often serves to enervate and anaesthetize would-be participants. 
 In light of the conflictual, inegalitarian, and often absurd state of politics in the U.S. 
and other western democracies, it might seem that political theory is increasingly out of 
touch.  The world of politics is neither pretty nor fair.  Most of us try to avoid it and those 
that do get involved—which requires a willingness to dirty one’s hands—likely won’t get 
what they want out of it.  As Dunn points out, “politics is always a site of danger for human 
beings, and the experience of politics, for all but the most egotistical and resilient, will 
always be somewhat irritating and in the end all but invariably disappointing.”941  This 
dissertation has attempted to persuade the reader that the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic 
regime must be traced to the effective exercise of popular sovereignty, and that the latter is 
intelligible only in the event that popular discourse proves effective in influencing the 
political process and its outcomes.  The quality of discourse and the opinion-forming 
processes themselves depend on patterns of socialization—taking place through familial, 
associational, and civic life—through which a distinct political culture can be said to take 
shape.  A realistic approach to deliberative theory would take its starting point from our 
actual circumstances, but would not therefore forgo the consideration and pursuit of 
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alternative political possibilities given the contingency of social-political arrangements and 
their accompanying conceptual frames.942   
 One of the dominant themes throughout this project has been the place of the people 
in contemporary American politics.  I’ve made the case that social-scientific and political-
philosophic inquiry can be redeemed in terms of their democratic service to the public, but 
only insofar as they take as their starting point the real difficulties facing the deployment of 
popular sovereignty in modern times.   The end result is that invocations of ‘the will of the 
people’ most always conceal real socio-political facts of division, confusion, and general 
disarray.  Nevertheless, deliberative theory continues to represent a promising way of 
reckoning with the disparities between political facts and norms.  Habermas has occupied a 
central role in my diagnosis here, by virtue of his sensitivity to the practical limitations of 
politics but also to the necessary normative dimensions of political relationships and 
discursive practices.  His stubborn dedication to the idea that truth has a place in democratic 
life, and can only be found out through communicative processes connecting the ordinary 
world of citizens and the bureaucratic world of the political system, should serve to inspire an 
interdisciplinary approach to public opinion studies.  One might well say that the difficulties 
of measuring and evaluating democratic systems today involves a return to the content of our 
expectations as scholars, but more importantly as political subjects.  Put succinctly, “What 
we mean by democracy depends on the forms of communication by which we conduct 
politics. What we mean by communication depends on central impulses and aspirations of 
                                                             
942 Prinz (2016, 787) describes the ‘radicalization’ of realism to involve a central place for political imagination.  
“Political theory should focus on the actual, but should view it through the orientation toward the possible in 
order to connect to the possibility of thinking and acting differently, i.e. to the criticism and the transformation 
of the actual.” 
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democratic politics. What we mean by public opinion depends on both.”943  It is no 
coincidence the elusiveness of public opinion—in both measurement and theorization—has 
continued to serve as a source of deep frustration in academia and political society.  I’ve 
made the case here, however, that its continued role in both the imagination and in the 
practices of collective life is sufficient reason to maintain democratic hopes even in the 
darkest of political realities. 
 Hope, however, is not the same as blind optimism, or the type of ‘wishful thinking’ 
that realists rightly hold to be antithetical to intellectual honesty and rigor.  Responsible 
political theorists, especially those driven to imagine the redemption of democratic hopes in 
practice, should resist the urge to tell their readers ‘something pretty’ when it comes to 
describing the political status quo.  The complex factors and developments that have led to 
this point of our political history defy attempts to hang our problems on a political figure, 
party, demographic, public policy, or institution.  Deliberation represents a response to the 
diverse facets that together characterize life in post-modernity, and attempts to re-imagine 
how democracy might be cultivated and enlivened despite itself.  It seizes upon the 
suggestion that popular sovereignty has more potential to be realized at this point than has 
ever hitherto been the case, given comparatively rapid changes—material and ideational—
which have transformed how we live and understand ourselves.  
My proposal is that a realistic and mature approach to deliberation must take as its 
starting point not only the ‘good’ that has come with modernization, but also the trends of 
social and philosophical destabilization that represent its flip side.  A realist approach to 
deliberation emphasizes that the contingencies of our social and political life are indicative of 
the potential for radical transformations in the collective exercise of political authority and 
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the reconstruction of human relationships.  On the other hand, these same contingencies and 
the disruption of pre-given meanings undermine a trust in linear progress and the guarantee 
of mankind’s moral/intellectual development.   What is constructed can be deconstructed; 
that which was once sacred is today profaned.  This holds not only for institutions and 
customs that come to be seen as unproductive or unjust, but also those that were once thought 
to be natural, self-evident or in accordance with human flourishing.  The imaginative 
capacity to ‘think differently’ may therefore not only work to counteract prejudices and 
deceits, but can also disorient and antagonize subjects who must nevertheless find their way 
in the world.  Deliberative democracy encourages a way of navigating this new terrain in 
such a way that the depth of conflict and disagreement is revealed rather than obscured.  This 
uncovering, rather than precluding potentials for collective political action, is rather 
necessary if members of liberal-democracies are to exercise self-determination and 
effectively address problems of common concern. 
Answering the question of ‘What is to be done?’ on the part of the many living in 
liberal-democracies depends on our attitudes towards the scope and purpose of politics.  
Though I’ve suggested extant institutional mechanisms of reform are unlikely to get at the 
deeper issues that together signal the people’s status as quasi-sovereign, this does not entail a 
defeatist strand of pessimism.  Rather, in focusing on our actual situation, a realistic 
deliberative outlook can help orient us to the possible.  As Nietzsche encourages those of us 
who would respond to disappointment with inaction or despair, "It is a measure of the degree 
of strength of will to what extent one can without meaning in things, to what extent one can 
endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of it oneself.”944  
Even lacking metaphysical foundations, politics—broadly construed to encompass outlooks, 
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institutions, practices, and relationships—plays a formative role in shaping our ethical 
dispositions.  A deliberative political culture would be a demanding one, requiring shared 
reflection on our ethical commitments and the relative priority of moral considerations in 
ever-changing circumstances.  It would challenge participants to revisit their self-conceptions 
and values in expressive engagements with others, which would require exposure to the 
unfamiliar, uncertain, and uncomfortable.  Serving to reveal alterity and deep disagreements, 
members of diverse publics might come to see the respectability of their differences or even 
the misunderstandings that made such oppositions unnecessary.  This might breed shifts in 
allegiances, reformed coalitions, and a greater demand for political competition in the 
political process.  On the other hand, these revelations might breed an invidious sense of 
unshared solidarity, serving to exacerbate political antagonisms, ossify political blocs, and 
frustrate the pursuit of political projects.  Deliberation therefore represents a risky enterprise, 
but it is for that reason that it carries the potential to illuminate who we are as ‘a people’ and 
inspire a reimagination of that which we might become.  Its achievement is by no means 
guaranteed, and I’ve enumerated the real reasons for doubting its fulfillment in light of 
current empirical realities.  The sustainability of the democratic hope to which I’ve paid 
tribute depends on our willingness to engage one another on hard questions lacking easy 
answers, to reflect on the basis and extent of our political obligations, and to reconstruct 
ourselves accordingly.   
As a former statesman once said, the way of successfully dealing with 
disappointments and entrenched opposition is not to hang up one’s gloves in resignation.  
Instead, the response has to be to push forward “with a certain infectious and relentless 
optimism…Not blind optimism, not one that ignores the scale and scope of our challenges, 
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but that hard-earned optimism, that's rooted in the stories of very real progress that have 
occurred throughout human history."  It is only because we have long dreamt of achieving 
democracy that we are discontented, if not distraught, by the distance yet to be traversed.  
Navigating the long road ahead is daunting, but this makes the steps we take as individuals in 
our immediate circumstances all the more important in the deployment of popular 
sovereignty.  Collective self-governance begins with individual self-governance, and the 
deliberative quality of our politics will inevitably depend on the conduct of individuals in the 
active exercise of their situated judgment.  Time will tell whether the American demos—in 
the face of unequal standings and conflicting worldviews—is willing and able to embrace the 
challenges that pursing a deliberative political culture entails. 
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